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Abstract 
As a middle-income country, South Africa’s high poverty rate remains a serious concern and 
has been at the centre of policy debates for over a decade now. Since poverty is inextricably 
linked to the labour market, labour market policies often top the list of proposed 
interventions. While several types of labour market policies are arguably appropriate, this 
analysis is particularly concerned with two ‘wage-based’ labour market policy options, 
namely minimum wages and wage subsidies. The poverty-reducing potential of these policy 
options are unclear, and depend on a wide range of factors including, but not limited to, the 
wage elasticity of labour demand, the targeting of the policy, and the way in which wage or 
employment gains and losses are distributed among individuals and households under each 
of these policies. The complexity of the issue warrants the use of a suite of ex ante models 
that capture economy-wide direct and indirect effects as well as the micro-level poverty and 
distributional effects in a satisfactory manner. In this study, general equilibrium, micro-
incidence and micro-simulation models for South Africa are developed and linked in a 
consistent, sequential manner to form a comprehensive macro-micro modelling framework 
that allows for such detailed explorations.   
This study adds value to the South African literature on labour market policy evaluation and 
their poverty impacts in general, and minimum wages and wage subsidies in particular, both 
in terms of the theoretical and descriptive analyses provided. Various possible modelling 
approaches are explored, with careful consideration of the advantages and limitations of 
each. A rich set of model results is also generated. Under both the policies evaluated, the 
poverty outcome is shown to generally be positive but small. Furthermore, the outcome is 
highly sensitive to the wage elasticity of demand: while minimum wages tend to be more 
effective in reducing poverty when the wage elasticity is low, wage subsidies generate 
superior outcomes under a high wage elasticity scenario.  
However, there are at least three other factors to consider as well. Firstly, both policies have 
important implications for consumer prices and household incomes, which from a welfare 
perspective cannot be ignored. Secondly, assumptions about how gains and losses are 
distributed in the micro-modelling frameworks greatly influence results. Thirdly, various 
external factors, such as ‘efficiency wage effects’ under a minimum wage policy or 
alternative financing options for a wage subsidy programme, are important considerations. 
The policy analyses provided in this study contribute to the debates around these and other 
policy questions, and ultimately facilitate the process of designing appropriate policies.
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
outh Africa is officially classified by the World Bank as an upper middle-income 
country. Certainly, as measured by its per capita income, the average South African 
citizen is well-off compared to international standards for developing countries, and 
especially those in Sub-Saharan Africa.1 However, the economy is also characterised by 
extreme degrees of inequality in the distribution of income, assets and opportunities. Past 
discriminatory policies have left a large proportion of the population outside the economic 
mainstream and poor, especially when compared to an elite minority. Since 1994, one of the 
democratically elected government’s key policy goals has been to address these economic 
and socio-economic disparities.  
Depending on the choice of the poverty line and the data used, estimates for South Africa 
suggest that between 45 and 55 per cent of the population are poor (see for example 
Hoogeveen and Özler, 2004, May, 1998, Taylor, 2002, Van der Berg et al., 2005, Woolard 
and Leibbrandt, 2001). Of these poor, about half are said to be in extreme or abject poverty. 
These poverty rates remain unacceptably high and stubbornly so; evidence suggests that 
poverty rates have generally stayed the same or even increased marginally between 1995 and 
2000. It is only since 2000 that poverty rates appear to have declined, thanks in part to 
moderate economic growth and a strong employment performance (Van der Berg et al., 
2005). Although it is too early to tell, the recent slowdown of the world economy and the 
potential adverse effects this may have on domestic growth and employment may once again 
bring an end to the period of declining poverty, unless appropriate policy interventions are 
adopted.  
Rapid  real increases in welfare transfer payments to poor households between 2001 and 2006 
have also played an important role in reducing poverty (Van der Berg et al., 2005). However, 
this has meant an increased reliance on welfare transfers as a source of income among the 
poor in particular.2 Estimates suggest that up to one-quarter of households in South Africa 
                                                 
1
  The most recent Human Development Report 2007/2008 estimates South Africa’s per capita income at 
around US $11 000 (2005 prices) when converted at purchasing power parity rates (UNDP, 2007). 
2
  Most types of welfare transfer payments are means-tested in South Africa and hence explicitly target 
low-income individuals and households.  
S 
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relies on welfare grants for part or all of their income. These grant recipient households are 
home to about 30 per cent of the population (Pauw and Mncube, 2007). When bearing in 
mind that the share of registered (individual) taxpayers is probably only about half that, it is 
clear why many feel the current situation is financially untenable.3 In light of evidence now 
emerging suggesting that much of the increased welfare spending between 2001 and 2006 
was made possible by a better than expected revenue performance, former Minister of 
Finance, Trevor Manuel, recently stated that “the poor could not be taken care of on the basis 
of tax overruns” (see Daniels, 2006).  
Given the political transition in South Africa, the immediate future of traditional welfare 
mechanisms as a tool for fighting poverty is somewhat uncertain.4 Officially, though, the 
African National Congress (ANC) government, in power since 1994, has long held the view 
that able-bodied adults should “enjoy the opportunity, the dignity and the rewards of work” 
rather than rely on welfare assistance (Matisonn and Seekings, 2001). Until fairly recently the 
policy rhetoric has indicated a stronger focus in the future on what could be considered ‘more 
sustainable’ approaches to relieving poverty, with labour market-based policies coming to the 
fore as a favoured alternative to expanded social security programmes. A confirmation of this 
came from former President Thabo Mbeki in his last State of the Nation Address, where he 
spoke of the “elaboration of an integrated and comprehensive anti-poverty strategy”. Key 
interventions of this initiative of The Presidency include (among other things) expanding the 
public works programme, using employment subsidies for direct job-creation for targeted 
groups, enhancing employment search capability, and improving on education and training 
initiatives (Mbeki, 2008).5 
It is within this context that investigations into the poverty effects of labour market policies 
are particularly relevant in South Africa. Such analyses require an understanding of the 
poverty milieu and its relation to the labour market. It also requires an understanding of the 
functioning and features of the labour market itself. There is a vast South African literature 
on the extent, trends and nature of poverty in this country, some of which is drawn on in 
Chapter 2 and the Appendix. What is very evident from this body of knowledge and the 
survey data analysed in Chapter 2 is that poverty is inextricably linked to the labour market. 
                                                 
3
  The South African Revenue Services (SARS) reports that there approximately 7 million registered 
taxpayers in South Africa in 2007/8 (see www.sars.gov.za), while Statistics South Africa estimates the 
population at about 48.7 million (2008 mid-year population estimates; see www.statssa.gov.za). This 
implies that only about 14.3 per cent of South Africans pay personal income taxes.  
4
  Elections were held in April 2009 and saw the election of Jacob Zuma as a more populist and seemingly 
leftist president than his predecessor, Thabo Mbeki.  
5
  Thabo Mbeki also made reference to ‘specific interventions in poor households’ (presumably with 
reference to welfare transfers, which some interpreted as indications of an imminent basic income grant), 
as well as improving services and assets among poor communities and ensuring effectiveness of 
institutions supporting women and other sectors.  
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A key determinant of the poverty status of a household, and by extension its household 
members, is the ability of its members to find employment, or perhaps more importantly, to 
find quality employment that offers a reasonable wage. Most analysts of poverty in this 
country agree that labour market outcomes lie at the heart of the poverty situation. As a 
result, labour market policy will always be considered “a potentially powerful tool in the 
battle to eradicate poverty and inequality” (Maziya, 2001:218).  
The economic justifications for favouring labour market policies over other forms of 
intervention such as welfare grants are obvious. Labour market policies are considered more 
sustainable than welfare grants since they reward people for being in employment where they 
can make a meaningful contribution to the economic production. Furthermore, policies that 
actively raise employment levels also ensure that workers are acquiring skills and experience 
that will enhance their employment prospects and productivity levels in the future (see 
Kingdon and Knight, 2000). There are also numerous positive socio-economic externalities 
associated with having a job that offers a decent wage as opposed to not having this privilege 
and having to rely on welfare transfers or remittances. 
There are, however, some caveats. Firstly, labour market policies may only be effective when 
designed and implemented correctly. It is unlikely that a particular labour market intervention 
would provide a blanket solution to all kinds of unemployment or under-employment. From 
this perspective it is important to understand what has contributed to the high levels of 
unemployment observed in South Africa today, as this will be crucial in forming appropriate 
labour market policies. Secondly, labour market policies should also not be seen as the only 
or even the main instruments for eradicating poverty. Many of the poor have very weak 
linkages with the formal economy or cannot be gainfully inserted into the labour market in 
the short run. These people may still require some form of direct assistance (Taylor, 2002, 
Torres et al., 2000). Labour market policies may therefore be most effective as part of a suite 
of anti-poverty policies.  
The kind of labour market policies required to address poverty may, in many respects, seem 
self-evident: the analysis of the labour market features in Chapter 2 will point out that more 
and better-paying jobs are needed. In the long run this means creating an economic 
environment that is conducive to growth in labour demand, particularly demand for low-
skilled workers, while at the same time addressing some of the structural supply-side issues 
in the labour market through investments in training and education (many of these issues are 
highlighted in the same chapter).  
In the short run, however, these policies may need to be complemented by a variety of 
temporary interventions, many of which fall in the realm of ‘active labour market policies’. 
Active labour market policies aim to increase participation in the labour market and/or lower 
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unemployment levels through measures that directly affect employment demand and supply 
in the short run.6 This study focuses on such short-term interventions and their ability to 
make inroads into poverty in the short-run.  
Public investments in labour intensive industries or public works-type programmes represent 
one strand of active labour market policies that operate from the demand side. The South 
African government’s flagship job creation initiative, the Expanded Public Works 
Programme (EPWP), is one such example of a direct or active labour market policy aimed at 
temporarily increasing the number of low-skilled jobs while simultaneously transferring skills 
to participants (see McCord, 2008, for a review of the EPWP). The argument is that any skills 
acquired would improve participants’ chances of finding employment after completion of the 
programme. Supply-side active labour market policies may include employment services 
such as job search assistance or vocational training either offered through public institutions 
or subsidised by government.  
Another type of active labour market policy is a wage subsidy. Wage subsidies are unique in 
that they can be designed to operate from either the supply- or the demand-side. As a supply-
side policy the subsidy is offered to workers, i.e., the worker’s wage is supplemented directly 
while the firm still pays the original wage. The aim is to boost labour supply and hence such 
a policy would typically be used in economies faced with labour shortages or where high 
reservation wages act as a deterrent to people to enter the labour market. Traditionally, 
however, and particularly in a developing country context where unemployment is a problem, 
wage subsidies operate from the demand-side whereby the wage faced by employer is 
subsidised by government while employees’ wages remain the same. Wage subsidy 
programmes may also be combined with supply-side job search assistance or training 
programmes. Alternatively, training may be offered by the firm as part of the employment 
contract. Wage subsidies have been proposed for South Africa on several occasions. Most 
recently a youth-targeted wage subsidy was strongly endorsed by the International Panel on 
Growth in South Africa (popularly referred to as the Harvard Group) (see Levinsohn, 2008).  
Although not strictly an active labour market policy, minimum wages also represent a form 
of policy that intervenes directly in the wage-employment relationship. Since such a policy 
raises average wages in the economy, which benefits some, there is also the risk of job losses. 
Despite these adverse effects, these policies are nevertheless justified on the grounds of 
fairness and equity at the workplace. Proponents of minimum wages may also argue that they 
reduce poverty among the working poor and their families. The potential of minimum wages 
                                                 
6
  Unemployment insurance is an example of a passive labour market policy. Often, however, active and 
passive policies are integrated (see Smith, 2006); for example, unemployment insurance may only be 
available to persons who actively seek for work, attend job training seminars or are registered with local 
employment offices who provide job search assistance.  
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to reduce poverty is both a relevant and interesting theoretical question, especially given the 
uncertainty about the extent to which the adverse employment effects of these types of 
policies counter the positive income effects for those that remain employed. The popularity of 
minimum wages stems in part from the fact that these policies have the potential to address 
equity and poverty issues without requiring any major financial commitment from 
government. As far as this country is concerned, minimum wages were introduced between 
2002 and 2006 and form part of general guidelines and conditions of employment as set out 
in several so-called ‘sectoral determinations’. In total, thirteen economic sectors are covered 
by minimum wage legislation. This mostly includes those sectors or subsectors where 
workers do not enjoy representation at formal wage bargaining councils.     
The aim of this study is to do an in-depth analysis of the poverty and distributional impacts of 
minimum wages and wage subsidies. The decision to focus on minimum wages and wage 
subsidies in particular is not necessarily a reflection of a preference for these two particular 
policies over and above other labour market policy options, but rather reflects the fact that (a) 
both are ‘wage-based’ policies in that they use wages as the primary policy tool, and (b) 
despite their fundamental differences, both seemingly have merits as anti-poverty strategies 
for South Africa.  
While the precise workings of these policies are discussed in detail in Chapter 3, it should be 
clear that the first major difference between wage subsidies and minimum wages is in terms 
of the direction of the wage change. Minimum wages address poverty among low-wage 
workers directly, albeit at the risk of aggravating unemployment. Wage subsidies, on the 
other hand, address the poverty problem indirectly by lowering unemployment. It therefore 
addresses a key labour market failure in the country, but it may come at a considerable cost to 
taxpayers.7 In both instances the extent of the employment effects – and ultimately the 
success of the policy – is dependent to a large extent on the wage elasticity of labour demand, 
i.e., the responsiveness of employment levels to changes in the wage. If the wage elasticity is 
low, minimum wages arguably have a better chance at success, while high wage elasticities 
are required for a wage subsidy to have significant employment and poverty effects.  
A second major difference between these two wage-based policies is in terms of their 
‘macroeconomic’ or economy-wide effects.8 The fact that wage subsidies involve a 
                                                 
7
  This distinction between the two policies is important. Although the rationale of a policy intervention is 
usually to correct a labour market failure, minimum wages, in contrast to wage subsidies, are likely to 
aggravate the labour market failure of unemployment. For that reason it is often dismissed as an 
inappropriate policy in a labour-surplus economy. However, from a different perspective, minimum 
wages addresses the failure of the labour market in ensuring (a) that workers enjoy a life free of poverty, 
(b) that wages are equitably distributed, and (c) that basic conditions of employment are met.  
8
  The terms ‘macroeconomic effects’ and ‘economy-wide effects’ are often used interchangeably, although 
the latter is preferred among general equilibrium modelers as it better captures the notion of ‘direct and 
indirect effects’ at both macro and micro levels.    
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substantial financial contribution by government already means that the dynamics of this 
programme will be very different from a minimum wage policy where financing is raised 
‘internally’ through factor market substitution effects at the firm level (see discussions in 
Chapter 3).  
The aim of this study is not necessarily to compare minimum wages and wage subsidies in 
terms of their poverty-reducing effects and to then, on the basis of that comparison, make 
suggestions as to which is a better alternative. What the study does focus on is the uncertainty 
surrounding the poverty effects of each policy option, particularly with regards to the nature 
of the wage employment relationship, the linkages between labour markets and (poor) 
households, and the economy-wide implications of each policy. In terms of the latter, the 
specific interest lies in understanding the indirect demand and price effects and the role of 
government as financier of the chosen policy. Such an extensive analysis requires a suitable 
modelling framework that captures the complexities of the policy impacts in a satisfactory 
manner. 
Analyses of labour market policy impacts are often ex post in nature in the sense that they use 
historical data on wages, employment and poverty sampled during a period in which a certain 
labour market intervention was introduced. By exploring the complex relationships between 
these and other dependent and independent variables in an econometric framework it is 
sometimes possible to identify any structural breaks in these relationships occurring during 
the period after the policy intervention. Bourguignon and Ferreira (2003:1) note that such ex 
post evaluations are essential for assessing the true impacts of current policies and 
programmes, but there are many instances in which policymakers would “value the ability to 
simulate ex ante the effects of alternative reforms in existing policies and programmes, or 
indeed the introduction of entirely new ones”. In another paper Bourguignon and Spadaro 
(2005:78) argue that an ex post approach is often “too cumbersome, costly and time-
consuming for real-time policy analysis”.  
The South African literature on poverty and labour market policies almost exclusively 
follows the ex post tradition (see for example the compilations of leading articles in Bhorat 
and Kanbur, 2006b, Bhorat et al., 2001, and May, 2000). The aim in this study is to develop 
an ex ante modelling framework that can be applied broadly to the analysis of the poverty 
effects of development policies, and specifically (in the applications in this study) to labour 
market policies. In contrast to ex post analyses that aim to test theory or hypotheses, ex ante 
analyses employ simulation models that rely on theoretical assumptions about how agents 
respond to changes in, say, wages, prices or subsidies to arrive at a likely set of outcomes. 
These outcomes or model results, also called the counterfactual data, can then be compared 
against ‘base data’, which represents the initial state of the economy. Model results are 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Chapter 1: Introduction 
7 
therefore presented in terms of the changes in key model variables relative to their base 
values.  
Although described as forward-looking, ex ante models should not be viewed as predictive 
tools; rather, they are policy tools that are used to evaluate the impact of specific policy 
shocks under specific behavioural conditions and assumptions about how agents in the 
economy interact and respond to economic shocks. As such, ex ante models are very different 
from ex post econometric analyses or forecasting models. However, ex post and ex ante 
modelling approaches should not be seen as competing approaches; in fact, they are to a large 
extent complementary, partly in the sense that econometric evidence is frequently used to 
define some of the behavioural relationships in ex ante models, and partly because they 
essentially entail different but equally appropriate approaches to evaluating economic 
problems.9  
There are several ex ante modelling approaches that are appropriate for analysing the poverty 
effects of labour market policies. Chapter 4 reviews these modelling approaches in detail. 
The clear message from this review is that different modelling approaches have different 
strengths and weaknesses, and there is no single modelling approach that is superior in all 
respects. For example, a micro-focused partial equilibrium approach permits careful analysis 
of labour market-household linkages at the individual level, but neglects the economy-wide 
effects of policies. In contrast, a general equilibrium framework better captures the economy-
wide effects of policies, but is less suited for poverty analyses at the micro-level. We 
therefore attempt to discover in this study whether the use of both these modelling 
approaches in an integrated or sequential framework is the appropriate way forward in 
evaluating the poverty implications of labour market policies in South Africa. 
A consideration of the ‘traditional’ uses of partial and general equilibrium models is 
warranted at this point. Usually the type of policy simulated influences the choice of model. 
Traditionally, therefore, microeconomic policies (such as government welfare spending, 
labour market policies, and so on) that have income redistribution and poverty reduction as 
primary policy goals are evaluated in micro-models. Such models are typically calibrated 
with micro-survey data observed at the individual or household level.  
Micro-analyses can be simple ‘accounting exercises’ in the mould of incidence analysis-type 
studies, or they can incorporate some form of behavioural response by individuals or 
households (Bourguignon and Pereira da Silva, 2003). The behavioural models are referred to 
                                                 
9
  The term ‘behavioural’ is used throughout this thesis to refer to microeconomic models of consumer or 
firm behavior, i.e. those that define how these agents might respond to relative price or income changes. 
This is not a reference to ‘behavioural economics’, which is distinct field in modern economics.   
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as micro-simulation models.10 Depending on the topic of study, behavioural responses may 
include decisions about school attendance, changes in the formation of households, changes 
in households’ savings propensities or expenditure patterns, and so on. In the context of 
labour market analyses, micro-simulation refers to models of labour market behaviour as 
studied in the occupational choice-type models of labour market participation, employment 
prospects, and the earnings potential of individuals. A shortcoming of these micro-simulation 
or micro-incidence models is that they are almost exclusively partial equilibrium models, 
which means any economy-wide effects of policy changes are unaccounted for.   
Macroeconomic policy impacts, in turn, are traditionally evaluated in a general equilibrium 
modelling framework that captures the important economy-wide effects of policies, including 
the indirect price effects, consumption demand effects, employment effects and financing 
implications. General equilibrium models further permit modellers to explicitly consider 
responses or actions by government and countries’ international trading partners. However, 
just as macroeconomic policies have direct and indirect economy-wide effects, there is also 
an increased awareness of the potentially important economy-wide impacts of 
microeconomic policies. Even the more elaborate micro-simulation analyses that incorporate 
behavioural responses are still partial equilibrium models that only account for first round 
effects of policies, thus ignoring any further downstream effects on the rest of the economy.  
This is an important limitation, especially in instances where microeconomic policies have 
significant impacts on the spending capacity of beneficiaries (an argument raised by 
minimum wage proponents) or where large-scale financial involvement by government is 
required (such as in the case of wage subsidies). Where the economy-wide or macroeconomic 
effects of microeconomic policies can no longer be ignored, the use of general equilibrium 
models is therefore warranted.  
Fortunately, with the growing interest in understanding the micro-level distributional 
implications of macroeconomic policy shocks, general equilibrium models now capture 
information at a much more disaggregated level than in the past. Bourguignon et al. 
(2002:28) argue that general equilibrium models “probably remain today the first step of any 
analysis seeking to integrate distribution considerations and economic policy at both the 
micro and macro level”.  
However, despite this, traditional general equilibrium modelling approaches are still 
somewhat limited in terms of dealing with impacts at a true micro-level. Given the 
complexity of the model structure, factor and household income changes are still only 
                                                 
10
  Incidence-type models are also sometimes referred to as micro-simulation models even though no 
behavioural responses are modelled. This study adopts the terms ‘micro-incidence’ and ‘micro-
simulation’ models to distinguish between non-behavioural and behavioural approaches.  
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observed at the ‘representative’ factor or household group level rather than at the individual 
level. This means any distributional changes that might occur within representative household 
or factor groups is not modelled, and ultimately the poverty estimates generated in these 
models reflect average impacts on groups rather than specific impacts on individuals.  
The challenge is to try and bring these two distinct levels of modelling closer together in what 
is commonly referred to as macro-micro modelling frameworks. Macro-micro modelling can 
consist of combining macro (e.g., general equilibrium) and micro (e.g., partial equilibrium) 
models sequentially or developing fully integrated macro-micro general equilibrium models. 
Such a combined model framework allows modellers to exploit the best features of both these 
modelling approaches.  
Developments in macro-micro modelling are ongoing. Bourguignon and Spadaro (2005) 
predict that macro-micro modelling is an area that will enjoy tremendous growth in the 
future, thanks largely to increased data availability, continuous improvements in data quality 
and better integration of micro-survey and national accounts data. Furthermore, advances in 
software and computing capacity have pushed out the boundaries of what can feasibly be 
achieved in terms of solving complex macro-micro models. However, as new techniques are 
developed, it becomes equally important to pause and critically assess the developments. 
Therefore, in addition to applying some of these methods and deriving policy lessons from 
them, this study also hopes to point out some of the limitations and inconsistencies of these 
new techniques. In this regard a particular focus is on illustrating how sensitive poverty 
outcomes are to the way in which the macro-micro linkages are modelled.  
The study is organised as follows. Chapter 2, as explained, provides a detailed analysis of the 
poverty-labour market nexus. The chapter draws mainly on literature, while complementing 
findings with figures and tables generated using various South African labour force and 
household survey data sets. The analysis of poverty, the labour market and its failures, and 
the linkages between poor households and the labour market are important from both a policy 
and a model development perspective.  
On the basis of the analyses in Chapter 2 strong arguments can be made to support the use of 
minimum wages and/or wage subsidies as anti-poverty strategies in South Africa. Thus, 
Chapter 3 provides a detailed theoretical overview of minimum wages and wage subsidies. 
As an introduction to the theoretical concepts used in this chapter, we first provide a 
perspective on the theory of labour demand and the important role of the wage elasticity of 
labour demand in explaining employment responses to (policy-induced) wage changes. The 
chapter then continues with a discussion of these two wage-based labour market policies, 
focusing on issues such as the rationale for each of these policy interventions, methods and 
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models that have been used to analyse their respective impacts and relevant policy design 
issues. 
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the types of ex ante models that can be considered 
appropriate for the evaluation of the poverty effects of labour market policies in particular, 
but also for development policies in general. This chapter provides some thoughts around the 
conceptualisation of a suitable model framework, and then continues with an in-depth 
discussion of partial and general equilibrium models. Both these modelling approaches, as 
explained, have limitations and advantages as far as their applicability in this type of study is 
concerned, and as a result, the chapter argues, there is a strong case for adopting an integrated 
or sequential macro-micro modelling framework. The chapter therefore also considers the 
options, challenges and limitations of macro-micro modelling frameworks. A description of 
the specific modelling frameworks developed in this study for the evaluation of the poverty 
impacts of minimum wages and wage subsidies is also provided.  
The model results and findings from these applications are included in Chapter 5 and Chapter 
6 respectively. The minimum wage simulations are based on actual minimum wages 
implemented in South Africa during the last few years. For the wage subsidy simulations a 
hypothetical wage subsidy is modelled. In designing this hypothetical simulation, careful 
consideration was given to recent proposals around subsidy values, overall programme 
budget, and the targeting of workers and/or sectors.  
The aim of these analyses is two-fold. Firstly, various important and relevant policy lessons 
can be learned, particularly as far as the poverty-reducing effects of these policies are 
concerned. The simulations are primarily designed with the idea of providing insights into the 
policy impacts under different assumptions about the wage-employment relationship. This is 
useful in the context of our earlier hypothesis that minimum wages will be more effective at 
reducing poverty when the wage elasticity is low, and vice versa for wage subsidies. Both 
policies are also evaluated under short and long-run closures, which, as explained in more 
detail in the respective chapters, relates to the assumptions around capital accumulation and 
structural changes at a sector level. For the minimum wage scenarios, additional simulations 
assuming labour productivity gains among beneficiaries of minimum wages are also run. 
These simulations illustrate how many of the negative externalities associated with minimum 
wages can be mitigated through labour productivity enhancements. For the wage subsidy 
scenarios, alternative financing options are explored, which allows for some interesting 
policy lessons to be drawn in this regard.    
A second and perhaps equally important aim of the modelling exercises is to illustrate how 
sensitive poverty outcomes are to the way in which the macro-micro linkages are modelled. 
This is both a testament to the power of ex ante modelling as far as its flexibility is concerned 
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and to the danger that exists in disseminating modelled results without clearly explaining the 
underlying assumptions of the simulations.  
Chapter 7 draws general conclusions about the labour market-poverty nexus in South Africa, 
the modelling approaches followed in this study and the sensitivity of outcomes. The 
important policy lessons emanating from the analyses of minimum wages and wage subsidies 
are also highlighted in this final chapter. An Appendix that includes additional information 
and technical details about the models and data used is included at the back.  
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Chapter 2. The Poverty-Labour Market 
Nexus in South Africa: A 
Review of the Evidence 
he introductory discussions in Chapter 1 highlighted the need for understanding both 
how labour markets function and how the poor are linked to the labour market as this 
will facilitate a better understanding of the potential poverty-reducing effects of 
labour market policies. This chapter therefore explores the poverty-labour market nexus in 
more depth, drawing extensively on the recent South African literature and household and 
labour force survey data. The chapter starts with a review of the poverty problem in South 
Africa and explores the linkages between poor households and the broader labour market 
(section 1). Section 2 evaluates the recent labour market trends, focusing specifically on the 
unemployment trends and the factors that have contributed to South Africa’s high 
unemployment rate. This section also reviews the trends in wage earnings over the last 
decade. Section 3 considers the determinants of employment and earnings, which are 
important for the development and interpretation of ex ante labour market model results, 
while section 4 concludes the chapter. 
1. Poverty Definition and Profile 
1.1. What is Poverty?  
Taylor (2002:15) broadly defines poverty as the “inability of individuals, households or 
entire communities to command sufficient resources to satisfy a socially acceptable minimum 
standard of living”. Poverty analysis, therefore, is an attempt to define this minimum standard 
of living or welfare level in terms of a poverty line, and to then study those households or 
individuals that fall below it. Most often welfare is expressed in terms of household or per 
capita income or expenditure as this is easily measured, but there are various non-income 
welfare measures that can also be used in poverty analyses. Generally, income poverty 
studies measure poverty using the familiar Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) class of 
decomposable measures (Foster et al., 1984). A technical explanation of FGT calculations 
and the interpretation of FGT results appear in the Appendix (see section 1.1).  
T 
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While income is important in determining the poverty status of an individual or household, it 
is certainly not the only suitable welfare measure. Bhorat and Kanbur (2006a) argue that any 
exhaustive analysis of changes in well-being should account for both income and non-income 
measures of well-being. The literature distinguishes between two additional dimensions of 
poverty, namely capability poverty and asset poverty. According to Taylor (2002), capability 
poverty refers to a lack of access to basic services that enable people to live and function in 
society.11 Asset poverty relates to the private ownership of income-generating assets or 
access to ‘social assets’ such as community infrastructure.12  
Although these three dimensions of poverty are often interlinked, measures of capability or 
asset poverty are more informative in a dynamic context where welfare changes over time are 
concerned. Carter and May (2001) illustrate this by defining people who are both asset poor 
and income poor as ‘structurally poor’, arguing that their low asset bases prevent them from 
mitigating the impact of short-term shocks to their income flows and they are therefore likely 
to remain income poor in a future period. The transitory poor, in turn, are those that happen to 
be income poor at a given point in time, but given their access to or ownership of assets, they 
are more likely to escape poverty in the future.  
While these dimensions of poverty are recognised, the focus in this study is exclusively on 
income poverty. This limited focus is necessitated by the types of models selected for 
subsequent analyses of the poverty implications of labour market policy (see Chapter 4). The 
next section briefly looks at the recent income poverty trends in South Africa, followed by a 
discussion of the broad characteristics of the poor in section 1.3.  
1.2. Recent Poverty Trends 
Poverty remains one the biggest socio-economic challenges today. There is some uncertainty 
and even controversy about whether poverty has increased or decreased during the last 
decade. The poverty trend is a side-issue in this study; instead, the real interest lies in the 
relationship between poverty and the labour market (see below). Nevertheless, the debates are 
interesting, and hence section 1.2 in the Appendix provides an overview of the recent South 
Africa poverty trends.  
                                                 
11
  These services may include water, electricity, free and adequate healthcare, free education, food security, 
and affordable housing and transport. A lack of access to employment and training opportunities could 
also render a person capability poor. Often a lack of access to such services relates to income poverty in 
the sense that the income poor lack the financial capability of paying for basic services that are not 
provided free of charge. Examples include transport, clothing and food costs.  
12
  The lines between asset and capability poverty may sometimes be blurred; for example, access to public 
schooling can be thought of both in terms of the service provided (schooling) and the community 
infrastructure (the school building) (see for example the analysis of income and non-income welfare 
shifts in Bhorat et al., 2007b). 
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Based on the evidence presented there (see Appendix Table 1 in particular) the consensus 
position has to be that poverty (and particularly extreme poverty) increased between 1995 
and 2000. The extent of the increase varies widely depending on the data used, the choice of 
poverty line and the welfare measure used. Although slow to emerge (the IES, which is the 
preferred dataset for poverty analyses, is only conducted every five years), early evidence 
suggests a turnaround in the poverty trend since 2000. For example, Van der Berg et al. 
(2005) use alternative data to the standard surveys from Statistics South Africa to show that 
poverty had dropped by 8 percentage points between 2000 and 2004. Yu’s (2008) findings, 
based on a comparison of the IES 1995, 2000 and 2005/06, corroborate those of Van der Berg 
et al. (2005) in suggesting that incomes rose by 6 percent and poverty declined by 10 
percentage points between 2000 and 2005/06.  
As noted, a more detailed assessment is provided in the Appendix. However, what is clear 
from the recent South African analyses is that the initial increase in poverty between 1995 
and 2000 coincided with a sharp rise in unemployment (see section 2 below). The subsequent 
decline in unemployment is also consistent with declining poverty between 2000 and 2005. It 
would therefore seem that the poverty trend is closely linked to the trend in employment. The 
next section explores the links between poor households and the labour market in more detail. 
1.3. A Poverty Profile for South Africa 
Poverty profiles are developed with the aim to characterise the poor in terms of a range of 
variables, including location, demography, education, gender, livelihoods and social capital 
(McCulloch et al., 2001). This enables policymakers to better understand the characteristics 
of the poor. A useful way of gene alising the approach to creating poverty profiles is to group 
households or individuals into several income groups rather than identifying poor households 
on the basis of some explicit poverty line. This approach is favoured here, as it avoids debates 
around what an appropriate poverty line might be. Particularly, households are grouped into 
five groups of equal size (or quintiles) on the basis of a ranking of their per capita incomes. 
The basic features of these groups vis-à-vis household size, household and per capita 
incomes, and labour market linkages are then briefly studied to provide a ‘snapshot view’ of 
poverty.13 Household per capita income is calculated by dividing the total household income 
by the household size and attaching the same per capita income to each individual in the 
household, irrespective of whether that person contributes to the pool of household income or 
                                                 
13
  The racial composition and spatial distribution of the poor and non-poor population is equally interesting 
and important in the context of past discriminatory policies that have excluded people from participating 
in the economy on the basis of their racial classification or where they lived. Interesting shifts are 
occurring; for example, there is evidence of an emergence of a black middle class since the fall of 
apartheid (Van der Berg et al., 2004), while the “rapid process of urban migration... could in the future 
reshape the spatial nature of poverty in South Africa” (Bhorat and Kanbur, 2006a:4). These dimensions 
of poverty, however, fall beyond the scope of this particular study.  
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not.14 A rule of thumb often applied in South African analyses is to assume that the bottom 
two household quintiles, representing just over half of the population (see below), are poor.  
1.3.1. Household Income Distribution 
Table 2.1 presents some of the basic features of the household quintiles in 2000. This table 
(and the subsequent analyses) draws on Statistics South Africa’s Income and Expenditure 
Survey of 2000, which has been merged with the Labour Force Survey of September 2000 
(SSA, 2002b, SSA, 2002c) (referenced as IES/LFS 2000). The IES 1995, merged with the 
October Household Survey of 1995 (SSA, 1997a, SSA, 1997b) (referenced as IES/OHS 
1995), is also consulted at times for comparative purposes, although the comparability of 
these two datasets has been questioned (see Appendix, section 1.2). Although the more recent 
IES/LFS 2005/06 is now available, the merged IES/LFS 2000 dataset represents the latest 
available comprehensive source of information on household incomes/expenditures and 
labour force activities of households. Hence, given the interest in labour market and poverty 
linkages in this study, the IES/LFS 2000 is selected as the basis for the analyses here.   
Table 2.1: Population Distribution, Household Size and Incomes across the Quintiles (2000) 
  Poor Non-poor 
  Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
All 
General            
Share of households 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
Number of people (000's) 13,221 9,985 7,641 6,458 5,341 42,646 
Share of population 31.0% 23.4% 17.9% 15.1% 12.5% 100.0% 
Avg. household size 6.0 4.6 3.5 2.9 2.4 3.9 
Household and per capita income            
Avg. annual household income R 6,913 R 13,592 R 20,779 R 40,172 R 135,187 R 42,020 
Avg. annual p.c. income R 1,169 R 2,946 R 5,957 R 13,657 R 56,626 R 11,022 
Source: IES/LFS 2000  
As shown in Table 2.1, each household quintile contains 20 per cent of households; the first 
quintile contains the poorest 20 percent of households, the second quintile contains the next 
poorest 20 percent, and so on. The poorest quintile contains 31 per cent of the population, 
while a further 23.4 per cent of people live in the second. Thus, 55.7 per cent of people were 
poor in 2000 according to the crude definition of poverty used here.    
                                                 
14
  The implication of such a uniform intra-household income distribution is that all members of a household 
are either poor or non-poor. In reality, however, the costs of poverty frequently fall disproportionately on 
women, children and the elderly within households (McCulloch et al., 2001); for example, a South 
African study on old age pensions found positive health effects in young children when pensions went to 
grandmothers, and no effects when the pension was paid to grandfathers (Duflo, 2003). Unfortunately 
very little is known about intra-household income distributions in the South African income and 
expenditure survey data, hence the need to settle on a second-best approach of assuming a uniform intra-
household group distribution.  
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The average household size across all household quintiles was 3.9 in 2000, down from 4.4 
members in 1995 (IES/OHS 1995). Household size declines rapidly as we move from the 
poor to the non-poor quintiles. Thus, although households in South Africa are generally 
becoming smaller, poor households are still about twice as large as non-poor ones.  
Of course, since households are grouped into quintiles on the basis of their per capita 
incomes, larger households will almost by default be poorer. However, the table shows that 
the disparities between quintiles stretch beyond the distribution of per capita incomes. Total 
household incomes are significantly lower in the poorer quintiles, suggesting that households 
are not only poor because they are large; low household incomes contribute as much to 
poverty. Poor households therefore have to distribute a much lower total income among much 
larger families, thus contributing to the fact that per capita incomes in the fifth quintile are 
about 50 times that of the poorest quintile. 
1.3.2. Poverty and the Labour Market 
That poverty in South Africa is inextricably linked to whether or not people have access to 
jobs that offer reasonable wages is undisputable. This section explores the linkages between 
poor and non-poor households and the labour market in more detail. The analysis considers 
(a) labour market participation rates and (b) the importance of wages as an income source 
across the different household quintiles. Rather than discussing the evolving picture, this 
section merely describes a snapshot picture of the labour market-poverty nexus in 2000, 
based on the IES/LFS 2000 data. Labour market trends are considered in more detail in 
section 2.  
a) Labour Market Participation and Employment 
Table 2.2 first presents labour market participation statistics of working age adults between 
the ages of 15 and 65 across the different household income quintiles. As before, we assume 
that people in the bottom two household quintiles are poor. Adults of working age can either 
be economically inactive (non-participants) or they can join the labour force. Participants, in 
turn, are either employed or unemployed. The first four rows of the table shows fractions of 
working age adults that are employed, unemployed (under both definitions) and inactive. The 
associated unemployment rates are shown directly below these shares. These are obtained by 
dividing the share of unemployed by the sum of the shares of unemployed and employed 
persons.  
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Table 2.2: Labour Market Participation and Wage Earnings across the Quintiles (2000) 
  Poor Non-poor 
  Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
All 
Labour market participation            
Employed 21.4% 33.7% 46.7% 59.0% 72.5% 43.1% 
Unemployed (strict) 20.6% 19.1% 16.3% 11.2% 4.0% 15.3% 
Additional unemployed (expanded) 15.5% 10.8% 8.5% 5.2% 1.7% 9.3% 
Non-participants (expanded) 42.5% 36.5% 28.5% 24.6% 21.9% 32.4% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Unemployment rates            
Strict unemployment rate 49.1% 36.1% 25.9% 15.9% 5.2% 26.2% 
Expanded unemployment rate 62.8% 47.0% 34.7% 21.8% 7.2% 36.3% 
Wages and labour market linkages            
Avg. wage of employed persons R 4,407 R 8,594 R 13,896 R 26,066 R 80,845 R 33,180 
Avg. no. employed per household 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.1 
% of people in ‘workerless’ h-holds 30.4% 16.4% 9.5% 5.7% 5.1% 16.7% 
Note: The sum of the strict and expanded shares gives the total share of broadly unemployed persons. 
Source:  IES/LFS 2000 
The table clearly shows how the level of household welfare is positively related to the 
fraction of employed and negatively to the fraction of unemployed 2000. Also evident are the 
high shares of poor people that are non-participants. Under the official definition, almost 60 
per cent of ultra poor adults and almost half of poor adults were non-participants in 2000. In 
sharp contrast only about one-fifth of adults in quintile five were economically inactive. 
What is particularly evident is the high rate of unemployment among people living in poor 
households. The broad unemployment rate among poor people was 58.7 per cent in 2000 (the 
weighted average of 62.8 and 47 per cent), compared to only 19.8 per cent among non-poor 
people. In fact, over two-thirds of the broadly defined unemployed were in the bottom two 
quintiles in 2000.     
b) Wage Earnings and Income Sharing in the Household 
The suggestion from the above is that poverty is closely linked to economic inactivity, high 
rates of unemployment and low rates of employment. High unemployment among the poor, 
however, only explains part of the poverty problem. Another is the fact that many of the poor 
that are able to secure employment are unable to command adequate wages. In one of the 
earlier studies of the post-apartheid era, Bhorat and Leibbrandt (1996) estimate what they 
term a low-earnings line, defined as the wage required to enable an average household to 
escape poverty, considering household size and average employment rates in households. 
They estimate that just under half of the labour force (including broadly defined unemployed) 
earned less than the low-earnings line. Of these, the unemployed made up half this group and 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Chapter 2: The Poverty-Labour Market Nexus in South Africa: A Review of the Evidence 
 18
the ‘working poor’ the other half. In a more recent study, Pollin et al. (2006:27) argue that 
African workers still only earn a wage that is “modestly above a reasonable poverty line”.  
Table 2.2 shows that the average wage of workers in quintile one was R4 407 in 2000. Those 
in quintile two earned almost double that. While these average wages are higher than the 
poverty line of R3 864 proposed by Hoogeveen and Özler (2006), an important fact to 
remember is that these workers are also typically the only wage earners in their respective 
households. For example, as shown in the table, the average number of reported wage earners 
in households in quintiles one and two are only 0.8 and 1, respectively. The implications is 
that “far more poorly paid workers than higher income earners are single-income 
breadwinners in their families” (Torres et al., 2000:91). Adding to the demands on poor, low-
wage workers is that the wages they earn typically have to be shared within larger households 
(see Table 2.1).  
The final row of Table 2.2 shows the share of the population that lives in households with no 
wage-income earners. About 30.4 and 16.4 per cent of people in quintiles one and two 
respectively lived in households without any attachment to the labour market. The 
comparative figures in 1995 were 55 per cent of people in quintile one and 29 per cent of 
people in quintile two (IES/OHS 1995), which are slightly higher but comparable to the 
estimates by Klasen and Woolard (1997) based on 1993 data. The Taylor Report regarded the 
growing incidence of ‘workerless households’ as  a major concern for the welfare system, 
since it creates a greater dependence on the state or social networks for survival (Taylor, 
2002). However, it appears from the 2000 figures that the share of people living in workerless 
households has dropped considerably after 1995.  
When considered in conjunction with the trend of a decline in the average number of workers 
per household and the decline in the overall size of households, it appears as if households 
are organising themselves into smaller units but with a specific intention to cluster around 
employed people. In a follow-up study on their earlier work, Klasen and Woolard  (2005) 
also find evidence of a decline in the share of the unemployed living in households with no 
connection to the labour market. This survival strategy in the face of growing unemployment 
is probably linked to the fact that there is little or no social insurance for the unemployed in 
South Africa. It has, however, meant that even more poor people are attached to the labour 
market indirectly via employed household members, thus making the notion that poverty is 
not only a phenomenon among workerless households or the unemployed even more relevant 
today. It also raises the potential of reaching a relatively large share of the poor through 
labour market policies.  
Although more people are now attached to the labour market indirectly, the links can still 
only be defined as weak. A simple analysis reveals that the poor rely heavily on non-wage 
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income sources. Figure 2.1 shows the shares of income derived from four main income 
sources, namely (1) income from labour, (2) income from business, (3) social welfare transfer 
income and (4) remittances and other income.15 The strong reliance on welfare and 
remittance income in the poor quintiles is evident, contributing over 60 per cent to income in 
the bottom quintile and 40 per cent in the second. As far as wages are concerned, the 
importance of this income source grows as we move to the richer household quintiles, 
reaching around 80 per cent in the top two quintiles.  
Figure 2.1: Income Sources of All Households and ‘Working’ Households (2000) 
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Source:  IES/LFS 2000 
While the ‘average’ poor household relies very little on wage income, it is interesting to 
consider these same income shares within ‘working households’, defined here as households 
with at least one wage income earner. The right-hand panel of the figure shows that that the 
wage income share in working households only ranges between 69 and 85 per cent. Thus, in 
those households that are attached to the labour market, wages are a very prominent income 
source.  
From the above figure two important deductions can be made. First, since the average poor 
household only derives about half its income from wages, wages would have to rise 
significantly to have an impact on poverty. Put simply, a 1 per cent rise in wages across the 
board will only lead to a half a per cent increase in poor households’ income. Second, despite 
its limited importance in poor households, wage income is still a significant income source in 
                                                 
15
  Income from labour includes all wages and salaries earned from employment. Business income is very 
loosely defined as the sum of ‘gross operating surplus’ (income arising from the ownership of physical 
and/or human capital), income from dividends, and transfers from incorporated business enterprises. 
Welfare transfer income in the IES is made up of pensions, disability grants and family allowances. 
Other income may include actual or implicit income from home produced goods, gifts, donations and so 
on. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Chapter 2: The Poverty-Labour Market Nexus in South Africa: A Review of the Evidence 
 20
working households across all quintiles. A strategy of increasing wages to combat poverty 
may therefore significantly improve the welfare levels in working households at least. For 
those living in workerless households (see Table 2.2) an alternative strategy needs to be 
sought.  
1.4. Sub-conclusions 
The main focus of this section was to present a snapshot picture of the South African labour 
market-poverty nexus. Two central features can be highlighted. Firstly, high levels of poverty 
are very closely linked to high levels of unemployment and low levels of labour market 
participation. A reduction in unemployment is therefore likely to be effective in reducing 
poverty. Secondly, many low-wage workers live in large households where they are typically 
the only income-earners. Meagre wages are shared among many household members, 
suggesting that attachment to the labour market is no guarantee against poverty. Furthermore, 
wages represent the primary income in poor households that are attached to the labour 
market, which suggests that these households only have limited access to social welfare 
assistance. If more of the household members in these households cannot get access to 
employment, the only escape from poverty for them is an increase in the wages of those 
fortunate enough to have jobs.  
The discussion raises several questions about the nature of the labour market in South Africa. 
It is important to understand what has caused the high rates of unemployment in South 
Africa, as this is relevant for understanding what kinds of policies might be appropriate for 
generating more employment opportunities. The large numbers of working poor also raises 
questions about the evolution of wages in South Africa. The following section explores these 
two important issues in more depth, drawing on recent South African literature.  
2. The South African Labour Market 
2.1. Unemployment Trends and Causes of Unemployment 
One of the most troubling features of the South African labour market is the persistently high 
rate of unemployment. Ever since the ANC government came into power in 1994, job 
creation and a reduction in unemployment have been key policy goals in the fight against 
poverty and inequality in this country. Despite this, unemployment increased during much of 
the first post-apartheid decade. Figure 2.2 shows the broad and narrow unemployment rates 
for the period 1995 to 2005, calculated on the basis of various OHS and LFSs conducted by 
Statistics South Africa.16 The narrow unemployment rate increased from 17.6 per cent in 
                                                 
16
  Statistics South Africa uses two definitions of unemployment, namely a strict (official) and broad 
definition. The strictly unemployed are those people within the economically active population who (a) 
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1995 and peaked at 30.4 per cent in 2002. Thereafter, it declined and seems to have stabilised 
at around 26 per cent. The broad unemployment rate increased from 30.8 per cent to 41.8 per 
cent between 1995 and 2002, and subsequently fell to 37.3 per cent in 2005.  
Figure 2.2: Unemployment Rates, 1995 to 2006  
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Source:  October Household Survey 1995, and Labour Force Surveys (various years) (Statistics South Africa). 
Unemployment in South Africa has several defining features. The LFS 2005 data suggests 
that unemployment remains largely a phenomenon among previously disadvantaged African, 
Coloured and Asians, with only 2.2 per cent f the unemployed officially classified as White. 
Women make up 58.6 per cent of the unemployed despite only accounting for 48.8 per cent 
of labour force participants, thus signifying the relative disadvantage of female workers in 
securing employment. Geographically, unemployment is more pronounced in rural areas: it is 
estimated that about half of rural jobseekers are unable to find employment (LFS 2003), 
while the rural unemployed constitute 54.6 per cent of the total, despite only making up 37.5 
per cent of the labour force.17 
The youth labour force, defined in line with the South African National Youth Commission 
Act No 19 (1996) as people under the age of 35, accounts for 55.9 per cent of the overall 
labour force. Yet, as shown in Table 2.3, the youth makes up 72.7 per cent of the unemployed 
and face a broad unemployment rate of 50.4 per cent. This stands in sharp contrast to the 
unemployment rate of ‘only’ 24.0 per cent among adults. The interaction between age and 
education is a particularly important consideration. Generally speaking, and in line with 
                                                                                                                                                        
did not work during the seven days prior to the interview, (b) want to work and are available to start work 
within a week of the interview, and (c) have taken active steps to look for work or to start some form of 
self-employment in the four weeks prior to the interview. The broad or expanded unemployment 
definition excludes criterion (c). 
17
  The LFS 2003 was the last of the labour force surveys to distinguish rural and urban areas.   
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expectations, higher levels of education are associated with lower levels of unemployment. 
However, youth employment prospects are also weaker than those of adults at every level of 
education.  
Table 2.3: Labour market participation and unemployment by age and education (2005) 
 Youth Adults All 
Share of participants (%) 55.9 44.1 100.0 
Share of unemployed (%) 72.7 27.3 100.0 
 
Distribution 
of all youth 
participants 
(%) 
Broad 
unemployme
nt rate 
(%) 
Distribution 
of all adult 
participants 
(%) 
Broad 
unemployme
nt rate 
(%) 
Distribution 
of all 
participants 
(%) 
Broad 
unemployme
nt rate 
(%) 
None   3.2 45.1 11.3 28.8 6.8 33.1 
Grade 0 - Grade 8  22.1 57.0 36.5 30.9 28.4 42.2 
Grade 9 - Grade 11  33.0 59.0 20.1 28.6 27.3 49.2 
Grade 12 (Matric)  32.7 46.7 18.0 17.7 26.2 38.0 
Diploma/Certificate without 
Grade 12  1.0 27.0 1.0 7.0 1.0 18.1 
Diploma/Certificate with 
Grade 12   5.6 21.2 6.9 5.0 6.2 13.2 
University degree  2.4 8.7 6.2 2.3 4.1 4.4 
Total 100.0 50.4 100.0 24.0 100.0 38.8 
Note:  Youth include people under the age of 35.  
Source: LFS September 2005 (SSA, 2006).  
The sources of unemployment in South Africa are multiple and complex. While some have 
sought to blame the education system for failing in delivering on the kinds of skills required 
by employers, others have pointed at sharp increases in labour market participation 
(especially among the youth) and the economy’s inability to absorb people due to slow 
growth. Others have highlighted the role of increased demand for highly experienced workers 
in an economy undergoing structural changes. The following sub-sections consider these and 
other factors that have contributed to unemployment in South Africa. 
2.1.1. Macroeconomic Policy, Economic Growth and Aggregate Labour Market Trends 
Although macroeconomic policy and economic growth are not key themes in this chapter, the 
relationship between growth and employment is an important one, and hence deserves some 
attention. Macroeconomic policy and economic growth potentially have significant effects on 
employment and unemployment levels. The sharp rise in unemployment between 1995 and 
2001/02 shown in Figure 2.2 came at a time when the Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) programme dominated the policy front.18 The policy certainly set 
ambitious growth and employment targets: GDP growth was predicted to reach 6 per cent per 
annum by 2000, which in turn would create an average of 270 000 jobs per annum between 
                                                 
18
  GEAR replaced the Reconstruction and Development Programme in 1996 and remained the official 
macroeconomic strategy until 2001.  
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1996 and 2000 (Department of Finance, 1996:7). The GEAR policymakers further envisaged 
a much more central role for the private sector than its predecessor, the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP), specifically as far as investments and capital formation was 
concerned. In this respect, gross fixed capital formation grew steadily, averaging 5.1 per cent 
between 1994 and 2003. The economic growth that did materialise, was, however, still 
inadequate to reduce unemployment and poverty significantly (Bhorat et al., 2005:7).  
There is some uncertainty as to whether job creation was positive or negative between 1994 
and 2002. The Survey of Earnings and Employment (SEE) conducted by Statistics South 
Africa suggests that formal employment fell by 12 per cent, which translates into over one 
million jobs lost. This outcome raised concerns about the ability of the economy to generate 
jobs through growth, fuelling the so-called ‘jobless growth debate’. While simple output-
employment elasticities, which are calculated by expressing the percentage change in 
employment as a share of GDP growth, may have been negative when using certain data 
sources, such an approach ignores the impact of factor costs on employment. Hence, in a 
more careful examination by Fields et al. (1999), also using the SEE data, the output-
employment elasticity for the period 1990 to 1998 was actually shown to be insignificantly 
different from zero.19 Thus, although strictly speaking the relationship between output and 
employment could still be described as ‘jobless’, the two are at least not negatively related.    
Another criticism of the jobless growth thesis comes from Bhorat (2008), who, like (Casale et 
al., 2004), questions the validity of the SEE. This dataset, Bhorat argues, has a very narrow 
sectoral coverage, the most significant exclusions (from an employment perspective) being 
the agricultural and informal sectors. Comparisons of long-term employment trends are also 
problematic given inconsistencies in terms of the sectors included in the different SEE 
datasets. Over a comparable period, the October Household Survey of 1995 and the Labour 
Force Survey of 2002 already paints a more positive picture than the SEE dataset in 
suggesting that total employment (formal and informal sector) actually grew by 2.5 per cent 
per annum.  
In many respects the year 2000 marks a turnaround in the economy, which now grew at an 
increased tempo. Government adopted a more expansionary fiscal policy stance during the 
‘post-GEAR’ period and private consumption grew strongly. Employment creation followed 
and in 2000 alone an estimated 409 000 jobs were created (Oosthuizen, 2005). This strong 
employment performance continued throughout the period 2000 to 2005. The resurgence of 
employment growth came at an opportune time for the ANC government, who, during their 
                                                 
19
  They estimate wage- and employment elasticities in standard fashion by estimating a labour demand 
equation of the form 1 2 3ln ln lnt t t t tL w r Qβ β β β ε= + + + +  . Lt represents employment in time period 
t, while wt and rt are labour and capital costs, respectively. Qt represents output in time period t.  
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2004 election campaign, were able to claim that the economy had generated 2 million net 
new jobs since 1995 (see Casale et al., 2004). These claims are substantiated by Statistics 
South Africa’s surveys, but others have questioned whether these jobs have been ‘real’ or 
whether this was merely a perceived increase in employment related to changes in the 
definition of what constitutes having a job (see section 2.2 for further discussions).  
On the face of it, and based on the evidence from Statistics South Africa, growth in total 
employment exceeded growth in both the population and the working age population, even 
though it was slightly lower than economic growth  (Oosthuizen, 2005). Clearly, though, 
employment growth was still insufficient to make the kind of inroads into unemployment that 
were needed.  
The emerging consensus now is that slow growth or jobless growth is not the only or even the 
main cause of the stubbornly high unemployment rate; rather, a more balanced assessment is 
that the economy was simply unable to absorb a rapidly growing labour force between 1995 
and 2005. The Labour Force Surveys suggest that the broadly defined labour force grew by 
46 per cent between 1995 and 2005 (from 13.8 million to 20.1 million) at an average rate of 
3.9 per cent per annum. This rise of 6.3 million people stands in sharp contrast to the 2.8 
million jobs created during the same period. Banerjee et al. (2007) show that participation 
rates among females, Africans and the youth in particular have risen sharply since the end of 
apartheid. They further show that the unemployment rate in 2005 would have been roughly 
similar to the level in 1995 had the participation rate remained constant at the 1995 level. 
This, they argue, is a strong indicator that changes in participation rather than lower 
employment absorption rates explain much of the change in unemployment seen between 
1995 and 2005. 
The preceding discussion raises two important points relating to the relationship between 
economic growth and employment. Firstly, although the economy did not necessarily 
experience jobless growth, the level of growth was certainly insufficient to absorb all new 
entrants. Some simple back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that, ceteris paribus, GDP 
would have to grow at 5 per cent per annum just to maintain the current unemployment rate 
until 2015. Further, if government wished to reach its intended target of reducing 
unemployment by half in 2015, GDP would have to be maintained at between 8 and 9 per 
cent per annum.20 This highlights the need for – and indeed importance of – complementary 
microeconomic policy interventions to stimulate employment demand in South Africa. 
                                                 
20
  These calculations are based on the assumption that the labour force continued to grow at 3.9 per cent per 
annum (the average over the past decade) and that the output-employment elasticity is fixed at 0.8. Given 
evidence presented by Bhorat et al. (2005) a value of 0.8 perhaps represents a fairly optimistic elasticity 
value.  
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The second issue concerns the type of growth experienced. Output increases has been 
characterised by skills-intensification and an overall decline in the labour-intensity of 
production. Therefore, even during those periods when the economy did grow strongly, much 
of the growth was attributed to skills-biased technical change that has generally had a 
dampening effect of demand for low-skilled labour. This issue is explored further in the 
following sub-section.  
2.1.2. Structural Shifts in Production and Labour Demand  
When considering the trends in the broad and official unemployment rates (see Figure 2.2), a 
widening of the gap between the two unemployment rates becomes observable, especially 
from 2001 up until about 2004. This is evidence of a growing share of discouraged jobseekers 
in the economy. The share of discouraged jobseekers peaked at 49 per cent of the 
unemployed (broad definition) in 2004, dropping slightly to 42 per cent i  2006. This figure, 
Bhorat (2008:2) argues, is a “powerful indicator of the deeply structural nature of South 
Africa’s unemployment problem”.  
‘Structural unemployment’ is a term used widely in the South African literature, but it is not 
always clear exactly what people mean by it. Structural unemployment relates to two distinct 
trends that have developed in the South African economy. The first is a shift in the sectoral 
composition in the economy. Most apparent has been the shift in output away from primary 
and secondary sectors towards services or tertiary sectors (Bhorat and Oosthuizen, 2004), a 
trend natural to any developing economy. This has brought about a change in the demand 
patterns for different types of labour due to differences in sectors’ skills composition, as 
reflected in the increase in demand for skilled labour relative to unskilled workers (Burger 
and Woolard, 2005). Some studies have attributed these effects to trade liberalisation and 
shifting trade flows. Bell and Cattaneo (1997), for example, find that “trade flows have 
shifted production away from Black intensive sectors towards White intensive (or skill 
intensive) sectors”. Dunne and Edwards (2005) believe the direct employment effect of 
liberalisation has been biased against low-skilled workers because tariffs fell relatively 
sharply in labour intensive sectors, and particularly those with high shares of low-skilled 
workers.  
A second trend relates to changes in production techniques within sectors. South African 
firms have in the past decade or more been forced to adopt improved production techniques 
in order to remain competitive in the face of globalisation, trade liberalisation, and more 
recently, the strengthening of the currency. Production efficiency gains enable producers to 
produce a unit of output using fewer inputs than before, thus, depending on the demand-side 
effect of the resulting lower commodity prices, often leading to a decrease in demand for 
factors of production. The technical change experienced has been mostly capital deepening in 
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nature. Bhorat and Oosthuizen argue that capital-deepening technical change is generally 
“viewed in a ... negative light due to [its] dampening of the employment-increasing effect of 
output expansion” (2004:12). Intuitively speaking, however, one would expect greater capital 
intensity to actually increase the demand for high-skilled workers, albeit sometimes at the 
expense of low-skilled workers. This is due to the fact that firms demand more skilled 
workers who are required to operate and maintain capital equipment (Bhorat and Hodge, 
1999).21  
Both these ‘structural’ labour demand effects have given rise to an increase in demand for 
skilled workers and ultimately the emergence of a skills shortage in the economy. At the 
other end of the skills spectrum low-skilled and inexperienced workers are ‘structurally’ 
unemployed, which leads Banerjee et al. (2007) to conclude that unemployment has in some 
sense become an equilibrium outcome in South Africa, and, moreover, one that is unlikely to 
correct itself without some form of direct policy intervention.  
2.1.3. The Wage-Employment Relationship 
Labour demand theory suggests that employers adjust their employment patterns in response 
to changes in relative factor costs. Several South African econometric time-series analyses 
support the notion of a trade-off between real wage levels and employment (Fallon and 
Lucas, 1998, Fedderke and Mariotti, 2002, Fields et al., 2000) (see further discussions in 
Chapter 3). Given this, one possible cause of growing unemployment is the rising cost of 
employment, both in terms of wage and non-wage costs of employment.  
With respect to actual wages, Lewis (2001) estimates that the real wage of South African 
semi- and unskilled workers increased by 150 percent between 1970 and 1999, while in stark 
comparison, wages skilled workers rose by approximately 10 percent and those of highly 
skilled workers declined over this period. These changes in relative wage levels are often 
offered as a reason for the relatively disadvantaged position of low-skilled workers as far as 
employment prospects are concerned. Section 2.2 reviews the more recent wage trends, and 
the suggestion from this analysis is that formal sector low-skilled wages have in fact 
remained fairly stable over the last decade.  
Perhaps, therefore, a more appropriate way of thinking about wage costs is in terms of unit 
labour costs, and particular the unit labour costs of low-skilled versus skilled workers. In this 
regard Fedderke (2006) attributes large-scale job losses in agriculture and mining, both of 
which have historically been important employers of low-skilled workers, to the fact that real 
                                                 
21
  Bhorat and Hodge (1999) further decompose the changing labour demand patterns in order to gauge the 
relative importance of technical change versus structural change in the overall employment change and 
find that although both had been important, the former had a greater impact in terms of the demands for 
different types of labour (skilled versus unskilled and low-skilled).  
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wage costs (driven in part by union demands) outstripped improvements in labour 
productivity. Evidence by Edwards and Golub (2002), who compare relative wage and 
productivity levels of different types of factors, and Fallon and Lucas (1998) further attest to 
these types of employment trends. Based on this evidence in the South African literature, 
Pollin et al. (2006:32) conclude that although analyses of the wage-employment relationship 
are marred by weak empirics, reducing unit labour costs “could be a central feature of 
policies to attack mass unemployment”.22   
Non-wage costs are perhaps equally important. The post-1994 period has seen increases in 
non-wage costs of employment due to stricter labour market legislation and regulation, the 
emergence of a strong trade union movement and rigidities imposed by bargaining councils 
(see for example Bhorat, 2008, Fedderke, 2006, and Nattrass, 2000). The analysis by Bhorat 
(2008), in particular, shows that the wages of unionised workers are on average 23 per cent 
above those of non-unionised workers, while the premium for unionised workers in the 
bottom quartile of the wage distribution is 30 per cent.  
With respect to labour market rigidity, Bhorat (2008) finds that South Africa’s hiring and 
firing costs are in actual fact low by global standards for upper-middle income countries. 
However, the legislative provisions for firing workers suggest a relatively high level of 
administrative rigidity. For this reason, Bhorat (2008:32) argues that direct hiring and firing 
costs are a secondary concern; instead, legislation that governs dismissals and unfair labour 
processes and practices should be “at the heart of the labour market flexibility debate”. Either 
way, whether costs are high in monetary terms or high implicitly in terms of compliance with 
stringent legislation, the legislative complexities involved in dismissing workers in South 
Africa certainly acts as a deterrent to increased employment and labour market flexibility.    
In conclusion, it seems employment demand is sluggish at least in part due to relatively high 
wage and non-wage costs of employment. Firms tend to substitute workers whose relative 
costs of employment are rising, and the burden has fallen disproportionately on low-skilled 
workers. These employment demand trends also display a particular risk management 
strategy of firms, namely to avoid hiring people whom they think might not succeed in the 
workplace. Training costs are high (given low skills) and dismissals are procedurally 
complex, which means employers rather keep posts vacant than to employ people who might 
not be suitable. In this regard, the youth are at a distinct disadvantage as they often lack the 
experience that could serve as a signal to potential employees of their abilities. The youth 
unemployment problem is revisited in section 2.1.5. 
                                                 
22
  The reliability of employment and earnings statistics spanning long periods of time is questionable, partly 
due to changes in sampling and data collection methods during South Africa’s political transition period.  
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2.1.4. Job Search Costs and Reservation Wages 
Several factors influence individuals’ decisions around labour market participation, and also 
whether they actively or passively seek employment (the latter group are classified as 
discouraged work seekers). Many people knowingly lack the skills necessary to find 
employment in an economy that has increasingly become skill-intensive. Such individuals 
may want to work, but often choose to not actively seek employment.    
There are several other factors that may impede people’s ability or willingness to actively 
seek work, or even their decisions about whether to take up employment opportunities that 
are available to them. The first such factor concerns the high cost of job search. Citing several 
studies, Burns (2008) argues that material job search costs in South Africa are high given 
large geographical distances between areas where employment opportunities mostly exist (i.e. 
urban areas) and where people reside. Urban jobcentres are furthermore spatially isolated. 
The youth, Burns (2008) argues, are particularly vulnerable given a lack of mobility and 
limited resources. Many people rely on word-of-mouth from friends and family to learn about 
job opportunities. Successful job search through such social networks requires good quality 
networks, which places the youth and those living in isolated areas at a relative disadvantage. 
The second factor relates to wage levels and whether people choose to look for work at the 
prevailing wage. In the context of excess labour supply at prevailing wages, there is little 
empirical support for reservation wages in South Africa (Burns, 2008), or put differently, the 
true reservation wage is below the existing wage. Moreover, the lack of welfare support for 
able-bodied unemployed persons in this country makes voluntary unemployment an irrational 
choice. However, related to the reservation wage idea is the issue of the costs associated with 
taking a job. In some instances, Burns (2008) argues, the costs associated with working 
(transport costs, having to pay for childcare and so on) actually exceed the wage associated 
with that job.  
Another consideration is the health status of jobseekers. For instance, Burns (2008) writes, 
the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS among the youth, and young women in particular, may 
contribute to unemployment since poor health impedes active job search, which reduces 
employment prospects.  
2.1.5. Revisiting Youth Unemployment 
Youth unemployment is often regarded as particularly problematic from a socio-economic 
perspective. In a report on Global Employment Trends for Youth the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) notes that the inability to find employment can create a sense of 
uselessness and idleness, and that this is especially true for the youth (ILO, 2004). Evidence 
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presented earlier in Table 2.3 shows that almost three-quarters of the unemployed are under 
the age of 35. The average unemployment rate among this group is 50.5 per cent, which is 
significantly higher than that of adults.  
When comparing the racial, gender and location profiles of the unemployed youth the picture 
looks very similar to that of overall unemployment. However, a comparison of educational 
attainment of the unemployed youth vis-à-vis adult participants reveals large differences, as 
shown earlier in Table 2.3. In short, the evidence suggests that the unemployed youth are 
much better qualified than their adult counterparts (see for example Pauw et al., 2008b). 
Despite this, the youth face much weaker employment prospects than adults. The issue 
clearly warrants further investigation.  
Several supply-side factors listed in the previous section relate directly to youth 
unemployment. To recap, the study by Burns (2008) finds that the youth are often unable to 
actively seek work given a lack of mobility, limited financial resources, poor networks and a 
high incidence of HIV/AIDS. It is intuitive that inactive jobseekers have a significantly 
reduced chance of finding employment compared to an active jobseeker.  
The interest in this section is, however, more on the demand-side. The reluctance of firms to 
hire young labour market entrants is a fairly common firm behavioural characteristic that is 
described in so-called ‘overlapping generations’ models. This problem seems to be 
particularly severe in the South African labour market. This raises several questions around 
education, skills and experience of youth labour market entrants.  
The quality (or perceived quality) of education in South Africa is important in explaining 
why employers are reluctant to hire young labour market entrants. Over 30 per cent of the 
unemployed youth have a matric qualification, which, according to Bhorat (2008:6), is a 
“stinging indictment of the inability of the … schooling system to guarantee employment”.23 
More systematic multivariate approaches to analysing employment prospects (see section 3) 
confirm that a matric qualification has become less important and even insignificant in 
determining whether a labour market participant finds employment or not compared to 
someone without a matric. Rapid growth in labour force participation rates among African 
youth in particular, as well as the fact that people are entering the labour market at an earlier 
                                                 
23
  Serious questions have been asked about the quality of education offered in South Africa, particularly to 
African pupils. A detailed discussion falls beyond the scope here. In short, though, as argued by Bhorat 
(2008), the significantly higher quality and effectiveness of schooling offered to White labour market 
participants relative to Africans (he cites several studies to substantiate this claim) results in an outcome 
where White and African participants with the same qualifications do not face the same employment 
prospects. This ‘schooling quality effect’, he explains, is not adequately captured by the education variable 
in the Labour Force Surveys, which means that the significant race effects found in these multivariate 
employment equations may in part be proxy for the impact of poor quality education attained by African 
jobseekers.  
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age and with higher education levels than in the past, has further increased competition for 
entry-level jobs (Branson, 2006, Pauw et al., 2008b). This implication is that a matric may 
simply not be good enough any longer to guarantee employment.  
The South African economy has become increasingly skills-intensive, with employers 
placing a premium on previous work experience when hiring workers. In fact, many South 
African firms face serious skills shortages, which is one of the reasons why the Joint 
Initiative on Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA), a task team within The Presidency, was 
launched. Even though there are many jobseekers, many South African firms remain 
understaffed, choosing to rather keep positions vacant than fill them with people who do not 
have the right experience.  
The youth are once again at a disadvantage as far as experience is concerned. Evidence from 
the LFS September 2005 suggests that younger people are much less likely to have previous 
work experience. On average, over three-quarters of the unemployed youth have never 
worked before, compared to ‘only’ to 46.2 of unemployed adults. The suggestion is that 
young people, despite being better educated, simply cannot compete with older, more 
experienced workers when applying for jobs due to a lack of skills and previous work 
experience. This ultimately puts the education system in a bad light.  
2.2. The Evolution of Wages 
Casale et al. (2004) rightfully argue that an evaluation of labour market trends is incomplete 
without also considering the returns to employment or wage trends. Their study sets out with 
the aim of critically reviewing claims by the ANC government in 2003/04 that 2 million net 
new jobs had been added to the economy since 1995.  
While total employment as reported in the OHS 1995 and LFS 2003 did indeed rise from 9.6 
to almost 11.6 million, several definitional and data capturing changes are worth noting. 
Firstly, the definition of what constitutes having a job changed with the introduction of the 
LFS in 2000. Under the new survey, even “one hour in the previous week” was enough to be 
classified as employed (Casale et al., 2004). At the same time there was a marked effort to 
better capture informal sector workers. The total change in employment between 1999 and 
2000 alone was 14 per cent, which is well above the 2.3 per cent average annual increase in 
employment between 1995 and 2003.  
Secondly, subsistence farmers were only captured as employed in the latter OHSs. By 2003 
this group made up 300 000 of the 11.6 million workers in the economy, which is a sizable 
portion of the 2 million ‘new jobs’ created between 1995 and 2003. Thirdly, the LFS 2003 
was the first LFS survey to be reweighted using data from the National Census 2001. In that 
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same year, employment increased substantially (by 500 000), i.e., one quarter of the new jobs 
created in the eight years since 1995 were seemingly created in the final year alone.  
Both employment and wage trends should be viewed in light of these data collection changes. 
Most important, perhaps, is the fact that over 1 million new jobs were created in informal 
self-employment (760 000) and subsistence agriculture (300 000) alone (Casale et al., 2004). 
Formal sector employment (self-employment and employees) growth accounted for less than 
40 per cent of the total growth in employment.  
So what happened to average wages? Table 2.4 shows the real average monthly wages of 
workers as estimated by Casale et al. (2004) (all wages are expressed in 2000 prices). 
According to these estimates the average wage declined from R3 014 in 1995 to R2 360 in 
2003, a decline of about 20 per cent. Burger and Yu’s (2006) estimate for the 1995 to 2005 
period shows a decline of 23 per cent, with wages dropping by 38 per cent between 1999 and 
2000 alone with the adoption of the LFS 2000. This translates into an average annual real 
decline of 2.1 per cent.  
Table 2.4: Real Monthly Wages: 1995 to 2003 
  OHS 1995 OHS 1997 LFS 2000 LFS 2001 LFS 2002 LFS 2003 
Subsistence agriculture - - 84 165 89 102 
Other agriculture - - 681 1,004 827 827 
Total agriculture 690 691 357 781 574 608 
Domestic work 585 677 524 481 421 473 
Formal self-employed 14,081 9,441 5,424 6,447 6,602 7,599 
Informal self-employed 3,352 1,684 1,154 971 988 968 
Total self-employed 6,866 4,441 2,232 2,261 2,360 2,610 
Formal employees - 3,060 3,161 3,153 3,182 2,986 
Informal employees - 1,389 1,037 1,030 888 891 
Total employees 3,191 2,642 2,944 2,958 2,999 2,805 
All formal workers - 3,339 3,290 3,340 3,371 3,241 
All informal workers - 1,523 1,109 991 956 941 
All employment 3,014 2,812 2,292 2,454 2,412 2,360 
Source: Casale et al. (2004) based on OHS 1995, OHS 1997 and LFS 2000 to LFS2003 
So what does this tell us? First of all, it is worth noting that informal sector wages have 
always been significantly lower than formal sector wages, and also that this gap has widened 
over time. An increase in the share of informal sector workers in the economy will therefore 
automatically lead to a decline in the economy-wide average wage. Burger and Yu (2006) 
derive what they argue is a more ‘comparable earnings series’ by excluding informal and 
self-employed workers as well as obvious outliers from the sample. The resulting dataset 
shows that semi-skilled wages declined by about 0.8 per cent on average every year, while 
unskilled wages declined by 0.9 per cent. Skilled wages, in turn, increased by an average of 1 
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per cent every year in real terms between 1995 and 2005. These changes are consistent with 
skills-biased technical change, shortages of skilled workers and an excess (and increasing) 
supply of low-skilled workers.  
The apparent trend of ‘informalisation’ of the labour market can also be interpreted in two 
ways. On the one hand it should be cause for serious concern. The data suggests that formal 
sector employment demand is stagnant – possibly due to more stringent labour market 
regulation and skills-biased technological shifts – and the only option for low-skilled workers 
is to pile into the informal sector where wages are declining at a rapid pace. On the other 
hand, one could argue that the magnitudes of these shifts (in particular the drop in informal 
wages) came too suddenly and is much too large over the ten-year period to be plausible; 
instead, as Burger and Yu (2006:6) argue, these “trends are mainly driven by Statistics South 
Africa’s improved ability to capture low-paying informal activities”. The suggestion of a such 
a line of reasoning is that many people were previously captured as unemployed or inactive 
when they should have been captured as employed, and hence estimates of average wages 
were biased upwards prior to the LFS 2000.      
Whatever one’s viewpoint is, the first policy lesson is that job creation in the formal rather 
than the informal sector is the preferred route. This presents a strong case for a policy such as 
a wage subsidy offered to formal sector employers. Formal sector jobs are more sustainable 
and formal sector work experience is more beneficial to workers (see Chapter 3). A second 
policy lesson is that declining wages is not, as many people would want to argue, a 
justification for minimum wages in South Africa. Much of the decline in the average wage is 
related to strong growth in informal self-employment – and clearly there is no sense in 
implementing minimum wages for the self-employed. However, what remains true is that 
many South Africans, despite being employed in formal or informal sector firms, are still not 
able to escape poverty. A minimum wage policy for these workers may therefore still have 
merit as a tool to address poverty.  
3. Determinants of Employment and Earnings 
The preceding analysis of unemployment, low earnings, skills deficits and education has been 
mostly descriptive in nature. A more nuanced approach to unravelling the link between 
education, participation, employment and earnings is to estimate econometric equations that 
help identify the determinants of labour force participation or earnings and the probability of 
finding employment following the principles laid out by Heckman (1979). Such 
‘occupational choice models’ as they are sometimes called are not only useful from a 
descriptive point of view, but can also be applied in ex ante labour market models in which 
changes in participation and earnings are predicted or where individuals that might benefit or 
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lose out during employment expansions or contractions are identified (see Chapter 4 for a 
detailed discussion).  
Bhorat and Leibbrandt (2001) estimate various occupational choice models and find that 
education already plays an important role in determining whether an individual participates or 
not. The significance of education as a determinant of participation increases when the strict 
definition of employment is used. This, they explain, “is manifested in much better 
educational qualifications amongst participants relative to non-participants when non-
participants are dominated by discouraged work seekers” (Bhorat and Leibbrandt, 
2001:118). Put differently, among the broadly unemployed, the active work seekers are 
generally better qualified than the discouraged work seekers. More recent estimates of labour 
market participation (see for example Oosthuizen, 2005, and Van der Westhuizen et al., 
2007) corroborate the earlier findings of Bhorat and Leibbrandt (2001).  
As expected, education is also a key determinant of a participant’s probability of finding 
employment, with those with lower levels of education being more likely to remain 
unemployed (Bhorat and Leibbrandt, 2001). Oosthuizen’s (2005) study confirms this, but 
notes an interesting change between 1995 and 2004. Ten years ago, a matric qualification 
raised a participant’s probability of finding employment well above that of someone without 
it, but this relative advantage had since diminished significantly. This suggests that the stakes 
have been raised; in order to effectively compete for jobs in the modern economy a post-
matric certificate, diploma or degree has become much more important. This finding reflects, 
firstly, the relative increase in the labour supply of matrics, and, secondly, the relatively 
strong growth in demand for higher-skilled labour vis-à-vis lower skilled workers, which is a 
prominent feature of the structural changes experienced in the economy. 
Bhorat (2008) notes that race in particular remains a strong predictor of employment 
probabilities, but argues that this variable stands proxy for a range of omitted variables in 
these kinds employment equations. Most important of these omitted variables, he argues, is 
the significantly higher quality and effectiveness of schooling offered to White labour market 
participants. This is reflected in larger class sizes, as well as better physical and ‘knowledge’ 
infrastructure in former White schools compared to former African schools. This means that 
the significant race effects found in these occupational choice models may in part be proxy 
for the impact of poor quality education attained by African jobseekers. Other omitted 
variables, Bhorat (2008) argues, may include language effects, parental income, social 
networks and peer effects, none of which can be tested econometrically within the confines of 
the labour force surveys in South Africa.      
The earnings equations estimated by Bhorat and Leibbrandt (2001) show an interesting yet 
somewhat controversial relationship between wages and education. Primary and secondary 
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schooling, they find, are important in increasing earnings, but each additional year of tertiary 
education is not. The implication of this seems to be that while a tertiary qualification is 
crucial in determining whether an individual is likely to gain employment, it is less important 
in determining that individual’s earnings once they have a job.  
These findings were challenged by Keswell and Poswell (2004). They use several datasets 
and a variety of functional forms and estimation techniques to test the robustness of 
econometric results on educational returns in proving that there is in actual fact a strong 
convex relationship between education and earnings (see Figure 2.3). Their findings show 
that the marginal returns to education are initially close to zero (or even negative depending 
on the estimation technique and/or functional form selected) at low levels of education, 
followed by a particularly sharp rise in the return structure at about twelve years of schooling 
(i.e., as scholars move into tertiary education and beyond). Incidentally, Keswell and Poswell 
(2004) show that when controlling for experience, the slightly negative returns to education at 
low levels of education disappears, suggesting that this effect may have more to do with age 
or experience effects than with education itself.     
Figure 2.3: Convex Returns to Education: Evidence for South Africa, 1993 to 2000 
 
Source:  Keswell and Poswell (2004) 
Given limited financial resources and their location, poor people are generally less likely to 
obtain higher degrees than their non-poor counterparts. Evidence from the IES/LFS 2000 
shows that just less than 50 per cent of poor people (i.e., those in the bottom two household 
quintiles) of working age have never progressed beyond primary school. In contrast, only 20 
per cent of non-poor people of working age only completed primary school. This implies that 
those among the poor that are fortunate enough to find employment are quite likely to be 
caught in an ‘earnings trap’ denoted by the flat sections of the returns to education curves 
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estimated by Keswell and Poswell (2004). Wages earned by the working poor are then often 
shared among much larger families as we have seen (see Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 earlier), 
thus causing the entire family to be in poverty, despite being attached to the labour market. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Given the centrality of the labour market in the determination of poverty, any policy that 
raises employment or wage earnings has the potential of being a powerful tool in the battle to 
eradicate poverty. Strong economic growth will always be crucial in generating more jobs 
and reducing poverty. However, in the interim, direct interventions in the labour market may 
be necessary. Torres et al. (2000) identify four distinct sets of instruments that can be used in 
labour market policy. First, there are those that aim to create more employment opportunities 
for the unemployed. Second, there are those that directly target wage income levels of the 
(working) poor. The third is a long-term approach aimed at increasing skills levels in the 
labour force, a policy that will allow people to compete for better quality jobs that offer 
higher wages. Finally there are those policies aimed at improving the bargaining power of 
workers, thus allowing them to negotiate better conditions of employment.  
The analysis here has shown that the South African poverty problem can be linked to at least 
two key labour market features. The first is the high level of unemployment. Over two-thirds 
of the unemployed are poor and typically lack the skills and means required to effectively 
compete for jobs. The second is very low wages, or more broadly speaking, the low earnings 
potential of workers. Once income sharing and the fact the wage earners have many 
dependants are taken into account, it becomes clear that wages (of low-skilled workers in 
particular) are simply not sufficient to allow these workers and their families to escape 
poverty.  
With this background information in mind, the focus in this turns to labour market policies 
that have the potential to raise employment or wages. In particular, we consider minimum 
wages and wage subsidies, both of which can be described as wage-based policies in that the 
primary intervention is through a direct (minimum wages) or indirect (wage subsidies) 
adjustment of wages. Chapter 3 elaborates on the theoretical and design aspects of these two 
policy approaches and argues their merits, limitations and design options.  
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Chapter 3. Labour Market Theory and 
Policy: The Case for Minimum 
Wages and Wage Subsidies 
n this chapter two ‘wage-based’ labour market interventions, namely minimum wages 
and wage subsidies, are analysed from a theoretical perspective. Both these policies use 
wages as the main policy lever to effect a change in the market outcome, and hence any 
theoretical overview of the likely impacts of these policies should start with a review of the 
relevant labour market theory that explains employment responses in the economy. Section 1 
therefore introduces the basic theoretical concepts around the wage-employment relationship 
as presented in the standard neo-classical theory of labour demand. Sections 2 and 3 then 
consider in more detail the theory and rationale for the implementation of minimum wage and 
wage subsidy policies. The aim is to provide the theoretical background needed in order to 
understand what the likely impacts of these policies in terms of employment, income and 
poverty effects might be. As such, where appropriate and relevant, the chapter will introduce 
some specific modelling issues around labour market policy and poverty impact analysis, but 
mainly as an introduction to the more in-depth discussion on modelling approaches that 
follows in Chapter 4. Section 4 draws brief conclusions.  
1. Wages and Employment Responses 
1.1. Theory of Labour Demand 
Both minimum wages and wage subsidies use wages as the primary policy lever in order to 
bring about change in the labour market. The primary outcome of an exogenous change in the 
wage is a change in the employment level. Given the standard assumption of an inverse 
relationship between wages and employment, minimum wages are likely to lower 
I 
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employment levels, while wage subsidies have the opposite effect. When evaluating the 
impact of these policies on welfare and poverty in the economy, the way in which the 
employment effect is modelled is critical.  
Neo-classical economic textbooks typically use a simple partial equilibrium approach to 
explain the impact of such wage changes on employment levels. The operating parameter is 
the wage elasticity of labour demand (ηL), which is defined as the marginal change in 
employment for a given change in the wage.  
 
% (ln )
 or 
% (ln )L L
L d L
w d w
η η∆= =
∆
 [3.1] 
Knowledge about the value of wage elasticity parameter, either within economic sectors or at 
the economy-wide level, is a useful start towards understanding the impact of the policy. By 
reorganising equation [3.1] the marginal employment effects associated with a specific 
change in the wage can be calculated as %∆L = ηL%∆w. Thus, for a given change in the 
wage, the change in employment experienced depends on the size of the wage elasticity 
parameter.  
A partial equilibrium analysis of employment changes at a national level ignores differential 
effects within economic sectors. Sectoral partial equilibrium analyses improve slightly on 
this, but still only consider direct employment effects within economic sectors and in 
isolation from one another; the interdependencies between sectors are ignored. Furthermore, 
partial equilibrium analyses of wage changes targeted at specific workers within sectors 
ignore the employment impacts that these policies may have on non-targeted factors of 
production. In reality firms employ a variety of different types of primary factors of 
production. This may include capital, land and various different types of labour, such as 
skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers. The wage elasticity as expressed in equation [3.1] 
is also sometimes referred to as the partial own-price elasticity of demand, as it only deals 
with the employment changes for that factor affected directly by a change in its own wage.  
In a general equilibrium setting, firms’ employment decisions take the employment of all 
primary factors of production into consideration. The combined contribution of the factors of 
production is typically called ‘value added’. The fundamental assumption is then that 
producers can choose between various combinations of primary factors of production that 
will, when combined in a production process, will all yield the same value of output. These 
input choices represent alternative production technologies available to the firm. If, for 
example, the primary inputs consisted of capital, skilled labour and unskilled labour, 
producers could decide to follow a more capital-intensive production technique, thus 
employing relatively more machinery and equipment and fewer labourers per unit of value 
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added. Alternatively, a high-skilled intensive production strategy could be followed by 
employing relatively more skilled workers and fewer unskilled workers. The choice of 
production technology is ultimately driven by relative factor costs: if capital is relatively 
more expensive, a more labour-intensive process will be followed, and vice versa.  
In practical applications the substitution possibilities in the value added function is typically 
modelled using either a Cobb-Douglas (CD) or a more flexible CES function.24 In a simple 
two-input case (say workers and capital, or skilled workers, LS, and unskilled workers, LU) 
the CD or CES function is represented by an isoquant, a smooth curve that is convex with 
respect to the origin. Two possible scenarios are sketched with the help of Figure 3.1 below. 
The vertical axes in each of these graphs represent skilled employment, while the horizontal 
axes represent unskilled employment. Initially, in the diagram on the left, the firm’s profit 
maximising level of employment is achieved at point A. In the event of a reduction in the 
wage of unskilled workers relative to that of skilled workers, the firm's isocost line becomes 
flatter (the slope of the isocost line is given by the ratio of unskilled wages to skilled wages). 
The firm’s production costs can now be reduced by substituting employment away from 
skilled labour towards point B while still maintaining output at the original level (output is 
represented here by the curved isoquant).  
Figure 3.1: Firm-level Analysis of Substitution along a Production Isoquant 
LS LS
LU LU
A
B
C
D
High elasticity of substitution Low elasticity of substitution
 
In economic models the ease with which producers can substitute between different factors of 
production is determined by the elasticity of substitution (EOS), which enters into the CD or 
CES value-added production function as a parameter. A high EOS indicates a high degree of 
                                                 
24
  More recently the use of a translog function has become popular. Such a function allows for a 
specification whereby by some factors production are complement and others substitutes. Go et al. (2009) 
adopt such a functional form and assume that due to structural reasons unskilled and skilled workers in 
South Africa are actually complements. As we show in the Appendix (section 4.2.3) their application to 
wage subsidies yields very different employment effects. While this partly relates to difference in 
simulation setup, it mainly reflects differences in the way factor demand is modelled.   
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substitutability between the primary factors and vice versa.25 The right hand diagram in 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the employment effects of a similar change in the relative factor costs as 
in the left-hand diagram, only now under a low elasticity scenario. As can be seen from the 
figures the EOS affects the curvature of the isoquant, and hence also the extent of the 
substitution (in this low elasticity scenario from points C to D). From a modelling 
perspective, therefore, the extent of the employment effect observed depends crucially on the 
size of the EOS parameter assumed or estimated for a particular sector or for particular 
factors of production.26  
A general equilibrium approach allows for the evaluation of the impact of a change in the 
wage of one factor of production on employment levels of that factor as well as other factors 
of production employed in the same production process. Whereas in a partial equilibrium 
model the employment change depends on the wage elasticity, it depends on the EOS 
between various factors of production in a general equilibrium model. It follows that the 
wage elasticity (ηL) and the EOS (σ) have to be related. Hamermesh (1993) shows this 
relationship to be:  
 
(1 ) 0Lη τ σ= − − <  where 
.
.
wL
PQτ =  [3.2] 
In this expression the symbol τ represents labour’s share in the value of output (or a particular 
subset of labour, e.g. low-skilled workers). This share is calculated as the ratio of the wage 
bill (w.L) to total revenue (P.Q), where P represents the price of the underlying goods 
produced by the firm. As τ becomes very small, ηL and σ are very similar. Thus, in models 
where factor accounts are highly disaggregated, τ is small and the distinction between the 
wage elasticity and the EOS is less pronounced.  
                                                 
25
  For the CD function EOS = 1. The more versatile multiple-input CES value added function is defined as 
1
i ii
QVA A F ρ ρδ
−
− =
 ∑  where A is an efficiency or shift parameter, and δι (0 ≤ δι ≤ 1) is a share 
parameter. The parameter ρ (-1 ≤ ρ < ∞, ρ ≠ 0) is the substitution parameter or function exponent, which 
is related to the EOS (σ) as follows: 1
1
σ
ρ
=
+
 (0 ≤ σ ≤ ∞).  The CES function is not defined for ρ = 0 
due to division by zero. However, using L’Hôpital’s Rule it can be shown that as ρ → 0 (and hence 
σ → 1), the linearly homogenous CES production function approaches the linearly homogenous CD 
function. Also, as σ → ∞ the CES function approaches a linear production function (perfect substitution), 
while, as σ → 0, the function approaches a Leontief fixed input-output production function (no 
substitution possible).  
26
  In some sectors it may be harder to substitute between different types of factors of production than in 
other sectors. Consider for example the construction of a skyscraper. It would be technically infeasible to 
substitute a 100 foot crane for construction workers. In the agricultural sector, however, it may be more 
feasible to replace a tractor (say) with a number of workers and still maintain output levels. 
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Partial equilibrium models evaluate changes in a single market (say the market for low-
skilled workers) in isolation from other markets, treating the impacts in other markets and/or 
sectors as exogenous. This ignores various important interrelationships between different 
agents and markets in the economy. All these indirect effects are considered in a general 
equilibrium model. In the context of labour market policies, two important indirect effects 
can be considered. The first are income effects. Minimum wages and wage subsidies (for 
example) impact on wage earnings and/or employment levels. This implies that the spending 
capacity of households is affected, leading to a change in household consumption, which has 
further indirect employment effects on the economy. For this reason wage-based policies are 
said to have a substitution effect (as has been illustrated) as well as a scale (or a ‘macro 
demand-side’) effect. Scale effects, as the name suggests, relate to changes in the scale of 
production due to demand changes, and are represented by moves to higher or lower 
production isoquants.  
The second type of effect is a price effect. As we shall see in sections 2 and 3 below, both 
minimum wages and wage subsidies alter employers’ production costs. Minimum wages, for 
example, cause production costs to rise. Although this is partly mitigated by substituting 
away from the more expensive factor of production, at least some of these costs are passed on 
to consumers in the form of higher prices, especially when substitutability is low. Wage 
subsidies have the opposite effect, i.e. the subsidy (if payable to the firm) reduces the unit 
cost of labour and hence the unit cost of production. These savings are passed on to 
consumers. Consumers respond to relative changes in commodity prices by altering their 
consumption bundles and/or levels of consumption. At a sectoral level such changes in 
demand will also induce a change in production levels.  
Clearly, the relationships between wages, employment responses, prices and consumers’ 
behavioural responses (demand effects) are important. Hamermesh (1993) shows that in a 
competitive market a one per cent rise in the wage will cause consumer prices to rise by 
labour’s share of revenue (τ). Since all firms face the same wage increase, the price increase 
will be across the board, and hence, given a downward-sloping demand curve in the 
commodity market, demand will fall and output will decline. This effect is due to the fact that 
output levels in a perfectly competitive environment are driven by demand levels, which is 
why labour demand is also sometimes called ‘derived demand’ – it is the demand for labour 
derived from the demand for commodities produced by those workers. We can now define 
the ‘total wage elasticity’, which is represented by η ′L in equation [3.3] below, as a function of 
the wage elasticity and the price elasticity of demand for the product (ηP): 
 
(1 )L Pη τ σ τη′ = − − −  [3.3] 
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The product τηP reflects Marshall’s second law of derived demand, and shows that labour 
demand is less elastic when demand for the product is less elastic.  
In summary then, the Hicks-Marshall laws of derived demand identify a number of factors 
that will influence the own-price elasticity of labour demand in an industry. The wage 
elasticity will be high if (1) the price elasticity of demand for the product produced in that 
industry is high, (2) when other factors of production are easily substituted for that category 
of labour, (3) when the supply of other factors is highly elastic (production costs are unlikely 
to increase too much as demand for other factors increase), and (4) when labour costs of the 
particular category of labour make up a large share of total costs. All these laws pertain to 
scale and substitution effects associated with a change in relative factor costs, as discussed in 
the previous sub-section. 
The preceding discussions further illustrate the important interrelationships between wage 
elasticities, elasticities of substitution and the price elasticity of demand. It also illustrates 
why it may be important to consider all the direct and indirect price and demand effects when 
modelling the impact of labour market policies on the economy. Partial and general 
equilibrium models are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.   
1.2. Wage Elasticity Estimation: The Example of South Africa 
Estimating wage elasticities econometrically is one way of exploring the trade-off between 
wages and employment levels. Although this sub-section is mainly intended as a theoretical 
review of wage elasticity estimation and difficulties associated with it, it draws on South 
African wage elasticity estimates for illustration purposes. The study by Fallon and Lucas 
(1998) produced some of the most widely cited sets of wage-employment elasticities for 
South Africa. A comparison of these estimates with those from other studies illustrates just 
how sensitive estimates can be to data and methods used, as well as assumptions made. The 
standard approach to estimating wage elasticities starts with an estimation of labour demand 
equations, based on the assumption that firms’ employment decisions can be modelled as a 
CES production function (see discussion earlier). Hamermesh (1993) explains that by 
expressing the CES function in cost terms, partially differentiating with respect to the wage 
and then taking the natural logarithm yields a labour demand function of the form  
 
ln ln lni i iL w b Qα σ= − +  [3.4] 
where Li and wi are the employment and wage levels respectively in a given sector (or even at 
the firm-level), Qi is the level of output for the sector or firm, α is a constant term, and b and 
σ are model coefficients, with the latter representing the EOS.  
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In Fallon and Lucas’s (1998) estimation model capital stock levels are assumed to be 
exogenous, while employment levels of white workers are endogenous. Their approach 
produces a set of long run wage elasticities, by economic sector, for black employees. These 
estimates, presented in Table 3.1 below, show a high degree of variation between sectors. The 
mining sector has a fairly low elasticity of -0.15, which stands in contrast to the much higher 
elasticity in the services sector (-0.95). The average for the manufacturing sector is -1.0. The 
authors admit that their estimate for the manufacturing sector is perhaps too high, driven by 
very high estimates in at least two of the manufacturing sectors, as is quite evident from 
Table 3.1. Fallon and Lucas (1998) also calculate a national average elasticity of -0.71. This 
national wage elasticity is a weighted mean estimate of all the sectoral wage elasticities, and 
has almost become the benchmark wage elasticity used in South African labour market 
studies.  
Table 3.1: Sectoral Wage-Employment Elasticities for Black Formal Sector Workers 
Economic Sector Long Run Impact 
Beverages -0.184 -0.095 
Tobacco -0.057 -0.018 
Textiles -0.984 -0.346 
Wearing apparel  -2.508 -0.709 
Wood products -0.196 -0.603 
Furniture -0.364 -0.139 
Chemicals -1.166 -0.344 
Rubber and plastic -0.243 -0.153 
Non-metals and minerals -2.929 -0.451 
Basic metals -0.758 -0.166 
Fabricated metals -0.466 -0.175 
Non-elec machinery -0.632 -0.408 
M
an
u
fa
ct
u
rin
g 
Transport equip -0.440 -0.201 
Mining -0.146 -0.118 
Construction -0.554 -0.360 O
th
er
 
se
ct
o
rs
 
Service -0.948 -0.147 
National average -0.709 -0.156 
Source: Fallon and Lucas (1998) 
In another South African study Fields et al. (2000) calculated elasticities for the South 
African private sector. They also find significant variation in elasticities between different 
sectors. At a national level they come up with estimates of -0.35 for the period 1990 to 1993 
and -0.53 for the period 1994 to 1998. On the basis of these (statistically significant) 
estimates they argue that the elasticity has increased over time, although their estimates are 
still somewhat lower than those obtained by Fallon and Lucas (1998). Fedderke and Marriotti 
(2002) analysed manufacturing sector data and concluded that the average wage elasticity in 
the manufacturing sector lies between -0.50 and -0.55, which is slightly higher than Fields et 
al.’s (2000) estimate of -0.45 for this same sector between 1994 and 1998.  
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Balcombe et al.’s (2000) wage elasticity estimates for the agricultural sector suggest a similar 
responsiveness as the manufacturing sector (-0.59). However, Conradie (2004) points out that 
substantial variation may be expected within different types of farms given differences in 
labour costs as a share of production costs. Her estimates suggest that wage elasticities on 
wine and table grape farms are -0.33 and -0.59 respectively, while wage elasticities are lower 
for regular as opposed to seasonal workers (-0.21 and -0.44 for male labourers).    
The South African studies cited here concur that there is a negative relationship between 
wages and employment levels, and further that the wage elasticity is inelastic. This means 
that for a one per cent rise in the wage, employment will decline by less than one per cent. 
The estimates are in line with international evidence. A literature review by Hamermesh 
(1993) finds that the constant-output wage elasticity for ‘general employment’ probably lies 
between -0.15 and -0.75, with -0.30 representing a good guess.  
However, the estimation of elasticities appears to be quite sensitive to the sectors studied and 
the time period analysed. In response to Fallon and Lucas’s (1998) estimates, Pollin et al. 
(2006) note that just six years prior to this Fallon also produced employment elasticities, only 
this time coming up with a national weighted average of -0.28. While their later estimate is 
perhaps, as argued by Fallon and Lucas (1998), more in line with those of other developing 
countries, Pollin et al. (2006: 26) write “the large shift in their own estimate underscores the 
difficulties in providing generalisations on this matter”. In the case of South Africa, “the 
remarkable historical and institutional changes that [the country] has undergone in the past 
30 years – as well as the inadequacy of data on employment under the apartheid regime” 
further adds to the difficulties around estimating wage elasticities.  
Pollin et al. (2006) are further concerned about Fallon and Lucas’s (1998) reporting of so-
called impact elasticities (see Table 3.1), defined as the wage elasticity over a one-year 
period. This is reported as -0.16 for the economy as a whole, which suggests that it would 
take over four-and-a-half years for the full (long run) effect of a wage increase or decrease to 
work its way through the economy. Pollin et al. (2006) argue that many other exogenous 
shocks would impact on the economy over such a long period, making the effectiveness of 
wage changes as a policy tool to affect employment levels uncertain.  
Hamermesh (1993) affords the wage elasticity estimation problem some attention, and in 
particular writes about the problem of aggregation. The problem has two dimensions; firstly, 
it concerns the estimation of elasticities at a sectoral level and how to aggregate these to 
obtain meaningful estimates for the economy as a whole. Secondly, it concerns the grouping 
of labour, i.e. the choice about how labour should be aggregated to form representative 
groups to be included in the estimation models. The first point is easily illustrated with the 
help of equation [3.4]. Aggregating to a national level simply involves adding up 
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employment levels and averaging wages across individual units (firms or sectors, as 
represented by the subscript i in the equation). Such linear aggregation yields the following 
aggregate labour demand function:  
 ( ) ( )ln ln lni i ii i iL w b Qα σ′ ′= − +∑ ∑ ∑  [3.5] 
In comparing equations [3.4] and [3.5], Hamermesh (1993) points out that there is no reason 
to expect that σ σ′ =  or even that b = 1.  
The second aggregation problem is around the grouping of labour and the implicit 
assumptions that go with it. No two workers are perfectly substitutable, yet when workers are 
grouped through linearly adding up employment levels of a particular group and using the 
average wage of the group in the estimation, the assumption is effectively that workers within 
a group are perfectly substitutable or homogeneous. Mathematically this implies that the 
elasticity of substitution between workers i and j within a group tends to infinity (σij → ∞). 
Aggregation is unavoidable if the aim is to come up with a manageable set of wage 
elasticities. Therefore, when aggregating, care should be taken to group workers that are 
indeed ‘similar’, something that will always remain a great challenge and one that general 
equilibrium modellers are frequently faced with (see Chapter 4).     
1.3. Challenging the Notion of a Wage-Employment Trade-Off 
The South African studies cited earlier are in agreement that there is a trade-off between 
wages and employment, i.e. wage elasticities are negative and statistically significantly 
different from zero. However, the notion of a trade-off between wages and employment 
levels has been challenged outright. Findings of a number of case studies conducted by Card 
and Krueger (1995:393) in the United States all show that both wages and employment levels 
improved after the introduction of minimum wages in various sectors. Employment gains 
reported were not always statistically significant, but at least, they argue, employment 
declines were never reported. Importantly though, is the fact that their case studies all focused 
on a fairly short period (1 to 3 years at the most). Elasticities are understandably small and 
possibly insignificantly different from zero over such a short period. While the authors 
suggest that long term analyses are necessary to complement their research, they caution 
against these given the difficulties in isolating other exogenous shocks that affect 
employment levels in the long run, as well as the eroding effect of inflation on real wage 
levels.  
In his literature review on the same subject Hertz (2002) raises the issue of whether it is in 
fact reasonable to assume that the wage elasticity, which is typically estimated at the average 
wage, can be used in ex ante minimum wage analyses. The elasticity with respect to the 
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average wage is a different elasticity than with respect to the minimum wage, i.e. the 
employment response will be sensitive to the level at which the minimum wage is set relative 
to the prior average. Thus, if the minimum wage is low relative to the prior average wage, the 
employment response is likely to be small, and vice versa. This concern is not necessarily 
restricted to a minimum wage context, i.e. this is an important issue irrespective of the 
direction of the wage change.   
The microeconomics literature also provides an explanation for the occurrence of positive 
wage elasticities in its monopsony model. Although the model is often dismissed as an  
“intellectual curiosity” (Card and Krueger, 1995), it introduces the notion that the existence 
of market power could lead to a situation where moderate wage increases (due to minimum 
wages for example) might not lead to a decline in employment as perfect competition models 
would suggest.27 A monopsonist is defined as a significant purchaser of labour. Therefore, 
since its labour supply curve is essentially the upward-sloping supply curve of the entire 
market, it must offer higher wages when it wishes to attract more workers. Given the 
existence of market power, the marginal revenue product of labour is equal to the marginal 
cost of labour in equilibrium, but this is still greater than the wage offered. This implies that 
the marginal worker is still profitable after a rise in the wage, while more workers want to 
work at this higher wage due to the upward-sloping labour supply curve. The end result is 
that both employment and wages rise. However, even in this model the wage cannot be 
increased indefinitely.  
2. Minimum Wages 
2.1. Theory 
Minimum wages involve setting a floor price which is above the existing equilibrium wage 
for workers in a certain market. Often minimum wages are targeted at low-wage sectors or 
occupation groups. Minimum wage policies are politically popular for at least two reasons. 
Firstly, they represent a straightforward way of redistributing earnings to low paid workers 
and lifting the working poor out of poverty. Secondly, they are often favoured over other 
types of labour market interventions as they do not require any additional government 
spending. For governments facing budget constraints and resistance to increased taxation, 
minimum wages are certainly an attractive way of redistributing income. Given the features 
of this policy “it is probably safe to assume that the minimum wage will continue to attract 
                                                 
27
  Given the prominence that this model still receives in modern microeconomic textbooks, especially when 
the topic of minimum wages is under discussion, it was considered necessary to include this brief 
discussion. The monopsony model, however, is not a serious candidate as a model for South Africa’s 
labour market. As Kuhn (2004:376) argues, unless “one focuses on workers with very specific skill types 
in very defined geographical areas, upward-sloping labour supply curves … seem unlikely”. This is 
especially true in a modern era of increased labour mobility and information sharing.  
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the attention of policymakers” (Card and Krueger, 1995). Developing a better understanding 
of the employment and poverty effects associated with minimum wages is therefore 
important.   
The single most important criticism against the implementation of minimum wages is that 
they lead to unemployment. The standard neo-classical textbook explanation of the impact of 
wage changes on employment levels (in a partial equilibrium context) assumes that the labour 
demand curve is downward-sloping or elastic (see for example McConnel and Brue, 1999). 
As shown in the left-hand panel of Figure 3.2 a minimum wage (wM) set above the initial 
market wage will lead to employment decline from LE to LD. At this wage, however, LS 
workers want to work, and hence the distance between LD and LS represents unemployment. 
When mass unemployment exists, such as is the case among low-skilled workers in South 
Africa, labour supply could be thought of as being infinitely elastic as there are always more 
people willing to work at the prevailing wage rate. This means that the supply curve for 
labour (SL) can be drawn as a horizontal line (see right-hand panel of the figure). In this 
scenario the minimum wage will lead to employment losses equal to the distance between 
LE and LD, which in this instance represents an increase in the ‘equilibrium’ unemployment 
level.  
Figure 3.2: Demand and Supply of Labour and the Impact of a Minimum Wage 
DL
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The analysis can easily be extended to the multiple-input case using production isoquants that 
allow for an analysis of the substitution effect between different factors of production. As 
discussed earlier with the aid of Figure 3.1, the extent of the employment loss will depend on 
the wage elasticity of demand in a partial equilibrium context or the elasticity of substitution 
(EOS) in a general equilibrium context.  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Chapter 3: Labour Market Theory and Policy: The Case for Minimum Wages and Wage Subsidies 
 47
2.2. The Rationale for Minimum Wages 
The idea that minimum wages will lead to employment losses is frequently challenged in the 
literature. Reference to some of this literature was made in section 1.3 above. It can be argued 
that the employment effects depend on the level of the minimum wage relative to market 
wages, i.e. if the wage increase is moderate, employment levels may be unaffected as 
employers may decide to mitigate cost increases in ways other than reducing employment 
levels. This may be particularly true in instances where the costs associated with laying off 
workers are higher than the minimum wage increase.  
Some would argue that the macroeconomic or scale effects of minimum wages are even more 
important than the debates around whether the microeconomic employment response is 
significant or not. Proponents of minimum wages argue that if the employment response is 
inelastic, the wage bill rises, which in turn increases the purchasing power of the working 
class (Hertz, 2002). Under such an outcome the minimum wage policy will be associated 
with a demand-side stimulus. While this may be true in a fixed-price context, it still ignores 
the possible price effects of minimum wage policies. In particular, as we argue in Chapter 5, 
when the wage elasticity is low, firms are more likely to pass higher wage costs on to 
consumers in the form of higher prices. This will erode some or all of these macroeconomic 
gains. 
There are also various socio-economic and political arguments in favour of minimum wage 
policies. The notion that minimum wages reduce poverty levels among the working poor and 
their families is most frequently offered as a justification. Minimum wages may also simply 
be about the promotion of fairness and equity in the workplace if issued as a “moral signal” 
to employers. As such minimum wages may simply be about setting a “benchmark for good 
wage practice amongst employers” (Bhorat, 2000:9).  
There are also at least two purely economic justifications for the use of minimum wages as a 
labour market policy option. The first relates to the notion of reservation wages, the argument 
being that a minimum wage may raise the equilibrium wage above the reservation wage, 
which will attract additional workers to the market. In terms of this reasoning, minimum 
wages may be suitable in labour supply-constrained economies, which of course excludes 
South Africa. (see earlier related discussion in Chapter 2).28 
A second economic justification is the ‘efficiency wage argument’, which can be attributed to 
Joseph Stiglitz (see for example Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). The efficiency wage argument 
was initially developed to explain why some firms pay above-equilibrium wages, also called 
                                                 
28
  Incidentally, this same kind of argument can be used to justify the idea of offering a wage subsidy to 
workers as opposed to firms (see section 3).  
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efficiency wages, and why then, as a result, unemployment may sometimes persist in the long 
run. In a perfectly competitive environment with full employment a worker who is fired for 
shirking on the job will immediately be rehired again. When efficiency wages are paid the 
worker has an incentive not to shirk, since, in the presence of unemployment, the worker may 
run the risk of not finding a job again. In effect, therefore, the opportunity cost of being fired 
is raised by efficiency wages. Ultimately, efficiency wages may lead to increases in worker 
productivity levels, while they minimise labour turnover and enable firms to attract better 
quality workers. Productivity increases may also simply arise due to the fact that employers 
utilise workers more efficiently because mandated minimum wages raise employment costs 
(McConnel and Brue, 1999). 
Although the efficiency wage theory was not necessarily developed with minimum wages in 
mind, minimum wages may by the same token increase labour productivity among minimum 
wage earners. In fact, if productivity levels rise by enough, the marginal revenue product of 
workers may increase to the extent that the minimum wage equals the equilibrium wage and 
employment losses will be mitigated. 
2.3. Policy Design and Implementation 
Minimum wage policies are used in both developed and developing countries as anti-poverty 
measures or as guidelines for good wage practice. As such they are also sometimes tied to 
basic conditions of employment (this is the case in South Africa; see Chapter 5). A survey 
conducted by the International Organisation of Employers (IOE) in 2006 provides a good 
idea of what minimum wage policies look like around the world. Over 80 per cent of the 48 
countries surveyed by the (IOE, 2006) reported that some form of minimum wage legislature 
was in place. In addition to this, a large majority of the countries (e.g., 75 per cent of 
European Union member countries) have statutory or ‘mandated’ minimum wages in addition 
to collectively agreed wages. There are some interesting models as well: Hong Kong, for 
example, follows a voluntary approach to minimum wages called a ‘wage protection 
movement’.   
About half the countries in the IOE (2006) survey have a single minimum wage for the entire 
country, but some countries differentiate between sectors, regions within the country and type 
of occupation in setting the wage benchmark. Age-specific minimum wages are set in about 9 
per cent of the countries. South African is an example of a country with non-uniform 
minimum wages, while Australia has over 20 000 specific minimum wage levels. Not all 
sectors are necessarily covered in these countries; e.g., in the United States, people who 
receive gratuities (services sectors) are exempt. In the case of South Africa, minimum wages 
were specifically introduced for those not covered by wage bargaining councils.  
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Minimum wages are either set by institutions or sectors through collective bargaining 
processes or by government, usually after consultation with stakeholders. Adjustments to the 
minimum wage are either agreed collectively or increases are linked to inflation. In some 
countries (e.g., Malaysia) a productivity-linked wage system is in use. More than half the 
countries surveyed by the IOE (2006) felt the minimum wage level was ‘just right’, which 
suggests that minimum wages are often set at a level considered to be a fair wage.  
However, in some countries (e.g., the United Kingdom) there is fear that the minimum wage 
has become too high. Employers there compensate for this by cutting benefits and curbing 
performance-based pay structures. Over time, wage increases of workers above the minimum 
wage may be curbed to finance minimum wage increases, thus leading to a narrowing of the 
overall wage distribution (see section 2.4.2 below).  
Minimum wage increases or the introduction of new minimum wage policies altogether may 
also have various other ‘unintended consequences’. For example, in South Africa, minimum 
wages for domestic workers did not necessarily lead to large-scale job losses, but employees’ 
hours were reduced, typically without a compensating reduction in the level of output 
expected by the employer (Hertz, 2005). A likely consequence of regional differences in 
minimum wages is increased migration from low- to high-wage regions (IOE, 2006), 
especially when regional wage differences are not founded on differences in living costs. 
Finally, in China, where minimum wages have been in place since 1993, authorities are 
reportedly concerned about the impact that minimum wage increases might have on the 
country’s competitiveness in world markets.   
2.4. Theoretical Models for Analysing Minimum Wage Effects 
Although labour market and economic modelling is a central theme in Chapter 4, it is 
worthwhile here to consider some of the models that have been developed to analyse the 
effects of this type of policy intervention. As we explain in more depth in the chapter to 
follow, there are two broad approaches that have been followed. The first is an ex post 
approach whereby, typically, econometric models are used to evaluate the statistical 
relationships between employment or poverty and wages over time. A South African example 
of such an approach can be found in Hertz (2005), who uses the series of Labour Force 
Surveys to investigate  domestic worker employment responses to minimum wages in South 
Africa.  
The alternative, and the main focus of attention in this study, is to use an ex ante analytical or 
modelling framework that allows for the analysis of the impact of changes in wage minima 
on employment, incomes and poverty in a forward-looking manner. Such ex ante modelling 
frameworks can either be partial or general equilibrium models. Once again details about the 
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workings of such models are provided in Chapter 4, but a brief discussion of some ex ante 
modelling analyses of minimum wage impacts is appropriate in the context of the theoretical 
overview in this chapter. The discussion to follow therefore serves, to some extent, as an 
introduction to ex ante modelling of the labour market in general, but it also provides a better 
understanding of the likely employment and poverty effects of minimum wage policies in 
particular.  
We focus on three types of models that have been described in the literature. The first is the 
minimum wage-poverty model by Fields and Kanbur (2007), which illustrates the complexity 
of the wage-employment poverty relationship. The second is the human capital model, which 
is essentially an adaptation of the standard neo-classical approach to understanding the 
employment responses to minimum wages (we draw on Card and Krueger’s (1995) 
discussion of this model). Finally, we consider two types of micro-simulation-type models 
that have been applied in a minimum wage context, namely an analysis by Hertz (2002) that 
looks at South African minimum wages for domestic workers, and a study by Bird and 
Manning (2005) that focuses on the production cost aspects of minimum wage policies and 
how that impacts on households’ spending power and welfare levels.  
2.4.1. Fields and Kanbur Model 
Fields and Kanbur’s (2007) model illustrates the importance of assumptions around model 
parameter values in determining the overall impact of minimum wages on poverty. Although 
their model is highly theoretical, it is useful to explore here given that is designed especially 
to evaluate the poverty effects of minimum wages. The Fields-Kanbur model it is per 
definition an economy-wide model, but given the model assumptions (see below) it operates 
similarly to a partial equilibrium model.  
The starting point of their model is the assumption that the minimum wage legislation applies 
and is enforced in all sectors of the economy equally. The model further assumes that there is 
a single homogenous type of labour that is supplied by workers and demanded by firms, with 
no labour force entry or exit. The entire population in the model participates in the labour 
market, i.e. everyone is either employed or unemployed. Any person who is unemployed 
earns zero income, except when some form of income sharing takes place where the 
unemployed share in the income earned by the employed. Based on the FGT approach to 
measuring poverty (see equation [A.1] in the Appendix), the model shows that the poverty 
effects of minimum wages depend on four parameters, namely (1) the degree of poverty 
aversion, which is represented by α in the FGT equation, (2) the wage-employment elasticity 
(ηL), (3) the ratio of the minimum wage to the poverty line ( Mw z ), and (4) the way in which 
income sharing takes place in the economy.  
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The supply curve in their model is normalised to one and represents the entire population. 
Given that labour supply is static, independent of the wage and represents aggregate supply in 
the economy, this curve, as shown in Figure 3.3, is vertical as opposed to the standard 
upward-sloping or horizontal supply curves shown earlier in Figure 3.2. Labour demand is a 
function of the wage rate and is represented by the downward-sloping labour demand curve, 
DL. Full-employment is obtained at the equilibrium wage, wE. For a minimum wage of wM set 
above the equilibrium wage, employment declines to x and there are (1 – x) unemployed 
persons. The extent of the unemployment depends on the change in the wage as well as the 
wage elasticity of demand following the relationship defined in equation [3.1].   
Figure 3.3: Minimum Wage Effects on Employment in a Competitive Labour Market  
DL
L
wE
SL
wM
1x
 
Source: Adapted from Fields and Kanbur (2007) 
In the basic scenario with no income sharing in the economy, the impact of the minimum 
wage on the FGT poverty measure (Pα) depends on where the minimum wage is set relative 
to the poverty line, z. If the aim of the minimum wage legislation is to raise the working poor 
out of poverty and the minimum wage is set above the poverty line (0 < z ≤ wM), it means 
that all those who work are non-poor, while the unemployed (1 – x) earn zero and are 
therefore poor. The extent of poverty under this scenario is shown in equation [3.6].  
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∑  [3.6] 
This result is independent of the value of α, i.e. the poverty measure equals 1 – x for all 
values of α. Further, since the population is normalized to one, the share of unemployed is 
also the number of unemployed. 
If, alternatively, the minimum wage is set below the poverty line (0 < wM < z) the population 
will consist of x people who receive the minimum wage and (1 – x) people who are 
unemployed and earn zero. Under such a scenario even the x employed people are poor since 
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their wage is still below the minimum wage. This means the entire population is poor, and 
hence P0 = 1. The results are more complex for P1 and P2 since income is not distributed 
uniformly among the poor. Thus, when the wage is set below the poverty line, Pα is defined 
by  
 (1 ) Mz wP x x
z
α
α
− 
= − +  
 
 [3.7] 
In essence, this result shows that there is a poverty trade-off between the working poor and 
non-working poor as the minimum wage is raised, with the parameters of the trade-off 
determined by the wage elasticity of demand. For example, when α = 1, poverty increases if 
the ηL > 1 and decreases if ηL < 1.  
These predicted outcomes are for a very simplistic model where the unemployed earn no 
income and also receive no remittance income from the employed. A more plausible scenario 
is one where the unemployed share in the income of employed members of society, either 
formally via some form of state-sanctioned unemployment insurance (social sharing model) 
or informally within communities or families (family sharing model).  
In the social sharing model employed persons are taxed or they donate a certain share of their 
income to the ‘community cooking pot’ from which all the unemployed partake. The impact 
on the poverty headcount now depends on a variety of factors. The level of the minimum 
wage relative to the poverty line will determine whether only the unemployed or all people 
will be poor (as before). The extent of unemployment depends on the wage elasticity, and this 
now also determines how many employed people are left to make contributions to the 
community cooking pot. The tax rate payable by wage earners will also impact on poverty, 
either among the employed (if the resulting net wage is less than the poverty line) or the 
unemployed (a higher tax share means unemployment insurance payments are higher).  
In the family sharing model the entire population lives in two-person households, and each 
household therefore has either zero, one or two employed members. The model assumes 
perfect income sharing within the household, i.e. household income is pooled and then shared 
equally between the two members. The per capita income is therefore wM in households with 
two employed persons, ½wM in households with one employed persons, and zero in the 
households with no employed persons. A further assumption is that each individual faces the 
exact same probability of becoming unemployed when a minimum wage is introduced. Each 
individual therefore has an unemployment probability of (1 – x). Given normalisation of the 
population, this implies that there will x2 households with two employed members, 2x(1 – x) 
households with one employed member and (1 – x)2 households with no employed persons. 
Once again, the outcome in terms of poverty is complex. The wage elasticity will determine 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Chapter 3: Labour Market Theory and Policy: The Case for Minimum Wages and Wage Subsidies 
 53
how many people become unemployed: the higher the elasticity, the larger the number of 
households with no employed members will be. These households are always poor. The level 
of the minimum wage with respect to the poverty line is also important, and whether z > wM 
(entire population is poor), wM < z < ½wM or ½wM < z < 0 will further determine whether 
households with one or two working members are poor or not.  
Labour market economists would often reject minimum wages outright, arguing that they 
cause unemployment, which in turn is associated with poverty and several other negative 
externalities. Trade unions, on the other hand, would argue that higher wages raise the 
incomes of the working poor, and even if minimum wage earners are not poor, higher wages 
may improve income sharing between the employed and the (poor) unemployed, thus 
ultimately reducing poverty. The Fields-Kanbur model is important in bringing across the 
notion that both these views of the labour market are too simplistic, and no simple answer 
exists. Field and Kanbur note that not only does the truth lie somewhere in between the views 
of labour economists and trade unions, but  “it can be characterised precisely in terms of 
empirically observable parameters” (2007:146).   
As a theoretical construct Fields and Kanbur’s (2007) model is very useful. However, 
practical application of their model is limited. A major limitation is their assumption that the 
entire population is part of the labour market, something that is especially unrealistic for an 
economy such as South Africa economy where labour force participation rates are low. This 
assumption of theirs rightfully makes the ratio of the minimum wage to the poverty line one 
of the key factors determining the poverty effect of minimum wages, but this ratio holds very 
little relevance in the real world for several reasons. Firstly, as is shown later in Chapter 5, a 
multitude of minimum wage levels apply in South Africa. Furthermore, minimum wages 
typically only cover certain occupation types and workers in certain sectors. In the absence of 
a single minimum wage covering all workers there is no single minimum wage-poverty line 
ratio.  
Secondly, in reality, income sharing is not as straightforward as the Fields-Kanbur model 
suggests. Households differ in terms of size and labour force participation of household 
members. This means that a R1 increase in the wage of one worker has very different poverty 
implications for that worker and her family than a R1 increase for another worker. A third 
complication relates to the assumption that workers earn a single market wage. While this is 
analytically convenient, actual observed wage distributions tend to follow a lognormal 
distribution. In terms of welfare analyses of minimum wages this means that some covered 
workers are below the minimum wage and others above it; furthermore, some of these ‘sub-
minimum wage workers’ may initially (i.e. prior to the introduction of the minimum wage) be 
further away from the minimum wage that applies to them than others. These workers are set 
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to gain relatively more from the introduction of minimum wages, provided they remain 
employed. 
A final concern related to the one above is that since the Fields-Kanbur model does not take 
into account the heterogeneity of workers, all workers are assumed to have the same 
probability of becoming unemployed and also earn the same wage. In a sense therefore, when 
job losses do occur, they are randomly distributed across the population. The implication is 
that whether worker x or worker y loses her job, the distributional impact is the same. The 
reality is that workers are not homogenous, as is evidenced by the fact that wages follow a 
lognormal distribution. Furthermore, individual workers each face different probabilities of 
being employed or not given differences in ability and personal characteristics.  
2.4.2. Human Capital Model 
In order to deal with this diversion from what traditional neo-classical economics assume 
about wage distributions and employment probabilities, Card and Krueger (1995) argue that 
the human capital model provides a better model for understanding employment losses 
associated with minimum wages. This model incorporat s the assumption that different 
workers possess different amounts of human capital, where human capital is seen as a 
function of schooling, experience, ability and so on. The labour market is still characterised 
by a single wage (w) for an “efficiency unit of human capital” (Card and Krueger, 1995:360-
361). The transformation function in equation [3.8] below shows how the single market wage 
(w) is related to the observed wage (wi) for each individual given the measured human capital 
of that individual (hi).  
 i iw hw=  [3.8] 
Under this model the distribution of wages is affected in two ways when a minimum wage is 
imposed. Firstly, the entire distribution shifts to the right as the market price for human 
capital increases from w to w′ . Secondly, the distribution is truncated to the left of the 
minimum wage. Any individual with i Mh w w′<  will now be excluded from the market, 
reflecting the fact that workers whose services are worth less than the minimum wage are 
discharged. As noted by Card and Krueger (1995:363), the interesting aspect of this model is 
the predicted pattern of employment losses: those individuals whose wages are furthest away 
from the minimum wage are most likely to lose their jobs, while those that initially earn just 
below the minimum wage may see their incomes rising by enough (due to the increase in w) 
to remain employed.  
A useful abstraction from the human capital model is the idea that workers are non-
homogenous as far as their wages and employment prospects are concerned. Also, in a 
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minimum wage context, those individuals that are further away from the minimum wage are 
more likely to lose their jobs.29    
2.4.3. Partial Equilibrium Micro-Models 
The idea that job losses are not randomly distributed is the domain of the type of micro-
incidence or micro-simulation models described in Chapter 4. The aim of such models is to 
better understand how job losses (or employment gains in a job gain scenario) are distributed 
among individuals in the economy.  
Hertz (2002) takes the idea of non-random job losses on board in his analysis of minimum 
wages for domestic workers in South Africa. His approach involves first calculating the 
extent of the job loss following standard neo-classical principles, i.e. equation [3.1] is 
applied. Thereafter he generates random numbers between 0 and 1 which serve as random 
unemployment ‘probabilities’, but these probabilities are then weighted by an index that 
indicates how far on average a minimum wage worker’s existing wage is from the minimum 
wage. This weighting method draws to some extent on the human capital model assumption 
about job loss allocations. A modification of this approach, and one that is explored in 
Chapter 4 and in the results chapters, is to estimate unemployment probabilities for 
individuals with the use of multivariate econometric employment equations, thus taking 
several other characteristics of individuals into account when assigning job losses or gains.  
Bird and Manning (2005) also analyse the poverty effects of minimum wages in a micro-level 
framework, but adopt a very different approach to that of Hertz (2002). In their simulations of 
minimum wages in Indonesia they assume zero job losses, which they claim may not be too 
unrealistic in the short run. They do, however, account for the possibility that firms, in order 
to mitigate the effects of higher production costs, raise their prices. Their approach is to 
calculate the increase in the wage bill faced by firms, which then allows them to calculate the 
required price increase in each sector (given aggregate demand) that would finance the 
increased wage bill. Expenditure data in the household survey then assists in determining the 
welfare implications for households.  
                                                 
29
  Of course, an alternative theory about the impact of minimum wages on wage distributions is that they do 
not cause a spill-over effect as the human capital model suggests. Rather, sub-minimum wage workers’ 
wages rise to the level of the minimum wage, while firms finance these wage increases by limiting (over 
time) the wage increases offered to workers above the minimum wage. 
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3. Wage Subsidies 
3.1. Theory 
As noted in the introduction, wage subsidies are unique in that they may operate from either 
the supply- or demand-side. As a supply-side policy a subsidy is offered to workers, i.e. the 
worker’s wage is supplemented directly while the firm still pays the original. Employee-side 
wage subsidies are prevalent in economies faced with labour shortages or where reservation 
wages are high. Traditionally, however, and particularly in a developing country context, 
wage subsidies operate from the demand-side whereby the wage faced by the employer (ws) 
is subsidised by government while the employee’s wage (w) remains unchanged. If the wage 
subsidy is expressed as a fixed share of the wage (s) then the following will hold.30   
 
(1 )  where (1 )sw s w w sδ δ= − = = −  [3.9] 
Economic theory suggests that a wage subsidy would act as an incentive for employers to 
increase employment of workers targeted by the wage subsidy policy. Figure 3.4 shows the 
expected employment effects graphically, first, on the left-hand side, for the individual firm. 
The short-run labour demand curve is represented by the downward-sloping marginal 
revenue product (MRP) curve, with the equilibrium employment level of the firm (defined 
where the wage, w, equals MRP) increasing from l1 to l2 as the wage drops from w to ws as a 
result of the wage subsidy. At the aggregate factor market-level, horizontal summation of 
individual firm-level responses causes the aggregate labour demand curve (DL) to shift to the 
right as shown in the right-hand panels. This causes overall employment in the targeted factor 
market to increase from L1 to L2.  
                                                 
30
  In some instances the subsidy would be a fixed value per worker rather than a share or percentage of the 
wage. This does not change the analysis except that in the event of wage increases the subsidy level will 
automatically increase if it is expressed as a share of the wage (see discussions to follow).  
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Figure 3.4: Partial Equilibrium Firm and Market-Level Analysis of Wage Subsidy Effects 
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There are two possible outcomes at this aggregate market-level (see Katz, 1998). The top 
panel on the right-hand side of Figure 3.4 shows the outcome when the labour supply curve 
(SL) slopes upwards. Under such a scenario the equilibrium wage will increase to w′ , which 
implies that the wage subsidy is shared between the worker and the firm. Both the wage 
elasticities of supply and demand will influence the employment effect.31 Usually, however, 
wage subsidies in the developing country context are targeted at low-skilled workers. If they 
face very high rates of unemployment as is the case in South Africa, their supply curve could 
be thought of as infinitely elastic (or horizontal). This case is shown in the bottom panel on 
the right-hand side of Figure 3.4. In this instance there will be no wage effect from the policy, 
but the employment impact will be larger than before.    
The above is still only a partial equilibrium analysis and only shows the direct employment 
effects for targeted workers. In reality other non-targeted factors of production employed by 
firms may also be affected by a wage subsidy policy. The direct effect is therefore more 
appropriately illustrated as a substitution effect along the production isoquant. Figure 3.5 
below shows such production isoquants for a production function in two inputs, namely 
skilled workers (LS) and unskilled workers (LU) under two scenarios. The left-hand panel 
shows the outcome under a high elasticity scenario, while the right hand panel illustrates the 
low elasticity scenario (compare Figure 3.1). If the unskilled wage is subsidised, employers 
                                                 
31
  Katz (1998) shows that for a demand elasticity of η and a supply elasticity of ε the employment effect is 
given by 
lnd L
ds
ηε
η ε= +  while the change in the wage will be 
lnd w
ds
η
η ε= + .  
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will substitute skilled workers for unskilled workers, which is represented in the figure by 
movements from A to B or from D to E in the two scenarios respectively. The substitution 
effect will be larger the higher the elasticity of substitution. Thus, in addition to an increase in 
unskilled employment, skilled employment levels may be affected negatively through this 
substitution effect.  
Figure 3.5: Direct Substitution and Indirect Employment Effects of Wage Subsidies  
LS LS
LU LU
A
B
D
E
C
F
Direct Indirect Direct Indirect
High elasticity of substitution Low elasticity of substitution
 
An indirect effect is also observable. Heintz and Bowles (1996) explain that wage subsidies 
lower the production costs of firms. This enables them to lower ‘commodity prices’, which in 
turn leads to an increase in demand for goods and services produced by the firm.32 This 
allows the firm to increase employment levels of all factors of production as production 
moves to a higher isoquant (i.e. from B to C, or from E to F).33 As indicated in Figure 3.5, the 
indirect employment effects work in a positive direction for both types of labour, although 
this depends on the exact shape and positioning of the isoquants. If, for example, unskilled 
labour is thought to be an inferior input, the indirect employment effect may be negative. 
Also, if the shift in the isoquant is substantial, net employment changes of skilled workers 
may even be positive despite the initial substitution effect.  
3.2. Policy Design Issues 
The particular design features of a wage subsidy policy depend on a number of factors. Most 
important of this is the aim or intention of the programme, which in turn depends on the 
                                                 
32
  The use of the term ‘commodity prices’ follows convention in the general equilibrium literature (see 
Chapter 4) to refer to goods and services (both intermediate and final) as commodities. This term is used 
throughout the study and should not be confused with ‘basic’ commodities such as wheat or coal. 
33
  A related way of thinking about this indirect effect is in terms of firm profits and capital accumulation. 
Lewis (2001) refers to this as the accumulation effect of a wage subsidy. In terms of this analysis, firms 
may choose to raise their profit levels rather than reduce commodity prices. This enables firms to 
increase their production capacity levels in the long run by investing more in capital stock.    
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underlying nature of the labour market problems that are to be corrected by the policy. Wage 
subsidies can be designed with any one of three types of objectives in mind (see Aislabie, 
1980). The first and most common is the aim of job creation, which is achieved either 
through reducing unemployment or increasing labour supply. A second objective may be 
employment retention, i.e. government offers a subsidy to the firm if they retain workers that 
would have been laid off in the absence of the subsidy. Thirdly, employment subsidies may 
be implemented to induce investment via the accumulation effect described earlier.  
The rationale for a wage subsidy in South Africa is a reduction in unemployment. However, 
the effectiveness of the policy may to a large extent depend on how well such a policy is 
designed. The literature identifies several choices that have to be made around design of a 
wage subsidy (Heintz and Bowles, 1996, Katz, 1998, Lewis, 2001, and Phelps, 1994 all 
provide good overviews). In particular, policymakers need to decide about coverage 
(targeting) of the policy, its applicability, the method of disbursement of the subsidy and 
financing of the programme. The theoretical and practical implications of each of these are 
discussed briefly below.  
3.2.1. Coverage 
The term coverage refers to whether a subsidy is a targeted or a general one. Targeting in this 
context refers to the targeting of workers or economic sectors that meet certain criteria. Broad 
(or no) targeting may be problematic since people who would have found employment easily 
in the absence of the subsidy will still be employed first (Smith, 2006). In contrast, narrow 
targeting increases the effectiveness of a policy in reaching the intended beneficiaries. 
Targeting further reduces the ove all subsidy cost by focusing resources on selected workers 
or industries. However, it comes at the expense of increased administrative and monitoring 
costs. Targeting of specific types of workers may also cause unintended labour substitution 
effects where non-targeted workers are simply replaced by targeted workers without raising 
overall employment levels (Aislabie, 1980).  
The targeting of industries is perhaps less common. In many respects industry targeting 
happens implicitly through the targeting of workers that are employed in abundance in 
specific sectors (Smith, 2006). If industry targeting is still deemed necessary, indicators such 
as value added or employment structures, the capital-labour ratio, labour-output coefficients 
and backward and forward linkages may be useful for identifying suitable industries. In 
theory the sectoral wage elasticity of demand for labour will also make for a good indicator, 
although, given the difficulties in obtaining reliable estimates this might be a tenuous option 
(Pauw, 2002 considers in more detail how these criteria could be applied).  
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3.2.2. Applicability 
A second design issue is the applicability of the subsidy. In some instances the wage subsidy 
only applies to additional workers employed (a marginal wage subsidy). Alternatively, it can 
apply to all targeted workers employed by the firm, i.e. both the existing workers that satisfy 
the conditions as well as new recruits. In the case of the latter firms enjoy windfall gains even 
if they fail to increase employment of targeted workers. Marginal subsidies, while cheaper 
overall, are more costly to administer as it requires detailed reporting by firms and 
monitoring by officials.  
Effectively, a marginal subsidy is also a form of targeting. However, rather than necessarily 
targeting specific occupation categories (e.g., low-skilled workers), marginal subsidies target 
potential newcomers as opposed to incumbents or existing workers. This may also lead to 
unintended substitution effects, although in this instance firms may replace incumbent low-
skilled workers with low-skilled targeted workers. Of course, under a general subsidy that is 
available to both incumbents and newcomers, this is not a concern.  
The subsidy period is also of relevance here. A subsidy that is only offered for a limited 
period of time effectively becomes a marginal subsidy, i.e. if the firm wishes to retain a 
worker after the subsidy period it would have to do so at the full employment cost. 
Substitution effects or ‘churning’ may therefore also relate to the subsidy period. Of course, if 
the subsidy period were longer, the subsidised worker would have received more training and 
the firm may be less inclined to dismiss such a person at the end of the subsidy period.  
3.2.3. Disbursement 
The third design choice is around payment or disbursement of the subsidy. There are three 
issues that need to be considered. The first is about how the subsidy value is to be calculated, 
i.e. it can either be calculated as a percentage of the wage or it can be a fixed payment per 
worker. The second concerns whether the subsidy is paid to the firm or the employee, while 
the third is about how the subsidy is to be disbursed, i.e. through the tax system (rebates or 
tax credits) or as a direct payment to firms or employees.  
As far as the calculation of the wage subsidy is concerned, Heintz and Bowles (1996) argue 
that a wage subsidy calculated as a percentage of the wage will act as an incentive to employ 
high-wage workers, while a fixed subsidy will have the opposite effect. A practical solution 
to this problem is to calculate the subsidy as a percentage of the wage at low wage levels but 
capping the total subsidy amount payable per worker once a certain threshold is reached. The 
actual share or amount by which each worker’s wage is subsidised is a related choice that has 
to be made. This choice is governed by the overall wage subsidy budget, but factors such as 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Chapter 3: Labour Market Theory and Policy: The Case for Minimum Wages and Wage Subsidies 
 61
the coverage and the expected employment response also need to be taken into account when 
solving for the optimal wage subsidy value or rate.  
The choice about whether the firm or employee receives the subsidy makes little difference 
theoretically. Figure 3.6 illustrates that both options will lead to the same employment effects 
(from L1 to L2). Whereas the left-hand panel shows the outcome under a firm-side subsidy 
(compare Figure 3.4), a worker-side subsidy (right-hand panel) initially raises the wage 
received by the worker (the firm still pays the market wage), which leads to an increase in 
labour supply. This will cause the equilibrium wage to decline to w′′  and the subsidy is once 
again shared between the employer and the employee. In a scenario where the labour supply 
curve is perfectly elastic a worker-side subsidy will have no effect other than raising incomes 
of existing workers. 
Figure 3.6: Firm-Side versus Worker-Side Wage Subsidies 
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In practice, however, worker-side subsidies have shown to be more effective in terms of 
raising employment levels. Smith (2006) attributes this to differences in administrative 
responsibilities under worker- and firm-side subsidies respectively. Worker-side subsidies are 
typically administered by government. In contrast, when firms are the direct beneficiaries 
they also incur the bulk of the administration costs.  
Worker-side subsidies can either be in the form of re-employment bonuses (i.e. once-off cash 
bonuses that are available to unemployed persons once they find employment) or they can be 
direct monthly supplements to wages earned. The main reason for the implementation of 
worker-side wage subsidies is to increase labour supply, particularly if reservation wages 
deter active labour participation or if unemployment benefits are higher than an individual’s 
expected wage. If successful, increased labour supply associated with employee-side 
subsidies will raise the productive capacity in the economy while it may also reduce claims 
against unemployment insurance schemes. As argued earlier, employee-side subsidies may 
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not be appropriate in a country where low employment rates relate to a lack of labour demand 
rather than a lack of labour supply.  
Finally, in terms of financial administration, both worker-side and firm-side subsidies are 
typically administered via the tax system. From an administrative point of view such tax 
credits or rebates may be preferable as it reduces the amount of money that needs to be 
transferred back and forth between authorities and wage subsidy recipients. Administering a 
firm-side subsidy programme through the tax system does, however, imply that only formal 
sector firms may partake in the programme.  
3.2.4. Financing 
A final design issue concerns the financing of the subsidy. Although a large budgetary outlay 
may be required, Phelps (1994:58) claims that the social and economic externalities 
associated with wage subsidies, including “savings in welfare outlays, unemployment 
benefits, crime-fighting, and the increased tax revenue flowing in [due to higher employment 
and output levels] might counterbalance the budget”. Perhaps the main difficulty with this 
type of policy is the uncertainty around what the net subsidy cost might be; the actual 
employment effect is uncertain, while the extent of the positive externalities and the savings 
associated with them is also unknown. This makes planning and budgeting rather difficult.  
As far as the specific financing options are concerned, there are a number of alternatives. One 
option is to restructure the budget and to use savings in other areas of government 
expenditure to finance a wage subsidy. Another is to finance a subsidy through a budget 
deficit, although this may crowd out private investments in the economy. A revenue-neutral 
option is to generate sufficient funding through the tax system.  
There are two alternatives. The first, considered by Heintz and Bowles (1996:198) as the 
most appropriate, is a tax on capital stock. Such a tax, they argue, will make capital stock (as 
a competing input for labour) “relatively more expensive, thus fostering labour-absorbing 
substitution beyond that entailed by the subsidy itself”. The alternative is to raise any of the 
taxes within the existing tax system, e.g. personal or corporate income taxes or the VAT rate. 
The aim is to find that tax rate that would balance the budget. This is less straightforward 
than it seems. The financing cost is variable and depends on the effectiveness of the policy to 
raise employment. Thus, under a low wage elasticity scenario the financing cost will be low 
but the policy will be less effective and vice versa. Also, any increase in employment and 
value added is associated with an increase in tax revenue in any event, which means the wage 
subsidy cost is partly self-financed. 
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3.3. International Experience of Wage Subsidies and Related Programmes 
Practical feasibility and appropriateness are both important considerations when making 
policy design decisions. From that perspective an evaluation of the international experiences 
with wage subsidy programmes is useful. The analysis here draws largely on a survey of the 
wage subsidy literature (mostly ex post case studies) by Smith (2006), unless otherwise cited. 
The aim is to see what seems to have worked and what seems to have been ineffectual as far 
as wage policy implementation and design choices are concerned.  
As with most ex post evaluations of the impact of a policy measure, randomised experimental 
data is typically unavailable. Since wage subsidies are often implemented as one component 
of a broader menu of active labour market policies, several factors (including other external 
economic factors) may influence outcomes observed in such an ex post analysis. It is 
virtually impossible to separately identify the impacts of each of these factors, thus making it 
hard to make judgement calls about the effectiveness of these policies. Despite the limitations 
of such analyses, it nevertheless remains useful and necessary exercise. 
As noted earlier wage subsidy programmes can be ither firm-side or worker-side 
programmes. There are several examples of worker-side wage subsidy policies, but these are 
mostly used in developed countries such as the USA, UK, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, The 
Netherlands, New Zealand and Canada as a tool to stimulate labour supply. As explained, 
such a policy approach is not considered appropriate in a surplus labour context, and hence in 
the analyses below only examples of firm-side subsidies are considered. 
3.3.1. Standard Firm-Side Sub idies 
Standard firm-side subsidies can either be untargeted or targeted programmes. There are very 
few examples of untargeted programmes. The New Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC) programme in 
the USA (1977 to 1978) is one such example, but the employment effects under this scheme 
were limited. The programme was quickly replaced (see below), which limits the extent to 
which policy lessons can be drawn from this experience. The fact that the policy was not 
targeted at specifically designated groups (e.g. disadvantaged workers) implied that at least 
some of the workers hired under the auspices of the scheme would have been hired anyway, 
even in the absence of the policy. As noted earlier, this is considered a general limitation of 
broadly targeted or non-targeted wage subsidy schemes.  
The NJTC programme was designed as a marginal wage subsidy. It offered a subsidy for all 
employment increases in excess of 2 per cent above the previous year’s employment level 
(Katz, 1998). As with any marginal subsidy it becomes difficult to distinguish between 
normal or planned employment growth and employment growth that was spurred by the 
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subsidy. Therefore, while theoretically appealing, a marginal subsidy greatly increases the 
administrative complexity of the scheme. A particular design flaw of the NJTC was that the 
total subsidy amount per firm was capped. This meant that large employers could not benefit 
as much in relative terms. As discussed below, it is often large firms that participate actively 
in wage subsidy programmes; hence, capping their potential benefits may seriously hamper 
the overall effectiveness of the policy. 
There are several examples of targeted firm-side wage subsidies. Northern American 
examples include the Employment Tax Credit Programme (ETCP), which was introduced in 
Canada in 1978. The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) in the USA (1978 to 1994) replaced 
the NJTC, and was itself replaced by the Work Opportunities Tax Credit (WOTC). This latter 
programme is still in existence in the USA. Once again, however, none of these programmes 
were as effective in terms of job creation as anticipated. Analyses reveal there are several 
possible reasons for this, including the fact that subsidy amounts were often considered not 
generous enough to compensate employers for hiring and training costs of ‘potentially risky 
workers’. Participating firms were typically large, suggesting that economies of scale are an 
important determinant for participation. This relates to the fact that smaller firms often found 
the administrative costs of ensuring that new hires complied with eligibility criteria 
prohibitive. Furthermore, firms that participated were typically those that employed targeted 
workers anyway. Thus, large firms that employ many subsidised low-skilled workers, such as 
retailers and hotel groups, are typical participants in wage subsidy programmes.  
A feature of many of the European and Eastern European wage subsidy programmes is that 
they are (or were) administered through local employment offices, often forming part of a 
more elaborate employment support programme. The New Deal in the UK, for example, 
which was introduced in 1998, “contains elements of job search assistance, retraining, 
subsidised employment, and public employment, all guided through a local employment office 
to find the best choice of employment policies for each individual” (Smith, 2006:13).  
A wage subsidy programme introduced in Germany after unification required jobseekers and 
prospective employers to register at local employment offices who then decided how to 
match them. Slovakia and Poland had similar programme designs. In the case of the Polish 
programme, research cited in Smith (2006) found that the employment prospects of workers 
actually worsened after participation since the labour offices often referred workers with the 
poorest employment prospects first in order to ease the burden on the state’s unemployment 
insurance system. The important policy lesson is that labour offices may play an important 
role in coordinating several labour market policies and matching jobseekers and employers, 
but they should not be prescriptive in this regard as this may further stigmatize targeted 
workers.  
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Two other Eastern European programmes that did not operate through labour offices include 
the wage subsidy in Hungary for long-term unemployed persons (implemented during the 
mid- to late 1990s) and Romania’s unique programme that offers firms the unemployment 
benefits that the unemployed individuals would have received (implemented in 1992). Smith 
(2006) cites evidence from the Hungarian programme suggesting that some months after 
having participated in the programme (subsidies are only available for a limited time) the 
employment rates of subsidised workers were no different from those of unsubsidised 
workers. In theory, however, this is not necessarily a bad outcome, because the subsidised 
workers are likely those that would have started out with lower employment prospects. 
Research conducted on the Romanian programme suggests that little of the hiring that took 
place under the auspices of the scheme could be considered incremental hiring.  
From these examples some further preliminary remarks can be made. Firstly, you do not 
necessarily expect participants in a wage subsidy programme to be better off (as far as 
employment prospects are concerned) than non-participants. What is important, however, is 
that their own employment prospects would now have improved through acquisition of some 
skills during the period of subsidised employment.34 A second requirement of a programme 
is that it actually generates above-equilibrium or incremental employment. Programmes 
generally appear to be less effective in reaching this goal, although it remains difficult to 
measure given the uncertainty around the ‘natural’ employment growth path of firms. 
3.3.2. Training-Linked Wage Subsidy Programmes 
There is a strong perception that training-linked wage subsidy programmes are ideal in 
countries such as South Africa where the unemployment problem is closely related to a lack 
of experiential training and low skill levels (see Lewis, 2001). The notion that a wage subsidy 
programme can only really be considered successful if participants’ employment prospects 
improve after completion of the programme presents a strong argument for linking the 
subsidy to some form of training provision.  
As far as international examples are concerned, several of the South American wage subsidy 
programmes, including programmes implemented in Chile, Argentina, Peru and Uruguay (see 
Smith, 2006 for details), are particularly relevant from a South African perspective. These 
developing countries face many of the same kinds of economic challenges as South Africa, 
while the training-linked subsidy programmes used in these countries are quite similar to 
                                                 
34
  For example, Smith (2006) cites research that finds that the wage subsidy programme in Australia 
(Jobstart was introduced in 1985 and was targeted at long-term unemployed, homeless disabled, ex-
offenders and the elderly) actually raised people’s employment prospects by 30 per cent after the 
subsidisation period came to an end. The Polish example discussed earlier had the opposite effect. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Chapter 3: Labour Market Theory and Policy: The Case for Minimum Wages and Wage Subsidies 
 66
South Africa’s learnership programme.35 Unfortunately the South American programmes 
have not been extensively evaluated, but participation rates are generally reported to be high. 
There is at least some evidence that participants’ employment prospects improve after the 
completion of training.  
3.3.3. Worker-Initiated Subsidies 
Worker-initiated subsidies typically operate via a voucher system whereby targeted workers 
carry a voucher which can be presented to employers when they apply for work. The voucher 
then enables employers to claim a subsidy for employing the worker. The advantage of this 
system is that employers are not required to confirm the eligibility of the worker. The 
downside, however, is that voucher-carrying workers may be stigmatised if they are 
perceived by employers to be inferior. Wage subsidy policies designed in this manner, 
however, appear to be more effective than normal subsidies, most likely due to the fact that 
voucher-carrying jobseekers rate their chances of finding employment with a voucher higher 
than before and hence look harder. The reason why this design option is interesting from a 
South African perspective is that it essentially contains the same ingredients as the youth 
wage subsidy proposed by Levinsohn (2008) for South Africa (see Chapter 6). Also, since the 
programme is initiated by jobseekers it is effectively a marginal subsidy programme, 
although it does not suffer the same administrative drawbacks as standard firm-side marginal 
subsidies. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Minimum wages and wage subsidies represent two almost opposing views of what an 
appropriate labour market intervention would be to reduce poverty. However, given the 
context of labour markets and poverty in South Africa, both policies have merit. As argued in 
Chapter 2, poverty in South African is linked both to low wages earned by the working poor 
and an inability among the remaining poor labour market participants to access employment. 
However, the success or failure of these policies in reducing poverty is likely to depend on 
very specific and often conflicting circumstances.  
Table 3.2 summarises the features of these policy approaches based on the preceding 
discussions, looking in particular at the way in which the policy is implemented (the policy 
‘handle’), the way in which it is financed and how wage incomes and aggregate demand are 
affected by each. For the purpose of the discussions here and in the remainder of this study, 
we focus on the fifth row of the table, namely the poverty implications of each policy. Both 
                                                 
35
  Learnerships are probably more accurately described as training subsidies, but in South Africa this policy 
intervention also aims to raise employment. A discussion of the South African learnership experience 
appears in the Appendix (see section 4.2.1).  
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policies have uncertain poverty outcomes. In the case of minimum wages both the extent of 
the wage increase and, potentially, the number of jobs lost in the process are important. In the 
wage subsidy scenario the extent of the job gains will largely determine the poverty impact 
(assuming wages of incumbents and newly employed persons remain unchanged). 
Ultimately, though, minimum wages will be more effective when the wage elasticity is low, 
while wage subsidies require a high responsiveness to wage changes. For both these policy 
options the timeframe is important: when evaluated over a longer period it is likely that the 
employment response to each policy option will be larger, ceteris paribus.  
Table 3.2: Comparison of Minimum Wages and Wage Subsidies 
  Minimum wages Firm-side wage subsidies 
Policy ‘handle’ Increase wages of targeted workers directly 
through legislation. 
Reduce wages of targeted workers through 
subsidisation of wage faced by the firm, but 
maintaining wage level of the worker.  
Financing Self-financing, i.e. firms mitigate costs through 
price increases and employment substitution. 
Financing required, typically has tax implications 
or budget reorientation. 
Wage incomes Wages of incumbents increase, but this comes at 
the expense of employment losses. 
Wages stay unchanged, but higher employment 
levels translate into increased incomes in 
beneficiary households. 
Macro demand-side 
effects 
In a partial equilibrium context with inelastic 
labour demand, the total wage bill will increase, 
which causes aggregate demand and the scale of 
production to increase. However, a complete 
assessment requires consideration of both scale 
and price effects. Changes in the distribution of 
consumption are of greater interest.   
Aggregate demand is likely to increase as 
unemployed resources are drawn into 
employment, thus increasing the overall 
production capacity in the economy. Changes in 
the distribution of consumption are of interest 
given the financing requirements.    
Uncertain: depends on  Uncertain: depends on  
(1)       the extent of wage increase and job losses 
(effective when the wage elasticity of 
demand is low and job losses are 
minimised), 
(1)       the extent of job gains (effective when 
wage elasticity of demand is high and job 
gains are maximised, even though this 
raises the financing required),  
(2)       the distribution of job losses among poor 
workers, and 
(2)       the poverty status of beneficiaries and the 
distribution of job gains, and 
Poverty implications 
(3)       the extent of price increases associated 
with firms' cost mitigation strategies. 
 
 
(3)       the negative effects of increased taxation 
(if financed through the tax system); these 
are offset by lower production costs and 
prices in the economy 
A very important consideration is the distribution of job losses and job gains under the two 
policy options. This was illustrated in the earlier discussions about job loss distributions 
under a minimum wage policy, but the issue is equally important in the context of job gains 
under a wag subsidy policy. Under a minimum wage policy, if job losses are concentrated 
among workers that are further away from the minimum wages and more likely to be poor – 
and theory and evidence suggests this may well be the case – the poverty-reducing effects of 
the minimum wage is jeopardised. Wage subsidies will also only be effective as an anti-
poverty strategy if the beneficiaries are in fact poor jobseekers, as discussed earlier in 
Chapter 2. 
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Finally, the indirect effects of both policy approaches are important to consider. In the case of 
minimum wages, production cost increases may be passed on to consumers. This leads to a 
decline in households’ disposable income, and hence the overall effectiveness of the policy in 
reducing poverty is hampered. Wage subsidies, on the other hand, are associated with a 
reduction in production costs. In a perfectly competitive product market these cost savings 
are passed onto consumers in the form of lower commodity prices. This may have important 
indirect welfare and demand effects. The overall programme cost incurred by government is 
another important consideration. Ultimately, the cost is a function of the effectiveness of the 
policy in terms of creation jobs – the more jobs are created, the more workers have to be 
subsidised. The indirect effects of increased taxation, which ultimately impacts negatively on 
consumers’ disposable income and welfare levels, also need to be considered in an 
assessment of the net welfare or poverty effects associated with the policy.  
The preceding discussions are useful for starting to conceptualise what a modelling 
framework for ex ante labour market policy impact analyses should look like and what the 
important components, parameters and linkages in such a modelling framework should be. 
This is the central topic of discussion in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 then present 
results from various modelling simulations of minimum wage and wage subsidy policies.  
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Chapter 4. Labour Market Policy Impact 
Analysis: Model Design 
Options and Considerations 
he aim of this chapter is to provide a more technical description of possible 
modelling approaches that could be followed to analyse the impact of labour market 
policies on the economy. Section 1 is a recap and a formalisation of the important 
linkages and parameters that should ideally be included in an ex ante labour market model, 
drawing on earlier points raised in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. Section 2 continues with a 
discussion of two possible ex ante modelling approaches. The first is a micro-focused partial 
equilibrium modelling approach, while the second is an economy-wide or general equilibrium 
approach. Discussions in this section will concentrate on how important economic linkages 
and behavioural responses are captured in each of these models, and what the implications of 
the underlying assumptions are for the analysis of poverty and distributional effects.  
The conclusion from section 2 is that neither of the two modelling approaches is truly 
satisfactory; hence section 3 provides a critical discussion of the possible ways in which 
micro- and macro-modelling approaches can be integrated or used sequentially in order to 
provide a better representation of the economy at both the macro and micro levels of 
observation. Section 4 provides an explanation of the specific modelling approaches followed 
to analyse labour market policy effects in this study. Section 5 draws brief conclusions.  
1. Labour Market Policy Impacts: Conceptualising a Modelling Framework  
Generally, ex ante policy evaluations are done by implementing policy shocks in a modelling 
framework that incorporates behavioural responses by economic agents or actors. Such a 
model further captures various linkages between actors, which allows for an evaluation of the 
T 
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impact of a particular policy shock at an economy-wide level. When building such a model it 
is important to consider how these linkages between economic agents should be defined and 
captured in the model. A failure to incorporate all the linkages means that the full extent of 
the policy effect will not be captured. Model calibration, on the other hand, involves the 
process whereby values are assigned to parameters in the behavioural equations of the model. 
In instances where parameter values either represent shares that can be calculated directly 
from the underlying data or are clearly defined by economic theory, calibration is a fairly 
straightforward process. However, when parameters are behavioural parameters (e.g. 
elasticity values) that are either estimated with error or subjectively chosen by the modeller, 
the calibration process becomes more tenuous. It is these latter types of parameter values that 
will ultimately determine how agents respond to economic shocks, and hence it is important 
to consider carefully what values to choose.  
Based on the findings in the previous chapters, but also borrowing and adapting the collective 
ideas of McCulloch et al. (2001)36 and Fields and Kanbur (2007), we identify five important 
behavioural parameters and/or linkages that should ideally be included in a modelling 
framework used to analyse the impact of labour market policies on poverty. These are listed 
and discussed briefly below. This list of parameters or linkages serves as a useful checklist 
for evaluating the possible modelling framework discussed in section 2.   
The first parameter is the responsiveness of labour demand to changes in relative factor costs. 
The relevant parameter is the wage elasticity of labour demand, or the related concept of 
the elasticity of substitution between several factors of production. The wage elasticity or 
elasticity of substitution usually enters into economic models as an exogenous model 
parameter. Despite the fact that this parameter is crucial in determining the extent of the 
employment effect in a model, this parameter is often chosen subjectively by the modeller. 
As discussed in Chapter 3 there is a great deal of uncertainty around what the true value of 
this parameter is, and hence the choice of elasticity parameter is a tenuous one.    
A second important feature of ex ante models used in the context here of evaluating poverty 
impacts of labour market policies is the link between households and labour market 
participants. Two issues are of interest. Firstly, when employment levels change, careful 
thought needs to be given to the allocation of job gains or losses among individual labour 
market participants. Secondly, the linkages between these participants and households are 
important in determining the poverty and distributional results. Aggregation is a key theme in 
                                                 
36
  The handbook by McCulloch et al. (2001) focuses on trade liberalisation and poverty linkages. In short, 
they identify three potential pathways through which the poor are affected by trade policy. The first is 
through the price transmission mechanism, i.e. this linkage requires an understanding of how changes in 
border prices get translated into changes in prices faced by (poor) households. The second pathway is via 
the impact on enterprise profits, employment levels and wages. The third pathway considers changes in 
government revenue and the impact on its spending capacity. 
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this regard; some models are specified at the individual level where behaviour of or impacts 
on real persons (e.g. labour market participants) or households are modelled. Others operate 
at a representative factor or household group level and hence the labour market-household 
link is modelled at a more aggregated level. As the discussions in the following sections 
show, the level of aggregation in the model may ultimately affect poverty estimates obtained.  
The third important set of parameters relate to poverty measurement. As illustrated by 
Fields and Kanbur (2007), poverty results obtained under ex ante labour market models may 
be sensitive to the choice of poverty line (this could be thought of as a model parameter) and 
to the poverty aversion parameter used in the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke class of poverty 
measures. In the absence of a nationally agreed upon poverty line, the choice of poverty line 
is a subjective one and determined by the modeller. Of course, in a comparative static context 
the interest lies more in the change in poverty; the actual level of the poverty line is of 
secondary concern. Policy impact may also have very different impacts on (say) the poverty 
headcount and the depth of poverty. It is important to not fall in the trap of only reporting on 
poverty headcounts.  
The fourth set of linkage effects that should ideally be captured in a modelling framework is 
the behavioural responses of consumers, or more broadly, the indirect price and demand 
effects associated with policy shocks. Labour market policy shocks may lead to either price 
changes (this is associated with increases or decreases in production costs at the firm level) or 
household income levels may change in response to wage or employment variations. Both 
these changes impact on consumers’ disposable income levels. If these changes are large 
enough, indirect consumption demand effects may be significant in adding to or countering 
some of the direct production or employment effects of the policy. Ideally, therefore, a 
modelling framework should capture these potentially important indirect effects.  
A fifth important linkage relates to the role of government in the economy and in specific 
policies. Certain policies require substantial increases in government expenditure. While this 
implies an injection in the economy, it also means that additional funding needs to be raised. 
Often this is achieved through taxation, which in turn may have several indirect implications; 
for example, if personal income tax rates are increased to generate the required funding, 
households’ disposable income levels are adversely affected. A modelling framework should 
therefore ideally include a government dimension.  
The next section explores the different kinds of ex ante models that can be used to simulate 
the impacts of various labour market policies on poverty. The modelling approaches are 
evaluated against the list of parameters and linkages listed here and the advantages and 
disadvantages of each approach are highlighted. The aim is to develop a better idea of what 
type of model would be most suited to the analyses in this study.   
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2. Ex Ante Policy Evaluation: Micro- and Macro-Modelling Frameworks 
2.1. Partial Equilibrium Models for Micro-Level Policy Impact Analysis 
The first type of ex ante approach is a micro-level policy impact analysis approach. The term 
micro-level analysis refers to any evaluation of the impact of policy interventions on 
individual units of observation (e.g. households or individuals) in the economy. Such 
analyses typically utilise micro-survey data of households or the labour force, with the 
interest being in establishing whether a policy might have or has had any significant 
distributional or poverty effects.  
Micro-level analyses improve on analyses conducted at a more aggregated level by explicitly 
identifying individual winners and losers of a policy shock. Bourguignon and Spadaro 
(2005:78) note that the use of micro-level analyses only really started to develop in the 1980s 
as large and detailed datasets on individual agents became freely available and computing 
power started to increase rapidly. They predict that these approaches to economic analysis are 
“bound to intensify and deepen”. However, given the amount of detail included in these 
models, they are largely partial equilibrium analyses that ignore many of the important 
interaction effects with the rest of the economy.  
Micro-level analyses can be categorised into non-behavioural approaches, which are 
essentially accounting exercises or arithmetical models in the mould of basic incidence 
analyses, and behavioural approaches (Bourguignon and Pereira da Silva, 2003). Under the 
latter individual agents in the models are allowed to alter their behaviour in response to 
policy shocks. Although the term ‘micro-simulation models’ has been used to collectively 
refer to both behavioural and non-behavioural approaches, it is strictly speaking only the 
approaches that incorporate behavioural changes that can be considered true micro-simulation 
models. Perhaps part of the confusion around what can be called micro-simulation stems 
from the fact that the micro-level analyses conducted by Orcutt (1957) did not include 
behavioural responses of households, even though his work was referred to as micro-
simulation modelling. Orcutt is nevertheless considered by many as the originator of modern 
micro-simulation techniques.  
Figure 4.1 below provides a classification scheme for micro-level analyses that was 
developed in order to facilitate discussions to follow.  
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Figure 4.1: Classification Scheme for Micro-Level Analyses 
Micro-level 
analyses
Non-behavioural
approaches
Behavioural
approaches
Incidence 
analysis
Usually applied to 
government 
spending (health, 
welfare or 
education) or tax 
incidence
Labour market 
applications: 
allocation of job 
losses or gains 
among individuals
‘Micro-
simulation’
Variety of 
applications
Household demand effects in 
response to health spending 
Household formation effects in 
response to welfare spending
Occupational choice models 
(labour market supply effects)
New jobs/income 
allocation based on 
existing distribution 
among household
Random distribution of 
jobs gains/losses among 
pre-defined candidates
Probabilistic 
approaches based on 
estimated 
(un)employment 
probabilities
In the general 
equilibrium literature 
(macro-micro context) 
‘micro-simulation’ 
refers to occupational 
choice models
 
2.1.1. Micro-Incidence Models 
The non-behavioural approaches, as noted, are analyses in the mould of benefit incidence 
analysis techniques. Benefit incidence analysis is usually associated with the measurement of 
the incidence of public spending on health, welfare or education, or the incidence of tax 
expenditure on households (see Van der Berg, 2005 for a South Africa application). In terms 
of this approach, households are typically grouped into income or other relevant socio-
economic groups in order to make inferences about the distributional effects of social or tax 
policies (Ahmed and O'Donoghue, 2008). Although benefit incidence analyses are 
traditionally ex post in nature, they can easily be applied in an ex ante simulation context.37  
Of greater interest here are the ‘micro-incidence’ approaches that have been applied in a 
labour market context. Generally, micro-incidence labour market models use pre-defined 
allocation rules to determine how job gains or job losses associated with a certain policy 
shock might be distributed among individuals. These job losses or gains may be calculated as 
                                                 
37
  For example, the distributional or poverty effects of proposed expansions of government spending could 
be simulated under the assumption that such spending would be distributed in a similar way as existing 
expenditure. 
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part of the micro-incidence model using standard labour market theory, i.e. the employment 
change at the industry or economy-wide level is estimated by multiplying the wage change by 
the wage elasticity of demand (see Hertz, 2002). Alternatively, job losses or gains can be 
derived from other studies or observed from actual employment statistics (see Pauw et al., 
2007a). In such instances the micro-incidence model only serves the purpose of finding a 
plausible distribution of job gains or losses among individuals.  
Once winners and losers have been identified, wage incomes are adjusted accordingly: the 
newly unemployed lose their wage income while the newly employed now earn a wage. 
Often wages of newly employed persons are estimated econometrically using earnings 
functions. If data is available that allows the linking of individual labour force participants to 
the households in which they reside, the wage income changes can be transferred to the 
household in order, firstly, to determine where in the household welfare spectrum winners 
and losers are located, and secondly, to determine the overall poverty and income 
distributional effects of the policy.   
Clearly, the way in which the job allocation mechanism is designed will have important 
implications for the poverty and distributional effects obtained in the model. There are 
essentially three ways in which to model the job allocation process (see Figure 4.1 earlier). 
The first is to assume that job losses or gains are distributed among groups of households in 
the same proportions as existing employment opportunities are distributed. Under this ‘classic 
incidence analysis approach’ representative household groups are formed, say, on the basis of 
income quintiles. The initial distribution of jobs among these household groups then dictates 
how job gains or losses will be distributed. Of course, the use of household groups suggests 
aggregation of micro-data, and hence such an approach is no longer a true micro-level 
analysis. Such a model is therefore only suitable to show which broad groups are likely to be 
affected, but does not identify individual households or workers that might be affected.38   
A second option is to assume that job gains or losses are distributed randomly among 
individuals in a certain target group. In Chapter 3 reference was made to the study of Hertz 
(2002), which looked at the distributional effects of minimum wages and the resulting job 
losses among domestic workers in South Africa. In that study Hertz (2002) uses random 
probabilities to decide how job losses are allocated among individuals. Several options exist, 
e.g., job losses can be entirely random, or some method can be used to influence the chances 
of people to be selected. Hertz (2002), for example, weights his random probabilities by an 
index that indicates how far, on average, a minimum wage worker’s existing wage is from the 
minimum wage. Generally, though, a pure randomised approach or one where randomisation 
plays some role is not very appealing as it is difficult to replicate results.  
                                                 
38
  In fact, as we explain later, general equilibrium models often follow this kind of approach.    
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A third way of allocating job losses or gains could be called a ‘probabilistic’ approach. Under 
this approach the probabilities that are used to identify winners and losers are estimated using 
micro-econometric models rather than randomly generated probabilities. Most often 
multinominal logit or probit models are estimated in order to predict employment or 
unemployment probabilities for individual labour market participants. Employment gains and 
losses are then allocated according to these probabilities. An example of such an approach, 
applied to the area of trade-induced job losses and gains in South Africa, can be found in 
Pauw et al. (2007a). A variation of the random selection approach is to use predicted 
un/employment probabilities as weights in a random draw, but once again this makes 
replication of results difficult.  
The important assumption in the studies by Hertz (2002) and Pauw et al. (2007a) is that there 
is no behavioural response from labour market participants. This means that individuals do 
not alter their labour market participation decisions in response to the policy shock: 
economically inactive people will remain inactive after an exogenously imposed economic 
shock and vice versa. These approaches remain accounting exercises of allocating job gains 
or losses among individuals and then calculating the resulting changes in per capita incomes 
at the household level. Furthermore, the distributional and poverty effects only account for 
the first-round or direct effects of the change in employment, i.e. these models are strictly 
partial equilibrium models that do not consider household consumption responses to changes 
in disposable income, nor any other indirect price, demand and employment effects. We next 
turn to behavioural micro-level models, which improve at least on the first limitation of 
micro-incidence models.  
2.1.2. Micro-Simulation Models 
Micro-level models that explicitly incorporate behaviour are generally referred to as micro-
simulation models. Such models may also be applied to a variety of different situations (see 
Figure 4.1). Examples include the modelling of household formation responses (modelling 
changes in household size and structure in response to welfare grant payments), or models 
that determine how household consumption patterns might change in response to health or 
education spending. Most often micro-simulation models are used in the context of 
individuals’ labour supply decisions. It is this latter class of micro-simulation models that are 
of interest in this study.  
Typically, micro-simulation labour market models use econometric models to explain labour 
market supply decisions and to predict behavioural changes in response to policy shocks. As 
with the labour market micro-incidence models, econometric equations are used to predict 
employment probabilities of labour market participants, as well as earnings of those that are 
successful in securing employment. Therefore, the only true difference between a micro-
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simulation approach and the model developed by Pauw et al. (2007a) is that micro-simulation 
labour market models consider behavioural choices from the start of the decision-making 
process.  
In short, whereas the non-behavioural variant only consider which of the existing labour 
market participants (this includes both the unemployed and employed) are likely to be 
affected by job gains or losses, a fully specified micro-simulation model would also allow 
economically inactive people and active labour market participants to reconsider their labour 
market participation status in response to the original policy shock. A key component of a 
micro-simulation labour market model, therefore, is a “polytomic occupational allocation 
model where individuals are allocated to, or choose from [for example] inactivity or 
unemployment, wage work, and self-employment” (Bourguignon et al., 2002:18).  
In terms of the remainder of the process – the allocation of job losses or gains, the estimation 
of predicted earnings, and the linking of individuals and households – a micro-simulation 
model is very similar to the non-behavioural probabilistic models discussed earlier. 
Importantly, however, is the fact that predicted earnings, which are estimated as part of the 
income generation component of the micro-simulation model, may explicitly enter into the 
occupational choice model if it is set up recursively. The idea is that a policy-induced change 
in an individual’s (predicted) earnings may alter that person’s decision to participate in the 
labour market. Usually, however, some exogenous change in the average wage for a factor 
group enters the micro-simulation model as an initial shock, with participation behaviour then 
based on that initial shock. The earnings function then merely serves as a tool for estimating 
new participants’ wages. 
2.1.3. Limitations of Micro-Level Partial Equilibrium Analyses 
Micro-incidence and micro-simulation models are certainly useful for exploring the poverty 
and distributional effects associated with the changes in employment and wage earnings. The 
advantage of these models is that they are typically based on micro-survey data of the labour 
force and households. The linkages between the labour market and individuals labour market 
participants, as well as (in some instances) those between labour market participants and 
households are therefore precisely defined at the individual level rather than at a 
representative factor and household group level as is the case with general equilibrium model 
(see section 2.2). This is a useful feature that aids the analysis of poverty and distributional 
impacts of policies at the micro-level.  
As explained, in some instances partial equilibrium labour market models are used to first to 
estimate employment changes associated with, say, a wage shock. Partial equilibrium models 
of labour demand are, however, very limited. For example, when estimating the employment 
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effect associated with wage changes brought about by minimum wages or wage subsidies in a 
partial equilibrium setting, the impact of such a policy shock on other factors of production is 
ignored. In reality, firms’ employment decisions do not consider demand for specific factors 
in isolation from other factors of production; rather, relative prices (wages) of all factors of 
production are considered jointly to decide the optimal input mix of primary inputs (see 
earlier discussions in Chapter 3). A more complete model of labour demand should therefore 
ideally allow all factors of production to enter simultaneously into the factor demand 
equation.   
Perhaps the greatest limitation of micro-level models is the fact that they are almost 
invariably partial equilibrium models (Bourguignon and Pereira da Silva, 2003). This means 
that indirect price and demand effects are ignored. Since labour market policies impact on 
household incomes (via employment and wage changes) and consumer prices (via its impact 
on production costs), indirect demand effects may be important. Wage changes may also 
have important implications for consumer prices in the economy, and hence models that 
essentially ignore prices (also called fixed-price models) are often inadequate.   
The assumption of fixed prices may of course be relaxed. For example, in the minimum 
wage-poverty model developed by Bird and Manning (2005) (this model was introduced 
earlier in Chapter 3) it was assumed that employment levels remained fixed in response to 
minimum wage legislation, but that firms adjusted prices in order to finance the cost of the 
minimum wage. This model, however, effectively entails fixing quantities (labour demand 
and production quantities or consumer demand levels), which clearly shows how partial 
equilibrium models are unable to deal with both prices and quantities in the same model; 
invariably either one of these has to be fixed or regarded as exogenous.  
A further limitation of partial equilibrium models relates to the budget implications of 
policies. Public finance issues are largely ignored in partial equilibrium models. Since labour 
market models may impact both on the level of government spending and on taxes, both of 
which have implications for the economy, the role of government should ideally be included 
in the model framework.  
To conclude, the introductory section of this chapter argued that models that are developed to 
explore labour market-poverty linkages need to incorporate five important parameters or 
linkages. In terms of the first, the modelling of employment responses, partial equilibrium 
models can be used, but they are lacking in that they only consider demand for specific 
factors of production, thus ignoring cross-skill and cross-industry labour demand effects. In 
terms of the second (linkages between labour market participants and households) and the 
third dimensions (poverty measurement), micro-level models are useful and even (as we 
show later) superior to general equilibrium modelling approaches. However, there is always 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Chapter 4: Labour Market Policy Impact Analysis: Model Design Options and Considerations 
 78
the danger that the poverty and distributional effects observed in these models are biased 
because indirect effects are ignored. Thus, in terms of the fourth (indirect price and demand 
effects) and fifth dimensions (the role of government), these models are lacking. For these 
reasons it may be argued that a general equilibrium approach may be preferable, especially 
when there is reason to believe that both the direct and indirect effects might be significant. 
We next turn to a discussion of general equilibrium models.  
2.2. General Equilibrium Models for Analysing Economy-Wide Effects 
2.2.1. Overview 
The two main competing types of general equilibrium models are those in the structuralist 
tradition and those that follow neoclassical principles (see Gibson and Van Seventer, 2000). 
In this study the Standard General Equilibrium (STAGE) model developed by McDonald 
(2006) is used. The model is a member of the class of single country standard CGE models 
and is a direct descendant of models devised in the late 1980s and early 1990s by Robinson et 
al. (1990), Kilkenny (1991) and Devarajan et al. (1994). These models are also often referred 
to as standard general equilibrium or computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. In the 
discussions of general model assumptions and closure rules here and in the Appendix (section 
2.1) we refer specifically to the neoclassical variant of general equilibrium models, while 
specific model features mentioned are for the STAGE model used in the analyses later.  
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models have become one of the most widely used 
tools for development planning and policy analysis, and are endorsed by international 
institutions such as the World Bank, the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), 
and the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) (Ahmed and O'Donoghue, 2008). CGE 
models are primarily applied in three broad areas of research, namely trade policy, tax policy 
and energy or environmental issues (Ahmed and O'Donoghue, 2008). The consensus is that 
ex ante evaluations of such macroeconomic policies are best examined in the context of a 
general equilibrium model that effectively captures the important economy-wide effects of 
such policies (Cockburn, 2006). These models are used less frequently to analyse 
microeconomic policies, but as is the case for macroeconomic policies, microeconomic 
policies may also have important indirect economy-wide effects, in which case a CGE 
modelling framework is appropriate also for the analysis of microeconomic policies.  
The microeconomic principles upon which standard CGE models are built derive from 
neoclassical economic theory, with households assumed to maximise utility in their 
consumption decisions, while firms’ employment decisions are based on a profit-maximising 
motive. Various macroeconomic accounting principles are also upheld, e.g. savings equal 
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investments, aggregate supply equals aggregate demand in product and factor markets, and 
the balance of payments is in equilibrium.  
Consistency is further ensured in the budgets of private domestic institutions (households and 
incorporated business enterprises) and government by defining budget equations for each 
(e.g. in the case of government, revenue equals expenditure plus the budget surplus). Various 
flexible closure rules are defined by the modeller to ensure mathematical consistency. More 
importantly, closure rules assign causality in the model, i.e. they determine how equilibrium 
is reached in various markets.  
A CGE model is typically calibrated against a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM), a consistent, 
economy-wide data framework that captures all the resource flows associated with economic 
transactions that have taken place between agents in the economy during a specified 
accounting period. When representative agents such as household and factor groups 
contained in the SAM are sufficiently disaggregated, the SAM provides a very useful data 
source that links resource flows at the macro-level with agents at a more disaggregated level, 
all within a consistent framework.  
Further details of social accounting and general equilibrium modelling are provided in the 
Appendix (section 2.1). This section in the Appendix also provides information about 
alternative model closure rules that can be adopted in CGE models. Given the context of this 
study we briefly discuss the factor market closures in the following section, before 
considering several of the model linkages in CGE models that are relevant to this study 
(section 2.2.3). 
2.2.2. Labour Market Model Closures 
Although standard CGE models are “Walrasian and neoclassical in [their] truest form” 
(Robinson, 1989:894), it is possible to incorporate certain structural rigidities to provide a 
more realistic representation of the economy. This is especially true for the labour market 
closure options. Thus, while neoclassical models traditionally assume full employment at 
flexible wages, it is also possible to ‘model’ unemployment by assuming infinitely elastic 
supply at fixed wages (see Figure 3.2 earlier). Given the centrality of the labour market in this 
study it is appropriate to introduce some of the labour market closure options in the standard 
CGE models. This section also makes some proposals as to which labour market closures are 
appropriate in the context of the South African labour market.  
Generally, in South African CGE applications, skilled workers are assumed to suffer no 
unemployment, and hence a suitable labour market closure for this group of workers is the 
‘full employment closure’. In standard neoclassical tradition skilled wages are therefore 
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assumed to be flexible (i.e. specified as variables in the model), which means wages adjust to 
ensure full employment at a national level. Generally workers are also assumed to be mobile 
across sectors, i.e. under a full employment closure those workers that are released from 
declining sectors will be re-employed in growing sectors in order to maintain the economy-
wide employment level. This is also the assumption in this study.  
Low-skilled (semi- and unskilled) workers represent those workers that are characterised as 
being more prone to unemployment. In terms of the ‘unemployment closure’ typically 
selected for this class of labour, low-skilled wages are fixed (parameters), signifying the fact 
that there is excess capacity (as represented by an infinitely elastic labour supply curve) 
among these workers.  
The crucial assumption accompanying the unemployment closure rule is that there are always 
more workers willing to be employed at prevailing (fixed) wages,39 which in the South 
African case seems realistic given the high unemployment rate among labour market 
participants with very low levels of skills. For occupations that require higher levels of skills 
the assumption of excess supply may of course no longer be valid (see earlier discussions 
around the structural nature of unemployment in South Africa in Chapter 2), which is why 
this closure strictly applies to low-skilled workers. The implication of an unemployment 
closure is that the overall economy-wide employment level (of low-skilled workers in this 
instance) is flexible. As is the case for skilled workers under the full employment closure, 
low-skilled workers are also mobile between sectors.  
In the discussions to follow any reference to skilled workers assumes flexible wages and full 
employment conditions, while low-skilled workers are those that suffer unemployment and 
for whom employment levels are flexible at fixed wages.  
2.2.3. CGE Model Linkages  
We next consider whether a CGE modelling framework improves on a micro-level modelling 
framework in terms of the five parameters and linkages identified earlier in this chapter. 
Figure 4.2 is used as a basis for the discussions. This diagram, which shows linkages between 
factor market, households and government in price and quantity dimensions, is based on the 
modelling framework of the STAGE model in particular, although most standard CGE 
models follow a similar structure. The diagram clearly highlights the five parameters or 
linkages.  
                                                 
39
  A useful feature of this closure is that low-skilled wages can be adjusted exogenously as part of a policy 
shock. This is particularly relevant in the minimum wage scenarios where wages are changed directly as 
opposed to via a subsidy. This also implies that all workers that are affected by minimum wages have to 
be included in this low-skilled group facing an unemployment closure (see further discussions in Chapter 
5).  
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We start the discussion with a consideration of how labour markets are modelled in the 
STAGE model. The production structure is shown in both price terms (left-hand side) and 
quantity terms (right-hand side) in Figure 4.2. The line labelled , which illustrates the 
interplay between prices (wages) and quantities (employment levels) in the employment 
decision of firms, is of relevance. As far as the quantity-side of the production structure is 
concerned, it can be noted that activity output (QXa) is a nested function where, at the top 
level, value added (QVAa) and aggregate intermediate inputs (QINTa) are aggregated with the 
use of a CES or Leontief production function (see further details in the Appendix, section 
2.1.2). Value added, in turn, is a CES aggregation function of primary inputs, QF1 to QFm, 
while QINTD1 to QINTDn represent the quantities of intermediate inputs used in fixed 
proportions (Leontief function) to the level of QINTa in the production process of activity a.  
The value added function is of particular importance, as it represents the factor demand 
component of the CGE model. Given the choice of functional form (CES), it is clear that 
demand for a particular factor of production is modelled here as a substitution effect between 
two or more factors of production rather than a movement along a particular factor demand 
curve as would be the case in a simple partial equilibrium framework. 
The price structure in the production system mirrors the nested structure assumed for 
quantities. In this instance the primary building blocks on the value added side are the costs 
of factors of production, represented by W1 to Wm for m types of factors of production that 
can be employed in an industry. The actual substitution that takes place along the value added 
function will depend on movements in relative factor costs. Clearly this is more 
comprehensive framework for simulating factor demand responses than a simplistic partial 
equilibrium model.  
The lines labelled  in Figure 4.2 show the links between wage earnings and household 
incomes (YH). Since the wage bill for factor k, the product of Wk and QFk, also represents 
total factor earnings of factor group k, any change in Wk or QFk will cause total factor 
earnings to change. This, in turn, will impact on the incomes of the owners of factors of 
production, which, in the case of labour factors, includes households. The link between 
factors and households, however, is only specified at the representative factor and household 
group level as opposed to the individual level as was the case for micro-level models. This, as 
illustrated in more detail in section 2.2.4, is an important drawback of the standard CGE 
model.  
Changes in household income (YH) cause household disposable income levels (HEXP) to 
change. This measure is important for two reasons. Firstly, it serves as a measure of welfare 
and can be used to assess poverty changes (see  in Figure 4.2). Disposable income is shown 
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here as gross income net of income taxes (ty)40 and savings, and can be directly linked to the 
level of consumption demand by households (QCD). From a poverty measurement 
perspective, a particular advantage of CGE models is that prices are explicitly modelled. This 
means that disposable income levels can be expressed in real terms, which is an important 
value addition (price relationships are discussed in more detail below). Once again, however, 
the disadvantage is that real disposable income changes are only known at the representative 
household group level, which limits the extent to which poverty impacts can be accurately 
assessed. 
HEXP, in conjunction with relative prices changes (PQD), is important for a second reason. 
Wage-based labour market policies, as argued previously, cause changes in household 
incomes and relative prices. Households are assumed to choose the bundles of commodities 
so as to maximise utility, where the utility function is a Stone-Geary function that allows for 
subsistence consumption expenditures. This is arguably a realistic assumption when there are 
substantial numbers of very poor consumers. In the Stone-Geary function, household income 
and price elasticities are defined separately for each commodity and for each household 
group. Since wage-based labour market policies target specific labour groups, households 
gain or lose out depending on the linkages between household groups and the labour groups. 
These policies furthermore only target certain industries, which imply that only certain 
commodity prices are directly affected. Household spending patterns will therefore determine 
how different households are affected by relative price changes. The fact that the model is 
specified over multiple households, labour groups, production activities and their related 
commodity prices is therefore extremely useful for understanding precisely how policies 
impact on overall demand in the economy.  
More detail about the consumption demand structure in the CGE model is included in the 
Appendix (section 2.1.2). Clearly, though, the size of the income and price elasticities 
assumed (these are applied exogenously) will have important implications for the nature and 
extent of the indirect effects observed in the model. These elasticities are obtained from 
PROVIDE (2005). Given the focus on wage elasticities and their impact on modelled 
outcomes, the CGE scenarios discussed in the results chapters do not consider outcomes 
under different price and income elasticity levels.  
The price structure in the production system mirrors the quantity structure. Prices of factors 
of production (or wages, Wk) form a core component of the production structure in the model.  
Where relevant, factor use taxes (tf) may be added to the cost of primary inputs. These costs 
                                                 
40
  All taxes are expressed as ad valorem taxes in the model. During calibration tax rates are simply set to 
zero if the relevant tax instrument is not in use or applicable to a certain sector, commodity, factor or 
household group.   
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are combined with a CES aggregation function to produce the price of value added (PVAa), a 
measure that provides an indication of the average cost of primary inputs. This cost is 
producer- or activity-specific, hence the subscript a. The price of intermediate inputs (PINTa) 
for each producer is dependent on the prices of commodity inputs used in fixed proportions in 
the production process (PQD1 to PQDn for n commodity types supplied in the economy).  
Next, intermediate and primary input costs are combined in either a CES or Leontief function 
to form PXa, the activity price or average production cost of a producer. Where relevant, 
producer taxes (tx) are added, and these producer costs are then translated into producer or 
supplier prices of commodities (PXCc).41 
Domestic supplier prices are defined as the weighted averages of the prices received for 
domestically produced commodities sold domestically (PDc) and exported (PEc). This export 
price is equal to the world price of exports (PWEc) in a foreign currency, multiplied by the 
exchange rate (ER) and is inclusive of any export taxes that may be levied by government 
(te). PQSc represents the supply price of a so-called ‘composite commodity’ of imported and 
domestically supplied goods, where the price of imported goods (PMc) depends on the world 
price of imports (PWMc) multiplied by the exchange rate and increased by an ad valorem 
import duty (tm). Finally, commodity taxes are added (ts)42 to yield domestic consumer 
prices (PQDc). 
The important deduction from this brief discussion of the price relationships in the CGE 
model is that any exogenous increase (say) in the wage of a group of workers will directly 
lead to an increase in PVAa and hence PXa. Ultimately such production cost increases will 
raise domestic consumer prices (PQDc). The fact that the price implications of wage-based 
policies are taken into account in a CGE model allows for a better evaluation of the poverty 
effects of these policies, but also of the indirect demand-side effects, thus improving 
significantly on a fixed-price partial equilibrium model.  
                                                 
41
  In reality this ‘transformation’ is more complex. The CGE model allows for multi-product industries, i.e. 
each industry, in theory, may produce many different kinds of commodities. The producer prices of 
commodities is therefore in reality an aggregation of the activity prices of several activities that produce a 
given commodity (see PROVIDE, 2005 for details). The same also holds true on the quantity side.  
42
  The tax parameter, ts, in this instance represents all commodity taxes, including sales taxes, fuel taxes 
and excise duties. In the CGE model these tax measures enter into the model as separate model 
parameters that are set during the calibration process.   
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Figure 4.2: Labour Markets, Prices, Quantities, Household Income Relationships and Government in a CGE Model 
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Source: Adapted from PROVIDE (2005) 
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As shown by the lines labelled  in Figure 4.2, a change commodity prices not only affects 
the price of intermediate inputs (PINTa) and hence producer prices (PXa) (capturing of inter-
industry linkages), but it also impacts on final commodity demand. In particular, changes in 
prices cause real households disposable income levels (HEXP) to change, which leads to 
changes in household consumption levels (QCDc). In demand-driven models, changes in 
consumption will impact directly on production and employment levels in the economy.  
This brings us to the linkages between activity output (QXa) and commodity supply in the 
economy, or more broadly, the quantity relationships in the CGE model. Once activity 
outputs (QXa) are transformed into domestic commodity production (QXCc) (this 
transformation is similar to the related price transformation; see footnote 41), domestic 
commodity production can be delivered to either the export market (QEc) or the domestic 
market (QDc). The optimal output mix is determined by an output transformation function 
with a constant elasticity of transformation (CET function). Imperfect substitutability is also 
assumed in the formation of a ‘composite commodity’ of domestic supply (QQs), which is a 
CES aggregation of domestically supplied (QDc) and imported goods (QMc) (following 
Armington, 1969). In both the CES and CET trade functions the relative prices of 
imports/exports (PMc or PEc) and domestically produced goods (PDc) determine the optimal 
commodity mix.  
In demand-driven models total domestic supply (QQc) has to satisfy intermediate input 
demand (QINTDc) and final commodity demand in the economy. The latter is the sum of 
household (QCDc) government (QGDc) and investment demand (QINVDc). Any change in 
consumption demand is met by a change in supply, either through changes in the level of 
imported goods or domestically produced goods supplied to the local market.  
Ultimately, therefore, domestic producers are likely to respond to demand changes by altering 
their production levels (QXa). This in turn leads to changes in employment (QFk) or wage 
levels (Wk) in the economy. Under a wage-based labour market policy experiment any such 
secondary employment shock can now be considered ‘indirect’ as opposed to the initial direct 
employment effect caused by the wage change.  
The lines labelled  show the links between the various tax parameters and government 
revenue (YG), which in turn is linked to government consumption expenditure (QGDc). Any 
changes in production, exports, imports and household incomes will impact on government 
revenue and hence the government budget. These impacts are explicitly captured in the 
model. More importantly, though, and specifically in the context of a wage subsidy 
programme, is the government financing aspect that can be captured in a CGE model. For 
example, in the wage subsidy modelling scenarios explored in Chapter 6, two financing 
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options are explored, namely raising capital taxes (tf) or income taxes (ty). From Figure 4.2 it 
is clear to see where these taxes enter into the model and what impacts they may have on 
production costs and household disposable income levels respectively. 
The preceding discussion has shown how a CGE modelling framework improves on a partial 
equilibrium model in terms of the modelling of labour demand. CGE models also explicitly 
capture economy-wide effects through careful consideration of how prices and indirect 
demand effects might contribute or detract from direct policy effects. It was further pointed 
out that CGE models explicitly model linkages between individual factors and households. 
This allows for a consideration of how labour market policy shocks might affect household 
incomes and poverty. All five model parameters and linkages considered important in the 
context of the analysis of poverty effects of labour market policy shocks are therefore 
incorporated in these models.  
However, as explained briefly above, poverty and distributional effects are only observed at a 
representative household group level as opposed to at an individual level as is the case under 
a micro-modelling approach. The issue at hand is that household income data in CGE models 
are only available at the representative household group level (as specified in the underlying 
SAM). The functional distribution matrix, which shows the distribution of factor incomes to 
households, is also only specified at such an aggregated level (a schematic representation of a 
SAM is found in Appendix Table 2). This has important implications for poverty analyses; 
hence the issue deserves closer inspection.   
2.2.4. A Closer Look at Labour Market-Household Linkages and Poverty Analysis  
Aggregation and the use of representative factors and households in CGE modelling has 
drawn much criticism (see Laitner et al., 2000 for a thorough discussion). In neoclassical 
microeconomics, agents are assumed to always act in a rational manner, responding to price 
signals and always striving to maximise either utility (households) or profits (firms). Agents 
further have perfect information about prices of alternatives and the actions of other agents, 
including competitors. The implication is that markets always clear and equilibrium is always 
reached. In reality such rationality is said to be ‘bounded’ given imperfect information and 
the fact that economic agents do not always choose the utility-maximising alternative. The 
strict assumption of rationality of individual economic agents extends to representative 
groups in the CGE model, i.e. individual members of a representative firm or household 
group are joined together in the assumption that they will act in the exact same manner when 
responding to price signals. This joint behaviour has been termed ‘collective rationality’. 
Despite the limitation of an assumption of collective rationality, aggregation is unfortunately 
a practical necessity. It would simply be impossible to construct a fully disaggregated 
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individual-level SAM – neither do we have such data, nor would it be feasible to balance 
such a large SAM. Each SAM account, therefore, is made up of combined information on 
individual firms, factors of production or households as captured in underlying surveys of 
manufacturing, labour markets or households. While care obviously has to be taken to group 
individual firms, workers or households that are similar, individual members of groups still 
exhibit different preferences and behavioural patterns. There is no real justification for an 
assumption that the aggregate of several individuals acts like a single optimising agent; put 
simply, “individual optimisation does not necessarily generate collective rationality” (see 
Cogneau and Robilliard, 2000:7-8). 
The use of representative groups, and particular household and factor groups, has important 
implications for the analyses of labour market policies and their impact on poverty. Firstly, 
with regards to household income distributions and poverty analyses, the assumption of 
homogenous behaviour within representative groups in a CGE model implies that any 
simulated income gain or loss accruing to a certain group is shared equally among all the 
individual members of that group. For household groups, if the modeller only knows the total 
and average income of the household group without any knowledge of the underlying income 
distribution, the analysis of household poverty would be tantamount to determining whether 
the poverty status of the group as a whole remains unchanged or stays the same in response to 
the simulated policy shock. In reality, however, different members might have been affected 
differently, while heterogeneity within the group also implies that not every member is 
equally far removed from the poverty line.   
A second limitation of CGE models is the way in which the factor market-household linkages 
are modelled. Whereas micro-level models allows for these linkages to be drawn at the 
individual unit of observation in the survey data, the use of representative groups necessitates 
that these links are specified at a group level. The relevant sub-matrix in the SAM, the 
functional distribution matrix, shows how the factor income from various factor groups is 
distributed among the various household groups, the ‘owners’ of these factors of production. 
CGE models assume that any factor income gains or losses arising from a simulated policy 
shock will be distributed among household groups in the same proportion as which factor 
income is distributed in the base data (i.e. as determined by the functional distribution 
matrix). By extension, any employment gains or losses are implicitly43 distributed following 
the factor endowments in the base, which stands in contrast to the much more nuanced 
approaches that are permitted by micro-models.  
                                                 
43
  This allocation is said to be implicit since there are no direct links in the model between actual factor 
endowments (employment levels) and households. The link is via total factor remuneration, but in an 
unemployment closure where employment levels are flexible and wages are fixed, changes in factor 
incomes are directly proportional to changes in factor endowments at the household level. 
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The above two issues are revisited in section 3 as we seek possible solutions to these model 
limitations. The conclusion from the above discussion is that CGE models as a tool for 
poverty and distributional analyses improve on micro-level analyses in that they capture 
indirect effects of policy shocks. However, they also suffer from a ‘loss in specificity’, or an 
‘averaging out’ of income changes at the representative household group level. Whereas in 
reality a wage-based policy may cause individual members of representative household 
groups to gain and others to lose out, the CGE model will assume that each member is 
affected in the same average way. Gains and losses within household groups potentially 
cancel each other out, which ultimately implies that the poverty results emanating from a 
CGE analysis are muted or understated. The challenge therefore is to improve the way in 
which the micro-dimension of CGE models is captured.  
3. Improving the Micro-Dimension of CGE Models 
Broadly speaking, there are three possible ways in which to improve the micro-dimension of 
CGE models. The first is to simply increase the number of representative household and/or 
factor groups contained in the SAM in order to allow for a more accurate evaluation of 
distributional changes. As more and more household groups are included the analysis of 
poverty and distributional effects becomes more nuanced. This is easily illustrated by means 
of statistical decomposition techniques, as shown later.  
The two remaining macro-micro modelling approaches that will be discussed in this section 
both involve linking CGE models and micro-level models sequentially. This means the 
macroeconomic effects are first analysed in a CGE model, and then the micro-level impacts 
of these macro-level effects are analysed in a micro-framework by linking key price, wage 
and income results from the CGE model with the micro-level model. The first such approach 
is a non-behavioural micro-incidence model where real changes in representative household 
group incomes as predicted in the CGE model are linked to the relevant individual 
households in a top-down fashion.  
The second is to link CGE results with a behavioural micro-simulation model. In particular, 
such a modelling approach allows for changes in the labour supply decisions of individuals in 
response to the economic shock modelled in the CGE model. Some modellers have also 
attempted to ‘close the system’ by linking micro-level effects back up to the macro-level in a 
top-down-bottom-up iterative model. The macro-micro modelling options are summarised in 
Figure 4.3 below, while a more detailed discussion follows in sections 3.1 to 3.3.  
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Figure 4.3: Taxonomy of CGE Macro-Micro Modelling Approaches 
CGE Macro-Micro 
Modelling Approaches
Increasing the 
number of 
household and/or 
factor groups
‘Many’ (100-300) 
households and/or 
factor groups
Fully integrated CGE-micro 
model with ‘real’ households; 
number of households 
determined by household 
survey size
Macro-micro ‘simulation’ 
models (behavioural micro-
level model); link factor 
incomes, household incomes 
and price data to individuals 
and households in micro-
model
Top-down macro-micro 
‘incidence’ models (non-
behavioural micro-level 
model); link CGE 
household income 
changes to households in 
micro-model
Underlying household income 
distribution based on 
hypothetical data in the absence 
of real data
Real household survey data is 
used to specify within-group 
income distribution
Top-down models with 
occupational choice 
decisions made at the 
individual level
Top-down/bottom-up 
approaches, which allow 
for feedback from 
micro-labour supply 
decisions back to CGE 
model (recursive)
 
3.1. CGE Models with Many Representative Household and/or Factor Accounts 
The first macro-micro modelling approach is to simply increase the number of representative 
household and/or factor groups in the CGE model, provided that data is available to develop 
the underlying SAM. As discussed in the section 2.2.4, a crucial CGE modelling assumption 
associated with the use of representative agents is that these agents act as single, optimising 
entities. The implication is that each individual or household that forms part of a broader 
factor or household group in the model is assumed to follow the behaviour of the group. By 
extension each member of a group is also affected in the same way by a policy shock. In the 
context of representative household groups this assumptions implies that distributional 
changes in the broader economy can only be caused by changes in between-group income 
distributions, since within-group distributions are assumed to be unaffected by a policy 
shock.  
Three issues are of interest. Firstly, it is necessary to consider how household or factor groups 
should be formed given the assumption that within-group income distributions stay 
unchanged. The second issue relates to the contribution of between-group variance (or 
inequality) to overall variance, and the implications of increasing the number of groups. The 
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third is the question around how far we can go in terms of disaggregating household or factor 
groups before the SAM becomes unwieldy? These issues are discussed in the sub-sections 
below.  
3.1.1. Household and Factor Group Categorisation: A Theoretical Perspective 
Given the limitations of the representative household group approach to CGE modelling it is 
crucial to consider carefully how these groups are actually formed in the SAM.44 Careful 
categorisation of household groups will, to some extent, validate the assumptions that all 
members of a particular group are affected in a similar way by a policy shock if it can be 
ensured that members of a group are as homogenous as possible.  
SAM building and household group formation has a long history. Two of the first CGE 
models developed to explore distributional impacts of macroeconomic policies included the 
models by Adelman and Robinson (1978) for Korea and Lysy and Taylor (1980) for Brazil. 
These models produced very different results. Initially this was ascribed to structural 
differences between the economies of Korea and Brazil, but in a subsequent study Adelman 
and Robinson (1988) found that differences were due to different ‘definitions of income 
distribution’ in these models caused by the way in which household groups were formed. The 
household groups in the Korea model followed a neo-classical approach, which traditionally 
focuses on the ‘size distribution’ of income45, while the Brazil model originated from within 
a Marxian tradition where classes in society are characterised by their factor endowments (a 
‘functional classification’).  
Cogneau and Robilliard (2000:7) explain that this earlier insight has led modern-day CGE 
modellers to adopt an “extended functional classification”, which takes into account several 
criteria for forming household groups. Although there are no hard and fast rules, there are 
various guidelines and requirements that have to be met when forming representative 
household groups (see Decaluwé et al., 1999). Firstly, the classification should correctly 
reproduce the socio-economic stratification within the society and the economy. Secondly, 
relatively homogenous categories have to be formed, i.e. the members of representative 
groups should be similar to one another in terms of how they are expected to react to or be 
affected by economic shocks. Thirdly, the groups should be composed of socio-economic 
groups that are recognisable for policy purposes. This may be especially important when 
implementing policy shocks and interpreting results. Finally, the representative groups should 
                                                 
44
  Note the terms household group ‘categorisation’ and ‘formation’ are used interchangeably in the CGE 
literature. Household formation in this context refers only to how we use data to construct groups with 
certain similarities, and not the theory of how individuals in the real world combine to form households.  
45
  This is essentially an individualistic approach whereby the typology of households is based simply on 
household income levels.  
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be based on comparatively stable characteristics that are reliable and easily measured using 
existing data sources.46  
Given the above requirements, it should be clear to see why a size distribution approach to 
household group formation yields unreliable results. A particular low-income group can quite 
possibly include a household head classified as a landless agricultural worker and an urban 
informal sector worker. Policies are likely to have very different implications for each of 
these households (Decaluwé et al., 1999). Yet, when grouped together in a single 
representative household, the model would assume they are affected similarly. However, 
given policymakers’ interest in the effects of policy on poverty or household incomes at 
different points in the income distribution, it is certainly convenient to have some income 
dimension in the household group structure of a SAM, or at least a distinction between poor 
and non-poor households. It is important, however, that income is not the only criteria around 
which household groups are formed.47 
The realisation that the way in which representative household groups are formed is 
important has meant that household group classification systems have enjoyed much 
attention. It could equally be argued that factor groups (labour groups in particular) should 
enjoy as much attention given the importance of wages as an income source of households 
and the fact that the functional distribution of income is a key in determining the overall 
distribution in the economy. It also follows that the increased detail afforded by an increase in 
the number of representative household and factor groups improves the overall capturing of 
income and expenditure flows associated with households. In fact, the same can be said for 
virtually any of the other representative accounts in SAMs. Löfgren et al. (2003:4) argue that 
for a SAM to truly support analyses of poverty and inequality it must include “a detailed 
disaggregation of households and the factors, activities and commodities that are important 
in their income generation and consumption”. This brings us to the theoretical question 
                                                 
46
  In an ideal world a unique SAM would be compiled for every policy experiment conducted. However, 
given that SAM building is time-consuming and costly, household and factor groups are often fairly 
generic (see Pauw, 2005b for a survey of household classifications used in Southern African SAMs). 
Household groups, for example, are often based on a combination of household characteristics, such as 
household poverty status or income groups, location (rural or urban), asset ownership (land or capital), or 
various characteristics of the head of the household (employment status, industry of employment, 
educational attainment, gender, race and so on). Representative factor groups, on the other hand, are 
often based on occupation types, skills levels or educational attainment of labour market participants. 
Detail about how household and factor groups are formed in the South African PROVIDE SAM is 
included in the Appendix (section 3.2). 
47
  Despite its limitations, income is often still the only distinguishable dimension in SAM household 
groups. For example, one of the prominent SAMs in South Africa, developed by Thurlow and Van 
Seventer (2002:42), only disaggregates households on the basis of income deciles. The authors admit 
though that this simple disaggregation is perhaps insufficient as “policy makers are often interested in a 
richer household picture”.  
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around how poverty and income distribution modelling can actually be improved through 
increased disaggregation of household accounts.  
3.1.2. Increasing the Number of Households: Distributional Implications  
Traditionally SAMs have included only a limited number of household accounts. The level of 
disaggregation was typically suited to the research question being asked. Since most CGE 
applications focused on trade and sectoral issues, little attention was given to the household 
account disaggregation. However, as analysts have become more concerned with the poverty 
and distributional effects of policies, the limitations of models with small numbers of 
household accounts became clear, with the most obvious limitation being that heterogeneity 
within aggregated household types was not properly accounted for in models with very few 
representative household groups (Davis, 2003).  
The fact that within-group variance adds significantly to the overall variance of a distribution 
is widely offered as a criticism of the representative household gr up approach in the CGE 
literature. Standard analysis of variance (ANOVA) techniques can be used to calculate the 
contributions of within-group and between-group variance to overall variance of a stochastic 
variable that is specified across a number of sub-groups.48 In terms of this analysis the ‘sum 
of squares’ is the numerator in the calculation of the sample variance of the stochastic 
variable, or simply the variance multiplied by the population size. The between- and within-
group sum of squares (SSW and SSB) of a distribution can then formally be specified as:   
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= −
∑
∑∑
 [4.1] 
In this formulation the variable xig is defined over G groups in the population (g = 1, …, G), 
where each group contains ng observations. The terms gx  and xrepresent the group means 
and overall or ‘grand’ means respectively. These two components combined make up the 
total sum of squares of a stochastic variable, i.e. the overall variance multiplied by the 
population size:  
 ( )2
1 1
gnG
ig
g i
SST SSB SSW x x
= =
= + = −∑∑  [4.2] 
                                                 
48
  ANOVA techniques are usually used in the context of testing the ‘goodness of fit’ of an econometric 
model, i.e. it is a way to test how well a regression model (‘within-group variation’) explains overall 
variation, where overall variation is the sum of the variation explain by the model plus the sum of the 
variation of the error term or residual (‘between-group variation’).    
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Applied to the context of representative household groups and within- and between group 
variance, it should be evident that the more groups are formed, the more ‘homogenous’ 
members of a particular household group become, provided household formation is done in a 
consistent and sensible manner (i.e. by forming increasingly smaller and smaller groupings 
with more homogeneous households). Therefore, even if income is not explicitly a dimension 
along which household groups are formed, the within-group variation, represented in this 
instance by SSW, can be expected to decline with an increase in the number of households.  
This hypothesis can be tested by considering different aggregations of the household groups 
in the South African PROVIDE SAM used in this study. There are 162 representative 
household groups in the fully disaggregated SAM, with groups formed around province, race, 
and gender and education of the head of the household (details of the household group 
formation appear in the Appendix, section 3.2). As shown in Table 4.1 the relative 
contribution of within-group sum of squares declines from 98 per cent when only 9 groups 
(provinces) are formed to 69 per cent under the fully disaggregated set of 162 household 
groups.  
Table 4.1: Household Groups and Within- and Between Group Sum of Squares of Income  
  
Within- and between group contributions to overall sum of 
squares  
Number of 
household groups 
(G) Disaggregating… 
Within-group  
(share SSW in SST) 
Between group  
(share of SSB in SST) 
9 By province 98% 2% 
29 … add race 81% 19% 
54 … add gender (household head) 81% 19% 
132 … add education (household head) 75% 25% 
162 … add income 69% 31% 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on IES/LFS 2000 data. 
Within- and between-group distributions have also been explored in the context of inequality. 
The Theil-L (L) measure of inequality is derived from the notion of entropy in information 
theory. Estudillo (1997) defines L in terms of a welfare measure (yi), the population size (n) 
and the population mean income (µ):  
 
1
1 ln
n
i i
L
n y
µ
=
 
=  
 
∑  [4.3] 
This measure can be decomposed to show the relative contributions of within- and between-
group inequalities to overall inequality in the economy for a population disaggregated into k 
distinct groups (see Leibbrandt et al., 2001). In equation [4.4] below the component LB is the 
between-group contribution and is calculated in the same way as L before, but assumes that 
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all incomes within a group are equal. Lj is the Theil inequality measure within the jth group in 
the sample, while qj is the weight attached to each within-group inequality measure. This 
weighting factor is the proportion of income accruing to the jth group. An alternative 
formulation of the Theil inequality measure, called the Theil-T index, uses population 
weights (pj) as the weighting factor, which makes it similar to the method applied in an 
ANOVA application. 
 
1
1
Theil-L: 
Theil-T: 
k
B j j
j
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B j j
j
L L q L
T T p T
=
=
= +
= +
∑
∑
 [4.4] 
Intuitively, as more household groups are formed, the weighting factors qj or pj become 
smaller, and hence the inequality within a certain group contributes less to overall inequality. 
It follows that a change in inequality within a specific group will have less of an impact on 
the change in overall inequality when there are many groups. Furthermore, as explained 
previously, higher levels of disaggregation, if done sensibly, will cause groups to become 
increasingly homogeneous, also in terms of their welfare or income levels. The within-group 
inequalities (Lj or Tj) will therefore also decline.  
Table 4.2 below shows within- and between-group shares of inequality for the different 
aggregations of the household groups in the PROVIDE SAM. It is clear from these results 
that a higher level of disaggregation shifts the weight significantly towards the between-
group inequality. Whereas only 8 per cent of overall inequality is explained by between-
group inequality when 9 groups are formed, almost two-thirds is explained with a fully 
disaggregated set of 162 household groups, a share that is significantly higher than found 
earlier under the ANOVA illustration. 
Table 4.2: Household Groups and Within- and Between Group Income Inequality  
  
Within- and between group 
contributions to overall inequality 
(Theil-L) 
Within- and between group 
contributions to overall inequality 
(Theil-T) 
Number of 
household 
groups (k) Disaggregating… 
Within-group  
 
(share of LB in L) 
Between group  
(share of 
1
k
j jj q L=∑  in L) 
Within-group  
 
(share of TB in T) 
Between group  
(share of 
1
k
j jj p T=∑  in T) 
9 By province 91.6% 8.4% 90.7% 9.3% 
29 … add race 57.2% 42.8% 64.0% 36.0% 
54 … add gender 54.5% 45.5% 58.9% 41.1% 
132 … add education 43.9% 56.1% 45.6% 54.4% 
162 … add income 37.8% 62.2% 40.5% 59.5% 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on IES/LFS 2000 data. 
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Once again it appears as if within-group inequalities decline as groups become more 
homogenous. A simple yet crude way to test this is to calculate the average within-group 
inequality across all the groups for different levels of disaggregation. Thus, if we let 
W jjL L k=∑  we find that WL  is 1.00 when only nine groups are formed (this is only 
marginally lower than the national Theil-L index of 1.02), while WL  is only 0.40 when 162 
groups are formed.  
Thus, the conclusion stands that when many household groups are formed, a large part of the 
overall inequality among households in the CGE model is captured by changes in between-
group income distributions. Disaggregation therefore in effect endogenises a substantial part 
of overall inequality. Thus, even though the within-group income distribution is fixed in CGE 
models, much of the overall inequality is still captured when the model is highly 
disaggregated. In fact, as models become more disaggregated and household group members 
become more homogenous, the assumption that these members are affected the same by a 
policy (i.e. the within-group variance does not change) becomes more valid.  
This is an important topic we return to when the micro-modelling results are presented in 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. In reality the issue is much more complex, especially when the 
income changes at the household level originate from a labour market shock with substantial 
impacts on wages or employment levels. Even if households are very similar in terms of their 
household-level characteristics, it remains very difficult to disaggregate households in a SAM 
on the basis of labour market characteristics. This is especially true when labour market 
shocks can potentially impact on several individuals in the household, each of whom have 
unique linkages with the labour market. Given this, even results from a model with many 
household groups should be treated with caution, especially where factor-market induced 
distributional effects are evaluated.  
3.1.3. Incorporating ‘Real’ Households in an Integrated CGE Macro-Micro Framework 
Cockburn (2006:3) agrees that the “problem of intra-category variation decreases with the 
degree of disaggregation”, but still argues that even the most disaggregated versions – he 
cites Piggott and Whalley (1985) who included over 100 household categories – still suffer 
from “substantial intra-category heterogeneity”. He therefore proposes a model using ‘real’ 
households, i.e. where each household as represented in a household survey is included as a 
separate account in the SAM. Cockburn (2006) originally applied his approach to Nepal, 
which already had an aggregated SAM. His aim was to then use data from a Nepalese 
household survey with approximately 3 400 households to incorporate more detail into the 
SAM. Cockburn (2006) describes his approach as a fully integrated macro-micro model as 
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opposed to the top-down sequential approaches to macro-micro modelling (see sections 3.2 
and 3.3).  
Technically speaking, this approach still follows the representative household group approach 
in the sense each household sampled in a household survey and now included in the SAM is 
still representative of other households in the economy (hence the use of sampling weights in 
survey data analyses). The main difference, however, is that each household’s behaviour is 
derived from that of a single ‘real’ (or actual) household. This approach effectively deals with 
the problem of collective rationality in aggregated models. Furthermore, poverty headcount 
ratios can also be calculated with much greater accuracy compared to highly aggregated 
models.  
The downside is that the approach can be quite taxing, especially in terms of data and 
computing requirements. The use of individual survey units in a macro-model places a 
substantial burden on the survey data and hence requires very good quality data. Observations 
that contain outliers, for example, may cause results for some households to be unrealistic. 
Under the standard representative household group approach such data errors are 
conveniently concealed through averaging. 
A further and perhaps more problematic data requirement is that full reconciliation is 
necessary between the micro- and macro datasets, something that is often not required in the 
top-down approaches (see later). In theory the process of integrating the macro and micro 
datasets is fairly straightforward. Cockburn (2006) explains that the process starts with an 
existing balanced SAM, which has two important features, namely (1) row and column totals 
match, i.e. the SAM is balanced, and (2) the aggregates in the SAM are consistent with those 
in the national accounts of a country. A new set of fully disaggregated household row and 
column accounts are inserted in the place of the existing household groups. This causes the 
SAM to become unbalanced either because individual household income and expenditure 
estimates are not reconciled in the survey data or because aggregate household incomes or 
expenditures are underreported in the survey compared to national accounts.49  
It is therefore necessary to rebalance the SAM, which is achieved by applying standard SAM 
balancing techniques. This involves allowing SAM coefficients to change until the SAM is 
fully reconciled, and hence the balancing process may lead to changes in the households’ 
income and expenditure structures (Savard, 2003). This may cause poverty and inequality 
estimates as calculated from the balanced SAM to differ from the original estimates in the 
                                                 
49
  Such underreporting is not uncommon in household surveys. While this inconsistency may relate to 
incorrect sampling weights in the survey, it more often relates to the fact that household surveys and 
national accounts data are collected in very different ways and from entirely different theoretical 
perspectives.   
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survey data. In an application of this balancing process to a South African SAM, Cockburn et 
al. (2007) claim that despite substantial reweighting and balancing, they still obtain poverty 
and inequality indicators that are “close to official figures”. This is quite surprising given the 
substantial underreporting in the IES 2000 when compared against National Accounts 
estimates (see earlier discussions in Chapter 2), but possibly relates to the fact that they adjust 
sampling weights rather than actual income or expenditure estimates of individual 
households. 
Balancing such a large SAM is a complex computational endeavour. Cockburn’s (2006) 
initial application in Nepal was based on a survey with 3 400 households, which is relatively 
small. The South African IES 2000, for example, which was used as a basis for the household 
account disaggregation in Cockburn et al. (2007) contains close to 30 000 households. It is 
practically infeasible to include 30 000 households in a SAM and still successfully balance it. 
Cockburn et al.’s (2007) solution to this problem was to use a random sample of 8 000 
households rather than the full sample. This method requires that sample weights are adjusted 
upwards in order to still produce aggregate estimates that are consistent with the national 
accounts. A smaller sample size and larger weights implies that confidence intervals increase, 
thus reducing the reliability of estimates used in the SAM.  
Once the SAM is balanced and the CGE modelling phase is reached, computational 
constraints still play a role given the sheer number of simultaneous equations that have to be 
solved. Although this problem is continually diminished thanks to rapid gains in computing 
power, a pragmatic solution in the mean time is to limit the overall number of non-household 
accounts in the SAM. In Cockburn’s (2006) SAM, for example, there are only six labour 
factors. Having very few factor groups seems to defeat the objective of having many 
household groups since any income gains or losses accruing to households via the factor 
market will be ‘averaged out’ in the functional distribution matrix. Thus, unless the policy 
shocks evaluated largely bypass the factor market, it makes little sense to have many 
households and very few factors of production.     
A related modelling aspect of this integrated CGE modelling approach has to do with the way 
in which job losses or gains are (implicitly) allocated among the real households. Cockburn’s 
(2006) model actually operates similarly to the standard CGE model in the sense that factor 
income changes are distributed among household groups in the same proportions as in the 
base (as determined by the functional distribution matrix). By extension, under an 
unemployment closure where wages are fixed, new jobs created in the economy are also 
distributed across household groups in the same proportion as in the base (and vice versa for 
employment losses). From this perspective even a fully integrated approach is still unable to 
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deal properly with differences among individuals within households and how this may affect 
labour supply decisions and earnings capacity of individuals.   
Based on the preceding discussion there seems to be little justification for the use of a fully 
integrated approach in this study. When doing labour market policy analysis it is important to 
have a detailed specification of the functional distribution matrix. It may well be that a more 
‘balanced’ SAM with many households and many factor groups that better capture the 
overall distributional picture would produce better results. The use of real household also 
does not solve the problem of identifying individual labour market participants that enter or 
exit employment, which makes it as limited as a standard representative household group 
approach. We next consider the options for linking CGE models and micro-models 
sequentially, an approach that has come to be known as macro-micro modelling.  
3.2. Top-Down Macro-Micro ‘Incidence’ Models 
A second macro-micro modelling approach is a top-down ‘incidence’ model. This is the 
simplest of sequential macro-micro models and combines information about aggregate 
changes in income at the representative household group level as reported in the CGE model 
with information about the underlying income distributions within those representative 
household groups. Since the intra-household group income distribution is assumed to be fixed 
in a CGE model, any change in the aggregate income of a representative household group is 
shared equally among its members, which causes the entire within-group distribution to shift 
to the left or the right. The within-group distribution itself does not change shape. This effect 
is illustrated in Figure 4.4, which plots the pre- and post-simulation distributions against 
some notional poverty line. The poverty effect within a representative household group is 
easily derived from the figure, and will depend, firstly, on how income is distributed within 
the group relative to the poverty line, and secondly, on the size of the income effect (Davis, 
2003).50  
                                                 
50
  The approach can be refined by incorporating CGE model results about changes in household-specific 
consumer prices, the idea being that any change in the cost of a particular household’s consumption 
bundle affects that households spending power and hence its welfare level. This approach to macro-micro 
modelling is sometimes called micro-simulation modelling in the literature, but in terms of the 
terminology adopted in this study this is misleading. The micro-level analysis involves no behavioural 
modelling, and hence this approach is better described as a non-behavioural or incidence approach. 
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Figure 4.4: Within-Group Income Distribution Shifts 
Per capita income
Fr
a
c
tio
n
Poverty line
 
CGE-micro-incidence analyses require some knowledge of the shape of the within-group 
income distributions of representative households. If information about the true within-group 
income distribution is not available, some hypothetical distribution has to be assumed. 
Alternatively, if the survey data that was used to construct the representative household 
groups in the SAM is available, this can be used to calculate poverty measures within a 
standard software package using the survey data directly. These two options are considered 
below.   
3.2.1. Hypothetical Income Distributions  
In some instances a CGE modeller will have access to a SAM but will have no knowledge 
about the parameters of the income distribution underlying each representative household 
group. This may happen, for example, when a SAM is published by a central statistical 
agency without any further supporting documentation or data. If the CGE modeller wants to 
use a micro-incidence approach it will be necessary to assume that the underlying within-
group income distribution functions are defined by some mathematical function. Various 
functional forms have been used in the past, including the lognormal and Pareto distributions. 
However, according to Decaluwé et al. (1999) the statistical literature suggests that other 
functional forms might be more appropriate. In particular, these authors propose using the 
Beta function, which is much more flexible than the lognormal function as far as its possible 
asymmetric forms are concerned.  
To illustrate this, Decaluwé et al. (1999:28) use a hypothetical SAM with six household 
groups common to a “archetype African country”, namely rural households, small landowner 
households, large landowner households, urban low-education households, urban high-
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education households and capitalist households. Four parameters, namely the minimum and 
maximum income levels in the group and parameters that determine the shape and skewness 
of the function, are then specified to define what the distribution function looks like and 
where it is located relative to the poverty line. These functions are shown in Figure 4.5.      
Figure 4.5: Beta Distribution Functions for Different Household Types  
 
Source: Decaluwé et al. (1999) 
Of course, these functional forms are completely hypothetical and might be based on 
anecdotal knowledge. Ultimately the shape and positioning assumed will be crucial in 
determining the overall poverty effects.  
3.2.2. Real or Actual Income Distributions  
When the income information underlying representative household groups and information 
about how they were constructed are available, it is unnecessary to assume a hypothetical 
within-group distribution function. The survey data represents the true income distribution in 
the economy, and this information can be used directly in the micro-component of the model. 
When income levels of households are adjusted on the basis of information from the CGE 
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model, poverty measures can be calculated and compared against the base in standard 
comparative static fashion. Although the process of analysing poverty effects is the same as 
under the hypothetical distribution approach, there are two distinct advantages: firstly, there 
is no concern over the shape or positioning of the distribution function, and secondly, it is 
possible to identify actual households in the survey data that are likely to be poor or non-poor 
before and after a shock.  
There are two possible options when linking CGE results with the micro-incidence model. 
The first is to increase (or decrease) each household group member’s income by the same 
amount as the change in the average group income as reported in the CGE model (approach 
A). The second option is to change each household group member’s income by the 
percentage by which the average income of the group changes, i.e. a uniform proportional 
change in income is applied (approach B). These approaches are illustrated algebraically 
below. If xi is the average income of household i prior to the shock, x
 
is the group mean as 
per the original SAM data, and the related post-simulation shock values are indicated with an 
asterisk (*) superscript, then the alternative approaches are:  
 ( )
* *
*
*
Approach A: ( )
Approach B: 
i i
i i
x x x x
xx x
x
= + −
=
 [4.5] 
Both these methods have been used in the literature. If approach A is followed the mean 
group income as calculated from the survey has to be consistent or comparable with the mean 
group income as reported in the SAM, i.e. full consistency is required between the micro- and 
macro datasets.51 This is seldom the case unless the survey data is adjusted explicitly. 
Decaluwé et al. (1999) (see earlier) use approach A, but since their underlying income 
distribution is a hypothetical one the consistency issue is irrelevant. In most practical 
applications approach B is favoured (see for example Pauw and McDonald, 2006, and 
Thurlow, 2007).  
The method followed has important implications for poverty and inequality results, but this 
issue is largely ignored in the CGE macro-micro literature. Recall that the standard criticism 
levelled against the representative household group approach is that the assumption of 
constant within-group distributions makes it ill-equipped to analyse changes in inequality. 
The problem with this kind of criticism is that the concepts of distribution and inequality, 
although related, are not the same. When approach A is followed, the within-group variance, 
                                                 
51
  In theory, if there is full consistency between the micro- and macro-datasets, both approaches A and B 
will actually yield the same average income change in the survey data. The use of survey weights may, 
however, distort estimates somewhat. For example, if households at the lower end of the income 
distribution have a larger average weighting factor than those at the upper end of the distribution, the 
overall weighted percentage change will be lower than the average change as per the CGE model. 
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which is a measure of the dispersion or distribution of the income variable, stays constant. 
This is the example where, as shown earlier in Figure 4.4, the entire group’s distribution 
shifts horizontally while the shape of the distribution function stays the same. This can be 
easily verified by examining the following property of the variance, where k is the constant 
term that is added to every element in a stochastic variable (x) (i.e. a = 1).  
 
2var( ) var( )ax k a x+ ≡
 [4.6] 
When a uniform proportion change is applied (approach B), e.g. each element in x is 
multiplied by a constant factor a (a ≠ 1), the variance will increase by a2. Most of the 
standard inequality measures used in the literature, including the Gini coefficient, the Theil 
indices and Atkinson’s measures, are said to be scale independent (Litchfield, 1999). This 
means inequality remains unchanged if there is such a uniform proportional change in an 
income variable. The variance does not satisfy this income scale independence condition and 
hence is not usually considered a true measure of income inequality. Inequality does, 
however, increase (decrease) when all incomes in a distribution are increased (decreased) by 
the same fixed value (approach A). 
Ultimately it probably does not matter a great deal which approach is used. The choice is 
really subjective and often comes down to what is practical and feasible given the nature of 
the underlying survey data. For this reason approach B is also adopted in this study. It 
remains important though to realise the implications of the approach selected. Either the 
variance or the inequality within representative household groups will stay constant; it cannot 
be both.  
3.2.3. What about the Allocations of Job Gains and Losses?  
The one area where the micro-incidence approach still has shortcomings is in terms of the 
allocation of job gains or losses among individuals. As noted before, under an unemployment 
closure, CGE models implicitly allocate any job gains or losses among household groups 
following the distribution of jobs in the base. This limitation in the CGE model is not 
resolved in the micro-incidence model, and hence the issue deserves further attention.  
In a job loss scenario it is quite plausible that households that are linked to employment 
opportunities will lose out when those employment opportunities are taken away (for 
example in a minimum wage context). Importantly, however, is the assumption here that job 
losses will follow the distribution of jobs in the base, i.e. the model basically assumes that 
each employed individual has the exact same probability of becoming unemployed.  
If this strong assumption were made, one would then also have to assume that each jobseeker 
(or unemployed person) had an equal chance of finding employment under a job creation 
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scenario. Under such an assumption job gains would be distributed in the same way as the 
unemployed are distributed in the base. This is not the case in the CGE model, and by 
extension, also not in the CGE-micro-incidence model. The CGE model disregards the 
distribution of the unemployed across representative household groups (unemployment is 
regarded as something that exists outside the CGE model) and allocates any new jobs across 
household groups in the same way as existing jobs are distributed in the base.  
Figure 4.6 shows the distribution of low-skilled workers and the unemployed (broad 
definition) across different household income deciles (see bars). Low-skilled workers, as 
explained earlier, are represented by a factor group for which an unemployment closure is 
typically selected in the CGE model; hence employment changes will be observed at an 
economy-wide level when minimum wages or wage subsidies are modelled. This data also 
forms the basis of the employment data in CGE model, and hence provides a good indication 
of what we can expect in terms of distributional results. Under the representative household 
group assumption both job gains and losses will tend to be distributed in the same way as 
which low-skilled workers are distributed in the base, i.e. both these policy shocks are likely 
to have the greatest impact in the middle-income deciles. Perhaps a more realistic outcome 
for the job gain scenario under a wage subsidy scenario would have been if gains were 
distributed in the same way as the unemployed are distributed in the base, i.e. if the lower 
income deciles benefited the most.    
Also shown in Figure 4.6 are estimates of the average employment probabilities of jobseekers 
and unemployment probabilities of low-skilled workers (line graphs).52 If it was believed that 
job losses were not random but rather depended on personal characteristics of individuals, job 
losses might have been biased against low-skilled workers in the lower income deciles as 
indicated by the higher unemployment probabilities for these poorer workers. Job gains, on 
the other hand, would mostly benefit wealthier jobseekers if they were determined by 
people’s employment probabilities rather than the distribution of jobs in the base.  
                                                 
52
  These probabilities are based on an employment-unemployment probit model, which was estimated using 
the IES/LFS 2000 data. This merely serves as a (fairly crude) illustration, and hence estimation results 
are not shown. Age, race, gender, location and education were included as independent variables.  
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Figure 4.6: Employed and Unemployed by Household Income Deciles and RHGs 
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This fairly crude analysis suggests that the representative household group approach, and by 
extension the CGE-micro-incidence approach, would actually yield results that are more 
favourable for middle- and lower-income households. Savard (2004) also detects such a ‘pro-
poor bias’ when comparing pro-poor policy impacts in a CGE-representative household 
group model with results obtained in his CGE-micro-simulation model. The latter modelling 
approach considers individual characteristics when deciding how job gains and losses are 
distributed among individuals. We turn to a discussion of such a modelling approach below.  
3.3. Top-Down Macro-Micro ‘Simulation’ Models 
A third approach is the top-down macro-micro ‘simulation’ model. The simple ‘incidence’ 
approach to macro-micro analyses discussed above is based on the assumption that gains or 
losses accruing to a specific representative household group are distributed uniformly (in 
absolute or proportional terms) among the individual group members within that group. As an 
attempt towards improving our understanding of the macro-micro linkages, such an incidence 
approach is useful, but it still does not escape the main limitation of the representative 
household group approach to CGE modelling, namely that the within-group distribution 
function is fixed or exogenous. The quest for finding ways in which within-group 
distributions could be endogenised in order to reduce the arbitrariness of the above 
assumption received a significant boost with the development of the first CGE-micro-
simulation models in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Robilliard et al. (2001) provided one 
such macro-micro modelling framework which has subsequently been followed by many 
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others, in particular applications to South Africa by Herault (2006), Essama-Nssah et al. 
(2007) and Go et al. (2009). 
3.3.1. Basic Principles of Macro-Micro-Simulation Models 
The basic principles of the CGE-micro-simulation approach are similar to the top-down 
incidence approach described above. The idea is to first run an economic policy shock in the 
CGE model and to then link key results from the CGE model with the micro-simulation 
model in a sequential manner. The micro-simulation model, which in this context is 
essentially a labour market behavioural model (participation decisions, the allocation of job 
gains and losses and earnings are modelled), is then run separately to simulate micro-level 
behavioural effects in the labour market. These changes may ultimately impact the way in 
which income is distributed within household groups, and hence this modelling framework 
not only endogenises the within-group distribution of income, but may even produce a very 
different distributional outcome than the CGE model.  
Apart from the fact that micro-simulation models account for behavioural changes of 
individuals, a further important difference between the micro-incidence approach and the 
micro-simulation approach lies at the interface between the macro and micro-models. In the 
micro-incidence model changes in real household incomes as reported in the CGE model are 
linked with individual households in the micro-model. In contrast, given the focus on labour 
market behaviour in micro-simulation models, the interface in this modelling framework is 
primarily at the labour market level. This means that key labour outcomes in the CGE model, 
most notably changes in wages and employment levels, are linked to individuals in the micro-
simulation model.53 These individuals are in turn linked to their respective households once 
micro-level behavioural responses have been taken into account. In a sense, therefore, when 
the micro-simulation approach is opted for, changes in household incomes as predicted by the 
CGE model are largely ignored and an entirely new income distribution is estimated in the 
micro-simulation model via careful modelling of labour market behaviour.    
Micro-simulation models used in a CGE context are typically made up of three blocks of 
equations. The basic principles are derived from standard occupational choice models (see 
earlier discussion in section 2.1, as well as reference to applications of occupational choice 
modelling results in Chapter 2). In the first block of equations the discrete occupational 
choices of individuals are specified, i.e. individuals are allocated to (or ‘choose’ from) 
inactivity or unemployment, wage work, self-employment and so on. The discrete choices in 
this regard may depend on the modeller’s preferences, data availability and so on. Robilliard 
                                                 
53
  As we show below some other household-level results that are important in explaining changes in 
household incomes are also linked to the micro-simulation model, including returns to capital, changes in 
income taxes (where appropriate) and changes in household-specific CPIs.  
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et al. (2001), for example, include three occupational choices (inactivity, wage employment 
and self-employment) in a single step, while Herault’s (2006) model for South Africa 
includes five possible outcomes (inactivity, unemployment, subsistence agricultural worker, 
informal employment and formal wage employment) in a two-step approach that controls for 
selection bias in the estimation of the employment-unemployment probit model estimated in 
the second step. Occupational choice is typically specified as a function of personal 
characteristics, which, in addition to the standard demographic and labour market 
characteristics (e.g. education, skills and experience), also includes predicted earnings. This is 
an important feature of the occupational choice equation. A wage or earnings function is 
estimated separately as part of the second block of equations (see below), with earnings then 
entering into the occupational choice equation. The idea is that a change in potential earnings 
may bring about a different occupational choice for individuals. 
In the second block of equations the (log) wage of member i in household m is specified as a 
function of that individual’s personal characteristics (xmi) and a residual term (vmi) (see 
equation [4.7]). The function is specified separately over several segments in the labour 
market, typically disaggregating by gender, skill/education, region, and so on. Usually the 
disaggregation is determined by the factor account structure in the CGE model or SAM. If 
relevant, a profit function is also specified for self-employed individuals, defined now at the 
household level and dependent, firstly, on the number of household members involved in an 
entrepreneurial activity (Nm) and, secondly, on the type of activity (Zm). The term profit in 
this context can be interpreted as returns to physical and human capital owned by the 
household. 
 
( )
( ),
mi mi mi
m m m m
w w x v
y y N Z η
= +
= +
 [4.7] 
The final block of equations includes a household income equation and a price deflator. The 
price deflator (Pm) takes into account household-specific consumption shares, while the 
income equation is simply a household-level aggregation of real individual incomes (wim), 
and household incomes such as profits (ym) and exogenous incomes (y0m). In some 
formulations (for example in Herault, 2006) income is expressed net of income taxes (tm), as 
shown in equation [4.8] below. Although the main interface between the CGE and micro-
simulation models is at the labour market level, it is clear from this equation that several 
other results variables are also linked in order to fully replicate income generation at the 
household level.  
 ( )0, , , ,= ∑m m im m m miY Y P w y y t  [4.8] 
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Once all the equations have been estimated, a CGE simulation is performed and all the 
relevant model results are passed down to the micro-simulation model. The nature of the 
factor market results generated in the CGE model and linked with the micro-simulation 
model is dependent on the closures selected for specific types of factors of production. Thus, 
under an unemployment closure (low-skilled workers) wages are fixed (unless changed 
exogenously as in the minimum wage simulations) and employment levels adjust both at 
sectoral and national level. Average wages as well as sectoral wage and employment levels of 
fully employed skilled workers may change. All these wage and employment changes 
observed at the relevant factor group level are passed down to individual members of these 
factor groups in the micro-simulation model.  
As far as capital stock is concerned, the level of capital stock employed is typically fixed 
within sectors under a short-run closure or fixed at the economy-wide level under a long-run 
closure (intra-sectoral capital mobility). Under both these closures the economy-wide and/or 
activity-specific returns to capital may change. Either way, when returns to capital adjust, the 
base-level profits of households (ym) are adjusted accordingly in the micro-simulation model. 
Note that for both wages and profits the percentage change results in the CGE model are 
simply applied in the micro-simulation model as this avoids the need to fully reconcile micro 
(survey) and macro (SAM) data (see Go et al., 2009, Herault, 2006).  
Changes in wages and profit levels may alter individuals’ labour market participation 
decisions. Thus, once a policy shock has been simulated in the CGE model, a new set of 
labour market participants is generated in the micro-simulation model’s occupational choice 
equation. Expected wage and profit incomes form part of the decision-making process. All 
labour market entrants now compete for jobs that are available in the economy. The final 
employment levels targeted in the micro-simulation model are determined in the CGE model. 
Although in theory any new participants, whether skilled or unskilled, can compete for 
employment opportunities, most of the changes in employment relate to changes in 
employment levels of unskilled workers as reported in the CGE model. Here the predicted 
employment or unemployment probabilities of labour market participants are used to 
determine which individuals become employed or unemployed using a simple ranking 
process.  
Finally, changes in employment, wages and profits are used to calculate a new household 
income level for each individual household with the use of the household income equation. 
Other household income sources include a variety of transfers from government or other 
domestic and foreign institutions. These are usually fixed or exogenous in the CGE models 
and hence do not affect household incomes unless changes are explicitly modelled (y0m). The 
gross income of households is further adjusted to account for commodity price and household 
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income tax changes, thus producing a measure of real disposable income at the household 
level. The change in this income measure provides an indication of the real welfare change at 
the household level. This measure is generated independently from the income of the 
representative household group in the CGE model to which the individual household is 
attached.  
3.3.2. A General Critique of Macro-Micro-Simulation Models   
Micro-simulation models seem to improve on standard CGE models and micro-incidence 
models because they explicitly account for individual behavioural changes, which allows for 
a much more nuanced modelling of the functional distribution in the economy. However, the 
modelling approach does raise a number of concerns. These are discussed below under three 
broad themes, namely (a) issues around consistency between the macro- and micro-
simulation models, (b) hiring and firing processes simulated in the micro-simulation model 
and (c) general remarks around probabilistic occupational choice-type models.  
a) Consistency Issues 
The first concern relates to the issue of consistency between CGE and micro-simulation 
models. This is specifically with regards to the treatment of labour and the labour market 
closures assumed in the respective models. The CGE model is essentially demand-driven, 
with a change in labour demand leading either to an increase in employment (unemployment 
closure) or wages (full employment closure). Labour supply decisions are not explicitly 
considered, at least not in the standard CGE model setup. The micro-simulation model, in 
contrast, allows individuals to change their participation decision in response to a policy 
shock. This poses problems for skilled employment in particular. If skilled wages increase in 
the CGE model the micro-simulation model will predict an increase in labour supply. 
However, the overall number of skilled jobs in the economy will stay unchanged in terms of 
the full employment closure in the CGE model, which means that unemployment among 
skilled workers will rise. Some labour market churning may be allowed for in the micro-
simulation model (see point (b) below), which means that new entrants may in fact find 
employment, but this will be at the expense of other skilled workers. Such a result seems 
counter-intuitive, especially in a country with skills shortages.  
CGE-micro-simulation modellers have devised two ways of dealing with this inconsistency. 
The first option represents an approach that has not been widely adopted in the CGE-micro-
simulation literature and involves setting up a ‘top-down-bottom-up’ iterative macro-micro 
model. Such a ‘bi-directional’ model was developed by Savard (2003). Essentially, when the 
micro-simulation model predicts an increase in labour market participation, the labour supply 
level is adjusted accordingly in the CGE model where a full employment closure is still 
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maintained. The process is repeated until the supply response in the micro-simulation model 
is zero, i.e. a stable equilibrium is reached. The algorithm that is required for this iterative 
process is highly complex. Savard (2003:7) explains that such a “regime switching 
mechanism is not possible with standard software such as GAMS” (the software typically 
used to programme CGE models), and hence this remains a very difficult model to set up 
within the standard CGE coding framework.  
The second option is to adjust the micro-simulation model coefficients so that employment 
results produced are consistent with those of the CGE model. Robilliard et al. (2001) explain 
that in reality consistency is required in three sets of variables: (1) changes in average wage 
earnings (formal or self-employment) in the micro-simulation module must be equal to 
changes in the wage rates in the CGE model for each labour market segment; (2) changes in 
consumption price vector must be consistent; and (3) employment levels in each labour 
market segment must be consistent.  
The first two conditions are automatically ensured if percentage changes (as opposed to 
absolute levels) in prices and wages are passed down to the micro-simulation model and 
applied uniformly to the relevant labour market segments or household income equations, as 
is done by Herault (2006) and Go et al. (2009). However, in order to ensure consistent 
employment results without having to model a feedback effect to the macro-level model, it is 
necessary to make adjustments to the coefficients in the occupational choice section of the 
micro-simulation model. This is achieved by solving a set of simultaneous equations that 
produce a new set of coefficients for the micro-simulation model. Details of this process are 
available in Robilliard et al. (2002) (in the case where consistency is required in all three sets 
of variables) and Herault (2006) (in the case where consistency is only required in the labour 
supply equation). In many respects this seemingly ad hoc adjustment to the model 
coefficients could be considered one of the great drawbacks of this approach. It seems 
convoluted to set up a complex micro-simulation framework that allows for behavioural 
responses only to ‘alter’ this behaviour again in order for the model to produce results that are 
consistent with the CGE model.  
In the case of an unemployment closure, which is typically assumed for low-skilled workers, 
and in a scenario where (say) the economy expands and there is an increase in labour 
demand, the CGE model assumes there are always enough unemployed low-skilled 
jobseekers to satisfy demand. Thus, the CGE model will predict a certain increase in 
employment of low-skilled workers, and the micro-simulation model is then used to identify 
the individuals that would gain from an increase in employment by comparing the 
employment/unemployment probabilities of suitable jobseekers as predicted by the 
occupational choice model. Since wages are generally fixed under an unemployment closure, 
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there is no labour supply response in the micro-simulation model. The only requirement for 
the micro-simulation model is that there are in actual fact enough suitably qualified 
jobseekers (as identified in the survey data). The main role of the occupational model in this 
instance is to allocate job losses or gains among individuals on the basis of their predicted 
employment or unemployment probabilities. Under this labour market closure the micro-
simulation model is therefore quite appealing.  
A related consistency issue pertains to the income distribution in the two models and the 
implication this has for general equilibrium consumption effects. A CGE model works on the 
principle that policy shocks have direct and indirect effects, with indirect effects mostly 
relating to demand-side responses of consumers. Thus, changes in household disposable 
income or consumer prices will induce changes in aggregate spending and consumption 
patterns in the economy. The disaggregation of households is important in this regard, as 
different households are affected differently by policy shocks and also exhibit different 
spending patterns. For example, if relatively poorer households experience an increase in 
income they will most likely allocate more of this increased income towards expenditure on 
food and basic consumption goods. Relatively richer households are more likely to spend 
their marginal income on luxury goods and services, while they also typically have higher 
savings rates.  
Micro-simulation models endogenise the within-group income distributions and produce a 
disposable income vector that is potentially very different from that generated in the CGE 
model. In the standard top-down approach no feedback from the micro-simulation model 
back into the CGE model is modelled. Full consistency would only be achieved if the final 
consumption demand vector in the CGE model is adjusted at successive stages in the 
modelling (i.e., as part of each iteration) so that it is now consistent with the income vector in 
the micro-simulation model. This particular linkage appears to be one of the more 
challenging ones to set up in a top-down-bottom-up iterative model (see Savard, 2003).  
Of course, this problem may not be as significant as it is made out to be. Aggregate income 
changes are usually consistent in the two models. This means that the inconsistency relates 
mostly to compositional effects and not so much scale effects. Thus, when in the micro-
simulation income is redistributed towards households that have dramatically different 
preferences or expenditure patterns, it may become a concern. The inconsistency is somewhat 
amplified in dynamic CGE models where capital accumulation patterns adjust to changing 
consumption demand conditions. In a static model framework, however, this concern is more 
academic in nature. Poverty and inequality measures will not likely vary significantly 
whether feedback is modelled or not, which is why Essama-Nssah et al. (2007:51) in their 
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application to South Africa (the same model used in Go et al. (2009)) argue that “no 
recursive feedback into the macro model was found necessary”.     
b) Hiring, Re-Hiring and Firing Processes 
Micro-simulation models, as shown, explicitly aim to consider the processes of hiring, re-
hiring and firing of individuals. As such they can provide interesting insights into the 
distributional effects of policies, particularly labour market policies. CGE models are 
generally unable to deal with the issue of whether those workers that are released from 
declining sectors are the same ones that are re-hired again in expanding sectors. Certainly, in 
terms of the full employment closure, it is implicitly assumed that it is the same workers that 
are re-hired to reach full employment again. The micro-simulation model provides a 
framework within which these hiring, re-hiring and firing processes can be evaluated in a 
systematic way.  Not only is the selection of people that are released from declining sectors 
based on a careful evaluation of these individuals’ employment prospects, but once released, 
they can be added to a general pool of jobseekers from which expanding sectors select 
workers that are deemed most suitable for employment in that sector.   
Where micro-simulation models might be problematic is in terms of predictions around 
employment gains and losses that take place within sectors and independently of whether the 
CGE model predicts a net increase or decrease in employment for that sector (see Herault, 
2006). Micro-simulation models allow new labour market entrants to replace currently 
employed people if they have a higher probability of being employed. Such churning takes 
place within sectors even if the CGE predicted no change in employment in that sector. This 
may not be a fair reflection of hiring and firing processes in reality. Rigid labour laws such as 
those in South Africa would prevent a firm from dismissing an employee simply because a 
better qualified individual comes along. Very few modellers report the extent to which such 
churning takes place in their models. It is quite likely that incumbents have a fairly good 
chance of being hired again anyway, but essentially job security is not guaranteed under a 
model that permits sectoral mobility for workers.  
c) Limitations of Probabilistic Models: Some General Comments 
Probabilistic models are frequently used in labour market applications to predict employment 
or unemployment outcomes at a micro-level. As explained in the preceding discussions and 
earlier in section 2.1, the approach usually followed is to rank individuals by their predicted 
employment or unemployment probabilities, and to then on that basis identify the likely 
winners or losers. In reality, however, hiring and firing processes are much more complex 
and depend on whether changes in employment levels are induced by marginal employment 
changes at the firm-level or large contractions or expansions which lead to entire firms 
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shutting down or starting up. In theory probabilistic models are useful for predicting changes 
‘at the margin’, but in the case where entire firms shut down or start up, hiring and firing will 
probably affect people with a mix of skills and characteristics representative of an entire firm 
and not only those ‘most suited’ to the industry type.     
Probabilistic models can also sometimes produce erratic results. Pauw et al. (2007a) explore 
marginal changes in employment levels across broad industry groups, and find that a typical 
result when using probabilistic models to allocate small job gains or losses across individuals 
is that ‘blocks’ of individuals in the survey data with the exact same characteristics end up 
being selected for hiring or firing. This problem relates to the specification of the employment 
equation, and most notably the fact that there are only a limited number of independent 
variables that can be included. This means that when predicting employment or 
unemployment probabilities of individuals, there are large blocks of individual observations 
in the survey data with the same predicted probabilities. The problem of ‘lumpy’ results 
becomes less acute when employment changes are large enough to allow more than one of 
these homogenous blocks of observations to be selected. It can also be avoided by using 
unemployment probabilities as weights in a random draw rather than using the ranking 
method (see section 2.1.1).  
Another concern raised by Pauw et al. (2007a) is the issue of the reliability or accuracy of 
predicted employment probabilities. Personal characteristics such as gender, race or province 
(location), which are typically included in these types of models, may be statistically 
important in terms of explaining existing (ex post) occupational outcomes, but they may not 
truly explain ex ante how hiring and firing processes might unfold. Labour market outcomes 
in South Africa, for example, have been distorted by past policies of discrimination and 
preferential treatment. Such biased treatment of labour market participants will simply be 
perpetuated in a probabilistic model unless specific targeting measures are incorporated in the 
modelling framework. Models of this nature are also rarely able to capture something as 
abstract as, say, ability. Several other variables, such as age, experience and education may 
stand proxy for ability, but ultimately such abstract (yet important) determinants of a person’s 
employment prospects are relegated to the error term in the model. 
4. Modelling Approach Adopted for this Study 
4.1. Top Layer: CGE Model 
The primary method for analysing the economy-wide effects of minimum wages and wage 
subsidies in the following two chapters is through the use of a highly disaggregated CGE 
model. The CGE model itself is used primarily to evaluate the impact of the labour market 
policy shocks investigated in this study at a more aggregate level. In particular, we are 
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interested in results on sectoral employment changes for different skills groups, aggregate 
household income changes, prices, and, where relevant, taxation and financing issues. 
This study makes use of the Standard General Equilibrium (STAGE) model developed by 
McDonald (2006), which is calibrated with a South African SAM with base-year 2000. This 
SAM was compiled by the PROVIDE Project (PROVIDE, 2006).54 The version of the SAM 
used in this study includes 22 commodity accounts and 22 activities representing economic 
sectors. This disaggregation, while not as detailed as is permitted in the PROVIDE SAM, was 
selected for two reasons. Firstly, the activity structure allows for the precise identification of 
those sectors for which minimum wages are defined in terms of the sectoral determinations 
(see Chapter 5). Secondly, since one of the micro-simulation model equations is a 
multinomial logit model specified across all the sectors in the SAM, the number of accounts 
had to be limited to ensure that estimation is in fact feasible.  
The preceding discussions have motivated for the use of a richly specified household and 
factor account structure, especially when evaluating poverty and distributional effects. Hence, 
the model includes 88 labour groups and 162 representative household groups. Details of how 
these groups were formed are provided in the Appendix (section 3.2). The same account 
structures are used in both applications. 
4.2. Second Layer: Micro-Models  
Poverty and distributional issues are not analysed in the CGE model directly; rather, we link 
two types of micro-level models, namely a micro-incidence model and a micro-simulation 
model, sequentially with the CGE model in order to produce improved poverty and 
distributional results. 
4.2.1. Micro-Incidence Model 
The micro-incidence model links changes in gross household income (in percentage terms) as 
reported for each of the 162 household groups in the CGE model to individual households in 
the micro-level model. For the minimum wage simulations the change in gross income is the 
same as the change in disposable income since taxes are fixed, and hence this is an 
appropriate welfare measure for analysing poverty changes in this particular application. In 
some of the wage subsidy simulations, however, household income taxes are adjusted 
endogenously in order to raise the additional revenue required to finance the programme. For 
these simulations it is therefore necessary to also link changes in household income tax rates 
observed in the CGE model to relevant individual households in the micro-incidence model.   
                                                 
54
  This author was a part of the Project research team between 2002 and 2005.  
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The gross household income variable is already expressed in real terms given that the CPI is 
selected as the numéraire in the model. However, since individual households in the CGE 
have unique consumption bundles and face unique price changes55, it is appropriate to adjust 
the real income values in the CGE model by so-called household-specific CPIs. These are 
price indices constructed in much the same way as the national CPI, except for the fact that 
the price index is estimated separately for each household group in the CGE model, thus 
taking into account household-specific consumption bundles and prices. Household-specific 
CPIs are also expressed relative to the numéraire and are therefore expressed in real terms. 
Furthermore, since households adjust their consumption bundles in response to price changes 
by switching towards relatively cheaper goods, changes in household-specific CPIs are 
generally quite small. In the minimum wage scenarios, for example, changes range from -0.4 
to 1.4 per cent.  
Once changes in real gross household income (Y), income taxes (ty) and household-specific 
CPIs (CPIH) have been passed down from the CGE model to the micro-incidence model, it is 
possible to generate a new per capita disposable income variable (PCDISPY) for each 
individual household in the micro-model that is linked to a specific household group in the 
CGE model. These variables are specified for individual households in the micro-incidence 
model (subscript h) and/or for household groups in the CGE model (subscript H), while 
changes are strictly applied where h∈ H. The new disposable per capita income variable 
( *hDISPYPC ) is now simply calculated as follows in the micro-incidence model: 
 ( )* .(1 ). 1 .(1 ) .(1 ) /= + − + + ∆  h h H h H H hDISPYPC Y Y ty ty CPIH HHSIZE  [4.9] 
In this equation the symbol ∆ should be read as ‘percentage change in’, while HHSIZE is the 
household size variable used to convert household incomes to per capita values. *hDISPYPC
 
can be compared against the base value ( hDISPYPC ) in order to estimate changes in income, 
poverty and inequality. Importantly, the above method still assumes that the within-group 
income distribution (or inequality) stays unchanged since the same percentage changes in 
variables are passed down to each member of a representative household group. However, as 
argued, the high level of disaggregation in household group structure means that assumption 
of constant within-group distribution is less of a concern that it would have been for a highly 
aggregated model.   
                                                 
55
  Poorer households, for example, spend a greater proportion of their income on agricultural produce; 
hence the minimum wage in agriculture may cause their particular bundle to become relatively more 
expensive relative to other consumers’ bundles that are less food-intensive. Similarly, ‘domestic services’ 
is a luxury service used mainly by higher-income households. It is apparent that different households will 
be affected in different ways by minimum wage policies as far consumption costs and hence true poverty 
levels are concerned. The same is true for the wage subsidy scenarios.  
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4.2.2. Micro-Simulation Model 
The micro-simulation model specified for these analyses follows a similar sequencing 
structure as the ‘traditional’ micro-simulation models, but it is important to note upfront that 
this is not a true behavioural model. The use of the term ‘micro-simulation’ is therefore not 
entirely appropriate, but is nevertheless used to distinguish this model from the micro-
incidence model described above. The reason why the model developed here is no longer a 
true behavioural model relates to the fact that the model component that allows individuals to 
alter their labour supply decisions in response to a policy shock has been ‘switched off’. This 
means that the set of labour market participants (employed and unemployed persons) is the 
same before and after the policy shock. People that are economically inactive in the base will 
always remain inactive; only those that actively participate, i.e. the unemployed in the base or 
those that lose their jobs as a result of the policy shock are considered for any vacancies that 
may arise in the economy.  
The approach is justified for a number of reasons. Firstly, by locking down labour supply in 
the micro-simulation model many of the inconsistency problems discussed in section 3.3.2 
are automatically dealt with, particularly those concerning labour supply of skilled workers. 
Secondly, since there is no real evidence in South Africa of a reservation wage, the 
assumption that people will not respond to wage changes due to (say) a minimum wage being 
implemented is not entirely unacceptable.  
Thirdly, from a modelling perspective it is unlikely that the overall poverty results will be 
much altered whether currently inactive participants are allowed to enter or not. Many of the 
discouraged poor jobseekers in the economy have very similar characteristics to the 
economically inactive poor. Although the unemployment definition seems clear, the line 
between being economically inactive and a discouraged jobseeker is somewhat blurred. 
Active poor jobseekers are those that have not lost hope of finding employment, and evidence 
from the micro-simulation model suggests that they do in fact have a better chance of finding 
employment. Thus, even if inactive poor persons do decide to participate, their estimated 
employment probabilities are such that they will, on average, have little chance of ‘jumping 
the queue’ and finding employment before other poor active jobseekers.56 From a 
                                                 
56
  Although a comparison of average employment probabilities cannot be considered proof that allowing 
participating among the inactive will alter poverty results, it is nevertheless useful to consider the 
evidence. The micro-simulation model shows that poor (i.e. those located in the four bottom household 
income deciles) active jobseekers have an average employment probability of 0.481 with a 95 per cent 
confidence interval of [0.476, 0.486]. This is significantly higher than the employment probability of 
inactive persons under the strict definition (this includes discouraged jobseekers), which is 0.447 
[0.443, 0.450]. Even under the expanded definition of unemployment used in this study, the unemployed 
poor have a better chance of securing employment than the inactive, with an average employment 
probability of 0.465 [0.462, 0.469] compared to 0.448 [0.444, 0.452] for inactive persons.  
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consistency, economic and simplicity point of view the approach adopted here therefore 
seems justified.  
a) Low-skilled Workers 
The primary interface between the CGE and micro-simulation model is at the level of the 
labour market. Given differential treatment of different types of workers in the CGE model – 
an unemployment closure is assumed for low-skilled workers while skilled workers are fully 
employed – the macro-micro linkages for these two types of workers are also specified 
differently. As far as low-skilled workers are concerned, and in the absence of a module that 
permits changes in labour market participation, the first step in the micro-simulation model is 
to determine how the sector-specific low-skilled employment changes observed in the CGE 
model are likely to be allocated among individual labour market participants in the micro-
simulation model.  
Most micro-simulation models use predicted employment or unemployment probabilities to 
determine the distribution of job gains and losses. Such probabilities are obtained by 
estimating either a binominal employment-unemployment probit (or logit) model or a 
multinomial logit occupational choice model. In this study a multinomial logit approach is 
followed. This observations included in the estimation is restricted to all low-skilled labour 
market participants. All unemployed persons in the economy are assumed to also fall in this 
category, which is consistent with the assumption of full employment among skilled labour 
market participants. The dependent variable includes 23 discrete outcomes, i.e. participants 
can either be employed in any one of the 22 economic sectors found in the CGE model or 
they can be unemployed.  
The independent variables include dummies for age, race, gender, location and education. 
Details of the construction of these dummy variables and the model output appear in the 
Appendix (see Appendix Table 3). The age variable plays an important role in capturing the 
employment experience of workers. As shown earlier in Chapter 2, the relationship between 
work experience and age is an important one, with limited experience among the youth 
offered as one of the major causes of unemployment among the youth. This is clearly 
reflected in the estimated coefficients. Race remains an important predictor of a person’s 
unemployment probability, although as explained in Chapter 2, this variable stands proxy for 
a range of omitted variables, including the lower quality and effectiveness of schooling 
offered to African and Coloured labour market participants in particular. The race, gender, 
location and education variables are further important in that they help identify unique 
features of sectors as far as the characteristics of the workforce is concerned. This, as 
explained below, facilitates a more realistic job gain allocation outcome.   
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Once the econometric model is estimated, the probabilities of an individual being allocated to 
or ‘choosing’ any one of the 23 outcomes are predicted for each labour market participant. 
These unemployment and employment probabilities are used to allocate job losses among 
employed individuals or to identify jobseekers that have the ‘best fit’ for being employed in a 
particular sector.57 Such a model is said to be probabilistic in the sense that the model does 
not identify a particular labour market outcome for each individual, but rather generates a 
probability distribution over all the possible labour market outcomes (see Herault, 2006). 
The modelling framework developed here also incorporates further refinements, specifically 
with regards to targeting of individuals that are selected for hiring or firing. This is achieved 
in one of two ways: either predicted unemployment or employment probabilities are adjusted 
or weighted directly to influence outcomes, or the model is set up so as to select only certain 
labour market participants when allocating job gains or losses.  
Since minimum wages are associated with net job losses among low-skilled workers, the 
focus is on the ‘firing processes’ in the model. Employment probabilities are therefore left 
unchanged, but unemployment probabilities that help identify those that are most likely to 
lose their jobs are multiplied by a factor that is proportional to the distance between a 
minimum wage worker’s existing wage and the minimum wage. Thus, as shown in equation 
[4.10] below, the new predicted unemployment probability ( *
upr ) is obtained my multiplying 
the originally estimated probability by the ratio of the minimum wage (wM) to the wage (w).  
 
*
. if = <Mu u M
wpr pr w w
w
 [4.10] 
As explained in more detail in Chapter 5, some workers employed in minimum wage sectors 
already earn more than the minimum wage (this is modelled as a new policy intervention and 
not as an increase in existing minimum wages), and hence the adjustment is only done for 
workers than initially earn less than the minimum wage (w < wM). Targeting is also 
introduced by assuming that only those workers that are initially below the minimum wage 
can lose their jobs. Ultimately, the purpose of the weighting and targeting mechanism 
introduced here is to ensure that those workers that are initially further away from the 
minimum wage are more likely to lose their jobs than those that are just below the minimum 
wage. This loosely follows the approach in Hertz (2002), except for the fact that the initial set 
of probabilities are not random as was the case in Hertz’s study. This simulation is called the 
‘non-random, weighted, targeted’ simulation and is treated as the benchmark simulation.   
                                                 
57
  For example, if the agricultural sector grows and increases its demand for labour, the model is more 
likely to predict an increase in demand for low-skilled (i.e. low levels of education) African and Coloured 
workers in rural (non-homeland) areas. Similarly, growth in demand for domestic workers will most 
likely translate into growth in demand for African or Coloured women in urban or metropolitan areas. 
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In order to illustrate the sensitivity of results to the assumptions about job gain/loss allocation 
rules, two additional sets of results are generated under alternative assumptions. The first 
does not apply the weighting factor, but still only targets workers that are below the minimum 
wage in the base. This is called the ‘non-random, non-weighted, targeted’ scenario. The 
second assumes job losses are completely random. Thus, the estimated unemployment 
probabilities from the multinomial logit model are ignored and replaced by a randomly 
generated probability (i.e. a value between 0 and 1). No weighting is applied and no targeting 
is assumed, which is tantamount to saying that any person currently employed in a declining 
sector is vulnerable to losing his or her job, irrespective of whether that person initially 
earned above or below the minimum wage. The expectation is that this simulation would 
most closely represent the outcome under the micro-incidence model. Results are reported in 
Chapter 5.  
In the wage subsidy simulations the focus is on ‘hiring processes’. Various targeting 
mechanisms are introduced to allow for an evaluation of the outcome under alternative 
assumptions about how the policy might be implemented. No direct adjustments are made to 
employment probabilities as is the case in the minimum wage simulations. However, in order 
to be consistent with the way in which the simulations are formulated in the CGE model58, 
only African, Coloured and Asian jobseekers are eligible for employment under this policy. 
A further set of simulations are conducted whereby beneficiaries may only be young 
jobseekers under the age of 35. This is consistent with calls for a youth-targeted wage subsidy 
policy (see Levinsohn, 2008).  
Two important comments have to be made. The first concerns the approach followed in 
linking employment results between the two models. Usually the CGE models used in macro-
micro applications have a fairly aggregated factor account structure, and hence employment 
results for each of these factors and in each sector (or groups of sectors; see Go et al., 2009) 
are linked to the micro-simulation model. In the case here there are too many factors and 
activities for which employment changes are observed in the CGE model to feasibly set up a 
multinomial logit model that can incorporate all these outcomes (48 low-skilled groups 
employed across 22 sectors). One option is to specify separate multinomial logit functions for 
different factor sub-groups. However, the approach adopted here is to link only the change in 
total low-skilled employment in each sector in the CGE to the micro-simulation model. This 
reduces the ‘prescriptiveness’ of the CGE model as far as employment gains for specific 
                                                 
58
  Chapter 6 provides details, but essentially, in terms of the factor targeting mechanisms devised, only low-
skilled labour groups with an average wage at or below a certain threshold (R35 000) were included in 
the target group. This excluded all White factor groups, and hence in the micro-simulation model we also 
assume that no White unemployed persons would benefit (incidentally, Whites only make up 2.4 per cent 
of the broadly unemployed in any event).  
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types of workers is concerned by permitting the micro-simulation model to come up with a 
completely independent set of gainers and losers.  
The second concerns the specific steps followed in identifying individuals for employment in 
growing sectors. Since sectors pick new employees from the same set of unemployed 
persons, and since the same individual could in theory be selected for employment in more 
than one sector, it is necessary to establish some ‘pecking order’ for firms. In reality it is 
quite unlikely that the same person would in fact be considered for employment by more than 
one employer given that the employment probabilities are designed to identify workers with 
the ‘best fit’. Nevertheless, the simple rule followed here is that those sectors that offer the 
highest average low-skilled wage in the economy get to pick their preferred candidates first.  
Once job losses and gains have been allocated, the second step in the micro-simulation model 
sequence is to adjust wage income levels of low-skilled workers affected by employment 
changes. Those that lose their jobs will now earn no income, while those that gain will earn a 
wage level predicted in a simple earnings function. The earnings function is a simple 
regression on wages earned and is estimated with the same set of independent variables as the 
multinomial logit model, except for the addition of sector dummy variables with 
‘unemployment’ as reference case. The model is therefore also specified across all low-
skilled labour market participants (i.e. unemployed and employed ), and once an unemployed 
person is selected for employment his or her predicted wage is simply adjusted upwards by 
the coefficient obtained for the sector dummy associated with the industry in which that 
person has found employment.59 Further details are provided in the Appendix (see Appendix 
Table 4).  
Given the labour market closure for low-skilled workers, wages are fixed and hence no 
further links are necessary between the CGE and micro-simulation models as far as low-
skilled workers are concerned. In the minimum wage simulations, however, an exogenous 
wage shock is explicitly modelled, and hence, in reality, the CGE model reports a change in 
low-skilled wages. However, these wage changes are only observed at a CGE factor group 
level, while it is possible to identify actual individual beneficiaries of minimum wage policies 
in the micro-survey data. Hence, for the minimum wage simulations only we adjust the wages 
of those low-skilled workers that initially earned below the minimum wage applicable to 
them upwards to the level of the minimum wage in a manner that is consistent with the initial 
                                                 
59
  One problem with using an earnings function in this manner is that random noise in the wage distribution 
is reduced, i.e. by assigning predicted wages to individuals the variance (and hence inequality) is 
reduced. One option is to add a randomly selected residual or error term from the sample to each 
predicted wage: the mean remains unchanged given the properties of the error term, but the noisiness is 
preserved. This is unlikely to affect poverty results, but does introduce some degree of randomness in 
results which makes it hard to replicate outcomes. 
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simulation shock in the CGE model. No such adjustments are required in the wage subsidy 
simulations.   
b) Skilled Workers 
The closure rule for skilled workers allows these workers to move between sectors, but 
overall skilled employment remains stable. This means the national average wage for skilled 
workers adjusts to ensure full employment. However, as workers move between different 
sectors their wage levels may also adjust to differences in average sector-specific wages. 
CGE models therefore define the activity-specific wage of factor f employed in activity a as 
the product WFf.WFDISTf,a, where WFf is the national average wage of that specific type of 
factor and WFDISTf,a is the ‘wage distortion factor’ that accounts for differences in average 
wages across sectors. Adjusting national average wages for specific factors in the micro-
simulation model is straightforward. The only requirement is a mapping between individual 
skilled workers (skill) in the micro-simulation model and the relevant factor group (SKILL) in 
the CGE model, which is indeed available. Thus, for skill ∈ SKILL, a new skilled wage 
variable is generated in the micro-simulation model by simply applying the percentage 
changes in skilled wages observed in the CGE model to the individual reported wages in the 
survey data.  
 ( )* 1skill skill SKILLw w w= + ∆  [4.11] 
An attempt was also made to replicate the inter-sectoral migration of skilled workers 
observed in the CGE model. This was done by assuming that skilled workers are released 
from contracting sectors and absorbed into growing sectors in much the same way as 
movements are predicted for unskilled workers, i.e. a multinomial logit model was used to 
estimate probabilities of hiring and firing. The only difference was that the model was only 
specified for skilled workers (i.e. no unemployment category), which meant that the same 
workers released from the contracting sectors were re-employed elsewhere, which is 
consistent with the full employment assumption in the CGE model. Once individuals that are 
involved in these inter-sectoral movements have been identified in the micro-simulation 
model, it would be possible to predict the changes in their wages emanating from these 
movements using an earnings function. However, while the job loss and allocation model 
produced good results, the application of the earnings function was less successful. As with 
the earnings function for low-skilled workers, the coefficients of sectoral dummies were used 
to estimate the change in a person’s wage as that person moved from one sector to another. 
Unfortunately, this approach invariably led to predicted wages below zero, and consequently 
these changes were conveniently ignored. This is tantamount to assuming that workers will 
earn the same wage when they move between sectors (although their wages may adjust as 
national average wages fluctuate due to demand conditions), which is not altogether 
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unrealistic. Although this simplification is a possible source of discrepancy between the 
micro-simulation and CGE models, it is probably insignificant given the small numbers of 
skilled workers that do in fact migrate between sectors in the scenarios modelled here.60   
c) Returns to Capital and Land 
Returns to capital and land owned by households are two further factor income sources that 
are endogenous in the model. In the survey data (IES 2000) these incomes are reported jointly 
as gross operating surplus (GOS). However, following the approach in Pauw (2007), 
households in the micro-simulation model are divided into agricultural households and non-
agricultural households. It is then further assumed that all GOS income reported by the 
former is linked to the ownership of agricultural land, while GOS income reported by non-
agricultural households relates to returns to physical capital stock. These income sources are 
adjusted in accordance with the results in the CGE model for these two types of factors of 
production. In the equation below, ∆N and ∆K represent the percentage changes in the returns 
to land and capital as observed in the CGE model. These fact rs of production are not 
disaggregated, hence the lack of a subscript. Any household in the survey data that reports 
earnings from either of these two sources in the base will experience the same percentage 
increase in earnings from that income source, irrespective of the CGE household group that 
the household is attached to.61 
 ( ) ( )* * * 1 1h h h h hGOS N K N N K K= + = +∆ + + ∆  [4.12] 
d) Income Generation Function 
The household income generation function is essentially an aggregation of factor incomes 
(skilled wages, unskilled wages, and returns to land and capital owned by the household) and 
exogenous incomes (Y0) (mainly transfer income from government and remittance income). 
The equation below shows how the new (post-shock) household income value ( *hY ) might be 
calculated. All skilled and unskilled wages earned by employed household members are 
added to form a household-level wage income variable. Skilled wages are derived as per 
equation [4.11], while low-skilled wages are estimated with the help of the earnings function 
or set to zero depending on whether jobs were gained or lost. Equation [4.12] shows how 
                                                 
60
  In the simulation considered the benchmark of the minimum wage simulations, about 10 000 skilled 
workers (5 per cent of the skilled workforce) migrate between sectors. In the benchmark wage subsidy 
simulation, migration amounts to about 13 500 workers. Clearly, these are not very large movements, 
especially when considered in the context of the large employment changes observed for low-skilled 
workers in these scenarios (see Chapter 5 and Chapter 6).  
61
  Incidentally, in the short run scenario capital stock is fixed within sectors (immobility) and hence the 
wage distortion factor, WFDISTf,a for capital is also fixed. Hence we do not have the same problems as 
with mobile skilled workers. WFDISTf,a is flexible under a long-run closure, but we only link the macro 
and micro results for the short run scenarios in this study. Land is always activity specific (only 
employed in agriculture) and hence WFDISTf,a for this factor is always fixed. 
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GOS income is obtained. Since Y0 represents exogenous incomes, the real value of this 
variable is the same before and after the policy shock.  
 ( )* * * * 0h skill lowsk hfY w w GOS Y= + + +∑  [4.13] 
Since we wish to evaluate changes in per capita disposable income, some further adjustments 
are required. Taxes payable by households are calculated with the help of a new tax rate 
parameter, * (1 )= + ∆h h Hty ty ty . Also, although income values are expressed in real terms, the 
model also accounts for changes in household-specific CPI values as observed in the CGE 
model and at a household group level. Finally, household disposable income is divided by the 
household size to yield a post-shock per capita disposable income variable. This can be 
compared against the base-level value in order to estimate changes in poverty and income 
distributions.   
 ( ) ( )* * *1 1h h h H hPCDISPY Y ty CPIH HHSIZE= − + ∆  [4.14] 
In essence, the above equation is the same as the income generation function specified in 
equation [4.9] for the micro-incidence model, with the important difference being that the 
new household income variable is generated from a factor income perspective rather than 
through direct adjustment of household incomes. 
5. Concluding Remarks  
This chapter has established that partial equilibrium labour market models that are calibrated 
with micro-survey data allow for a very precise evaluation of poverty and distributional 
impacts of labour market shocks. However, when these models are also used to estimate 
wage and employment effects of different labour market policies, they are likely to under- or 
overestimate the true effects due to the fact that they do not account for indirect price and 
demand effects. Partial equilibrium labour market models are further unable to deal with 
cross-skill or cross-industry effects of labour market policy shocks.  
For this reason it is proposed that a CGE model, given its superior setup in terms of the 
modelling of the factor market, is a preferred model framework for the evaluation of labour 
market policy shocks. CGE models further capture all the direct and indirect price and 
quantity relationships as well as linkages between various economic agents, all of which are 
potentially important in the evaluation of the net effects of labour market policies.  
CGE models are, however, somewhat limited when it comes to the evaluation of poverty and 
distributional effects at the micro-level. This is due to the fact that the linkages between 
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factors of production and households are only specified at a representative group level, which 
means much of the within-group distributional information is lost.  
For this reason, a desirable property of CGE models used for poverty analyses is highly 
disaggregated sets of factor and household groups. Micro-incidence or micro-simulation 
models linked sequentially to CGE models may also improve the quality of poverty and 
income distribution results substantially. Various options in this regard were explored in this 
chapter, while a detailed discussion of the particular models developed for this study was 
offered in the previous section. We next apply these proposed model frameworks to two 
labour market policy options, namely minimum wages and wage subsidies. 
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Chapter 5. Protection for the Working 
Poor: But do Minimum Wages 
Reduce Poverty?   
n this first application chapter the impact of minimum wages on employment, household 
welfare and poverty levels is explored. This analysis is unique for two reasons. Firstly, it 
is the only analysis that explores the joint impact of all the minimum wages as defined 
by the sectoral determinations in South Africa. Previous analyses have focused only on the 
‘main’ minimum wage sectors such as agriculture and domestic workers. Secondly, most 
analyses have been ex post or partial equilibrium ex ante analyses. This study adopts a 
general equilibrium ex ante approach and points out several indirect implications of minimum 
wage policies that were unaccounted for in previous analyses.  
Section 1 provides the context for the analyses in this chapter by discussing some of the 
earlier research on this topic as well as the implementation of minimum wage policies in 
South Africa. Section 2 presents and discusses the results obtained from several sets of 
experiments or simulations of minimum wages. The experiments are set up by comparing 
actual wages earned prior to the introduction of minimum wages against minimum wage 
levels set by the authorities. Simulations are set up by assuming that employers comply with 
the minimum wage legislation and that all those workers who were initially earning below the 
minimum wage would now start earning the minimum wage. Since minimum wages raise 
production costs, employers respond by raising prices of their outputs and/or reducing 
employment levels. Their choices in this regard are governed by the production technology 
structure assumed for each industry as well as the demand-effects they face as an industry. 
Section 3 makes some brief closing statements, while more comprehensive conclusions are 
included in Chapter 7. 
I 
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1. Minimum Wages in South Africa 
1.1. Introductory Remarks and Literature Review 
Chapter 3 provided a detailed theoretical review of minimum wages and how they are 
typically implemented. Various modelling frameworks for the evaluation of minimum wage 
impacts were described to illustrate the complexity of the relationship between minimum 
wages and poverty. It was concluded that poverty levels may be affected in at least three 
ways by minimum wages: some minimum wage workers will earn a higher wage, others may 
lose their jobs, and prices in the economy may increase which affects households’ real 
disposable income levels. It was further argued that in order to properly assess these poverty 
effects, it is necessary to evaluate the policy impact in an economy-wide model that captures 
both the direct and indirect (or demand-side) effects of the policy. Also important is the 
wage-employment relationship, as encapsulated in the wage elasticity parameter, as well as 
income sharing in the household.       
Analyses of minimum wage impacts are often ex post in nature, usually applying econometric 
techniques to evaluate wage employment relationships during a period in which minimum 
wages were introduced. The chosen method of analysis in this study is an ex ante framework. 
Hertz (2002:7) explains that an ex ante framework is useful in the context of minimum wage 
analyses as it “solves the ceteris paribus problem that plagues econometric work”. However, 
this comes at the expense of having to assume (as opposed to measure) changes in 
employment by imposing a certain wage elasticity level. 
Domestic workers and farm workers represent two of the most vulnerable occupation groups 
in the South African economy. Consequently, the introduction of minimum wages for these 
groups of workers, in particular, generated a lot of interest from policy analysts. Prior to the 
implementation of the minimum wages, a number of studies were conducted to estimate the 
potential effects of these policies.  
Bhorat (2000) performed simulations to explore the wage income and employment effects of 
notional increases in wages of domestic workers, farm workers and drivers. He concluded 
that the poverty-reducing effects of minimum wages were limited, and that it would require 
“very large, and in policy terms highly unlikely, wage adjustments to ensure a tangible 
poverty reduction impact”. He furthermore argued that employment losses that might arise 
from the policy would offset some of these gains (Bhorat, 2000:9). This particular study only 
accounted for first round effects of wage adjustments. It also applied the same percentage 
adjustment to every individual in a target group (as opposed to only adjusting wages of those 
that are initially below the minimum wage) and was not set up to allow for an evaluation of 
the net effects of wage income gains and employment losses in an integrated framework.  
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Given our interest in evaluating the poverty-reducing effects of actual minimum wages 
introduced in South Africa, the study by Hertz (2002) is perhaps a more appropriate point of 
reference (this model was discussed earlier in Chapter 3). In his model wages are raised to the 
level of the minimum wage, while the issue of the distribution of job losses among 
individuals is afforded explicit consideration. All of this is done within an integrated 
framework where income earned by individuals is pooled at the household level and 
redistributed among individual household members to study the poverty effects of minimum 
wages. As far as results are concerned, Hertz (2002) finds appreciable declines in poverty at 
low wage elasticity levels. Gains in both poverty and ultra poverty are, however, quickly 
eroded as the wage elasticity increases and employment losses erode income gains. In fact, 
poverty levels start rising once the wage elasticity increases beyond unity. An important 
contribution of Hertz’s (2002) study is the notion that job losses are more likely to occur 
among those workers that are initially further away from the minimum wage. In an ex ante 
setup such an assumption has important implications for measurements of the depth of 
poverty.  
The ex ante models of Bhorat (2000) and Hertz (2002) are both partial equilibrium 
approaches. As discussed and argued at length in Chapter 4, a general equilibrium approach 
may be required to properly capture the indirect effects of minimum wages, most important 
of which are the effects of minimum wages on prices, returns to other factors of production 
and indirect demand effects. This study therefore uses a CGE model as the primary method 
for analysing the economy-wide effects of minimum wages. CGE models are seldom applied 
in a minimum wage context, most probably due to the fact that these models make use of 
representative factor groups. When simulating the impact of the introduction of a new 
minimum wage policy it may be difficult to estimate the average wage change at a factor 
group level if the underlying survey data is not available or if the factor account is 
disaggregated in a man er that makes it hard to distinguish minimum wage workers from 
other workers in the economy.  
The topic of minimum wages does, however, frequently come up in CGE analyses of trade 
liberalisation. Although changes in minimum wages are not necessarily modelled explicitly 
in such studies, the existence of minimum wages is used as a justification for modelling the 
market for formal (low-skilled) workers as ‘rigid’ (i.e., selecting an ‘unemployment’ closure 
with fixed wages). In one such application Decaluwe et al. (2000) illustrate how the welfare 
gains from trade liberalisation in Western African countries are reduced by up to 45 per cent 
due to labour market rigidities. Decaluwe et al. (2000) also cite several other studies that 
substantiate these types of results.  
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The application here explicitly explores the impact of a new minimum wage policy being 
introduced. Given access to the survey data that underpins the wage income information in 
the SAM it is possible to precisely calculate the minimum wage-induced average wage 
change that may be expected for each factor group employed across the economic sectors in 
the model. In many respects the modelling approach here is similar to that in Holland et al. 
(2006) in an application to Washington state in the United States.  
However, an important and perhaps not so obvious difference between our simulations and 
those of Holland et al. (2006) is that they model the impact of an increase in an existing 
minimum wage rather than a new minimum wage policy. While from a technical point of 
view the modelling of these two types of policy shocks is exactly the same (i.e., the 
simulation shock involves raising wages of certain workers by a certain percentage), there are 
some practical considerations when the policy is an entirely new one. Appendix Figure 2 
shows how the introduction of a new minimum wage policy might alter within-factor group 
wage income distributions. What is expected to happen when a new minimum wage is set is 
for the wage distribution to ‘bunch together’ at the level of the minimum wage as sub-
minimum wage workers’ wages are raised to the level of the minimum wage. While this does 
indeed raise the average wage, it is also likely to reduce wage inequality, which violates the 
assumption in CGE models that within-group distributions are constant. Therefore, when 
such a wage shock is applied to the CGE model, the model will treat it as if the entire 
distribution shifts to the right without changing shape.  
What often happens when minimum wages have been in place for some time is that wage 
annual increases for workers that initially earn more than the minimum wage are limited in an 
attempt to cross-subsidise mandated wage increases for sub-minimum wage workers. In the 
long run therefore, the bunching together of wages also happens from the upper-end of the 
distribution. Eventually the wage dispersion becomes small. When this minimum wage is 
adjusted (as opposed to a new minimum wage being implemented), it is plausible that the 
entire wage curve shifts to right without affecting the shape. The implication is that a CGE 
simulation of an increase in a minimum wage that has been in place for some time would 
yield more plausible distributional results.    
South African minimum wages are set in terms several so-called sectoral determinations that 
govern employment conditions in various economic sectors. Sectors or occupation types that 
are afforded such explicit protection include (1) the retail sector, (2) domestic workers, (3) 
farm workers, (4) forestry workers, (5) taxi operators, (6) security personnel, (7) the 
hospitality industry, (8) contract cleaners, (9) people employed on learnership agreements, 
(10) children working in performance arts, and (11) the civil engineering sector. As discussed 
below in section 1.3, about one-third of workers in the economy are covered by these 
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minimum wages (the share is higher when excluding self-employed persons). A further 30 
per cent of workers fall under the system of Bargaining Councils. These are joint employer 
and union bargaining institutions that deal with general disputes at the workplace, while also 
serving as a platform for the negotiation of conditions of employment, including minimum 
wage levels, hours of work, overtime, leave pay, notice periods, and retrenchment pay (see 
Bhorat et al., 2007a).  
It is important to note upfront that the analyses in this study are only concerned with those 
minimum wages that are explicitly defined in terms of the sectoral determinations, and not 
those wage levels that are negotiated in Bargaining Councils on an annual basis. We therefore 
exclude large parts of manufacturing and community and social services sectors where wage 
bargaining does in fact take place. An important value addition in this study is that it 
considers the impact of eight of the eleven sectoral determinations, and not only those for 
farm and domestic workers, which has been the focus area of earlier studies.  
1.2. South Africa’s Minimum Wages 
Most of South Africa’s sectoral determinations were adopted between 2002 and 2006. Details 
of the prescriptions are published on the Department of Labour website.62 As noted, there are 
currently eleven sectoral determinations in force in South Africa. In these analyses, however, 
the sectoral determinations covering learnerships and children working in performance arts 
are excluded because these particular ‘occupation groups’ are not specified in the IES/LFS 
2000, which is used as a basis for the CGE simulations and the micro-modelling. The civil 
engineering sectoral determination is also excluded due to the small sample size of civil 
engineering workers earning less than the minimum wage. Despite these exclusions, this 
study is still unique in that it is the first attempt at analysing the impact of the bulk of the 
minimum wages that are currently in force in a joint simulation and within an economy-wide, 
comprehensive modelling framework. 
Table 5.1 provides details of minimum wage levels associated with the remaining eight 
sectoral determinations that are included in the analyses here. The sector of employment, 
occupation or skill level, firm size and the region of employment are generally the main 
factors determining whether a person is eligible for a minimum wage and also what the 
applicable level of the minimum wage is. With respect to the latter, minimum wages are 
typically higher in urban areas to compensate for higher transport and living costs. Up to five 
geographical areas are specified in each of the sectoral determinations, usually representing 
regions with different degrees of urbanisation (from A to E). This explains why several wage 
minima may exist within a particular sectoral determination. All the wage minima reported in 
                                                 
62
  See http://www.labour.gov.za/programmes/programme_display.jsp?programme_id=2664.  
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the table are monthly wages converted to 2000 prices and are based on a standard 45-hour 
workweek.  
Table 5.1: Minimum Wages Sectoral Determinations 
Sectoral Determination Occupation/Other Specifications Area (*) 
Monthly 
Minimum Wage 
(2000 prices) 
Managers Area A R 2,081 
Managers Area B R 1,678 
Managers Area C R 1,435 
Clerks Area A R 1,430 
Clerks Area B R 1,152 
Clerks Area C R 1,042 
Sales assistant Area A R 1,694 
Sales assistant Area B R 1,376 
Sales assistant Area C R 1,250 
Shop assistant Area A R 1,339 
Shop assistant Area B R 1,080 
Shop assistant Area C R 976 
Drivers Area A R 1,291 
Drivers Area B R 1,024 
Drivers Area C R 875 
Forklift operators Area A R 1,217 
Forklift operators Area B R 964 
Forklift operators Area C R 800 
Security guards Area A R 1,142 
Security guards Area B R 1,087 
Retail and Wholesale Trade 
Security guards Area C R 804 
All Domestic Workers Area A R 727 Domestic Workers 
All Domestic Workers Area B & C R 590 
All Farm Workers Area A R 742 Farm Workers 
All Farm Workers Area B & C R 660 
Forestry Workers All Forestry Workers No region specified R 624 
Taxi Drivers No region specified R 1,055 Taxi Operators   
Taxi Fare collector No region specified R 1,055 
All Security Workers Area A (†) R 1,439 
All Security Workers Area B (†) R 1,326 
All Security Workers Area C (†) R 1,197 
All Security Workers Area D (†) R 1,124 
Private Security Workers 
All Security Workers Area E (†) R 1,001 
Small firm employees No region specified R 1,105 Hospitality Sector Workers 
Medium to large firm employees No region specified R 1,231 
All Contract Cleaners Area A (§) R 1,305 
All Contract Cleaners Area B (§) R 1,176 Contract Cleaners 
All Contract Cleaners Area C (§) R 1,047 
Notes: (*) All areas labelled A, B and C are the same across the sectoral determinations, except: (†) the five 
private security workers regions, and (§) the three contract cleaner regions.  
Source: Department of Labour website and author’s own calculations. Mapping files are available from the 
author on request.  
The security worker minimum wages deserves some closer attention. In reality, minimum 
wages are differentiated by the security officers’ grade or qualification. Therefore, in addition 
to the five regions of employment, five grades are also distinguished (A to E). However, due 
to a lack of information in the IES/LFS 2000, it is impossible to determine the grades of 
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security workers in the dataset. Consequently, the minimum wage levels shown in Table 5.1 
and used in this analysis for any security workers within a given region are those for grade C. 
We further assume that all security workers employed in the retail sector fall under the retail 
and wholesale trade sectoral determination. 
1.3. Potential Wage and Employment Effects  
In this section some general statistics are presented that will facilitate our understanding of 
the extent of the wage and employment effects of minimum wages as implemented in South 
Africa. The first step is to look at wage earnings prior to the implementation of minimum 
wages, as this will provide an indication, firstly, of which individuals might benefit from 
minimum wages and, secondly, what the extent of the wage gain will be, both for individuals 
and at a sectoral or household group level (see section 1.4). Wage and employment 
information in the IES/LFS 2000 provides a useful benchmark for the analyses here because 
the year 2000 represents a period prior to the introduction of any of the minimum wages 
currently in force in South Africa. A comparison of these wages with the minimum wages 
(converted to 2000 levels as per Table 5.1) that are applicable to specific workers63 allows us 
to identify potential beneficiaries. These beneficiaries will include those workers earning less 
than the minimum wage that would eventually apply to them. Thus, once the sectoral 
determination comes into force they are set to earn a wage increase, provided of course their 
employers comply fully with the legislation and they keep their jobs.  
Before continuing the discussion, it is necessary to clarify the terminology used. A covered 
worker is defined as any individual who is protected by a minimum wage in terms of the 
sectoral determination that governs conditions of employment in the sector of employment. 
Uncovered workers include the self-employed and people in sectors or in occupation types 
for which no minimum wage exists. Many of these workers fall under the system of 
Bargaining Councils. Given the definitions of covered workers, some covered workers may 
have already earned a wage equal to or above the minimum wage in 2000. These workers are 
classified in this study as covered workers above the minimum wage. In the simulations that 
we conduct later, their wages are assumed to remain unchanged once the minimum wage is 
introduced. Covered workers earning less than the minimum wage are referred to as sub-
minimum wage workers in this study. In the comparative static analyses these workers’ wages 
are adjusted to the level of the minimum wage.  
Once the impact of minimum wages on individual wages is known, it is possible to calculate 
its impact on average wages, i.e. we can precisely calculate by how much factor- and sector-
                                                 
63
  Such a comparison also requires that minimum wages are adjusted to reflect the average number of hours 
that an individual works. 
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specific average wages will increase. This, together with the wage elasticity of demand, will 
determine the employment loss in an ex ante model. The extent of the wage increase depends 
on at least three factors. Firstly, it depends on the share of workers in particular sector that are 
covered by minimum wages. We use the term minimum wage coverage rate to denote this 
share. A high coverage rate, however, still does not guarantee a large wage effect. Therefore, 
a second important consideration is the share of these covered workers that are below the 
minimum wage prior to its implementation. Finally, the average distance between the wages 
of sub-minimum wage workers and the minimum wage in each sector is also important. We 
consider these three factors in the following two sub-sections.  
1.3.1. Sectoral Coverage Rates 
Table 5.2 below shows the eight sectoral determinations identified for this study cross-
tabulated against the main economic sectors in South Africa. Employment numbers and 
information on coverage is provided. The industry breakdown here, which corresponds to the 
sectors included in the CGE analyses conducted later, was governed to some extent by the 
sectoral determinations, i.e. care was taken to keep sectors for which a sectoral determination 
is in force separate from other industries in order to facilitate the analysis of the minimum 
wage impacts.64 Some of the sectoral determinations, however, only cover certain types of 
workers or activities that form part of economic sectors in the CGE model that cannot be 
disaggregated further due to a lack of data.65 Examples include the taxi industry (part of the 
transport sector), the contract cleaning sector (mainly part of community, social and personal 
services) and the security sector (mainly part of business and financial services). Coverage in 
these sectors is therefore automatically low.  
Sectoral coverage rates are high in instances where the sectoral determination covers a large 
share of workers employed within an industry and there are relatively few self-employed 
workers. Thus, high coverage rates are found in the agricultural sector, the forestry sector and 
in private households (employers of domestic workers). In contrast, even though the retail 
and hospitality sectoral determinations cover all non-self-employed persons in the retail and 
wholesale trade and accommodation sectors respectively, the high share of self-employed 
workers in these sectors mean that overall coverage rates are low.   
 
                                                 
64
  The same set of sectors were also used in the wage subsidy analyses, mainly for simplicity reasons.  
65
  The industry disaggregation is constrained by the industry disaggregation in the Supply and Use Tables 
(Statistics South Africa), as these form the basis of the supply and use information in the SAM on which 
the CGE model is based.  
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Table 5.2: Number of Workers by Sectoral Determination and Industry 
Description Retail sector 
Domestic 
workers 
Farm 
workers 
Forestry 
workers 
Taxi 
operators 
Security 
personnel  
Hospitality 
industry 
Contract 
cleaning 
Total 
covered 
workers 
Self-
employed 
Other 
uncovered 
workers 
Total 
uncovered 
workers 
Total 
employment 
Total 
sectoral 
coverage 
Agriculture                -                   -    
     741,506                 -                   -                   -                   -                   -    
     741,506       165,130                 -         165,130        906,636  81.8% 
Forestry                -                   -                   -    
       68,573                 -                   -                   -                   -    
       68,573           1,869                 -             1,869          70,442  97.3% 
Fishing                -                   -                   -                   -                   -                   -                   -                   -    
              -             3,313         12,572         15,885          15,885  0.0% 
Minerals and mining                -                   -                   -                   -                   -             6,648                 -             8,404  
       15,052           1,597       500,469       502,066        517,118  2.9% 
Food products                -                   -                   -                   -                   -             1,071                 -             4,693  
         5,764         10,992       202,343       213,335        219,099  2.6% 
Beverages and tobacco                -                   -                   -                   -                   -             2,407                 -                681  
         3,088         15,858         50,545         66,403          69,491  4.4% 
Textiles                -                   -                   -                   -                   -             1,305                 -           11,610  
       12,915         93,950       271,074       365,024        377,939  3.4% 
Leather, wood and paper                -                   -                   -                   -                   -                865                 -             2,747  
         3,612         21,197       147,831       169,028        172,640  2.1% 
Petroleum                -                   -                   -                   -                   -                   -                   -                399  
            399           2,342         18,972         21,314          21,713  1.8% 
Fertilisers and pesticides                -                   -                   -                   -                   -                   -                   -                438  
            438           1,385         41,906         43,291          43,729  1.0% 
Pharmaceuticals &  other chem.                -                   -                   -                   -                   -                   -                   -                535  
            535              495         13,723         14,218          14,753  3.6% 
Non-metals                -                   -                   -                   -                   -                   -                   -             4,365  
         4,365           8,811       130,677       139,488        143,853  3.0% 
Metals                -                   -                   -                   -                   -                  -                   -             4,213  
         4,213         18,992       192,597       211,589        215,802  2.0% 
Machinery, equip. & other manuf.               -                   -                   -                   -                   -                984                 -           12,809  
       13,793         18,553       219,293       237,846        251,639  5.5% 
Electricity and water                -                   -                   -                   -                   -             1,135                 -             4,099  
         5,234           1,242         71,986         73,228          78,462  6.7% 
Construction and building                -                   -                   -                   -                   -             1,914                 -             4,493  
         6,407       120,511       505,554       626,065        632,472  1.0% 
Retail and wholesale trade 
  1,108,620                 -                   -                   -                   -                   -                   -                   -    
  1,108,620       796,450                 -         796,450     1,905,070  58.2% 
Accommodation                -                   -                   -                   -                   -                   -    
     239,858                 -    
     239,858       123,055                 -         123,055        362,913  66.1% 
Transport and communication                -                   -                   -                   -    
       94,855         10,376                 -             2,327  
     107,558         73,094       343,720       416,814        524,372  20.5% 
Financial and business services                -                   -                   -                   -                   -    
     159,688                 -           79,136  
     238,824         76,823       544,894       621,717        860,541  27.8% 
Government, social & other serv.                -                   -                   -                   -                   -           43,925                 -    
     150,405  
     194,330       144,354    2,103,871    2,248,225     2,442,555  8.0% 
Domestic services                -    
  1,001,394       191,923                 -                   -             1,498                 -             5,585  
  1,200,400           9,031                 -             9,031     1,209,431  99.3% 
    1,108,620    1,001,394       933,429         68,573         94,855       231,816       239,858       296,939  
  3,975,484    1,709,044    5,372,027    7,081,071   11,056,555  36.0% 
Note: The shaded cells represent the ‘main sectors’ associated with each sectoral determination.  
Source:  IES/LFS 2000 
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1.3.2. Sub-Minimum Wage Workers and the Wage Gap 
In addition to the coverage rate, it was noted earlier that the extent of the wage increase will 
also depend on the share of covered workers below the minimum wage and on the average 
distance between reported wages and minimum wages among these sub-minimum wage 
workers. These two concepts are similar to what is referred to in poverty analysis as the 
‘headcount ratio’ and the ‘poverty gap’ (i.e. P0 and P1 in the FGT poverty index. The FGT 
index can easily be modified to calculate the ‘sub-minimum wage headcount ratio’ and the 
‘wage gap’. If this index is denoted by Wα the sub-minimum wage headcount ratio is 
calculated by setting α = 0 and the wage gap is obtained by setting α = 1. Another way of 
interpreting W0 is to see this as the percentile in the initial wage distribution for a particular 
group of covered workers at which the minimum wage is set.  
 
1
1 Mq i i
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i i
w wW
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α
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 
−
=  
 
∑  [5.1] 
The index has a similar range to the FGT index. The symbol n in this equation represents the 
number of covered workers, q is the number of sub-minimum wage workers, Miw is
 
the 
minimum wage and wi is the actual reported wage of each worker prior to the introduction of 
minimum wages. An important distinction between the standard FGT index and Wα is the 
indexing of the minimum wage Miw  over i (the poverty line (z) in the FGT index is a fixed 
value). Such indexing is required in the South African case because the minimum wage 
varies across sectors, occupation types, regions and so on. Monthly or annual minimum 
wages also depend on the number of hours people work, which means a different minimum 
wage may be applicable to each minimum wage worker. One solution is to simplify Wα by 
substituting Mi i is w w= , thus yielding  
 ( )
1
1 1
q
i
i
W s
n
α
α
=
= −∑  [5.2] 
This equation is now similar to the standard FGT index with a ‘normalized minimum wage’ 
of 1 and a ‘relative wage’ of si, where si is each worker’s wage expressed relative to the 
minimum wage.  
Figure 5.1 shows the coverage rates (as per Table 5.2) for each of the eight ‘main sectors’ 
(see bar graph). Also shown are the sub-minimum headcount ratios (W0) and the wage gaps 
(W1) calculated for covered workers in each sector (line graphs, indexed on the right-hand 
axis). Estimates of W0 range between 0.38 in government and social services and 0.76 in 
agriculture. These represent the shares of covered workers that are below the minimum wage. 
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W0 and W1 further tend to be correlated, with a higher W0 often coinciding with a higher W1. 
The wage gap in agriculture is the highest (0.36), suggesting that farm worker wages are, on 
average, furthest away from their respective minimum wages. This is followed by domestic 
services (0.28) and the transport (0.27), both of which have similar levels of W1.  
Figure 5.1: Coverage, Headcounts, Wage Gaps and Wage Increases by Economic Sector 
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Source:  IES/LFS 2000 and author’s own calculations 
Given the above observations, coupled with the fact that coverage rates are high in 
agriculture and domestic services, the expectation is that wage increases associated with the 
implementation of minimum wages will be highest in these sectors (assuming full compliance 
and no job losses initially). This is confirmed by the graph in the right-hand panel of Figure 
5.1, which shows the average expected wage increase across all workers employed in sectors 
(compare Table 5.3 further below). Despite a high W0 and W1, wages in the transport sector 
only rise marginally, which reflects the fact that the sectoral determination for taxi operators 
only covers a small percentage of workers in the larger transport sector. These results indicate 
the importance of all three the observed variables – coverage rate, the sub-minimum wage 
headcount ratio and the wage gap – in determining the extent of the increase in the average 
sectoral wage in response to minimum wages. These wage change will play a crucial role in 
determining the extent of the employment loss associated with minimum wages at a given 
wage elasticity level.  
1.4. Potential Household Income and Poverty Effects  
The objective of the CGE analyses is to evaluate the poverty and distributional effects of 
minimum wages, and hence it is also instructive to briefly consider some of the linkages that 
exist between poor households and sub-minimum wage workers. Results presented earlier in 
Chapter 2 showed that relatively poorer households in South Africa have fewer income 
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earners and are larger in size. The poor are therefore generally less reliant on wage income as 
a source of income, which means they are also less exposed to changes in wages or 
employment levels. Of real interest, however, is the distribution of sub-minimum wage 
workers across different household income groups as they are ultimately the potential 
beneficiaries of the policy.  
The left-hand panel of Figure 5.2 shows the distribution, in absolute terms, of covered 
workers below and above the minimum wage as well as uncovered workers across household 
income quintiles. Sub-minimum wage workers are distributed fairly evenly across the bottom 
three quintiles (500 000 to 600 000 workers in each group). There are about half as many in 
quintile four, and virtually no sub-minimum wage workers in the richest quintile. On 
aggregate, though, there are roughly equal numbers of non-poor (top three quintiles) and poor 
(bottom two quintiles) sub-minimum wage workers (approximately 1 and 1.1 million 
respectively).      
Figure 5.2: Number and Share of Workers According to Minimum Wage Classification 
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Source:  IES/LFS 2000  
Although in absolute terms one may be tempted to say that minimum wage legislation will 
impact equally on poor and non-poor households, several other factors need to be considered 
as well. The right-hand panel of Figure 5.2 shows that about 50 per cent of workers in 
quintile one and 47 per cent in quintile two are covered by minimum wage legislation. Very 
large shares of these workers are in fact sub-minimum wage workers, as is clear from the 
figure. In contrast, only a small percentage of non-poor workers are covered, and even fewer 
of these are sub-minimum wage workers.  
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These shares imply that the sub-minimum wage headcount ratio (W0) in the poor quintiles is 
much higher than in non-poor quintiles. Evidence of this is presented in Figure 5.3, where 
ratios of 0.86 and 0.72 are calculated for W0 in the two poor quintiles (indexed on the right-
hand axis). Also shown in the figure is the wage gap (W1), which is also much higher in the 
poorer quintiles. This wage gap is evidence that poor workers are, on average, further away 
from the minimum wage.  
Figure 5.3: Coverage, Headcounts, Wage Gaps and Wage Increases by Household Quintiles 
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Source:  IES/LFS 2000 and author’s own calculations 
The combination of higher coverage rates, sub-minimum wage headcount ratios and wage 
gaps in the poor quintiles are all indicative of the fact that poor workers are set to experience 
larger wage increases than their non-poor counterparts once minimum wages are introduced. 
This is clearly shown in the right-hand panel of Figure 5.3, which shows the expected 
percentage increase in average wages earned by all workers across different quintiles. 
Workers in the poorest quintile will, on average, experience wage increases of 54.4 per cent, 
compared to 20.6 per cent in quintile two. In contrast those in the non-poor quintiles will only 
experience increases of about 10 per cent and below. Of course, when the policy shock is 
implemented in the CGE model, the average wage increase will be specified across sectors 
and for different factor groups (see Figure 5.1 earlier and Table 5.3) and not across quintiles. 
This means the distributional information generated in the CGE model may not look exactly 
like this.  
Even in absolute terms the increases earned by poor workers are large compared to those of 
non-poor workers. The percentage increases shown in Figure 5.3 are equivalent to absolute 
annual wage increases of about R2 454 for workers in quintile one, R1 821 in quintile two, 
R1 333 in quintile three, R612 in quintile four and R74 in quintile five. However, in order to 
truly understand the potential poverty effect it is necessary to consider household structures, 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Chapter 5: Protection for the Working Poor: But do Minimum Wages Reduce Poverty? 
137 
 
as wage increases are ultimately shared among several household members. Data from the 
IES/LFS 2000 suggests that poor sub-minimum wage workers live in households with an 
average of 5.5 members. The comparative figure for non-poor sub-minimum wage 
households is 3.1 members. This means the minimum wage-induced income gains earned by 
poor workers are shared among almost twice as many people, which puts the potential 
poverty-reducing effects of minimum wages into perspective.  
The analyses so far are preliminary and exploratory in the sense that we have not taken into 
account job losses that might result from minimum wages. Job losses, however small, will 
erode income gains associated with minimum wages. From a poverty and distributional point 
of view it is therefore important to consider how such job losses might be distributed among 
individuals and where these individuals are located in the welfare spectrum. Only once this 
distribution is known can the net effects of minimum wages be estimated. We next turn to an 
economy-wide modelling framework that will allow for such an integrated analysis.   
2. Economy-Wide Analysis 
2.1. Description of the Simulations 
Technical details of the CGE model and the micro-incidence and micro-simulation models 
were provided in Chapter 4. To recap, a highly disaggregated CGE model is used as the 
primary analysis tool. Economy-wide results on employment changes, factor income changes 
and household income changes are generated in this model. Two micro-level models are then 
specified to aid the analysis of poverty and distributional effects of minimum wage policies. 
These include a micro-incidence model whereby percentage changes in average income 
levels of household groups in the CGE model are linked to individual households in the 
micro-model, as well as a micro-simulation model where the primary interface is between 
factor groups in the CGE model and individual workers in the micro-model.  
All the simulations conducted model the same wage shock as calculated for each 
representative factor group employed in each sector in the CGE model. The aim is to explore 
the impact of a given minimum wage policy under different assumptions about firm 
behaviour and labour market responses to minimum wage policies rather than to explore 
outcomes under different minimum wage policy scenarios. Given uncertainty around the 
wage-employment relationship, one of the primary goals is in fact to evaluate the impact of 
minimum wages for different wage elasticity levels. We also evaluate the impact of minimum 
wages for different levels of labour productivity gains in order to test whether outcomes are 
improved under an efficiency wage scenario where increased wages induce higher 
productivity among workers. These simulations are conducted under both a short- and long 
run scenario.  
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A further important feature of the simulations is the assumption that employers across both 
formal and informal66 sectors fully comply with the legislation. Although full compliance 
(especially in the informal sector) is perhaps unlikely, the aim here is to simulate the policy 
as it is intended to operate (see section 2.1.3) 
2.1.1. Minimum Wage Shock  
The simulated wage shock is calculated directly from the IES/LFS 2000 data. This is possible 
because a direct mapping exists between the factor and activity groups in the SAM and 
individual workers in the IES/LFS 2000 data. Thus, average wage changes for all factor 
groups employed across all sectors can be calculated by comparing the reported wage levels 
against the wage level that workers would be earning once the minimum wage is 
implemented, assuming that employers fully comply with the minimum wage regulations. 
The wage change, as explained, only applies to sub-minimum wage workers, while all other 
workers’ wages remain constant. These changes (in percentage terms) are then applied to the 
relevant factors and activities in the CGE model as part of the simulation shock. 
There are 88 labour groups in the SAM. Although the wage change is calculated for all of 
these factor groups, it is technically speaking only those factor groups that are classified 
under an unemployment closure for which wage changes can be applied exogenously in the 
simulation shock. In this model this includes all unskilled and medium skilled workers (low-
skilled). High-skilled wages are flexible in terms of the full employment model closure, i.e. 
even if wage changes are applied for these workers in the simulation, their wages will simply 
revert back to the equilibrium level in the base once the model is solved. In reality, about 2 
per cent of workers classified as high-skilled workers are in fact sub-minimum wage workers 
(IES/LFS 2000), but this is more than likely a reporting error. Skilled wage changes are 
therefore effectively ignored in the simulations.  
It is important to note that since the CPI is the numéraire in the model and since low-skilled 
wages are fixed in terms of the unemployment closure, low-skilled wages are also fixed in 
real terms. By extension, the wage changes simulated are real changes, i.e. income gains 
associated with the minimum wage policy are, by construction, not eroded fully by inflation. 
This is consistent with the fact that minimum wage levels are revised regularly by the 
Department of Labour to keep pace with inflation.  
Table 5.3 shows the average wage changes in different sectors for different types of workers 
in the CGE model. The shaded column shows the average wage shock implemented for low-
skilled workers (the actual simulation shock is disaggregated across the low-skilled factor 
                                                 
66
  The identification of the formal/informal sectors is based on a question in the LFS September 2000 that 
asks whether the business in which the respondent is employed is in the formal or informal sector.  
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groups). Skilled workers, as explained, are fully employed and are assumed to be unaffected 
by the minimum wage. The last column (sectoral average) shows the effective change in the 
total wage bill experienced by each sector (compare Figure 5.1). It is clear to see that the 
agriculture, forestry and accommodation sectors will be hardest hit by minimum wages. The 
relative size of the agricultural and domestic worker sectors further imply that most of the job 
losses that result will occur within these two sectors.    
Table 5.3: Simulated Average Wage Changes by Sector 
  
Unskilled 
wages 
Medium- 
skilled  
wages 
All  
low-skilled 
wages 
Sectoral 
average 
Main minimum wage sectors        
Agriculture 55.7% 8.1% 24.1% 20.9% 
Forestry 33.8% 9.3% 19.3% 16.9% 
Retail and wholesale trade 15.0% 9.7% 11.0% 6.3% 
Accommodation 35.4% 18.2% 20.7% 11.7% 
Transport and communication 2.8% 5.8% 5.5% 2.3% 
Financial and business services 12.2% 6.9% 7.6% 1.6% 
Government, social and other services 4.1% 0.3% 1.1% 0.4% 
Domestic services 32.8% 1.7% 29.4% 29.4% 
Other Sectors 1.6% 0.1% 0.4% 0.2% 
All sectors 16.2% 3.6% 6.5% 3.1% 
Note: The sectoral average (last column) takes into account the entire wage bill, i.e. also high-skilled wages, 
which are unaffected by minimum wage legislation.    
Source: IES/LFS 2000 and author’s own calculations. 
The minimum wage in the government, social and other services sector needs some 
clarification. Although the effective wage increase is small (0.4 per cent), the government 
sector is not traditionally thought of as a sector where employment is governed by a 
production function or where it responds to relative wage changes. As shown in Table 5.2, 
however, this sector (or more correctly the ‘other services’ part of it) includes some security 
workers and contract cleaners that are covered by minimum wage legislation. It is therefore 
necessary to assume that the entire sector operates like any other profit-maximising sector, 
even if this is not entirely consistent with what we know about the government part of the 
sector.  
2.1.2. Simulation Loops 
Two sets of simulations are conducted. The first simulation set explores the general 
equilibrium effects of the minimum wage shock across a range of different sector-specific 
wage elasticity levels. Results are reported for national weighted (or aggregate) wage 
elasticity values (shown in absolute terms here) of η = 0.3, η = 0.5, η = 0.7, η = 1.0 and 
η = 2.0, where η = 0.7 represents the benchmark elasticity value. Section 3.3 in the Appendix 
provides a detailed explanation of how sector-specific elasticity of substitution values that 
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correspond to these specific national weighted wage elasticities, are estimated. These same 
elasticity values are also applied in the wage subsidy simulations.  
A second simulation set explores the impact of increased labour productivity under an 
‘efficiency wage’ scenario. Nutritional factors, lower labour turnover and better firm 
management may all contribute to rising labour productivity. Although there is little evidence 
linking minimum wages to productivity gains in South Africa, Hertz (2002:3) argues that this 
may be more than “an academic possibility for farm and domestic workers” in South Africa 
given low wages and poor labour relations. In running these simulations we do not imply to 
claim that productivity gains are a strong possibility; the simulations merely illustrate the 
obvious gains that may materialise when labour does in fact become more productive in 
response to minimum wages.  
The same minimum wage shock as before is modelled, but unskilled workers are now 
assumed to become more productive in response to earning a higher wage. All the 
productivity simulations are run at a wage elasticity of η = 0.7. The productivity gain is 
modelled by assuming that factor-specific gains are directly proportional to the wage change 
experienced by that factor. In short, the first simulation in this set assumes no labour 
productivity increase. In the second through to the fifth simulations, labour productivity 
increases by a factor of 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 1.0 and 1.25 of the percentage increase in the wage 
for low-skilled workers in each sector.67  
Pauw et al. (2007b) provide a detailed description of the different ways in which productivity 
changes can be modelled in CGE models and at various levels in the nested production 
structure. In the analyses here labour productivity gains are simply modelled as a direct 
increase in the marginal product of workers. Unfortunately the use of representative factor 
groups (rather than individual factors) in a CGE model makes it impossible to isolate sub-
minimum wage workers from uncovered workers or covered workers above the minimum 
wage. Therefore, all members in a particular group effectively experience the same change in 
productivity, irrespective of whether that person is a sub-minimum wage worker or what the 
individual’s wage gap was prior to the introduction of the minimum wage. 
Both the ‘no labour productivity’ and the ‘labour productivity’ simulation sets are conducted 
under a short run and long run scenario. These scenarios basically imply different treatments 
of capital stock in the model as defined in terms of the closure rules. As explained in the 
Appendix (section 2.1.3) capital stock is activity specific and fixed in the short run and 
mobile across sectors in the long run.  
                                                 
67
  For example, if the wage of an unskilled worker in a certain industry increases by 10 per cent, the 
productivity increase in the six simulations run here will be zero, 2.5, 5.0, 7.5, 10.0 and 12.5 per cent. 
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2.1.3. What is not modelled?  
There are several additional scenarios that could have been explored. The first is a 
consideration of outcomes under a ‘less-than-full’ compliance scenario. In theory, all workers 
in the economy across both formal and informal sectors are covered by minimum wage 
legislation. However, enforcement in informal sectors, smaller firms or households may be 
especially difficult. Hertz (2005), for example, finds evidence of substantial non-compliance 
with minimum wage provisions for domestic workers in South Africa, a sector that is largely 
informal. This suggests that the scenarios here are quite optimistic as far as the coverage of 
minimum wages is concerned.  
Using a partial equilibrium model, (Pauw et al., 2008a) compare poverty effects of minimum 
wages under a full and low compliance scenario. In the latter scenario, full compliance was 
assumed for the formal sector, but informal wages were left unchanged. Such lower 
compliance will mean a lower effective wage increase but also lower employment losses, 
which makes the implications for poverty uncertain. The authors find that a higher level of 
compliance results in an improved poverty effect, which reflects the fact that wages are 
generally lower in those sectors where employers are less likely to comply with minimum 
wage legislation (i.e., informal sectors). A similar analysis was considered beyond the scope 
of this study.  
This study also does not consider the sensitivity of outcomes to different household income 
and price elasticity levels. We argue throughout that the indirect demand effects of minimum 
wages are important given the policy’s impact on household incomes and prices. However, 
the extent to which indirect demand effects are important also depends on the sensitivity of 
consumption demand to changes in income and relative prices, i.e. the income and price 
elasticities are key parameters. The primary focus in this study, however, is to show how 
sensitive model outcomes are to different wage elasticity levels. The addition of extra layers 
of sensitivity tests will make the analysis convoluted; hence, all simulations are conducted 
using the same set of demand-side elasticities, and particularly those used by PROVIDE, 
2005).  
2.2. Interpretation of Results: Firms’ Responses to Minimum Wages  
Before continuing with a discussion of the results, it is useful to consider how, in a general 
equilibrium context, firms might respond to minimum wages under certain conditions. This 
brief discussion will aid the interpretation of results later. When faced with minimum wages, 
firms incur production cost increases. They essentially have two options available to them to 
mitigate these cost increases, i.e. they can either reduce the employment of minimum wage 
workers by substituting them for other factors of production, or they can absorb the cost 
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increases and pass these on to consumers in the form of higher prices.68 Figure 5.4 shows 
these cost mitigation options in a diagram.  
In practice firms will opt for a combination of the two cost mitigation options, with wage 
elasticity of labour demand determining the optimal choice. When the wage elasticity is high, 
substitution along the production isoquant is easy, and firms would lean towards substituting 
minimum wage workers with other factors of production (option A). If, however, the wage 
elasticity is low, substitution possibilities are limited and firms are forced to raise consumer 
prices by more than would have been necessary under a high wage elasticity scenario. For 
average elasticity levels both cost mitigation options will be used, which means that both 
employment and price effects will be moderate.  
Figure 5.4: Cost Mitigation Options: How do Firms Respond to Minimum Wages?  
Production costs 
rise due to 
minimum wages
Cost mitigation option B:
Pass increased production 
costs on to consumers in the 
form of higher commodity 
prices
Cost mitigation option A:
Substitute minimum wage 
workers with other factors 
of production (capital or 
workers not covered by 
minimum wages)
Feasible when wage 
elasticity is high, i.e. 
relatively easy to substitute
Feasible when wage 
elasticity is low, i.e. hard to 
substitute
Both options have important secondary demand effects:
• Higher unemployment AND increased prices both erode wage income 
gains associated with minimum wages, causing disposable income to drop.
• Reduced levels of disposable income impact negatively on consumption 
demand, which causes secondary employment and wage income losses due 
to a decline in labour demand. 
 
Standard labour market partial equilibrium models only consider the substitution effects of 
minimum wage policies, and then only partially, i.e. only employment levels of minimum 
wage workers are considered. This means only the implication of cost mitigation A are 
                                                 
68
  A third possibility, but one that cannot be explored in a model with perfectly competitive markets, is that 
some firms may choose absorb cost increases, but rather than raising prices, they reduce profits in an 
attempt to protect their market share.  
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explored, without considering the impact on prices. The tendency for firms to lean towards 
cost mitigation option B under a low wage elasticity scenario is therefore ignored. CGE 
models, on the other hand, allow for the exploration of both substitution and price effects. 
Both these have important downstream effects as explained in the box at the bottom of Figure 
5.4.    
2.3. Results and Analysis 
Minimum wages have been in place in South Africa for some years now, and already labour 
force data is available that allows for an ex post analysis of their impact, at least as far as 
employment effects are concerned. Some may argue that using actual observed data provides 
a much better indication of the true impact of minimum wages in South Africa than an ex 
ante analysis could. Ex ante modelling of a policy that is already in place is precarious 
indeed. The temptation will always exist to compare the results generated in such an ex ante 
model against actual data, and invariably the modelled results will look different from those 
observed in reality.  
It is important, however, to remind ourselves that comparative static models are not 
predictive tools. They do not account for long-term dynamic changes, such as sectoral growth 
or decline over time, changes in household size or structure, population growth, investment 
responses or economic growth. They also do not account for any other exogenous shocks, be 
they internal policy changes or external economic shocks. It is therefore almost expected that 
the economy today looks different to the economy represented by the counterfactual data 
produced in the general equilibrium and micro-level models here.69 Rather, these models are 
policy tools that are useful for evaluating the impact of policy shocks under specific 
assumptions about how agents in the economy interact and respond to shocks. Such analyses 
aid the exploration of possible scenarios and hence improve our understanding of economic 
linkages and behaviour. 
                                                 
69
  Examples in the South African context where we can almost expect the CGE results to differ from 
observed outcomes include: (1) The long-term decline in employment in agriculture in South Africa may 
relate to technological changes in production, structural shifts in production and minimum wages; hence 
modelled outcomes here may underestimate observed employment changes in this sector. (2) The retail 
and wholesale and retail trade sector experienced strong employment growth after 2000. Cost increases 
associated with minimum wages in this sector could well have been mitigated by cheaper imports, which 
also sparked a consumer boom and hence increased demand for workers in this sector. (3) Despite 
expectations that domestic worker minimum wages would lead to a large decline in employment in this 
sector, South African households have also become smaller and more fragmented, while more families 
now rely on two incomes for support. These factors have increased the demand for domestic services at 
home despite the introduction of minimum wages.  
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2.3.1. Employment and Production Effects 
When interpreting employment and wage results for different types of factors of production it 
is important to bear in mind the factor market closures selected. To recap, all labour 
categories are assumed to be fully mobile across sectors in both the short run and long run 
scenarios. Skilled workers are fully employed at the national level, but sectoral employment 
of skilled workers may vary depending on demand and supply conditions within sectors. 
Unskilled workers, on the other hand, face constant wages (unless changed exogenously, e.g. 
in the minimum wage simulation) and flexible employment levels both at a sectoral and 
national level, reflecting the ‘excess supply’ or unemployment that exists among unskilled 
workers in South Africa. It is also useful to bear in mind that the employment losses 
associated with the minimum wage simulations are probably upper bound estimates at any 
given wage elasticity level given the assumption of full compliance by employers across both 
formal and informal sectors. 
a) Low-Skilled and Skilled Employment in the Short Run 
Table 5.4 presents employment results for low-skilled and skilled workers in the main 
minimum wage sectors. Overall, 4.2 per cent of the 8.7 million low-skilled workers lose their 
jobs in the low-elasticity scenario (η = 0.3). This figure rises to 5.2 per cent when η = 0.7, the 
benchmark wage elasticity. At a very high wage elasticity (η = 2.0) job losses can be 
expected to be around 678 000 or 7.8 per cent of low-skilled employment in 2000. The 
benchmark scenario translates to a decline of 4.1 per cent in overall employment (there were 
just over 11 million workers employed in the base) and an increase in the unemployment rate 
(broad definition) from 37.1 to 38.6 per cent.   
In absolute terms domestic workers suffer the greatest employment decline, with losses 
accounting for almost three-quarters (289 213) of the 363 049 low-skilled jobs lost in the 
economy under the low-elasticity scenario (η = 0.3). The other major contributors to job 
losses are the agriculture, retail and wholesale trade and accommodation (hospitality) sectors. 
The large number of job losses among domestic workers is unsurprising given that this is a 
relatively large sector with a high minimum wage coverage rate. The simulated wage change 
for domestic workers is also the largest of all the sectors. Interestingly, however, domestic 
worker job losses appear to be fairly insensitive to the wage elasticity, with job losses 
remaining in the region of 290 000 even as the wage elasticity value approaches η = 1.0. At 
this wage elasticity level, domestic sector job losses ‘only’ account for 50 per cent of overall 
job losses, which implies that increases in job losses in other minimum wage sectors have 
risen relatively faster than in the domestic workers sector.  
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Table 5.4: Employment Results: Short and Long Run Scenarios (No Labour Productivity Gains) 
  Short run Long run 
  
η = 0.3 η = 0.5 η = 0.7 η = 1.0 η = 2.0 η = 0.3 η = 0.5 η = 0.7 η = 1.0 η = 2.0 
Low-skilled employment by sector               
Agriculture -23,783  -35,911  -46,902  -61,055  -95,626  -60,914  -72,340  -80,198  -88,491  -105,442  
Forestry -544  -879  -1,223  -1,731  -3,351  -2,276  -2,392  -2,556  -2,834  -3,823  
Retail and wholesale trade -27,756  -42,265  -54,842  -71,222  -114,039  -57,812  -64,705  -71,305  -81,015  -112,593  
Accommodation -9,637  -14,938  -19,597  -25,670  -40,968  -34,129  -36,177  -37,761  -39,845  -46,043  
Transport and communication -1,709  -2,942  -4,254  -6,338  -13,908  118  -1,504  -3,267  -6,003  -15,211  
Financial and business services -1,994  -3,622  -5,419  -8,329  -18,930  -1,030  -3,171  -5,392  -8,762  -19,888  
Government, social and other services -3,682  -8,018  -13,031  -21,169  -49,845  -1,445  -7,380  -13,540  -22,914  -54,161  
Domestic services -289,213  -290,315  -291,328  -292,714  -296,715  -294,846  -294,883  -295,334  -296,215  -299,467  
Other Sectors -4,731  -8,249  -12,395  -19,228  -45,024  21,722  14,844  7,223  -4,527  -43,909  
Net change -363,049  -407,139  -448,991  -507,457  -678,407  -430,611  -467,706  -502,130  -550,606  -700,539  
Percentage change in overall low-skilled employment -4.2% -4.7% -5.2% -5.9% -7.8% -5.0% -5.4% -5.8% -6.4% -8.1% 
Skilled employment by sector                     
Agriculture -624  -931  -1,202  -1,539  -2,286  -1,742  -2,034  -2,212  -2,370  -2,567  
Forestry -7  -12  -16  -21  -39  -47  -46  -46  -46  -48  
Retail and wholesale trade -3,658  -5,204  -6,337  -7,522  -9,149  -9,190  -9,129  -9,008  -8,786  -7,966  
Accommodation -1,552  -2,363  -3,050  -3,904  -5,819  -6,521  -6,687  -6,757  -6,801  -6,810  
Transport and communication 296  496  674  897  1,323  1,406  1,452  1,445  1,397  1,144  
Financial and business services 911  1,261  1,434  1,439  137  3,149  2,909  2,582  2,037  125  
Government, social and other services 3,373  4,718  5,718  6,873  9,531  6,316  6,766  7,119  7,584  8,935  
Domestic services -163  -162  -161  -160  -155  -165  -164  -163  -161  -156  
Other Sectors 1,425  2,198  2,940  3,936  6,456  6,796  6,933  7,039  7,146  7,343  
Net change 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
Note: Results from the ‘with labour productivity gains’ short run scenario is shown in Appendix Table 7.  
Source:  CGE/micro-model results 
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The domestic worker sector is unique in that no capital is employed in the production 
process, while virtually all domestic workers are low-skilled workers. This rigid employment 
structure means that there are no substitution possibilities available to employers, irrespective 
of the wage elasticity levels assumed for the sector. Production cost increases are therefore 
absorbed by employers and passed on to ‘consumers’, which in the case of domestic workers 
are the employers themselves. These consumers then respond to price increases by 
demanding less of the service, hence the employment effect is determined almost entirely by 
the price elasticity of demand and not by the elasticity of substitution in the production 
function.  
Scenarios considering different consumption demand responses are considered to be beyond 
the scope of this study as noted, but it is an interesting issue. Hertz (2002) notes that while 
domestic services can be considered a luxury or non-necessity, it is also relatively 
inexpensive in South Africa. Many households, he adds, have over a long period of time 
become accustomed to having hired help at home. He cites studies that suggest that domestic 
worker job losses might initially be large once the minimum wage is introduced, but this may 
be followed by a wave of re-hiring as people tire of the extra housework. The ultimate 
employment effect may therefore be smaller than what our model suggests. Such an outcome 
could be illustrated by running the scenarios at lower price elasticity for domestic services.    
Net job losses among skilled workers are zero by construction, with wages adjusting to 
ensure full employment at an economy-wide level. However, sectoral employment of skilled 
workers may vary as skilled workers are attracted to expanding sectors. As unskilled labour 
becomes relatively more expensive due to the introduction of minimum wages, their skilled 
counterparts will be relatively more attractive to employers. In the interim period, therefore, a 
substitution effect takes place along the value added production isoquant, with more skilled 
workers demanded relative to low-skilled workers. This will result in a decline in low-skilled 
employment and an increase in skilled employment at a sectoral level.  
However, a scale effect may also be observed. Since low-skilled wages rise exogenously in 
the minimum wage simulations, overall employment costs increase, thus causing production 
costs and consumer prices to increase. This leads to a decline in demand for output from 
minimum wage sectors, which may cause the demand for all types of labour to decline in 
those sectors. The results presented in Table 5.4 suggest that these scale effects dominate; 
skilled employment declines in most of the minimum wage sectors. Further evidence of a 
decline in aggregate demand for skilled labour in the economy is presented further below 
when changes in factor incomes are considered (economy-wide average skilled wages 
decline). These results illustrate the importance of considering prices and indirect demand 
effects when evaluating the net welfare effects of policy shocks.  
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b) Low-Skilled and Skilled Employment in the Long Run  
The short and long run scenarios differ only in terms of the assumption about whether capital 
is fixed at a sectoral level (short run) or mobile across sectors (long run). Greater flexibility in 
the long run allows contracting sectors to shed capital stock, which is then re-employed 
elsewhere. Substitution between capital and labour is still governed by relative prices of these 
factors, but the effect of a reduction in capital stock is that overall labour input requirements 
are lowered. Ultimately, this causes the employment response to minimum wages to be larger 
in the long run than in the short run. This is consistent with evidence that long run wage 
elasticities tend to exceed short run wage elasticities. However, in a CGE modelling context it 
is not wage elasticities (or elasticities of substitution) themselves that increase in the long run 
(these model parameters remain unchanged); it is merely the economy that develops the 
ability to undergo structural shifts in the longer run as far as sectoral production capacities 
and output levels are concerned. Sectoral production effects are considered in more detail 
below.  
c) Factor Incomes 
Table 5.5 presents results on real changes in total factor income. Factor incomes shown here 
are expressed in real terms, i.e. wage changes are expressed relative to the CPI, which is the 
numéraire in the model. In the case of labour, total factor income is simply the wage bill 
(wage times employment). The results suggest that all low-skilled workers (and unskilled 
workers in particular) experience fairly large gains in total remuneration as a result of 
minimum wages. This is not surprising considering the extent of the simulated wage 
increases (see Table 5.3). However, the income-eroding effect of job losses is clear: factor 
income gains deteriorate as the wage elasticity increases and job losses among low-skilled 
workers rise. At the benchmark wage elasticity level of η = 0.7, low-skilled workers 
experience a 3.0 per cent increase in total earnings (short-run scenario).  
Interestingly, though, is the observation that even at a high wage elasticity level (η = 2.0) the 
low-skilled wage bill still increases despite what economic theory might predict. It is true that 
in a theoretical partial equilibrium context the wage bill is expected to decline at elasticity 
levels beyond unity, but in a general equilibrium context indirect effects also come into play. 
The fact that the medium-skilled wage bill declines at this wage elasticity value does, 
however, attest to the fact that income declines associated with employment losses will 
eventually outweigh the wage income gains.  
Total factor income of skilled workers declines due to minimum wage legislation, 
irrespective of the wage elasticity level. This relates to the scale effects observed earlier, i.e. 
there is an overall decline in demand for skilled workers, which causes skilled wages to 
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decline. Given factor mobility and the existence of wage differentials between sectors, the 
movement of workers between sectors may also result in changes in total factor income of 
skilled workers. The combined effect for all unskilled, medium skilled and skilled workers is 
a small rise in total factor income at low to moderate wage elasticity levels; for example, at 
η = 0.3 total labour income increases by 0.8 per cent, while at η = 0.7 the gain is only 0.3 per 
cent.  
Evidence of negative scale effects and a contracting economy is also reflected in declining 
returns to capital and land, with the impact on the latter especially severe given the fairly 
large rise in wages in the agricultural sector. Combined income from all factors of production 
declines in all the scenarios, suggesting that gains in total wage income at low to moderate 
wage elasticity levels are overshadowed by the decline in the return to capital. Note that 
capital stock accounts for about 47 per cent of value added in the economy, i.e. it is important 
in determining changes in overall factor returns. Land only contributes about 0.4 per cent to 
overall value added, which suggests that the large decline in the returns to land has almost no 
bearing on overall factor incomes. 
The long run results are very similar to the short run results, although factor income gains for 
low-skilled workers are marginally lower. Capital stock mobility allows for a reallocation of 
capital stock away from minimum wage sectors given declining profitability in these sectors. 
This greater mobility allows the returns to capital to recover slightly in the longer run. Land 
remains locked down in the agricultural sector and cannot ‘migrate’ to more profitable 
sectors; hence declining demand for agricultural commodities leads to an even greater decline 
in the return to land in the long run.  
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Table 5.5: Changes in Factor Incomes Without and With Labour Productivity Gains 
No labour productivity gains 
  Short run Long run 
  
η = 0.3 η = 0.5 η = 0.7 η = 1.0 η = 2.0 η = 0.3 η = 0.5 η = 0.7 η = 1.0 η = 2.0 
Labour/Wage income            
Unskilled labour 8.7% 8.2% 7.6% 6.9% 4.8% 7.8% 7.3% 6.9% 6.3% 4.5% 
Medium-skilled labour 2.4% 2.0% 1.5% 0.9% -1.2% 2.2% 1.8% 1.3% 0.7% -1.3% 
All low-skilled labour 3.9% 3.5% 3.0% 2.3% 0.3% 3.5% 3.1% 2.7% 2.1% 0.1% 
Skilled labour -2.3% -2.4% -2.4% -2.4% -2.3% -2.7% -2.5% -2.5% -2.5% -2.5% 
All labour 0.8% 0.6% 0.3% -0.0% -1.0% 0.5% 0.3% 0.1% -0.2% -1.2% 
Capital  -2.7% -2.7% -2.7% -2.7% -2.7% -2.4% -2.6% -2.6% -2.7% -2.8% 
Land -16.7% -15.7% -14.8% -13.7% -11.1% -38.0% -29.7% -24.4% -19.6% -12.3% 
Total factor income -0.9% -1.0% -1.1% -1.3% -1.8% -1.0% -1.2% -1.3% -1.4% -2.0% 
           
With labour productivity gains (*) 
  Short run Long run 
  
25% lab. 
prod. ↑     
(η = 0.7) 
50% lab. 
prod. ↑     
 (η = 0.7) 
75% lab. 
prod. ↑      
 (η = 0.7) 
100% lab. 
prod. ↑     
(η = 0.7) 
125% lab. 
prod. ↑     
(η = 0.7) 
25% lab. 
prod. ↑     
(η = 0.7) 
50% lab. 
prod. ↑     
 (η = 0.7) 
75% lab. 
prod. ↑      
 (η = 0.7) 
100% lab. 
prod. ↑     
(η = 0.7) 
125% lab. 
prod. ↑     
(η = 0.7) 
Labour/Wage income            
Unskilled labour 8.4% 9.0% 9.5% 10.0% 10.4% 7.7% 8.3% 8.8% 9.3% 9.7% 
Medium-skilled labour 2.1% 2.5% 2.9% 3.2% 3.5% 1.9% 2.3% 2.7% 3.0% 3.3% 
All low-skilled labour 3.6% 4.1% 4.5% 4.8% 5.1% 3.3% 3.7% 4.1% 4.5% 4.8% 
Skilled labour -1.4% -0.7% 0.0% 0.6% 1.1% -1.6% -0.8% -0.1% 0.5% 1.0% 
All labour 1.1% 1.7% 2.2% 2.7% 3.1% 0.9% 1.5% 2.0% 2.5% 2.9% 
Capital  -1.8% -1.2% -0.6% -0.1% 0.4% -1.8% -1.2% -0.6% -0.1% 0.4% 
Land -13.5% -12.4% -11.6% -10.9% -10.3% -22.6% -21.3% -20.2% -19.4% -18.6% 
Total factor income -0.3% 0.3% 0.9% 1.4% 1.8% -0.5% 0.2% 0.7% 1.2% 1.7% 
Note: (*) The ‘with labour productivity gains’ results show the change with respect to the base outcome, but can also be compared against the ‘no labour productivity 
gains’ results for η = 0.7 (see shaded cells in top half of the table) in order to understand the relative impact of labour productivity gains within a minimum wage 
scenario.  
Source:  CGE/micro-model results
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An important result flowing from the above is that minimum wage policies tend to 
redistribute factor income from skilled workers and capital stock, both income sources that 
are typically attached to higher income households, to low-skilled workers, who are typically 
attached to lower income households. This is ultimately the aim of minimum wage policies, 
but it would be dangerous to use this evidence as a justification for minimum wages as a 
policy tool for redistribution before considering the overall effects. Redistribution of wage 
income comes at the expense of job losses among low-skilled workers, while rising 
production costs cause consumer prices to increase (as we see later). These additional effects 
make the overall distributional and welfare effects uncertain, thus requiring further 
investigation. 
d) Efficiency Wage Effects  
The bottom half of Table 5.5 shows the outcome of the minimum wage shock at a benchmark 
wage elasticity level of η = 0.7, only now assuming that workers experiencing an increase in 
wages also experience an increase in productivity that is proportional to the wage increase. 
For explanatory purposes it should be mentioned that the impact of increased labour 
productivity on employment and incomes is not always clear-cut, and depends on a multitude 
of direct and indirect effects. As workers become more efficient, fewer workers are required 
per unit of output. Thus, given demand conditions, an initial response from firms may be to 
lower employment levels of the more efficient factor. However, if only certain factors of 
production become more efficient relative to others, they now also now represent better 
‘value for money’ from an employer’s perspective, so, depending on the degree of 
substitutability between factors, a more likely scenario is an increase in demand for the more 
efficient factor. In a general equilibrium context, increased efficiency also means that 
production costs and consumer prices decline, which causes demand for firms’ output to 
increase. Firms may therefore also respond by increasing employment of all factors of 
production, including those factors that did not experience labour productivity gains.  
Employment changes under the ‘with labour productivity gains’ short run scenario are shown 
in Appendix Table 7. Clearly labour productivity gains are important in countering some of 
the employment losses associated with minimum wages. In the 25 per cent productivity gain 
scenario employment losses are already 11.7 per cent lower than in the benchmark scenario, 
while under the 125 per cent scenario job losses are 43.0 per cent lower. From Table 5.5 
earlier it is also clear that increased productivity among low-skilled workers causes total 
factor income among these workers to rise more than before, with gains reaching 4.1 per cent 
when the productivity gain matches the wage increase (100 per cent scenario, short run). This 
is 30 per cent more than the gain when there is no increase in labour productivity. Increased 
productivity among low-skilled workers also has positive effects for skilled workers’ 
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earnings. Already in the 75 per cent labour productivity scenario skilled workers no longer 
experience a loss in total factor income. Returns to capital and land also decline less sharply 
(or even increases in the case of capital in the high elasticity simulation) as low-skilled 
workers become progressively more productive. 
This outcome is an important one, and shows that when labour productivity increases, the 
upward pressure on production costs caused by increased low-skilled wages is relieved 
somewhat, since fewer person hours are needed to produce the same level of output. This 
means that consumer prices do not increase as much as in the ‘no labour productivity’ 
scenario, and hence demand for output also does not decline to the same extent as before, i.e. 
the negative scale effects are smaller. However, while important, labour productivity gains 
are still unable to completely negate job losses associated with minimum wage policies, at 
least in the spectrum of labour productivity gains explored here.  
e) Sectoral Production Effects 
Appendix Table 8 shows the changes in activity output levels (production changes) in the 
short and long under both the without and with labour productivity gains scenarios. In 
demand-driven models such as this CGE model, sectoral production effects reflect changing 
consumption demand patterns, which in turn are caused by changes in relative prices and 
disposable income levels. The production results here are closely related to the employment 
changes discussed in detail above, and hence only the main results are highlighted.  
A clear result emerging is that minimum wages generally have a dampening effect on 
economic activity, the more so the higher the wage elasticity of demand. The production 
losses in the long run are also marginally higher than in the short run. At the benchmark wage 
elasticity level (η = 0.7), activity output can be expected to decline by about 0.5 per cent. 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), measured from the factor cost side, declines by 1.1 and 1.3 
per cent in the short and long run benchmark scenarios (not shown in the table). These 
declines are, however, immediately reversed once labour productivity levels of minimum 
wage workers are adjusted upwards. In particular, the large declines in domestic services 
output – a result, as argued, driven to a large extent by the particular production structure 
found in this sector – become almost negligible when productivity increases match wage 
increases. Overall activity output could actually increase by 1.3 per cent in the 100 per cent 
scenario under both the short and long run closures. GDP rises by a similar magnitude in 
these scenarios (i.e. 1.4 and 1.2 per cent in the short and long run scenarios respectively).   
2.3.2. Aggregate Household Income Changes  
The change in real household disposable income of a household or household group can be 
used as measure of the welfare change experienced by that entity. There are 162 
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representative households in the CGE model. The analysis in this section is done at a more 
aggregated level – section 2.3.3 considers welfare and poverty results at the micro-level – and 
for that purpose the representative household groups are ranked by their average per capita 
income and grouped into three groups of equal size (i.e. 54 households in each group). The 
bottom third therefore represents the 54 poorest household groups, the second third the 
middle-income households and the top third are the richest households.70   
It is useful to understand how household disposable income is defined in the CGE model and 
to consider how the components of this welfare measure are affected in the minimum wage 
simulations. As per normal, household disposable income is calculated as gross household 
income net of personal income tax, remittances and savings. Gross household income is 
derived from two main sources. The first is combined factor income from the ownership of 
capital and land or from workers attached to households. The second main component is 
transfer income, which includes transfers from incorporated business enterprises (dividends 
and investment income), welfare transfers from government, and remittance income from 
other households or from abroad. Given the model closures selected for this study and the 
type of simulations performed, all transfer income components remain fixed in real terms and 
hence have no effect on gross income changes. Value added, however, is directly influenced 
by the minimum wage simulations. Value added also represents a very important income 
source for households, contributing about three-quarters of household income on average.71 
Changes in value added are therefore important in determining changes in gross household 
income.  
In order to move from changes in gross household income to changes in disposable 
household income it is necessary to also consider what happens to taxes and savings in the 
model. Taxes are calculated as a fixed share of household income, while the savings rate is 
flexible in terms of the savings-investment closure selected for these particular simulations. 
Although the savings rate increases in the simulations, the base-level savings rate is so low 
for most household groups that it does not have any significant impact on household 
disposable income levels. Given all of the above, the expectation is that changes in household 
disposable income (in percentage terms) will match changes in total factor income (shown 
previously in Table 5.5) very closely. This is confirmed by the results in Table 5.6. Of 
interest, therefore, is not the overall level of the change, but rather how different household 
                                                 
70
  The population of South Africa (approximately 42 million people in 2000) is distributed 45:35:20 
between the three constructed household groups. Based on the SAM data, the average per capita income 
is estimated at R4 205, R11 419 and R52 382 per annum in the three groups respectively. 
71
  Value added is the combined payments to factors of production in the economy, where factors of 
production are owned by domestic institutions (government, enterprises and households) or foreign 
institutions. About 24 per cent of the return to capital is allocated to households. For land the figure is 93 
per cent, while virtually all wage income is allocated to domestic households. On average, therefore, 64 
per cent of value added in the economy is allocated to domestic households.  
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welfare groups are affected by minimum wages. This will depend mainly on factor 
endowments of household groups.  
It is clear from Table 5.6 that relatively poorer households benefit more from minimum 
wages, which relates to the fact that these households are more likely to be linked to sub-
minimum wage workers who benefit from the minimum wage policy. At the benchmark 
simulation (short run), households in the bottom group experience a 3.1 per cent increase in 
disposable income. The middle income group only experiences a marginal increase (0.3 per 
cent), while wealthier households experience a decline of about 2.5 per cent. This latter group 
relies more on skilled wages and returns to capital, hence this outcome. Since this wealthiest 
group earns about two-thirds of the household income in the economy, overall disposable 
income in the economy declines by 1.1 per cent. 
Table 5.6: Changes in Aggregate Disposable Household Income 
  
η = 0.3 η = 0.5 η = 0.7 η = 1.0 η = 2.0 
 Short run        
Bottom one-third 3.6% 3.3% 3.1% 2.7% 1.7% 
Middle one-third 0.8% 0.6% 0.3% -0.0% -1.1% 
Top one-third -2.4% -2.5% -2.5% -2.6% -2.8% 
All households -0.8% -0.9% -1.1% -1.3% -1.8% 
         
 Long run        
Bottom one-third 3.2% 2.9% 2.7% 2.4% 1.5% 
Middle one-third 0.7% 0.4% 0.2% -0.2% -1.3% 
Top one-third -2.6% -2.6% -2.7% -2.7% -3.0% N
o
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All households -1.0% -1.1% -1.2% -1.4% -2.0% 
       
  
25% lab.  
prod. ↑      
(η = 0.7) 
50% lab.  
prod. ↑     
 (η = 0.7) 
75% lab.  
prod. ↑      
 (η = 0.7) 
100% lab.  
prod. ↑      
(η = 0.7) 
125% lab.  
prod. ↑      
(η = 0.7) 
 Short run       
Bottom one-third 3.7% 4.2% 4.6% 5.0% 5.4% 
Middle one-third 1.0% 1.6% 2.0% 2.5% 2.8% 
Top one-third -1.6% -0.9% -0.3% 0.2% 0.7% 
All households -0.3% 0.4% 0.9% 1.4% 1.9% 
        
 Long run       
Bottom one-third 3.3% 3.9% 4.3% 4.7% 5.0% 
Middle one-third 0.8% 1.4% 1.9% 2.3% 2.7% 
Top one-third -1.8% -1.1% -0.4% 0.1% 0.6% 
W
ith
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s 
All households -0.4% 0.2% 0.8% 1.3% 1.7% 
Source:  CGE/micro-model results 
Turning next to the scenarios in which labour productivity is assumed to increase with 
increased wages, a much improved outlook for households is observed. Increased 
productivity among low-skilled workers limits employment losses, and households in the 
bottom two groups experience larger disposable income gains compared to the no labour 
productivity scenario (recall that η = 0.7 in all these simulations). Wealthier households are 
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also better off compared to the no labour productivity scenario. In fact, when labour 
productivity gains match the wage increase (100 per cent simulation) they no longer 
experience a decline in disposable income. Overall, when labour productivity increases by as 
little as 50 per cent of the increase in the average wage, disposable income in the economy 
starts to increase, which once again illustrates the important impact that labour productivity 
adjustments can have in a minimum wage scenario.  
2.3.3. Poverty and Distributional Effects at the Micro-Level 
The purpose of the micro-level models used here is to calculate changes in individual 
incomes that relate to the specific policy shocks run in the CGE model. Once income changes 
have been calculated it is possible to evaluate the poverty and distributional effects of the 
policy shock at the micro-level as opposed to the more aggregated level permitted in a CGE 
model. Appendix Table 6 shows the baseline poverty estimates against which the changes in 
P0, P1 and P2 are measured in the minimum wage simulations. These poverty rates are shown 
for poverty lines ranging from R1 000 to R4 000 per capita per annum (2000 prices). Poverty 
analyses conducted in the past in South Africa have usually adopted poverty lines in the 
region of R3000 to R4000 per annum as indicative of ‘normal’ poverty. A poverty line in the 
region of R2000 per capita per annum (this is roughly equivalent to a $2-a-day poverty line) 
is sometimes used as a measure of extreme poverty (see for example Hoogeveen and Özler, 
2006, Van der Berg et al., 2005 and earlier chapters). Only results from the short-run 
minimum wage scenarios (without and with labour productivity adjustments) are linked to the 
micro-level models.  
a) Micro-Incidence Model Results 
We first consider results from the micro-incidence model. Figure 5.5 below shows the 
percentage changes in the three measures of poverty and for poverty lines ranging from 
R1 000 to R4 000. Results are shown for both the simulations with and without labour 
productivity gains.  
Reductions in poverty appear to be greatest when the wage elasticity is low or when labour 
productivity gains are high. Clearly, the extent of the negative employment consequences of 
minimum wages is a key factor in determining the poverty impacts: whereas high wage 
elasticity levels are associated with a greater loss in employment, increased productivity 
levels counter employment losses. The poverty results for all three poverty measures further 
appear to be more favourable at lower poverty lines, suggesting that relatively poorer 
households gain more from minimum wage legislation. This is also not unexpected given that 
minimum wage policies target low-wage workers, with those furthest away from the 
minimum wage and more likely to be vicinity of the low poverty lines gaining the most.  
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Interestingly, once we move to the R2 000 poverty line the decline in poverty observed at 
lower poverty lines disappears or even increases for high elasticity values. The effect is less 
severe under the labour productivity scenarios. It is unclear exactly why a R2 000 poverty 
line appears to be such an important watershed, but it may relate to the fact that most of the 
minimum wages are in the region of R1 000 per month or R12 000 per annum (see Table 
5.1). The household size of households in the vicinity of this poverty line is about six, which 
implies that the minimum wage equates to a ‘per capita wage’ of about R2 000 per annum. 
The implication is that once household size and within-household group income sharing is 
taken into account, minimum wages as applied in South Africa only appear to have 
noticeable effects at ‘extreme’ poverty lines below R2 000.  
Figure 5.5: Changes in FGT Poverty Measures: Micro-Incidence Approach  
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Source: CGE/micro-model results, IES/LFS 2000 and author’s own calculations. 
Both the line graphs for P1 and P2 are much smoother than the line graphs for P0, which is 
expected given that these measures take into account changes in the average income gap 
below a particular poverty line and not only the number of poor at a specific point in the 
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income spectrum. Once again the respective declines in P1 and P2 are higher at lower poverty 
lines and close to zero at higher poverty lines.  
The distribution of job gains and losses in the micro-incidence model is an important issue. 
As explained in Chapter 4, job gains and losses will follow the factor endowment proportions 
in the base data of the CGE model. This allocation ignores personal characteristics of workers 
that might be affected by the policy. It is plausible to think that job losses will in reality only 
occur among sub-minimum wage workers and that those further away from the minimum 
wage are more likely to lose their jobs. Such a selection process is not permitted in the micro-
incidence model.  
A related limitation is that income gains or losses in each CGE representative household 
group are shared equally among the members. The implication is that wage income gains and 
losses ultimately observed at the household group level in the CGE model have been 
‘averaged out’. These same changes are eventually passed down to the micro-incidence 
model, and hence the poverty effects in the micro-incidence model are muted.  
b) How can a Partial Equilibrium Micro-Model Contribute to the Debate? 
The fact that group wages rather than individual wages are adjusted in the CGE minimum 
wage simulations is a tenuous modelling issue. A micro-level partial equilibrium model such 
as the one used by Hertz (2002) to explore the employment and poverty effects of minimum 
wages for domestic workers presents an alternative to a CGE modelling approach. Such a 
model, which is calibrated with micro-level data, allows for the direct adjustment of 
individuals’ wages. As a further advantage the modelling framework permits the 
identification of individuals that are most likely to lose their jobs as a result of minimum 
wages. If data is available, it may also be possible to feed wage income changes associated 
with minimum wages and employment losses into a household income generation function, 
which enables the analysis of income and poverty effects at the household level.  
As discussed at length in Chapter 4, however, employment losses associated with minimum 
wages may relate both to direct substitution effects and indirect price and demand effects. 
Hence, partial equilibrium models potentially underestimate the overall employment effects 
associated with minimum wages, especially at low elasticity levels.  
To illustrate this, a partial equilibrium model similar to that used by Hertz (2002) was set up. 
In this model, sector-specific employment changes are calculated by simply multiplying the 
average wage change for low-skilled workers (see Table 5.3) employed in each sector by the 
sector-specific partial or own-price wage elasticity (see Appendix Table 5). This yields low-
skilled employment losses by sector. The economy-wide job losses in this model are Table 
5.7 below. A comparison with the employment results obtained earlier in the CGE model 
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reveals the underestimation of employment losses at low elasticity values in the partial 
equilibrium model.  
Table 5.7: Comparison of Job Losses in Partial and General Equilibrium Models 
 Simulation elasticity value 
 η = 0.3 η = 0.5 η = 0.7 η = 1.0 
Partial equilibrium model job losses 163,757 272,928 382,100 545,856 
CGE model job losses  
(short-run scenario, no labour productivity gains) 363,049 407,139 448,991 507,457 
Exchange rate depreciation 
(short-run scenario, no labour productivity gains) 0.83% 0.87% 0.90% 0.93% 
Source: CGE/micro-model results 
Part of the reason why a partial equilibrium model underestimates the employment loss is 
because it is essentially a fixed-price model. Since the CPI is the numéraire in the model, all 
prices are pegged to the inflation basket. It is therefore not possible to show directly what the 
impact of minimum wages is on prices in the economy other than to show how this effect is 
revealed in greater job losses (as in the table above) or demand-side shocks (see Table 5.6). 
However, since minimum wages reduce the competiveness of domestic producers relative to 
foreign ones, the inflationary effect of minimum wages is revealed in the exchange rate 
depreciation. Model results show that the currency depreciates by between 0.83 and 0.93 per 
cent as a result of minimum wages (Table 5.7).  
The partial equilibrium modelling framework is also used to analyse the net poverty effects 
associated with income gains and job losses. Job losses reported in Table 5.7 were allocated 
among individuals using the same approach as in the ‘basic’ scenario of the micro-simulation 
model (see Chapter 4 for details and discussions below). The poverty results obtained are 
shown in Figure 5.6 (P0) and Figure 5.7 (P1) below. These figures also include the poverty 
results obtained earlier under the micro-incidence model (centre panel).  
In contrast to the results obtained in the micro-incidence model, the partial equilibrium model 
shows fairly large decreases in poverty at low poverty lines and also at high wage elasticity 
levels. This relates to the fact that, when working with individual households at a micro-level, 
a large number of households lose all their income when workers in those households lose 
their jobs. As income falls to zero (or close to zero), the poverty impact at low poverty lines 
is high. In the CGE model such income losses are shared at the household group level, thus in 
effect cushioning the poverty decline.  
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Figure 5.6: Changes in P0: Comparing Results under Different Modelling Approaches 
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Source: CGE/micro-model results, IES/LFS 2000 and author’s own calculations. 
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Figure 5.7: Changes in P1: Comparing Results under Different Modelling Approaches  
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Source: CGE/micro-model results, IES/LFS 2000 and author’s own calculations. 
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It is clear from this comparison that the CGE-micro-incidence model produces much more 
moderate poverty changes. There is also much less variance across scenarios with different 
wage elasticity levels. While this is partly due to averaging out of changes at the factor and 
household group level (as discussed), it also relates to the capturing of indirect effects in the 
CGE model. Whereas the partial equilibrium model ignores price increases, especially at low 
wage elasticity levels, the CGE model explicitly captures these effects. This means that the 
poverty-reducing potential of minimum wages is probably overstated in the partial 
equilibrium model at low wage elasticity levels.  
Ultimately, however, neither the partial equilibrium or micro-incidence model is truly 
satisfactory; both have distinct advantages and disadvantages. One option is to design the 
partial equilibrium model differently so that production cost and price effects are explicitly 
modelled. For example, the model can be set up to calculate the extent to which firms would 
have to increase prices in order to recover production cost increases associated with 
minimum wages. This, however, effectively becomes a zero-wage elasticity scenario where 
no substitution takes place that might only be suitable for a very short-run scenario.  
c) Comparing Results from a Micro-Simulation Model 
CGE models allow for a more balanced analysis of the minimum wage effects than a partial 
equilibrium analysis by considering both labour market substitution and indirect demand and 
price effects in a single model framework. Although CGE analyses can be complemented by 
a simple top-down micro-incidence analysis of the micro-level effects, this is not entirely 
satisfactory for reasons explained.  
An alternative to the CGE-micro-incidence approach is a CGE-micro-simulation modelling 
approach. The poverty results from the micro-simulation model are shown in the right-hand 
panels of Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7 above. There is clearly much more variation in the 
poverty results at different wage elasticity levels in the micro-simulation approach compared 
to the micro-incidence approach. At high wage elasticity levels the results look remarkably 
similar to those obtained under the partial equilibrium model. At low wage elasticity levels, 
however, poverty reduction is nowhere near as large as they were in the case in the partial 
equilibrium model. This relates to the fact that this model accounts for the adverse effects of 
higher price increases in the low elasticity case.  
Compared to the micro-incidence results, however, the micro-simulation poverty results look 
very different. Although under both models the indirect demand and price effects are the 
same (i.e., as estimated by the CGE model), these models differ fundamentally in terms of 
their assumptions about job loss distributions. A particular striking difference between the 
two modelling approaches is the smaller decline in poverty in the micro-simulation model at 
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the lower poverty lines. This relates to the assumption in this model that job losses 
disproportionately affect workers that are further away from their respective minimum wage 
levels and hence also relatively poorer than other sub-minimum wage workers. These effects 
are not properly accounted for in the micro-incidence model due to the ‘averaging out’ of 
factor income gains and losses in the CGE model. For similar reasons, the models also 
predict very different results for P1, which rises sharply at low poverty lines. The suggestion 
is that minimum wages that lead to disproportionate job losses among the poorest of the 
minimum wage workers (i.e., those that are further away from the minimum wage) will cause 
inequality among the very poor to rise substantially.  
Of course, the assumption about how job losses are distributed among minimum wage 
workers has a major bearing on the outcome. There are many other ways in which the job 
loss allocation process can be modelled, and under each specification the distributional and 
poverty results might look different. The results presented above represent the outcome under 
a ‘basic’ setup (which we have called the ‘non-random, weighted, targeted’ scenario). For 
illustrative purposes, we produce results under several alternative assumptions about the job 
loss allocation, i.e., a ‘non-random, non-weighted, targeted’ scenario and a ‘random, non-
weighted, non-targeted’ scenario.72  
Figure 5.8 shows the cumulative job losses by household income deciles under these 
alternative specifications of the micro-simulation model. For comparative purposes we also 
show the implicit distribution of job losses under the CGE or micro-incidence approach (see 
dashed line). Clearly, the micro-simulation model generates results that are much more biased 
against poorer households than the standard micro-incidence approach. In fact, if we assume 
the bottom four deciles to represent the poor, the micro-incidence model shows that 40 per 
cent of job losses will impact on this group, compared to 66 per cent in the micro-simulation 
model. 
                                                 
72
  See Chapter 4 for a detailed explanation. To recap, ‘non-random’ in this context refers to the use of 
estimated unemployment probabilities in the allocation of job losses, while ‘weighted’ implies the use of 
a weighting factor that is applied to increase the unemployment probability of workers further away from 
the minimum wage. ‘Target’ refers to the assumption in the micro-simulation model that only sub-
minimum wage workers are affected by job losses. 
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Figure 5.8: Cumulative Job Losses under Alternative Micro-Modelling Approaches (η = 0.7) 
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Source:  CGE model results 
The outcome, however, is quite different under alternative assumptions of how job losses are 
allocated. Under the ‘non-random, non-weighted, targeted’ scenario the weights are removed 
and only the estimated unemployment probabilities determine who among the sub-minimum 
wage workers will lose their jobs. Job losses are now slightly less biased against the poor. An 
even more favourable outcome for the poor is achieved in the ‘random, non-weighted, non-
targeted’ scenario where job losses are assumed to affect any low-skilled worker randomly, 
i.e. personal characteristics are not taken into account while any low-skilled worker and not 
only the sub-minimum wage workers are vulnerable to job losses. This latter outcome, as 
expected, closely resembles that under the micro-incidence model.  
Some would argue that a minimum wage scenario with random job losses (i.e., the micro-
incidence model) is appropriate when the affected workers consist of a fairly homogenous 
group, e.g., domestic workers. In CGE simulation where the impact largely bypasses the 
labour market, e.g., a welfare transfer subsidy (Pauw and McDonald, 2006) or trade policy 
experiments (Thurlow, 2007), a micro-incidence approach to poverty analysis is also 
justifiable. However, the CGE-micro-incidence is limited when large changes in the labour 
market are observed or where there is much heterogeneity among workers within factor 
groups. Also, when CGE scenarios predict (large) net job gains, the micro-incidence 
approach will almost certainly be problematic since the distribution of the unemployed – the 
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primary beneficiaries of new jobs – is very different from the distribution of the currently 
employed. This point was argued previously in Chapter 4 (see Figure 4.6).   
d) Some Caveats and Areas for Future Research 
There are, of course, some caveats. The first concerns the issue of consistency between CGE 
results and the micro-model results. Micro-incidence results are fully consistent with the 
CGE model due to the fact that percentages changes in household group incomes in the CGE 
model are applied to individual households in the survey data. Therefore, in both the CGE 
model and the micro-incidence model, aggregate household income declines by about 1.1 per 
cent (see Table 5.6 earlier). However, in the micro-simulation model the decline in aggregate 
household income is only 0.1 per cent. This suggests that the poverty-reducing potential of 
minimum wages is possibly overstated in the micro-simulation model relative to the micro-
incidence model.  
This inconsistency stems from the fact that the minimum wage changes applied in the CGE 
model simulations are aggregated at a factor group level, whereas in the household income 
generation function in the micro-simulation model these same wage changes are applied to 
the relevant individuals and then aggregated at the individual household level. While some 
ingenious methods have been proposed to correct for these inconsistencies through 
adjustment of sampling weights (see Robilliard et al., 2001), the minimum wage simulations 
are different from the norm in that individual wages of minimum wage workers are adjusted 
directly rather than using the average factor group wage changes from the CGE model. As a 
result no attempt was made to force consistency between the two models.  
A second caveat relates to the issue of model feedback. As discussed in Chapter 4, a micro-
simulation model, per definition, generates a household income vector that looks very 
different to the household income vector generated by the CGE model given the distinct 
nature of the underlying income generation functions in the two models. This means that 
without some form of feedback from the micro-simulation model to the CGE model, the 
indirect demand effects in the CGE model are arguably incorrectly specified.  
The problem is probably small enough to ignore. However, to illustrate just how different 
household incomes are distributed depending whether a CGE-micro-incidence or CGE-
micro-simulation model is used, inequality results are shown in Table 5.8. The micro-
incidence model predicts virtually no change in overall inequality, measured in this instance 
by the Gini coefficient and the Theil-L index. This is despite the high level of disaggregation 
in the household accounts of the CGE model. The micro-simulation model, in contrast, yields 
much greater changes in inequality.  
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Table 5.8: Inequality Results: Micro-incidence and Micro-simulation Models 
  Change in Gini Change in Theil-L 
 Wage Elasticity  Micro-incidence Micro-simulation Micro-incidence Micro-simulation 
  η = 0.3 -0.3% -1.3% -0.6% -3.4% 
  η = 0.5 -0.3% -1.2% -0.6% -3.2% 
  η = 0.7 -0.3% -1.1% -0.5% -2.9% 
  η = 1.0 -0.3% -1.0% -0.5% -2.7% 
Source: CGE/micro-model results, IES/LFS 2000 and author’s own calculations. 
3. Final Remarks 
This chapter has produced a rich set of results for various minimum wage scenarios that have 
not previously been explored in such depth in this country. A common message across the 
different modelling approaches is that poverty outcomes improve as the wage elasticity 
parameter becomes smaller. In general, a minimum wage policy seems effective at reducing 
the poverty headcount rate at least when the employment response is small.  
However, the CGE-micro-incidence and CGE-micro-simulation models suggest very 
different outcomes at different poverty lines. The micro-incidence results show that those at 
extremely low poverty lines – between R1 000 and R2 000 per annum – will benefit from 
larger reductions in both the poverty rate and depth of poverty compared to those at higher 
poverty lines. In contrast, the micro-simulation model, which better captures the impact of 
job losses on individual welfare at the low-end of the distribution, suggests an increase in the 
depth of poverty at very low poverty lines. This model, however, predicts larger declines in 
P0 and P1 at higher poverty lines compared to the micro-incidence model. 
In choosing between the two approaches, it was argued that the micro-simulation approach is 
superior. Despite some drawbacks – the most important being the issues of consistency and 
feedbacks between the micro- and macro-levels of the combined model framework – they do 
offer a huge advantage to modellers in terms of the flexibility in modelling labour market 
impacts. The income generation function in the micro-simulation model also ensures that 
income gains and losses associated with factor market effects are better reflected at the 
individual household level. Of course, with greater flexibility also comes a responsibility to 
be honest and upfront about the behavioural assumptions of the model. The next chapter 
applies a similar modelling framework to a wage subsidy scenario.  
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Chapter 6. Fighting Poverty Through Job 
Creation: Can Wage Subsidies 
Work?  
nlike the case of minimum wages, South Africa does not currently have a ‘pure’ 
wage subsidy policy. However, in recent years wage subsidies have been proposed 
on many occasions as a suitable policy option for addressing unemployment and 
poverty in this country. A direct outcome of some of these earlier proposals has been the 
adoption of learnerships, which closely resemble training-linked employment subsidies used 
elsewhere. The analysis here aims to explore the efficacy of a pure wage subsidy programme 
in addressing unemployment and poverty in this country.  
Section 1 starts with a brief discussion of the appropriateness of a wage subsidy programme 
in South Africa, drawing on earlier analyses in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. This section also 
provides an overview of the wage subsidy proposals that have been put forward in this 
country. Finally, some preliminary policy lessons on programme design are drawn. Section 2 
then presents the results obtained from various sets of policy simulations performed, once 
again, with the aid of a CGE model linked to two types of micro-models. Model limitations 
prevent us from exploring all the policy questions that one might have around wage subsidy 
design and implementation. The model is, however, suited to exploring (a) the effectiveness 
of the policy in terms of generating jobs at different wage elasticity levels, and (b) assessing 
costs and financing options, the latter being an important value addition as far as the South 
African literature is concerned. The micro-level analyses, in turn, permit a closer evaluation 
of the poverty and distributional effects of wage subsidy schemes. Final remarks are made in 
section 3, with Chapter 7 drawing together the main conclusions of the study. 
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1. Wage Subsidies in the South African Context 
1.1. Why Wage Subsidies Make Sense 
There are several justifications for wage subsidies. In developing countries facing labour 
shortages, wage subsidies may be offered to workers as an incentive to enter into full-time 
employment. In the South African context the idea of a wage subsidy is borne more out of the 
need to stimulate labour demand in order so that more unemployed jobseekers can be 
absorbed into employment. Below we consider some reasons why wage subsidies may be 
seen as the policy option of choice to reduce unemployment in the short run, drawing in part 
on some of the findings from Chapter 2.  
The first justification pertains to poverty and socio-economic effects of wage subsidies. Any 
reduction in unemployment, ceteris paribus, will have a positive effect on poverty levels. 
Furthermore, the existence of unemployment constitutes a loss in output, while the dynamic 
aspects of high unemployment cannot be ignored: “workers who are unemployed today are 
not acquiring the skills and experience that will contribute to their productivity in the future” 
(Levinsohn, 2008:2). From a social perspective unemployment is associated with a loss of 
morale and an increase in idleness and crime, especially when it is high among the youth as is 
the case in South Africa. If wage subsidies raise employment levels, many of these negative 
externalities associated with unemployment are mitigated.  
A second reason why wage subsidies are justifiable is that they increase the attractiveness of 
certain workers from a hiring perspective. Unemployment in South Africa is generally 
described as a structural problem, which may lead some to argue that wage adjustments 
(either directly or through wage subsidies) do not present a viable solution. This may be true 
for the unemployable, but there seems to be some degree of consensus that relatively high 
wages of low-skilled workers – or more precisely the relatively high unit labour costs of these 
workers – are also partly to blame for the unemployment problem. In this regard Go et al. 
(2009) argue that macroeconomic management of aggregate demand swings may be less 
effective than wage subsidies for the simple reason that wage subsidies affect labour demand 
directly by addressing the issue of ‘attractiveness’ of certain workers. Wage subsidies 
certainly do not address the structural unemployment issues (e.g. low skill levels and poor 
educational attainment).    
The third justification for wage subsidies (and one that is related to the previous point) is that 
they reduce the risk associated with hiring, training and firing. The reluctance of firms to hire 
young labour market entrants is a common firm behavioural characteristic that is described in 
so-called ‘overlapping generations’ models. In the South African labour market this problem 
is particularly severe. This is caused chiefly by two factors. Firstly, the South African hiring 
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and firing processes are thought to be rigid and highly regulated, which adds to the hiring and 
firing costs (even if not direct or material, then implicit; see Chapter 2). Secondly, firms tend 
to be reluctant to hire young labour market entrants as they often require extensive training 
due to poor schooling outcomes and limited job experience. Once trained they become 
susceptible to ‘job hopping’ or being hired away by competitors. As a result South African 
firms have adjusted their risk profiles over the years to reflect high non-wage costs, 
explaining why employment demand is so sluggish. Firms rather avoid employing people 
whom they think might not succeed in the workplace since any training costs incurred are a 
deadweight loss, while dismissals are costly. A wage subsidy, Levinsohn (2008) argues, 
reduces all of these risks to the firm and makes it easier to justify hiring young people, even if 
they are considered to be more risky.  
Wage subsidies will only be effective at creating many job opportunities when the wage 
elasticity of labour demand for subsidised workers is high. The South African estimates 
suggest that the economy-wide average wage elasticity is around 0.7 (see for example Fallon 
and Lucas, 1998, Fedderke and Mariotti, 2002, Fields et al., 2000). Thus, although the wage 
elasticity is inelastic (or less than unity), a fairly significant employment effect might still be 
expected. Unfortunately many other factors affect the success of a wage subsidy policy in 
generating employment, and very often these factors relate to the administrative costs 
incurred by employers versus the benefits of actually receiving a subsidy (see section 1.3 
below). It is therefore uncertain to what extent the true employment effect will reflect the 
underlying wage elasticity in the economy, which is why the design of a wage subsidy 
scheme is so important.  
1.2. South African Wage Subsidy Analyses and Proposals 
Several South African studies have looked into wage subsidies as a way to promote 
employment among low-skilled or young workers in particular. Heintz and Bowles (1996) 
produced one of the first policy papers that focused mainly on the theoretical aspects around 
wage subsidy policy design, but also included some basic calculations of what the 
employment effects might look like and how the policy could be financed (they proposed a 
factor use tax on capital stock). They conclude that although wage subsidies could be 
considered a “bold approach” to addressing unemployment, it is perhaps time to “seriously 
consider wage subsidies as a policy alternative” (Heintz and Bowles, 1996:205). In a 
comprehensive country study under auspices of the World Bank, Lewis (2001) also explored 
the idea of a wage subsidy. This study also held a very positive view of wage subsidies and 
proposed that such a programme, targeted at unemployed individuals with limited or no 
labour market experience, should form an integral part of a strategy for skills accumulation 
and labour reform in South Africa. 
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At around the same time the Department of Labour started showing interest in the idea of 
subsidised employment creation. The youth was identified as a particularly vulnerable group 
that may require special intervention in order to improve their employment prospects. In its 
employment strategy framework Creating Jobs, Fighting Poverty they implore researchers to 
explore the option of subsidised youth employment combined with skills development 
programmes (Department of Labour, 1998). National Treasury articulated more directly for 
the need to investigate policies that would “encourage job creation by reducing the cost of 
hiring new workers” (National Treasury, 2001:76-77). Wage incentive schemes and 
learnerships were mentioned as specific policies that might be considered.  
After the initial wave of interest between 1996 and 2001, the idea of a pure wage subsidy 
scheme has recently once again surfaced in policy circles. Pollin et al. (2006), for example, 
propose that such a policy forms one of the three key components of an employment 
promotion and poverty reduction strategy (the other components being spending on public 
infrastructure investments and social transfers). Describing their particular wage subsidy 
programme as a “hybrid policy intervention”, Pollin et al. (2006:96) propose a simultaneous 
wage and credit subsidy.73 While wage subsidies will directly promote employment growth, 
they argue that credit concessions to private firms would further enable firms to increase their 
scale of production and hence raise their hiring capacity. Hiring will also be promoted 
indirectly through backward multipliers. The idea of such a hybrid approach, they explain, 
derives directly from Lewis’s (2001) earlier suggestion that wage subsidies and demand-side 
job creation policies should not be seen as mutually exclusive.   
A more recent proposal came from the International Panel on Growth in South Africa, 
popularly known as the ‘Harvard Group’. In one of the background papers to their report, 
Levinsohn (2008) proposes a youth wage subsidy as one of two labour market policy 
interventions (the second being immigration reform that would allow easier access to the 
local job market for foreign high-skilled workers). Levinsohn’s (2008) youth wage subsidy is 
targeted at all young people once they turn 18, and remains available even if labour market 
entry is deferred (for example to study further). Levinsohn (2008) provides some fairly 
specific ideas around how the subsidy could be implemented and managed. The main idea is 
that an ‘account’ of some sorts is opened for each young person upon graduating from high 
school from which employers can then draw a subsidy until the subsidy amount is depleted, 
thus making his proposed scheme similar to the idea of a worker-initiated subsidy (see 
Chapter 3).  
                                                 
73
  This idea goes against Heintz and Bowles’ (1996) earlier recommendation for a capital tax to finance the 
subsidy. Incidentally James Heintz himself was also one of the co-authors in the Pollin et al. (2006) 
study.  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Chapter 6: Fighting Poverty Through Job Creation: Can Wage Subsidies Work? 
169 
 
Recently, government has once again shown an interest in wage subsidies as a future policy 
programme. During his State of the Nation address in 2008 former President Thabo Mbeki 
spoke of “employment subsidies for direct job-creation for targeted groups” as one of the key 
interventions that would form part of government’s “integrated and comprehensive anti-
poverty strategy” (Mbeki, 2008). The policy is still in a development phase and funds have 
not yet been formally set aside for such a programme. The Budget Speech 2008 merely made 
reference to the fact that “options ... [were] being examined” (Manuel, 2008), presumably 
referring to National Treasury’s recently commissioned research into wage subsidies (by Go 
et al., 2009).  
The idea of using wage subsidies as part of a comprehensive reform of South Africa’s 
pension scheme already surfaced in the Budget Review 2007 (National Treasury, 2007). The 
current social old age pension (SOAP), the report argued, effectively acts as a disincentive for 
people to save, since any retirement funding saved privately would eventually displace 
potential earnings from SOAP. Thus, as part of the proposed pension reform, all employed 
persons would be required to contribute to a government-administered pension scheme 
during their working lives, which would ensure that at least part of the burden on SOAP 
would be reduced (also see Paton, 2009). However, in order to offset the loss in disposable 
income that will arise when pension contributions have to be made (or the decline in 
employment if employers make contributions on behalf of workers) a wage subsidy for low-
wage workers is also proposed. They estimate that the cost of such a subsidy could range 
between R20 and R30 billion per annum. Of course, if the wage subsidy simply offsets the 
cost of the mandatory pension contributions of low-wage workers it effectively becomes a 
‘pension subsidy’ made by government on behalf of workers rather than a wage subsidy, i.e. 
the wage-employment relationship is unchanged. 
Given their role as custodians of the SOAP, the Department of Social Development’s interest 
in the pension reform proposals is obvious. This Department, through its grant management 
agency, South African Social Security Agency (SASSA), may yet play a direct role if 
requested to administer pension payouts upon retirement as is proposed in the Budget Review 
2007. However, the Department of Social Development has also expressed interest in the use 
of active labour market policies as a way of reducing the financial burden on the South 
African welfare budget. In a discussion document it is claimed that 36 per cent of disability 
grant recipients “have physical disabilities that should not necessarily render them unable to 
obtain gainful employment” (see Department of Social Development, 2004:3). The report 
further argues that job placement and adult education programmes have not specifically 
targeted recipients of child support grants, but that a range of “active labour market 
measures, skills development programmes, special employment and labour intensive 
development programmes and labour intensive government services” could be used to draw 
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these people into employment and off the welfare system (Department of Social 
Development, 2004:7).74  
In addition to the research by Go et al. (2009), a team from the Southern African Labour and 
Development Research Unit (SALDRU) is currently conducting wage subsidy research on 
behalf of the Department of Social Development.75 The African Micro-Economic Research 
Umbrella (AMERU) has also recently secured the go-ahead for a wage subsidy pilot 
programme. The programme entails a randomised experiment whereby 4 000 young people 
will be interviewed. A worker-side wage subsidy is then randomly allocated to half of the 
unemployed. A follow-up interview one year later will provide information as to whether the 
subsidy has made a difference. Where possible, employers of targeted and non-targeted 
programme participants will be interviewed to get a perspective on the demand-side (Rankin, 
2009). This study itself extends on earlier research by (Pauw and Edwards, 2006).  
1.3. Policy Design: Options, Guidelines and Lessons 
Several policy design and implementation lessons can be drawn from the preceding 
discussions here and in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. Before continuing with the economy-wide 
analysis it is necessary to take stock at this point. A more detailed set of policy 
recommendations are included in Chapter 7.  
The most important goal of a wage subsidy policy is job creation, but the international 
evidence suggests that expectations in this regard are seldom met. Proponents of a South 
African wage subsidy scheme should take heed to these very serious alarm bells. For a wage 
subsidy policy to be successful in generating above-equilibrium employment it has to be 
designed correctly and implemented effectively.  
Given the particular features of the South African labour market problems – mass 
unemployment and excess supply of low-skilled workers – a firm-side subsidy is justified. 
Evidence suggests that the labour supply curve is highly elastic (and in the extreme case the 
supply curve is horizontal), which means a worker-side subsidy will mainly have the effect of 
raising the wages of those who are currently employed. Some have in fact argued in favour of 
worker-side subsidies in South Africa given the belief that firms here also have fairly 
inelastic or even asymmetric labour demand curves (see for example Loewald and Fletcher, 
2001). The implication of an asymmetric labour demand curve is that while an increase in the 
wage may lead to a decline in employment, a decline in the wage may not lead to an increase 
                                                 
74
  Wage subsidies may also simply reduce the burden on, say, pensioners. Once more people enter 
employment, pensioner households will become smaller and fewer people will rely indirectly on the 
pension income. This may relieve pressure on the state to increase welfare payments.   
75
  This author is involved in the project.  
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in employment of the same magnitude. This also relates to the existence of market power – if 
firms capture subsidies as rent rather than raising employment and lowering output prices, the 
employment effects may be small.     
The administration of a wage subsidy programme is a central issue. The South African 
experience with learnerships is a clear example of where a policy is failing in meeting certain 
objectives (in this instance raising employment levels among young labour market entrants) 
because of the administrative problems and the bureaucratic complexities involved in 
participating in the programme. A more detailed discussion of learnerships is included in the 
Appendix (see section 4.2.1), but the suggestion from this is that a wage subsidy programme 
should be kept as simple as possible so as not to act as a disincentive to firms (and especially 
smaller firms) to participate.  
Administratively speaking, the simplest (albeit costly) approach is to design the subsidy as a 
general subsidy. This implies that wages of all existing and new orkers are subsidised. 
Under this approach firms receive a windfall gain even if they do not raise employment. One 
way of circumventing the problem of low employment generation is to design the policy as a 
marginal subsidy where only employment above some long term employment growth trend is 
subsidised. The downside of such a marginal subsidy programme is the high monitoring and 
evaluation costs associated with it, while the administrative requirements of such a policy 
may be very onerous on the employer. Marginal subsidy programmes may also be more 
conducive to labour turnover as firms replace existing workers with subsidised ones.  
A slight variation on the standard firm-side subsidy model is the worker-initiated wage 
subsidy model such as the one proposed by Levinsohn (2008) for South Africa. Such a 
programme is effectively a marginal subsidy programme without the increased administrative 
burden. In fact, since it is worker-initiated, firms need to do very little to participate, even 
though it ultimately is a firm-side subsidy. The added advantage is that such programmes 
improve the supply-side job search incentives. This may therefore be the preferred approach, 
even though in the CGE model a firm-side general subsidy is modelled due to modelling 
limitations (see section 2.2).    
International and local evidence suggests that beneficiaries of wage subsidy or related 
programmes are often those that would have found employment even in the absence of 
support. Those that are truly in need of assistance simply do not make it to the front of the job 
queue. This can be avoided through careful targeting of the policy. There are at least three 
reasons for targeting. Firstly, it may be necessary to reduce costs. Secondly, as discussed just 
above, it may be necessary to allow the truly vulnerable to benefit from the policy. The third 
relates to the fact that wage subsidies should not be seen as a blanket solution to 
unemployment in South Africa. Unemployment is a highly complex phenomenon in this 
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country, with elements of a structural problem, deficient demand and labour supply-side 
problems. It is therefore important to identify those subsets of unemployed persons that 
would in fact be absorbed into employment once the subsidy lowers the market wage. 
There seems to be consensus around the idea of a youth subsidy that ties in with a broader 
suite of labour market policies aimed at improving skills and labour market absorption among 
the youth. This choice of target group for the South African case illustrates how policy 
targeting also has an important welfare objective. Earlier analyses have shown that the youth 
are particularly disadvantaged as far as employment prospects are concerned, despite the fact 
that they are becoming better educated. A firm-side subsidy in South Africa implicitly targets 
urban firms, since most firms are located in urban areas. Rural unemployment, however, 
accounts for a substantial share of unemployment in South Africa. In order to prevent 
increased rural-urban migration, complementary but very different kinds of active labour 
market policies may be required in rural areas (see earlier discussions in Chapter 2).  
Heintz and Bowles (1996) argue that the small employment effects of wage subsidy 
programmes may relate to the fact that most of these policies are designed to be short-term 
policies. The full employment effect of a wage change may take several years to be realised, 
which means firms may choose not to participate if they feel the wage subsidy might end 
soon. A longer subsidy period may therefore be warranted purely from a participation 
perspective. The idea of wage subsidy programmes is that the experience gained during the 
period of subsidised employment will improve participants’ employment prospects. If the 
subsidisation period is too short the participants may not yet have received enough training or 
experience to become attractive from an employer’s perspective. In this regard training-
linked wage subsidies may also be more effective at improving participants’ employment 
prospects, provided the training period is sufficient to ensure adequate transfer of skills (see 
below).  
It is further important that firm-side subsidies are generous enough to ensure participation by 
firms. Firms need to be incentivised to employ workers that may be perceived as being risky, 
while administrative costs incurred also need to be covered by the subsidy. It is unclear 
exactly what level of subsidisation would be deemed enough, and unfortunately economic 
models cannot predict this ‘dividing line’ between participation and non-participation. 
Consultation with stakeholders or a trial-and-error approach to policy design may therefore 
be necessary.   
The issue of wage subsidy programmes linked to training comes up frequently in discussions, 
and warrants further careful thought here. Training-linked wage subsidy programmes 
arguably have merit when unemployment is linked to a skills deficit as is the case in South 
Africa. Experiences with training-linked wage subsidies elsewhere seem positive, but more 
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analysis is needed. In the South African case, though, the learnership programme has not had 
a significant impact on employment levels. It is therefore important to consider whether a 
wage subsidy programme in this country should also be linked to training. Some further 
remarks in this regard are made in Chapter 7.  
2. Economy-Wide Analysis 
2.1. Introductory Remarks about the Modelling 
Once again, the South African CGE model forms the basis of the ex ante evaluations of a 
wage subsidy programme, while complementary analyses are done using micro-incidence 
and micro-simulation models. Given their design and setup, CGE models are somewhat 
restricted as far as simulation options are concerned. In the context of wage subsidies there 
are certain design issues that simply cannot be explored in this type of modelling framework. 
The first restriction relates to targeting options. CGE models make use of representative 
factor and industry accounts, which means that targeting options are restricted to the 
inclusion or exclusion of entire factor groups as they appear in the underlying SAM. For 
example, since age is not used in the classification of occupation groups, a youth subsidy 
cannot be modelled explicitly.  
A second limitation associated with this modelling framework is that only general subsidies 
can be modelled; a marginal subsidy programme where a wage subsidy is only offered to any 
additional workers employed by firms cannot be modelled. This modelling limitation also 
relates to the use of representative factor groups in the model. The model assumes that all 
members of such a group are homogenous and earn the same equilibrium wage. It is therefore 
not possible to divide the workers within a factor group into new labour market entrants that 
are subsidised and existing workers that are not, simply because the model treats each factor 
group as single entity rather than as a group of individuals.   
Fortunately, the addition of the micro-simulation model allows us to explore more varied 
targeting options. The approach adopted here is to assume a fairly broadly targeted wage 
subsidy programme as far as the CGE model simulations are concerned. Thus, as explained in 
more detail in section 2.2 below, a large share of unskilled and medium-skilled factor groups 
are included in the subsidy programme initially simulated in the CGE model. In the micro-
simulation model, then, where individual beneficiaries are identified, explicit targeting 
assumptions are imposed. For example, in one of the scenarios only youth participants are 
selected for employment. It should be noted though that the focus in this analysis is mainly 
on welfare outcomes under different assumptions about the wage elasticity of demand and 
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different financing options under both a short and long run context rather than on targeting 
issues and options.76  
Once again, the use of a general equilibrium approach improves on a partial equilibrium 
analysis in that both the direct and indirect effects of wage subsidy schemes are considered. 
As with the minimum wage simulations, we expect wage subsidy programmes to affect 
household disposable income levels. This may happen directly as a result of the increase in 
the number of employment opportunities. Since the wage subsidy effectively acts as a 
production subsidy prices may decline, which further increases the spending power of 
households. The downside, however, is that financing is required, and whether financing is 
raised via a tax on income or a tax on capital (see section 2.2) will ultimately impact 
negatively on households’ disposable  income levels. The advantage of the CGE model is that 
all these implications are accounted for within a single, consistent framework.   
2.2. Description of Simulations and Financing Options 
The aim of these simulations is to explore the impact of hypothetical wage subsidy scenarios 
under a range of wage elasticity levels and for different financing options. As before with the 
minimum wage scenarios, results are produced for wage elasticities ranging from η = 0.3 to 
η = 2.0, with η = 0.7 considered the benchmark. In all the scenarios a short- and long run 
closure is modelled whereby capital stock is either locked down within sectors in the short 
run or assumed to be mobile across sectors in the long run. Obviously these simulations, 
although hypothetical at this stage, need to be set up with some provisional budget 
parameters in mind. The Budget Review 2007 figures suggest that a wage subsidy programme 
could cost anything between R20 and R30 billion per annum (National Treasury, 2007). 
More recent media reports seem have settled on an amount of between R25 and R30 
billion77, which are the numbers we base our simulations on. 
The overall subsidy cost is determined by several factors, including the wage elasticity of 
demand (a greater elasticity means more subsidised employment opportunities are created), 
the workers or industries that are targeted and the subsidy amount per worker. Given model 
limitations only a general subsidy (as opposed to a marginal one) can be modelled. Such a 
scheme is also necessarily more expensive than a marginal programme given that all existing 
workers are subsidised. Importantly, though, this has indirect implications due to the fact that 
production costs are effectively subsidised by such a general subsidy, which in turn may have 
                                                 
76
  This does not mean to say that considerations about the outcomes under different factor group and 
industry targeting schemes are unimportant. Such targeting options is a key theme in an earlier paper by 
Pauw and Edwards (2006). 
77
  See for example http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fArticleId=3698305&fSectionId=552&fSetId=662. 
and http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20080222-2008-budget-national-treasury-briefing.  
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indirect consumption demand and employment effects. For this reason a general equilibrium 
model is appropriate.  
The simulations here assume a fairly widely targeted wage subsidy scheme. The same target 
group is maintained in all the CGE simulations to allow for an increased focus on the 
outcomes of a given wage subsidy programme under alternative assumptions about the wage 
elasticity and financing options. Youth targeting is, however, considered more explicitly in 
the micro-simulation model. Typically wage subsidy schemes are targeted at workers with 
limited or no work experience and poor employment prospects. Therefore, in the simulations 
here, only factor groups classified as unskilled or medium-skilled in the CGE model are 
targeted. There are 88 factor groups in the SAM, of which the unskilled and medium-skilled 
groups make up 22 and 46 respectively.  
If implemented, a wage subsidy scheme is likely to only be targeted at workers earning less 
than R45 000 per annum (in 2007 prices) (National Treasury, 2007). R35 000 is chosen as a 
roughly comparable threshold in 2000 prices. While all low-skilled workers in the SAM are 
below this threshold, about half the medium-skilled occupation categories were found to have 
an average wage exceeding this value and were hence excluded from the target group. This 
leaves 45 low-skilled labour groups in the target group. Incidentally, all these groups are 
Black (African, Coloured or Asian); hence White workers are implicitly excluded from the 
target group.   
These targeted factor groups represent 7.3 million workers, or about two-thirds of the 
workforce. These workers are employed across all the sectors, not all of which are necessarily 
suitable for targeting. Therefore, following Go et al. (2009) the mining sectors are excluded. 
Government is also excluded based on the belief that employment is not determined by profit 
maximising behaviour in this sector. Utilities (electricity and water) are also excluded since 
the lines between government and the private sector are blurred in such network industries. A 
wage subsidy to private households may be effective, but administration of the subsidy 
through the tax system (the preferred method for disbursement in normal commercial sectors) 
would be difficult. Hence, private households (domestic workers) are also excluded from the 
programme. Finally, of the manufacturing sectors, all the ‘heavy manufacturing’ industries 
are excluded. These sectors are typically more capital-intensive than labour intensive ‘light’ 
manufacturing industries and may as a result be less likely to be responsive to a wage subsidy 
programme (see Pauw and Edwards, 2006).78  
                                                 
78
  Sector-specific wage elasticity levels assumed for this study are shown in Appendix Table 5. We do in 
fact assume the same responsiveness to wages across all manufacturing sectors.  
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The sectors that remain in the target group include agriculture, food products, beverages and 
tobacco, textiles, leather, wood and paper, construction and building, trade services, 
accommodation, transport and communication, and financial and business services. The 
inclusions of the agricultural sector may seem an interesting choice, given that this sector (as 
is the case with the mining sector) has been in a long-run decline as far as employment levels 
are concerned. The inclusion is, however, motivated by at least two considerations. Firstly, 
the agricultural sector remains one of the largest employers of rural-based low-skilled 
workers in South Africa. As shown in Chapter 2 poverty and unemployment are rife in rural 
areas, and hence the poverty-reducing effects of a wage subsidy programme in agriculture 
might be significant. A second reason why an agricultural wage subsidy makes sense is that it 
may curb rural-urban migration that may increase as a result of a firm-side wage subsidy in 
manufacturing and services sectors. Most rural-urban migration is from non-homeland rural 
areas where employment opportunities on commercial farms are declining.  
Industry targeting reduces the number of workers in the target group to 4.1 million people (or 
about one-third of employment). Since a general subsidy is modelled, employers of these 4.1 
million workers immediately receive a windfall gain equal to the subsidy per worker 
multiplied by the employment of targeted occupation groups. Typical occupation groups that 
remain in the target group after excluding several sectors include medium, semi- and 
unskilled occupations such as services and sales workers, craft and trades people, machine 
and plant operators, agricultural workers and elementary occupations.  
A wage subsidy value of R4 200 per annum (2000 prices) or 50 per cent of the value of the 
annual wage, whichever is less, is set for all targeted workers.79 Although this value is set 
arbitrarily, it translates to about R6 000 in 2007 prices or R500 per month, which is close to 
the annual wage subsidy value of R5 000 used by Levinsohn (2008) in his illustrative 
examples. Given average wage levels of targeted workers across the various sectors and the 
fact that subsidies are capped, the effective ad valorem wage subsidy differs across targeted 
sectors. These values are shown in Table 6.1.  
                                                 
79
  The subsidy is modelled in the CGE model by calculating a factor use subsidy (a negative factor use tax) 
that is equivalent to a lump-sum subsidy of R4 200, i.e. the average wage of each targeted occupation 
group in each targeted industry is taken into consideration. If the wage is less than R8 400, the wage 
subsidy is capped at 50 per cent of the value of the wage.  
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Table 6.1: Effective Average Wage Subsidies by Sector 
  
Effective 
subsidy for 
unskilled 
workers 
Effective 
subsidy for 
medium-
skilled 
workers 
Effective 
subsidy for 
all low-
skilled 
workers 
Sectoral 
average 
subsidy 
Wage subsidy targeted sectors         
Agriculture 40.5% 33.0% 37.8% 36.6% 
Food products 24.2% 16.2% 19.3% 16.5% 
Beverages and tobacco 19.5% 19.1% 19.2% 15.8% 
Textiles 22.8% 25.9% 25.5% 22.6% 
Leather Wood and Paper 20.8% 16.8% 17.7% 15.1% 
Construction and Building 21.1% 19.4% 19.8% 19.0% 
Trade services 25.5% 14.7% 19.1% 15.6% 
Accommodation 25.5% 21.6% 22.2% 18.3% 
Transport and communication 18.5% 10.9% 12.2% 8.6% 
Financial and business services 27.5% 12.4% 16.1% 7.6% 
Other sectors 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Economy-wide average 13.8% 11.6% 12.5% 9.8% 
Source:  IES/LFS 2000 and author’s own calculations. 
The wage subsidy level is further chosen because, given the targeting mechanism devised, it 
yields a total wage subsidy cost of between R18 and R23 billion (2000 prices) for wage 
elasticity levels of η = 0.3 and η = 1.0 respectively. This is equivalent to R27 and R33 billion 
in 2007 prices if converted using Statistics South Africa’s CPI. At the benchmark elasticity 
level of η = 0.7 the subsidy cost (in 2007 prices) is expected to be around R30 billion, which 
is the upper bound of National Treasury’s possible costs range. These estimates are derived 
from the CGE model, so in effect we worked backwards in determining the targeting 
mechanism and subsidy values in setting up the simulations in such a manner that they would 
ultimately yield these overall costs. Table 6.2 further below in the results section provides 
further details.  
As for the financing of the wage subsidy scheme, the assumption here is that government 
needs to raise additional revenue through taxes in order to maintain the budget deficit of the 
base. This is referred to as a revenue neutral budget closure. Since the subsidy raises 
employment and value added, some of the subsidy cost will be recovered through increased 
tax revenue from existing tax instruments. However, additional financing will still have to be 
raised. Two such financing options are considered. The first is a tax on capital stock 
employed in those industries targeted by the wage subsidy. The rationale of such a tax is to 
enhance the substitution of capital for low-skilled workers further (as proposed by Heintz and 
Bowles, 1996).  
There are several design options, only one of which is implemented here. The first is to tax 
all capital employed in the economy. This would induce a general shift away from capital 
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intensity across all sectors, which is not necessarily something that can be explored in a 
satisfactory manner in a comparative static model. A second is to tax capital only in those 
sectors not targeted by the wage subsidy scheme, or perhaps those non-targeted sectors that 
are fairly capital-intensive sectors (e.g. ‘heavy manufacturing’ sectors). The rationale in this 
instance would be to induce a sectoral shift away from such capital-intensive sectors towards 
labour-intensive sectors in the long run. The third, and the option selected in this study is to 
only tax capital in those sectors that are targeted by the wage subsidy scheme. This choice is 
motivated by the fact that, firstly, taxation of capital in non-targeted sectors may seem 
unreasonable towards capital-intensive sectors, many of which contribute substantially to 
South Africa’s GDP, and secondly, that we wish to evaluate the ‘enhanced substitution’ 
effects that such a financing option might induce. It also ensures revenue neutrality ‘within’ 
the subsidised firm rather than a reliance on external parties (such as households through 
income taxes, or non-targeted sectors through capital taxes) to finance the scheme.     
Although theoretically the idea of a capital tax makes sense, it is fairly difficult to interpret 
CGE results due to problems around the measurement of returns to capital. Capital returns in 
this particular South African CGE model includes both returns to human and physical capital, 
i.e. some form of self-employment income or entrepreneurial rewards is also included. 
Returns to capital (from the perspective of the owners of capital) should therefore be thought 
of as ‘mixed income’ rather than income purely from physical capital stock such as 
machinery and equipment.80 A more appropriate tax measure would have been a tax on the 
value of physical capital stock employed, but since this information is not available in SAM 
the capital tax financing simulations are more of academic interest.    
The second financing option is a more orthodox approach whereby income tax rates are 
raised. Although several income and profit tax instruments exist in the model, we assume that 
only private household income taxes are raised, and by the same proportion across all 
household groups. Household income tax rates in the CGE model are average as opposed to 
marginal tax rates, and hence the results will show the percentage by which the average tax 
rate of households would have to increase in order to raise enough additional revenue to 
finance the shortfall in the budget. Typically, given the progressive tax system in this 
country, wealthier households have higher average tax rates, and hence these households will 
be responsible for financing the bulk of the subsidy cost.  
As with the minimum wage scenarios the focus here is on illustrating the sensitivity of model 
outcomes to different wage elasticity levels. While we acknowledge and argue that indirect 
                                                 
80
  This ‘problem’ is particularly severe in agriculture where farmers’ income consists of a mix of returns to 
land, physical capital and human capital, all of which is collectively reported in the national accounts 
(and household surveys) as income from ‘gross operating surplus’ (GOS) income.   
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demand effects (and hence income and price elasticities) are important, testing the model’s 
sensitivity in this regard is beyond the scope of these analyses. All simulations are conducted 
using the same set of income and price elasticities as those used in the minimum wage 
scenarios.  
2.3. Results and Analysis 
2.3.1. Financing Effects 
Table 6.2 shows the financing costs in billions of Rands, first in 2000 prices and then in 2007 
prices. As explained earlier, the wage subsidy values and targeting mechanism was devised 
specifically to ensure that the overall cost of the scheme would fall approximately within the 
range of R25 to R30 billion in 2007 prices. These costs are realised at elasticity values 
ranging between η = 0.3 and η = 0.7. Rising costs at higher wage elasticities relate to higher 
employment effects. Employment results are shown below.  
Table 6.2: Financing Costs of the Wage Subsidy Programme under Alternative Assumptions 
    
2000 prices (Rbn) 
    
η = 0.3 η = 0.5 η = 0.7 η = 1.0 η = 2.0 
Tax capital stock 18.8 19.8 20.8 22.5 29.2 
Sh
o
rt
 
ru
n
 
Tax personal income 19.1 20.1 21.2 22.9 29.6 
Tax capital stock 18.5 19.6 20.8 22.6 29.4 
Lo
n
g 
ru
n
 
Tax personal income 18.5 19.6 20.8 22.6 29.5 
    
2007 prices (Rbn) 
    η = 0.3 η = 0.5 η = 0.7 η = 1.0 η = 2.0 
Tax capital stock 26.9 28.4 29.9 32.3 42.0 
Sh
o
rt
 
ru
n
 
Tax personal income 27.3 28.8 30.4 32.8 42.5 
Tax capital stock 26.5 28.1 29.8 32.4 42.2 
Lo
n
g 
ru
n
 
Tax personal income 26.5 28.2 29.8 32.4 42.3 
Note: The cost estimates for 2000 are from the CGE model, while 2007 estimates are obtained using the 
standard CPI series produced by Statistics South Africa. 
Source: CGE/micro-model results 
Table 6.3 reports on the specific changes in tax instruments that are necessary in order to 
generate the required revenues. Since no capital tax exists in the base of the model, the capital 
tax results show the actual rates that need to be set. The results pertaining to the income tax 
instrument should be interpreted as the required percentage point increase in the base-level 
average income tax rate of households. The short- and long run results are fairly similar, 
although the slightly larger employment effects in the long run (see section 2.3.2) imply that 
more financing is required. At the benchmark elasticity of η = 0.7 a capital use tax of around 
10 per cent (ad valorem) is required, or, alternatively, an increase in the average household 
income tax rate of about 20 per cent will balance the budget.   
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Table 6.3: Required Capital Tax Rates or Income Tax Rate Increases 
    
η = 0.3 η = 0.5 η = 0.7 η = 1.0 η = 2.0 
Capital tax financing 
(actual rate to be set) 8.3% 9.0% 9.7% 10.8% 15.2% 
Sh
o
rt
 
ru
n
 
Income tax financing 
(increase in base rate) 17.3% 18.5% 19.7% 21.6% 28.4% 
Capital tax financing 
(actual rate to be set) 8.7% 9.3% 10.0% 11.1% 16.2% 
Lo
n
g 
ru
n
 
Income tax financing 
(increase in base rate) 17.8% 18.9% 20.0% 21.7% 28.5% 
Note: The results shown for income taxes represent the required increase in the average tax rate that would 
generate enough additional financing to cover the subsidy costs shown in Table 6.2 taking into 
account changes in government revenue from all sources.   
Source: CGE/micro-model results 
Further below a strong case is developed in favour of the income tax approach over the 
capital tax approach. A further look into the real impact of a 20 per cent increase in average 
income tax rates is therefore useful for putting this result into context. According to the SAM 
data used in this study the poorest one-third81 of households spent an average of 3.5 per cent 
of their income on income taxes, compared to 7.0 per cent for the middle one-third and 16.2 
per cent in the top one-third. A 19.7 per cent increase (short run, η = 0.7) therefore implies 
that these rates would now increase to 4.2, 8.4 and 19.4 per cent respectively. In the third 
group this translates into an increase in the monthly tax bill of just over R200 for the average 
adult in the household, which equates to 3 per cent of the average adult’s earnings of about 
R6 667 per month (2000 prices). For those in the bottom two groups, the monthly marginal 
tax contributions would have to be R5 and R23 per month respectively. For both these groups 
that represents about 1 per cent of the gross monthly income of an adult (R667 and R1 667 
respectively). From the abo e it is clear that a very large share of the tax burden would be 
carried by those in the wealthiest income group, which is understandable given low earnings 
and tax collection rates in the poorer groups.    
2.3.2. Employment and Production Effects 
a) Introductory Remarks 
We next turn to the employment results generated by the CGE model. Table 6.4 shows the 
outcomes for low-skilled and skilled workers and for various wage elasticity values under a 
short run closure. Table 6.5 shows the same results under the long-run closure. Results are 
shown separately for the targeted industries, while the non-targeted sectors are grouped 
together under the category ‘other sectors’. The employment results differ marginally for 
                                                 
81
  The SAM household groups are once again grouped into three segments of equal size as was done earlier 
in the reporting of minimum wage simulation results.  
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different financing and closure options, but vary greatly depending on the wage elasticity 
level. On average, about 500 000 low-skilled jobs are created in the low elasticity case 
(η = 0.3) compared to one million when η = 0.7 and 1.5 million when η = 1.0. At the 
benchmark elasticity this represents a 12 per cent increase in low-skilled employment. 
b) Programme Effectiveness: Cost per Job Estimates 
Relatively speaking, the overall programme cost only rises marginally as the wage elasticity 
levels increases. Employment gains, however, rise dramatically. This is an indication that the 
efficiency of the programme – measured here in terms of programme cost per job generated – 
is greatly enhanced at higher wage elasticity values. When η = 0.7 is the cost per job is about 
R20 000, while it is almost double that when η = 0.3 (see Appendix Table 9). Incidentally, 
the average wage of targeted workers is about R18 000 per annum (see Appendix Figure 3), 
and hence even at the benchmark wage elasticity it will still be more expensive to create a job 
through this policy than to give an unemployed person a welfare grant equivalent to the wage 
he or she might expect to earn if employed on the programme. However, this does not mean 
to say that welfare grants will be more effective at reducing poverty; in fact, as illustrated in 
Pauw and Edwards (2006), the multiplier effects of increas d employment are important and 
ultimately mean that the welfare effects of a wage subsidy programme will exceed that of a 
welfare programme with a similar budget.  
The high cost per job estimates also relate closely to the fact that the subsidy is modelled as a 
general subsidy. This implies that a large share of subsidised workers was already employed 
prior to the subsidy being implemented (about 4.3 million workers). If this were a marginal 
subsidy the cost per job created would be equal to average subsidy per worker, which in these 
simulations equals about 12.5 per cent of the wage (see Table 6.1) rather than over 100 per 
cent.  
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Table 6.4: Employment Results: Short Run Scenarios 
  Capital tax financing Income tax financing 
  
η = 0.3 η = 0.5 η = 0.7 η = 1.0 η = 2.0 η = 0.3 η = 0.5 η = 0.7 η = 1.0 η = 2.0 
Low-skilled employment                   
Agriculture 96,314  159,801  228,455  336,687  745,997  96,790  160,631  229,696  338,633  751,096  
Food products 12,446  20,870  29,493  42,948  94,683  12,553  21,044  29,731  43,278  95,301  
Beverages and tobacco 3,316  5,681  8,186  12,236  28,909  3,344  5,728  8,253  12,335  29,136  
Textiles 47,733  73,446  96,537  128,920  238,795  48,103  74,017  97,271  129,852  240,225  
Leather Wood and Paper 11,488  19,397  27,578  40,457  90,334  11,577  19,540  27,774  40,729  90,848  
Construction and Building 67,007  104,261  138,227  185,885  340,567  66,256  103,037  136,557  183,572  336,018  
Trade services 137,368  229,266  322,949  468,684  1,025,681  138,059  230,352  324,390  470,613  1,029,043  
Accommodation 31,156  53,474  77,124  115,264  269,453  31,284  53,697  77,449  115,758  270,728  
Transport & communication 15,580  26,632  38,334  57,204  133,241  15,810  26,998  38,824  57,868  134,439  
Financial and business services 22,169  39,130  57,860  89,375  228,879  21,728  38,373  56,766  87,729  224,764  
Other sectors (non-targeted) 8,081  19,187  34,368  62,910  197,314  -2,930  7,179  21,525  48,889  179,295  
Net change 452,658  751,144  1,059,111  1,540,570  3,393,853  442,575  740,594  1,048,236  1,529,256  3,380,893  
Percentage change in overall low-
skilled employment 5.2% 8.7% 12.2% 17.8% 39.2% 5.1% 8.6% 12.1% 17.7% 39.1% 
Skilled employment                     
Agriculture 487  714  894  1,063  839  507  746  939  1,127  964  
Food products 229  280  277  195  -507  257  324  335  273  -377  
Beverages and tobacco 14  8  -6  -34  -170  24  24  16  -4  -114  
Textiles 2,663  3,426  3,722  3,650  1,531  2,715  3,504  3,819  3,770  1,695  
Leather Wood and Paper 187  251  285  292  57  213  292  339  365  184  
Construction and Building 949  1,112  1,055  711  -1,451  930  1,083  1,017  664  -1,512  
Trade services 3,869  4,507  4,109  2,036  -13,307  4,142  4,929  4,659  2,755  -12,138  
Accommodation 1,089  1,667  2,144  2,670  2,806  1,135  1,743  2,248  2,815  3,090  
Transport & communication -168  -415  -661  -979  -1,465  -10  -169  -337  -549  -729  
Financial and business services -1,881  -2,515  -2,645  -2,051  4,755  -2,168  -2,997  -3,324  -3,020  2,852  
Other sectors (non-targeted) -7,437  -9,035  -9,173  -7,553  6,912  -7,745  -9,478  -9,711  -8,196  6,085  
Net change 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  -0  0  
Source: CGE/micro-model results 
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Table 6.5: Employment Results: Long Run Scenarios 
  Capital tax financing Income tax financing 
  
η = 0.3 η = 0.5 η = 0.7 η = 1.0 η = 2.0 η = 0.3 η = 0.5 η = 0.7 η = 1.0 η = 2.0 
Low-skilled employment                   
Agriculture 118,273  182,469  247,454  346,416  721,003  129,095  198,110  267,172  371,325  761,421  
Food products 12,565  19,468  27,024  39,494  91,922  16,846  23,752  31,316  43,778  95,519  
Beverages and tobacco 1,827  4,104  6,561  10,602  27,845  3,520  5,812  8,295  12,362  29,377  
Textiles 76,739  92,366  108,090  132,833  229,953  80,063  97,168  113,903  139,964  242,374  
Leather Wood and Paper 10,141  17,277  24,728  36,683  85,065  15,109  22,556  30,279  42,602  91,922  
Construction and Building 88,350  112,931  138,338  178,378  331,481  97,717  122,589  148,277  188,677  342,707  
Trade services 151,334  232,244  318,567  459,621  1,054,435  171,116  251,344  336,502  474,784  1,046,594  
Accommodation 43,490  62,499  82,125  113,734  244,317  58,071  79,371  100,973  135,540  278,797  
Transport & communication 3,994  15,436  27,662  47,455  128,089  14,381  25,837  38,094  57,830  136,166  
Financial and business services 13,453  31,993  52,090  85,369  230,926  18,026  36,266  55,924  88,206  225,450  
Other sectors 29,214  42,695  57,222  79,888  151,629  -25,920  -10,779  8,466  41,470  178,958  
Net change 549,380  813,481  1,089,862  1,530,473  3,296,665  578,024  852,027  1,139,200  1,596,536  3,429,285  
Percentage change in overall low-
skilled employment 6.3% 9.4% 12.6% 17.7% 38.1% 6.7% 9.8% 13.2% 18.5% 39.6% 
Skilled employment                     
Agriculture 1,114  1,337  1,403  1,337  544  1,375  1,708  1,846  1,846  1,101  
Food products 234  71  -56  -212  -555  858  658  490  268  -424  
Beverages and tobacco -275  -284  -287  -286  -212  41  18  1  -24  -106  
Textiles 5,748  5,365  4,891  4,112  1,260  5,982  5,718  5,299  4,563  1,747  
Leather Wood and Paper -75  -97  -132  -188  -317  681  669  631  555  234  
Construction and Building 1,810  1,465  1,103  540  -1,444  2,098  1,737  1,355  755  -1,404  
Trade services 6,442  5,148  3,747  1,535  -6,265  9,406  7,652  5,670  2,395  -10,823  
Accommodation 3,416  3,350  3,124  2,656  447  5,933  6,113  6,034  5,716  3,817  
Transport & communication -4,796  -4,661  -4,450  -4,015  -1,387  -982  -1,026  -1,014  -956  -609  
Financial and business services -10,933  -9,299  -7,431  -4,248  10,590  -7,464  -6,474  -5,425  -3,800  2,113  
Other sectors -2,686  -2,396  -1,912  -1,231  -2,660  -17,927  -16,773  -14,886  -11,319  4,356  
Net change 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
Source: CGE/micro-model results 
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The above issue does raise questions around affordability and efficiency of general versus 
marginal subsidy programmes. The important point to remember, though, is that a general 
subsidy is in effect both a marginal wage subsidy and a production subsidy combined. The 
marginal wage subsidy component has a certain direct employment effect, which in a partial 
equilibrium framework can be calculated as the wage elasticity multiplied by the percentage 
decline in the wage.82  
This is shown in Table 6.6 below. In this table employment calculations are done in the same 
way as in Table 5.7 before (for the minimum wage case), i.e. percentage changes in sectoral 
wages as reported in Table 6.1 are multiplied by sector-specific wage elasticity values shown 
in Appendix Table 5. The production subsidy component is the lump sum gain received by 
firms that already employ subsidised workers in the base, i.e. even if they do not increase 
employment, the subsidy still reduces their production costs. Under the assumption of a well-
functioning product market, these production cost savings are passed on to consumers in the 
form of lower prices, which implies an indirect increase in consumption demand and hence 
employment. The CGE model further accounts for the negative effects of having to raise 
finance through income or capital taxes, but despite this, the net employment effect in this 
model is almost double that of the partial equilibrium model.  
Table 6.6: Comparison of Job Gains in Partial and General Equilibrium Models 
 Simulation elasticity value 
 η = 0.3 η = 0.5 η = 0.7 η = 1.0 
Partial equilibrium model job gains     235,201     392,002     548,802     784,003  
CGE model job gains  
(short-run scenario, income tax financing) 442,575  740,594  1,048,236  1,529,256  
Exchange rate appreciation 
(short-run scenario, income tax financing) 0.26% 0.33% 0.41% 0.53% 
Source: CGE/micro-model results 
Since the CPI is the numéraire in the model, all prices are pegged to the inflation basket. It is 
therefore not possible to show directly what the impact of wage subsidies is on prices in the 
economy other than to show how this effect is revealed in greater job gains (as in the table 
above) or demand-side shocks. However, an alternative option is to show how a wage 
subsidy, which effectively acts as a domestic production subsidy, causes the exchange rate to 
appreciate. The model results show that the currency appreciates by between 0.26 and 0.53 
per cent as a result of wage subsidies (Table 6.6).  
                                                 
82
  In fact, in a partial equilibrium framework the (direct) employment effect of a marginal and general 
subsidy will be the same since the decision about employment takes place ‘at the margin’ only, i.e. at the 
point where the marginal cost of an additional worker (i.e. the subsidised wage) is equal to the marginal 
revenue product (see Chapter 3).  
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The above illustrates, once again, the importance of taking into account direct and indirect 
effects when contemplating the impact of policy. Also, while a marginal subsidy may seem 
more effective as measured in terms of the cost per job generated, a large portion of the cost 
per worker under the general subsidy is in fact a price subsidy that directly benefits poor 
consumers and not only those households that gain employment. An important consideration 
is whether firms do in fact reduce prices as the model suggests. Existence of market power 
may suggest otherwise. This issue is revisited in Chapter 7.  
c) Low-Skilled Employment and Financing Options 
Returning now to the detailed employment results for low-skilled workers (Table 6.4 and 
Table 6.5) it is evident that the employment effects are larger in the long run. This is expected 
given the greater flexibility afforded by capital mobility in the long run. The wage subsidy 
allows subsidised producers to lower production costs and commodity prices, thus causing 
demand for their output to increase. In the long run capital is attracted to these subsidised 
sectors, thus allowing subsidised sectors to increase the scale f production and hence 
employment further (sectoral production effects are considered later in this section).  
However, whereas the capital tax financing option generates slightly more favourable 
employment results for low-skilled workers than the income tax financing option in the short 
run, this is no longer the case in the long run. This is an important result that needs 
explaining. In the short run the capital tax enhances the substitution effect through the 
introduction of an additional factor price distortion, thus explaining the superior employment 
effects under this financing option. However, in the long where capital stock is mobile across 
sectors the capital tax actually deters capital stock from being attracted to the subsidised 
sectors simply because the tax reduces the returns to capital in those sectors. Thus, in this 
instance the income tax financing option is preferable from an employment-generation 
perspective.  
The above result raises some important questions around capital use taxes as a financing 
option for a wage subsidy programme. Although the variant of the CGE model used here is 
not dynamic, the long run closure does allow for some insight into the likely sectoral shifts 
that such a capital tax might bring about. 83 The results here show that a capital tax imposed 
on capital used in wage subsidy sectors will in the long run tend to divert capital stock 
                                                 
83
  In a dynamic model the long run process whereby current savings are converted into changes in future 
capital stock levels (and hence production capacity) is explicitly modelled in an inter-temporal 
framework. In a static model, processes of capital accumulation and depreciation in the long run are 
imitated by allowing capital stock levels to vary at an industry-level. Thus, although the model does not 
allow for a net increase in the production capacity or an outward shift in the production possibility 
frontier, it is possible to consider which sectors are more likely to attract future investments given 
changes in sectoral returns to such investments.  
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investments away from these wage subsidy sectors, thus ultimately reducing the employment 
capacity in these sectors. An unintended consequence in this ‘constant production possibility 
frontier closure’ (see footnote 83) is that capital will instead be attracted to non-targeted 
sectors that are already relatively more capital-intensive.  
The detrimental long run effects of a capital tax suggest that alternative financing options 
should be used. Pollin et al. (2006) in fact denounce the idea of a capital tax and instead 
propose that capital should rather be subsidised as part of a broader employment promotion 
programme that aims, ultimately, to enhance the overall capacity of sectors to employ more 
people. The alternative capital tax options mentioned earlier (but not modelled here) will all 
have similar unintended consequences for the employment capacity in the economy. These 
results illustrate how easily policy lessons can be misinterpreted when all factors – in this 
instance the short and long run effects – are not fully taken into account.  
The more orthodox financing method of raising income taxes could therefore be considered 
more appropriate. This conclusion is further supported when considering the household 
income distributional effects later in section 2.3.2, but it should already be evident from the 
employment results above that capital taxes tend to impact negatively on all forms of 
employment in the long run as it lowers the production capacity in taxed sectors. Returns to 
capital are furthermore an important income source to households across the income 
spectrum.84 As the returns to capital decline due to the tax (see directly Table 6.7 below), all 
households are affected similarly, irrespective of where they are located in the income 
spectrum. Income taxes are more progressive and allow for a scenario where a 
disproportionate share of the burden is carried by wealthier households. This suggests that the 
income tax scenario is also preferable from a purely distributional point of view, also in the 
short run.  
d) Low-Skilled Employment and the Labour Market Closure 
Any simulated policy shock that predicts employment gains in excess of one million (when 
η = 0.7) – an increase of almost 10 per cent in the overall workforce – requires careful 
consideration of the underlying assumptions. Apart from the fact that this might be an 
optimistic wage elasticity levels, two further issues around the labour market closure selected 
for low-skilled workers are of interest.  
Firstly, the assumption that there is an excess supply of low-skilled workers available to 
satisfy such a large increase in labour demand needs to carefully scrutinized. A large part of 
the unemployment problem has been described as a structural one in the sense that the 
                                                 
84
  The SAM suggests that it represents 13 per cent of income in both the bottom and middle one-third of 
household groups, and 14 per cent in the top one-third. 
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unemployed lack the skills required to be gainfully employed. The predicted increase in 
employment should, however, be seen in context of a very large pool of unemployed people 
from which employers can choose candidates. There were approximately 3.86 million active 
jobseekers plus a further 2.35 million inactive jobseekers in 2000. Even if all the inactive 
jobseekers were considered unemployable, the simulation still means that only about one-
quarter of active jobseekers (i.e. those defined as unemployed under the narrow definition) 
would have to be considered employable. These employment changes are marginal compared 
to the sheer number of unemployed persons in the country.  
What is important, though, and this relates to a second feature of the particular closure for 
low-skilled workers, is the assumption that their wage levels will be unaffected even in the 
face of a large increase in labour demand. This relates to the assumption that labour supply is 
infinitely elastic. As shown earlier in Chapter 3, an inelastic labour supply curve would mean 
that at least some of the wage subsidy is captured by workers in the form of higher wages, an 
outcome that is quite likely in industries where wage bargaining takes place and labour 
unions are strong. This reduces the employment effect as part of the wage subsidy becomes a 
direct transfer to workers in the form of higher wages. In this context the employment gains 
shown in CGE model should be considered the upper bound of the potential employment 
gains under such a programme.  
At the extreme, the entire wage subsidy might be captured by workers. Results generated by 
Pauw (2002) in a standard CGE model show that such a scenario will lead to virtually no 
employment gain as employers have no incentive to do so given that the wage they face 
remains the same when the subsidy is captured by workers in such a manner. The small 
changes in employment that are observed are due to indirect demand effects arising from the 
fact that subsidised workers now earn higher wages and hence consume more. A similar 
effect might be observed when a wage subsidy is payable directly to workers and strong 
unions or the existence of minimum wages prevent average wages from falling (Pauw, 2002).     
e) Is There Evidence of Unintended Labour Market Substitution Effects?  
Table 6.4 and Table 6.5 above also present employment results for skilled workers. Since this 
class of labour remains fully employed in terms of the labour market closure adopted, the net 
employment effect is zero. Often a concern of wage subsidies is that they create unintended 
substitution effects where unsubsidised workers (in this instance all skilled workers and some 
non-targeted low-skilled workers) are substituted for subsidised workers. Such substitution 
effects are in fact observed in some of the targeted sectors, and especially in the long run 
scenarios. For example, under the income tax financing scenario just under 6 500 skilled jobs 
are lost in the transport and communication and financial and business services sectors. 
However, most of the decline in labour demand takes place in the non-targeted sectors, with 
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almost 15 000 skilled jobs lost in these sectors in the same simulation. This suggests that 
scale effects within targeted sectors in fact dominate the substitution process, which allows 
targeted sectors to generally increase demand for both subsidised (low-skilled) and 
unsubsidised (skilled) workers.    
There is also the question of substitution among low-skilled workers. This is a concern when 
(a) the subsidy is a marginal subsidy only available to newly appointed workers and not 
incumbents, or (b) when the subsidy is only available for a short period of time and 
subsidised workers are replaced by newcomers once the subsidy period comes to an end 
(‘churning’) (see Chapter 3). Neither of these effects can be studied here since we model a 
general subsidy (rather than a marginal one) and also do not consider the subsidy period 
explicitly.  
In the absence of concrete results on the matter, we can only speculate, but the fact that we 
observe fairly large scale (production) effects due to the wage subsidy programme seems to 
suggest that such unintended substitution effects will be fairly unlikely to happen. Evidence 
further suggests that the currently employed have higher predicted employment probabilities, 
which relates to the level of experience they have relative to the unemployed (see for 
example Figure 4.6). It is therefore unlikely that firms will replace incumbents regardless. In 
fact, this same argument may be used to support a less costly (albeit more administratively 
intensive) marginal subsidy programme as opposed to a general one.  
In Chapter 2, labour market rigidity, and particularly the administrative burden associated 
with firing people in this country, was highlighted. Firms will therefore weigh up the cost of 
churning against the savings on their wage bill before deciding to replace an incumbent with 
a subsidised worker. It has also been argued in Chapter 3 that a longer subsidy period will 
lead to less churning in the labour market.  
f) Factor Incomes 
We next turn to a brief review of the changes in total factor incomes observed for these 
simulations, as shown in Table 6.7 below. Unskilled and medium-skilled labour income 
increases considerably in all the scenarios. As the wage elasticity increases, more jobs are 
created and thus total wage income increases despite the fact that average wage earnings 
remain constant in terms of the labour market closure for low-skilled workers. Skilled 
workers also gain in all the scenarios, which suggests that the subsidy causes overall demand 
and hence average wages of skilled workers to increase. This substantiates the claim above 
that scale effects dominate the substitution effects of the wage subsidy in both the short- and 
long run. As expected, returns to capital decline in the all the capital tax financing scenarios. 
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g) Sectoral Production Effects 
The sectoral production results in Table 6.8 reiterate many of the points made in the 
preceding sections. Capital tax financing in the short run ensures a greater net production 
effect. At the benchmark elasticity of η = 0.7, the increase in overall activity output is 1.7 per 
cent in this scenario, compared to 1.2 per cent in the income tax financing scenario. Those 
sectors targeted by the wage subsidy generally experience greater output gains. In a demand-
driven static model these sectoral shifts simply reflect changes in demand patterns due to 
changes in household disposable income levels and relative price changes.  
In the long run the capital tax financing option is not as favourable as the income tax 
scenario. This is particularly evident in the transport and communication and financial and 
business services sectors where output levels in fact decline despite the fact that low-skilled 
wages in these sectors are subsidised. This is due to the detrimental effect of capital taxes on 
production costs (demand-side effect), which also leads to an outflow of capital stock and a 
decline in production capacity in these sectors. Under the long run income tax scenario 
capital is actually attracted to the wage subsidy sectors, thus enhancing the output and 
employment effects. For example, fairly large gains are observed in the textiles (5 per cent) 
and accommodation (10.3 per cent) sectors.  
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Table 6.7: Changes in Factor Incomes: Short and Long Run Scenarios 
Short run closure 
  Capital tax financing Income tax financing 
  
η = 0.3 η = 0.5 η = 0.7 η = 1.0 η = 2.0 η = 0.3 η = 0.5 η = 0.7 η = 1.0 η = 2.0 
Unskilled labour 4.9% 8.2% 11.7% 17.1% 38.0% 4.8% 8.0% 11.5% 16.9% 37.7% 
Medium-skilled labour 2.8% 4.7% 6.6% 9.4% 19.9% 2.8% 4.7% 6.5% 9.4% 19.9% 
All low-skilled labour 3.3% 5.5% 7.8% 11.3% 24.3% 3.3% 5.5% 7.7% 11.2% 24.2% 
Skilled labour 2.4% 2.7% 2.9% 3.2% 4.2% 2.2% 2.5% 2.8% 3.1% 4.1% 
All labour 2.9% 4.1% 5.4% 7.3% 14.3% 2.8% 4.0% 5.3% 7.2% 14.2% 
Capital  -1.8% -2.2% -2.5% -3.0% -4.7% 3.2% 3.2% 3.2% 3.3% 3.7% 
Land 15.8% 14.7% 13.6% 12.0% 7.3% 16.2% 15.1% 13.9% 12.3% 7.7% 
Total factor income 0.7% 1.2% 1.7% 2.5% 5.4% 3.0% 3.7% 4.3% 5.4% 9.3% 
           
Long run closure 
  Capital tax financing Income tax financing 
  
η = 0.3 η = 0.5 η = 0.7 η = 1.0 η = 2.0 η = 0.3 η = 0.5 η = 0.7 η = 1.0 η = 2.0 
Unskilled labour 5.8% 8.8% 11.9% 16.9% 37.1% 5.9% 9.0% 12.2% 17.4% 38.3% 
Medium-skilled labour 3.7% 5.2% 6.9% 9.4% 19.1% 3.6% 5.3% 7.0% 9.7% 20.2% 
All low-skilled labour 4.2% 6.1% 8.1% 11.2% 23.4% 4.2% 6.2% 8.2% 11.5% 24.5% 
Skilled labour 2.2% 2.5% 2.7% 2.9% 3.5% 2.7% 2.8% 3.0% 3.3% 4.2% 
All labour 3.2% 4.3% 5.4% 7.1% 13.5% 3.5% 4.5% 5.6% 7.4% 14.4% 
Capital  -2.7% -3.0% -3.3% -3.8% -6.1% 2.7% 3.0% 3.2% 3.3% 3.8% 
Land 34.3% 25.3% 19.4% 13.8% 5.6% 44.3% 33.0% 25.6% 18.6% 8.4% 
Total factor income 0.6% 1.0% 1.4% 2.1% 4.3% 3.3% 3.9% 4.6% 5.6% 9.5% 
Source:  CGE/micro-model results 
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Table 6.8: Activity Output (Production Effects) 
Short run closure 
  Capital tax financing Income tax financing 
  
η = 0.3 η = 0.5 η = 0.7 η = 1.0 η = 2.0 η = 0.3 η = 0.5 η = 0.7 η = 1.0 η = 2.0 
Agriculture 1.1% 1.8% 2.6% 3.8% 8.0% -0.0% 1.3% 2.0% 2.8% 4.0% 
Food products 1.0% 1.7% 2.4% 3.5% 7.4% 0.0% 1.2% 1.9% 2.6% 3.7% 
Beverages and tobacco 0.9% 1.5% 2.1% 3.0% 6.4% 0.0% 1.0% 1.7% 2.3% 3.2% 
Textiles 2.1% 3.3% 4.5% 6.1% 11.7% 0.0% 2.3% 3.5% 4.7% 6.4% 
Leather Wood and Paper 0.8% 1.4% 2.0% 3.0% 6.5% 0.0% 0.9% 1.5% 2.1% 3.1% 
Construction and Building 0.8% 1.3% 1.8% 2.5% 5.3% 0.0% 0.5% 0.9% 1.4% 2.1% 
Trade services 0.8% 1.4% 2.0% 2.8% 6.2% -0.0% 0.9% 1.5% 2.1% 3.0% 
Accommodation 2.3% 3.9% 5.4% 7.9% 16.7% 0.0% 2.4% 3.9% 5.5% 8.0% 
Transport & communication 0.5% 0.9% 1.3% 2.0% 4.7% 0.0% 0.6% 1.0% 1.5% 2.1% 
Financial and business services 0.6% 0.9% 1.3% 1.9% 4.3% 0.0% 0.4% 0.7% 1.0% 1.6% 
Other sectors 0.5% 0.9% 1.3% 2.0% 4.6% 0.0% 0.6% 1.0% 1.4% 2.1% 
Net change 0.7% 1.2% 1.7% 2.4% 5.4% 0.0% 0.7% 1.2% 1.7% 2.5% 
           
Long run closure 
  Capital tax financing Income tax financing 
  
η = 0.3 η = 0.5 η = 0.7 η = 1.0 η = 2.0 η = 0.3 η = 0.5 η = 0.7 η = 1.0 η = 2.0 
Agriculture 1.6% 2.3% 2.9% 3.7% 6.4% -0.0% 2.4% 3.3% 4.1% 5.1% 
Food products 1.2% 1.7% 2.2% 2.9% 5.7% 0.0% 2.0% 2.6% 3.2% 4.1% 
Beverages and tobacco 0.6% 1.0% 1.4% 2.0% 4.0% 0.0% 1.8% 2.4% 2.9% 3.7% 
Textiles 3.0% 3.6% 4.3% 5.3% 9.1% -0.0% 4.1% 5.0% 5.8% 7.1% 
Leather Wood and Paper 0.3% 0.8% 1.2% 1.9% 4.6% 0.0% 1.1% 1.7% 2.3% 3.2% 
Construction and Building 0.9% 1.3% 1.7% 2.4% 5.2% 0.0% 0.4% 0.8% 1.2% 2.0% 
Trade services 0.4% 0.8% 1.2% 1.9% 4.4% 0.0% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0% 2.9% 
Accommodation 4.8% 5.7% 6.5% 7.5% 10.6% 0.0% 8.8% 10.3% 11.6% 13.4% 
Transport & communication -0.9% -0.6% -0.2% 0.3% 2.4% -0.0% 0.2% 0.6% 1.1% 1.9% 
Financial and business services -0.8% -0.5% -0.1% 0.4% 2.2% 0.0% -0.1% 0.3% 0.7% 1.4% 
Other sectors 0.5% 0.9% 1.4% 2.1% 4.8% 0.0% 0.2% 0.5% 1.0% 1.7% 
Net change 0.4% 0.8% 1.2% 1.9% 4.5% 0.0% 0.7% 1.1% 1.6% 2.4% 
Source:  CGE/micro-model results 
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2.3.3. Aggregate Household Income Changes 
As before with the minimum wage results, aggregate changes in factor incomes largely 
dictate the observed changes in aggregate household income. However, an important 
difference between the earlier simulations and the wage subsidy simulations is the fact that 
the latter programme requires financing. The capital tax option impacts directly on gross 
household income levels due to its dampening effect on returns to capital stock owned by 
households. Under an income tax financing option the household effect is not observed at the 
level of gross household income, but rather at the after-tax disposable income level.  
Although detailed income and poverty results are analysed in the following section, changes 
in disposable incomes of aggregated household groups are reported here. Thus, in Table 6.9 
households are once again grouped into three ‘welfare’ groups by ranking the representative 
household groups by their average per capita incomes and splitting them into three groups of 
roughly similar size. Households in the bottom one-third (the poorest households) generally 
experience the greatest gain in disposable income, followed by households in the second and 
third groups. This relates to the fact that poorer households are more likely to be attached to 
low-skilled workers who gain most from the wage subsidy scheme, which in these 
simulations are specifically targeted at low-skilled, low-wage occupation groups.  
Poorer household groups also pay lower taxes on average and are therefore not affected by 
rising income taxes under the income tax financing scheme to the same extent that wealthier 
household groups are affected. A further important result in this regard is that even though 
the capital and income tax financing options generate similar economy-wide disposable 
income changes, the distribution of these changes are very different. Raising income taxes as 
opposed to levying capital taxes ensures that the wage subsidy becomes a much more 
effective tool for redistributing income from wealthy to poorer households. The negative 
effects of capital taxes tend to be more equally distributed across households as it is of equal 
relative importance to households across the welfare spectrum. 
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Table 6.9: Changes in Aggregate Disposable Household Income 
  
η = 0.3 η = 0.5 η = 0.7 η = 1.0 η = 2.0 
Capital tax financing        
Bottom one-third 2.0% 3.6% 5.3% 8.0% 18.6% 
Middle one-third 1.7% 2.9% 4.2% 6.2% 13.4% 
Top one-third 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.6% 
All households 0.9% 1.5% 2.0% 2.9% 6.2% 
         
Income tax financing        
Bottom one-third 2.9% 4.6% 6.4% 9.1% 20.0% 
Middle one-third 2.1% 3.3% 4.6% 6.6% 13.9% 
Top one-third -0.4% -0.4% -0.4% -0.5% -0.6% 
Sh
o
rt
 r
u
n
 
cl
o
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re
 
All households 0.7% 1.2% 1.7% 2.6% 5.8% 
        
  
η = 0.3 η = 0.5 η = 0.7 η = 1.0 η = 2.0 
Capital tax financing        
Bottom one-third 2.3% 3.8% 5.3% 7.7% 17.6% 
Middle one-third 2.0% 3.1% 4.2% 5.9% 12.4% 
Top one-third 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -0.0% -0.5% 
All households 0.8% 1.3% 1.8% 2.5% 5.2% 
         
Income tax financing        
Bottom one-third 3.4% 5.1% 6.7% 9.4% 20.2% 
Middle one-third 2.5% 3.7% 4.9% 6.8% 14.1% 
Top one-third -0.3% -0.3% -0.3% -0.3% -0.5% 
Lo
n
g 
ru
n
 
cl
o
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re
 
All households 0.9% 1.4% 1.9% 2.7% 5.9% 
Source:  CGE/micro-model results 
The above conclusion requires some further qualification. Earlier in section 2.2 it was 
explained that returns to capital as captured in the SAM includes income from both physical 
and human capital. It is reasonable to assume that lower-income households and those that 
are attached to informal employment opportunities own less physical capital stock than 
wealthier households. This implies that a greater portion of their ‘mixed’ income could be 
classified as returns to human capital or ‘entrepreneurial returns’. In reality a capital tax 
would be levied against the return on (or the value of) physical capital stock in an industry, 
and as such this tax measure is more likely to have a disproportional impact on wealthy 
households.  
The fact that we are unable to distinguish between returns to human and physical capital in 
the underlying SAM probably means that the distributional estimates generated in the CGE 
model under the capital tax financing scenario are biased against poorer households. The 
extent of this bias is uncertain. Perhaps the most important lesson from this is the 
confirmation of just how difficult it would be to implement a capital tax measure given 
measurement problems.     
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2.3.4. Poverty and Distributional Effects at the Micro-Level 
Once again two approaches to linking the CGE model results with micro-level models are 
followed here. The first is a simple micro-incidence model, while the second is a more 
elaborate micro-simulation model. We first present results from the micro-incidence model.  
a) Micro-Incidence Model Results 
In the minimum wage scenarios there was no need to raise additional financing for the policy 
programme, which meant that all tax rates stayed unchanged. In that instance it was 
appropriate to link changes in gross household income as generated in the CGE model with 
the micro-incidence model. In the wage subsidy context, however, a substantial amount of 
money is required to fund the programme. These funds are raised either through capital or 
income taxes. Whereas factor taxes are incurred by firms, household income taxes are levied 
against gross household earnings. Depending on the tax incidence in different household 
groups, the implication is that changes in the average income tax rate will cause gross income 
and net income changes to differ (they were the same in the minimum wage scenarios). From 
a welfare perspective it is therefore appropriate to consider the change in the after-tax income 
of households.  
There are two ways in which a change in disposable income can be evaluated in the micro-
incidence model. The one option is to simply link changes in disposable income at the 
household group level as observed in the CGE model directly with a measure of disposable 
income in the micro-incidence model. However, since the tax burden is unevenly distributed 
among individual households within the representative household groups, the preferred 
approach is therefore to still link changes in gross income from the CGE model with the 
micro-incidence model, but to also extract and apply changes in average tax rates from the 
CGE model as a second link between the macro- and micro-models. An income generation 
function is then created within the micro-incidence model which ensures that only those 
members of the representative household groups that pay taxes in the base increase their tax 
payments to finance the subsidy programme. This ensures that the tax incidence is non-
neutral within households, which is more in line with reality.  
Figure 6.1 shows the changes in the FGT poverty measures under the micro-incidence 
approach, where the welfare measure is now per capita disposable income (i.e. the per capita 
after-tax income).85 Poverty changes are evaluated at notional poverty lines ranging from 
R1 000 to R4 000 per capita per annum. Only the results from the short run scenarios are 
presented. A first general observation is that poverty gains are greater under the income tax 
financing scenarios than under the capital tax scenarios, which relates to the fact that capital 
                                                 
85
 Appendix Table 10 shows the baseline poverty estimates against which the changes are measured.  
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taxes, in contract to income taxes, erode income of households across the income spectrum. 
The income tax financing option mainly has an impact on disposable incomes at the top-end 
of the income distribution and not so much in the vicinity of the poverty lines considered 
here. Generally, gains in poverty are higher at the lower poverty lines. This is expected given 
that low-income households are implicitly targeted by the wage subsidy programme through 
targeting low-wage workers.   
Figure 6.1: Changes in FGT Poverty Measures: Micro-Incidence Approach  
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Note: Results are from the short run scenarios.  
Source: CGE/micro-model results, IES/LFS 2000 and author’s own calculations. 
There are several reasons why a partial equilibrium model would not have been appropriate 
in this context. In short, a partial equilibrium model would generate biased employment and 
poverty results partly due to the fact that the impact of reduced production costs associated 
with a general wage subsidy programme, which in this model are passed on to consumers in 
the form of lower commodity prices, is not fully taken into account in a partial equilibrium 
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model. The implications of financing are also ignored in a partial equilibrium model 
framework. A partial equilibrium model was therefore not used to evaluate the wage 
subsidies.  
b) Comparing Results from a Micro-Simulation Model  
The setup of the wage subsidy micro-simulation model is very similar to the one developed 
for the minimum wage scenarios (see Chapter 4 for details). However, there are two 
important differences. The first concerns the allocation of job losses. In the minimum wage 
scenarios job losses were targeted at sub-minimum wage workers, while weighting factors 
were applied to unemployment probabilities in some scenarios. In the wage subsidy 
simulations no such weighting is applied, and job losses are simply allocated on the basis of a 
ranking of the standard unemployment probabilities that were estimated using the 
occupational choice model (see Appendix, section 2.2). Of course, low-skilled job losses 
rarely occur in a wage subsidy context. Only the short-run income tax financing results are 
considered in the micro-simulation model here, and as shown earlier in Table 6.4, low-skilled 
job losses only occurred in the first simulation (η = 0.3). These job losses are furthermore 
completely insignificant relative to the extent of the employment gains.  
In the context of a wage subsidy scenario the allocation of job gains in the micro-simulation 
model is clearly of greater interest and importance. This brings us to the second important 
difference in the setup of the micro-simulation model. By construction, only broadly 
unemployed persons (including those that lose their jobs and become unemployed as a result 
of the policy shock) can compete for new jobs. Beneficiaries are selected on the basis of their 
predicted probabilities of being employed, as estimated from the multinomial occupational 
choice. Although no weighting is applied to predicted probabilities, two specific targeted 
scenarios are modelled. In both scenarios only Black (African, Coloured and Asian) 
unemployed persons qualify for new jobs.86 The first scenario allows any Black jobseeker to 
become employed (this is referred to as the ‘non-targeted’ scenario) while in the second only 
jobseekers under the age of 35 can gain employment (the ‘youth-targeted’ scenario).  
The micro-simulation and micro-incidence models therefore differ substantially in terms of 
the way in which job gains are allocated. Whereas the micro-incidence model follows the 
implicit allocation of job gains as per the CGE model (i.e., new jobs are allocated among 
households in roughly the same proportions in which low-skilled jobs are distributed in the 
base), the micro-simulation model allocates new jobs to unemployed persons, and 
particularly those that meet the criteria (Black or youth) and have the highest probabilities of 
                                                 
86
  Targeting only Black jobseekers ensures consistency with the implicit targeting of Black workers in the 
CGE model simulations. Incidentally, only about 2 per cent of unemployed persons are White (IES/LFS 
2000), so if this layer of targeting was removed the results are unlikely to change much. 
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gaining employment. Since unemployed persons are distributed differently among household 
income groups than low-skilled workers, it is likely that these two approaches will yield very 
different job allocation distributions.  
This is illustrated in Figure 6.2, which shows the cumulative distribution of job gains under 
the micro-incidence model (implicit allocation) and the micro-simulation model in the short-
run income tax financing scenario for η = 0.7. The dashed line at the bottom shows the 
distribution of low-skilled jobs in the base model. Clearly the implicit allocation of new jobs 
in the micro-incidence model follows a very similar distribution. The dashed line at the top 
shows the distribution of unemployed persons (broad definition) in the base data. This 
distribution is comparable with the job allocations as predicted by two micro-simulation 
scenarios (youth-targeted and non-targeted).  
Figure 6.2: Cumulative Job Gains under Alternative Micro-Modelling Approaches (η = 0.7) 
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Source:  CGE/micro-model results 
It is clear that results from the micro-simulation model will be more pro-poor than those 
generated in the micro-incidence model. As far as the two micro-simulation scenarios are 
concerned, it is interesting to note that the job allocations are very similar whether the youth 
are targeted or not. A seemingly obvious reason for this is that since the youth make up about 
73 per cent of the broadly unemployed (according to the IES/LFS 2000), they are also more 
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likely to gain from new employment opportunities whether they are explicitly targeted by the 
policy or not.  
This is, in fact, not entirely true. In the non-targeted scenario a disproportionate share of new 
employment opportunities (68 per cent) accrue to non-youth. For example, of the 
approximately 320 000 jobs created in the wholesale and retail trade sector (η = 0.7; see 
Table 6.4), only 86 000 or 27 per cent went to young people. This reflects the relative 
disadvantage of the youth in securing employment. The fact that the distributional patterns 
are so similar therefore simply reflects the fact that both the youth and non-youth 
unemployed are distributed very similarly across the income groups. A youth-targeted policy 
is therefore not superior from a distributional point of view, but it does afford the youth a 
chance of securing employment ahead of their older cohorts.  
Differences in job allocation between the micro-incidence and micro-simulation models 
explain much of the difference in income distributions and poverty results generated by these 
two modelling approaches. Figure 6.3 shows the percentage changes in disposable income 
(by deciles) as generated by the micro-incidence (left) and micro-simulation (right) models. 
Also shown (bar graph; see right-hand axes) is the implicit or actual distribution of new jobs 
among household deciles, in this instance for η = 0.7. It is clear that job gains are biased in 
favour of the middle-income deciles when the micro-incidence approach is followed. As a 
result income gains are also generally higher in these deciles.  
Figure 6.3: Changes in Disposable Income: Micro-Incidence and Micro-Simulation Models 
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Note: The bars show the distribution of job gains when η = 0.7.  
Source:  CGE/micro-model results 
However, under the youth-targeted micro-simulation approach job gains are distributed more 
in favour of the poorer deciles, which results in very large increases in disposable income in 
these deciles. In fact, the average increase in disposable income in the bottom four deciles 
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(the poor) is 21 per cent when the wage elasticity is η = 0.7, compared to only 6 per cent in 
the micro-incidence model.  
On the face of it this may seem like an error, but some simple checks reveal that these 
estimates are in fact accurate given the assumptions of the model. There are approximately 3 
million employed people in the bottom four deciles in the base (IES/LFS 2000). This 
represents 28 per cent of total employment in the economy. The average annual wage (in 
2000 prices) of these workers is only about R7 200. Wage income contributes about half of 
the aggregate income in these poor deciles (about R23.5 billion). In the youth-targeted 
simulation (for η = 0.7) about 420 000 new jobs are allocated to these poor household groups. 
This represents 61 per cent of all new jobs created. The average estimated wage for these 
newly appointed individuals (based on an earnings function) is R16 500, more than double 
the amount earned by other poor workers.87 The total addition to income is about R10.6 
billion, which is 23 per cent of the base income. Once taxes are taken into account, the 21 per 
cent increase in disposable income among the poor seems realistic.  
We next turn to poverty effects. The poverty results generated depend on three aspects. It 
firstly depends on the assumption about the way in which jobs are allocated among poor and 
non-poor household groups. As we have seen the micro-simulation model allows for a much 
more favourable distribution for the poor. In any job gain scenario it is also necessary to 
make assumptions about how much a newly employed person might earn; hence, a second 
important issue is the estimation of this wage. In the CGE model (and by extension the 
micro-incidence model) new labour market entrants earn the same sector-specific average 
wage as other workers in the same factor group. In contrast, the micro-simulation model uses 
an econometrically estimated earnings function to predict wages based on personal 
characteristics of the beneficiaries of the policy.  
The third factor is the wage elasticity of demand. Even in this micro-simulation model that is 
set up to produce pro-poor results the gains are highly sensitive to the wage elasticity level. 
For example, if the elasticity is low (η = 0.3), income gains in the bottom four deciles will 
‘only’ be 9 per cent, which is only about a third of the gain under the benchmark elasticity.  
Figure 6.4 compares the poverty results obtained under the youth-targeted micro-simulation 
model with those from the micro-incidence model. At high wage elasticity levels the poverty-
reducing effects are much larger under the micro-simulation model, which relates to the fact 
that under this scenario where many jobs are created, relatively more jobs are also allocated 
                                                 
87
  This implication of this is that those unemployed persons who gain in these simulations are probably 
poor because of their labour market status, but once they find employment their earnings greatly potential 
exceeds that of the existing working poor. The estimated wage here is still slightly below that of the 
average targeted workers, which is about R18 000 (see Appendix Figure 3).  
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to poor jobseekers through direct targeting. At low wage elasticity levels the two approaches 
yield similar poverty effects. Under both models the wage subsidy leads to large declines in 
the depth of poverty (P1). These results are shown in Figure 6.5.  
Figure 6.4: Changes in P0: Comparing Results under Different Modelling Approaches  
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Notes: Both sets of results are from the short run scenario with income tax financing. The micro-simulation 
results are from the youth-targeted scenario.  
Source:  CGE/micro-model results, IES/LFS 2000 and author’s own calculations. 
Figure 6.5: Changes in P1: Comparing Results under Different Modelling Approaches 
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Notes: Both sets of results are from the short run scenario with income tax financing. The micro-simulation 
results are from the youth-targeted scenario.  
Source:  CGE/micro-model results, IES/LFS 2000 and author’s own calculations. 
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Poverty results based on changes in gross income as opposed to after-tax income look very 
similar to those shown above. This reflects that fact that income taxes mostly affect 
households at the upper end of the income distribution, and not those in the vicinity of the 
poverty line. However, when estimating inequality changes, a disposable income measure is 
perhaps more meaningful. Table 6.10 shows the percentage changes in the Gini and Theil-L 
coefficients, and compares the outcomes under the micro-incidence and micro-simulation 
approaches. As expected, given larger increases in per capita incomes at the lower end of the 
distribution, the micro-simulation model produces much larger changes in inequality, 
especially when the wage elasticity is high.  
Table 6.10: Inequality Results: Micro-Incidence and Micro-Simulation Models 
  Change in Gini Change in Theil-L 
 Wage Elasticity  Micro-incidence Micro-simulation Micro-incidence Micro-simulation 
  η = 0.3 -0.5% -1.0% -1.5% -2.5% 
  η = 0.5 -0.7% -1.6% -1.9% -4.0% 
  η = 0.7 -0.9% -2.3% -2.4% -5.4% 
  η = 1.0 -1.1% -3.4% -3.0% -7.7% 
Source:  CGE/micro-model results 
At around the same time as these simulations were conducted, the South African National 
Treasury commissioned research into a wage subsidy scheme. The report is currently 
available as a Working Paper (see Go et al., 2009). Although the studies differ as far as the 
simulations and certain model features are concerned, a comparison of results is still 
appropriate. This is provided in section 4.2.3 of the Appendix.  
3. Final Remarks 
The results and analyses in this study contribute to a rapidly growing and recent South 
African literature on the effectiveness of wage subsidies in reducing unemployment and 
poverty in this country. As with the minimum wage simulations before, the importance of 
assumptions around the level of the wage elasticity is important in determining the poverty-
reducing effects of wage subsidies. Some fairly significant gains materialise under a carefully 
designed targeted policy, but once again the model setup is important in explaining the 
results. The results here should be regarded as fairly optimistic given assumptions of 
perfectly competitive product markets and participation by all firms. More detailed 
conclusions are made in Chapter 7.  
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Chapter 7. Conclusions 
Relentless poverty remains one of the greatest challenges facing the South African society 
today. The defining causes of poverty can be sought in the failures of the labour market to 
generate enough quality jobs that offer reasonable wages. This centrality of the labour market 
in the determination of poverty suggests that labour market policies – whether these are 
policies that generate jobs or raise incomes directly – will always be regarded as central in the 
fight against poverty. A proper understanding of the nature of the labour market and its role 
in the determination of poverty is of paramount importance if appropriate labour market 
policies are to be designed.  
A review of the recent labour market and economic trends reveals that economic growth, 
although positive throughout the period 1995 to 2005, failed to generate enough employment 
opportunities to reduce unemployment. A particular concern is the slow growth in formal 
sector employment, with much of the employment growth occurring in the informal sector 
and among self-employed persons. The employment growth that did materialise during the 
last decade was furthermore overshadowed by a rapid increase in labour supply, with 
participation rates among Africans, women and the youth in particular rising rapidly. Despite 
the fact that many of these new labour market participants are better educated than 
incumbents, they lack work experience, which has been shown to be a great stumbling block 
towards finding employment. A general distrust in the education system has meant that 
employers are reluctant to employ young labour market entrants. This has given rise to a 
severe youth unemployment problem in South Africa.  
The type of growth experienced during the last decade or more has also not been beneficial 
from a labour absorption perspective. Technical advancements in production processes as 
well as structural shifts in production away from low-skill intensive primary sectors towards 
high-skill- and capital-intensive manufacturing and services sectors have all contributed to 
the fact that high skilled workers are in high demand. This demand shift has been at the 
expense of low-skilled workers, thus giving rise to a so-called structural unemployment 
problem. This has been exacerbated by the rapid increase in low-skilled labour force 
participation rates. Many of the poor unemployed simply lack the skills and experience 
necessary to effectively compete for skilled vacancies that exist in the economy.  
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Rising costs of employment, driven in part by slow growth in productivity and increased 
labour market regulation, have further dampened demand for low-skilled workers. Indications 
are that employers perceive employing new, inexperienced labour market entrants to be more 
risky and ultimately more costly than not employing people at all. Part of this relates to the 
fact that new recruits often require substantial training, but once trained, such workers 
become susceptible to job-hopping given the general skills shortages in the economy.  
The suggestion is that wage subsidies may be useful tools for addressing this problem of a 
deficient demand for low-skilled workers. By subsidising wages of low-skilled workers they 
become a more attractive proposition from an employer’s perspective. If such a policy is 
successful in reducing unemployment, and particularly unemployment among the poor, it 
may have important poverty-reducing effects. Although wage subsidies potentially involve a 
significant cost to government, the positive social and economic externalities associated with 
lower unemployment and increased absorption of workers into the formal sector are offered 
as a justification for this expense. 
A lack of skills and experience, low levels of education and poor quality education are some 
of the key explanatory factors for high levels of economic inactivity and unemployment 
among the poor. These same characteristics explain why those among the poor that are 
fortunate enough to find employment generally earn very low wages. While employers 
perhaps perceive the cost of employment of low-skilled workers as too high relative to those 
of skilled workers, wages earned by low-skilled workers are certainly low from an 
employee’s perspective. Low-wage workers are often the sole income earners in large 
families; thus, attachment to an employment opportunity is no guarantee against poverty. It is 
for this reason that minimum wages could also be considered appropriate and a potentially 
effective policy tool in the fight against poverty.  
Minimum wages may be effective at reaching large numbers of poor people given the large 
and growing number of people that are attached directly or indirectly (via family structures) 
to the labour market. It is also a policy that is fairly easily implementable in that it requires 
little direct government involvement other than monitoring employers for compliance. In 
addition to the potential poverty effects, minimum wages are further justified on the basis that 
workers deserve a fair wage. The possibility that minimum wages might lead to job losses is 
downplayed by its proponents, with discourse on this policy measure rather focusing on the 
fact that minimum wages are important in the fight against labour market exploitation and 
poverty among workers and their families.  
There are several economic and socio-economic reasons why a labour market approach to 
poverty reduction is more sensible than, say, a ‘direct’ approach such as an expansion of the 
welfare system. Policies that bring people into employment (wage subsidies) or that reward 
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those that are employed (minimum wages) ensure that people contribute to production and 
add value in the economy. As such, labour market policies are more sustainable in the long 
run than welfare policies. On the socio-economic front, a reduction in unemployment and/or 
improved conditions of employment will boost morale and reduce the sense of uselessness 
and idleness among the unemployed or under-employed. Being in employment as opposed to 
being idle improves people’s skills levels. This in turn raises their future productivity levels, 
earnings potential and employment prospects.   
However, using labour market-based policies to combat poverty is also challenging. With 
respect to minimum wages, evidence presented in this study suggests that wages of the 
working poor would have to increase substantially before they are likely to have a meaningful 
effect on overall poverty. Poor households that are attached to the labour market via an 
employed household member are often large, which implies that wage income gains are 
shared among many. Many poor households, and especially the very poor, are in fact 
completely detached from the labour market and rely instead on welfare and other transfers as 
a source of income. The effectiveness of minimum wage strategies in reaching the truly 
indigent is therefore limited. Non-compliance from employers may further limit the 
effectiveness of minimum wages in reducing poverty.     
As far as job creation strategies such as wage subsidies are concerned, the poverty effects are 
dependent on how well such a programme is targeted at poor unemployed persons. Many of 
the poor unemployed live in spatially isolated communities far from economic centres where 
the jobs are, while they also often lack the skills necessary to be considered for the kind of 
vacancies that exist in the South African economy. Those among the unemployed that are 
financially better off are more likely to have had access to better education, while their social 
standing and networks allow them to search for work more effectively. From this perspective 
it is important that job creation efforts effectively target those that are most in need of 
support. Complementary measures that improve poor jobseekers employability or their 
capacity to search for jobs may also be required.  
Both minimum wages and wage subsidies can be described as wage-based policies in the 
sense that a change in the wage-employment relationship is the primary policy lever. 
Minimum wage policies raise wages of workers directly, but since the costs are incurred by 
the employer, this may come at the expense of job losses. Under a firm-side wage subsidy 
policy and an infinitely elastic labour supply curve, workers’ take-home wages are kept 
constant, but the wage paid by the firm is subsidised, the intention being that the subsidy 
would lead to increased employment and ultimately a decline in poverty.  
The extent of the employment effects will be instrumental in determining the poverty effects 
of both these policies, and in this regard the wage elasticity of demand is of critical 
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importance. What makes the overall poverty impact highly uncertain is the lack of concrete 
evidence about the exact extent of the trade-off between wages and employment. Estimates of 
wage elasticities are sensitive to the source and level of aggregation of data, the time period 
over which the wage-employment relationship is analysed and the statistical estimation 
methods used. Standard wage elasticities further measure the employment response at the 
average wage. This may be different from the response at lower or higher wage levels. 
Adding to the uncertainty around the poverty effects of wage changes are questions around 
how the associated employment and/or wage income gains and losses might be distributed 
among individuals or households.  
Indirect effects related to price and demand effects and the financing of policies may also 
play an important role. The existence of such indirect effects – and these were shown to be 
very significant – was a key factor in motivating the use of a general equilibrium modelling 
approach as opposed to a partial equilibrium approach.  
Given the complexity of the policy outcomes, an ex ante modelling framework that allows for 
the exploration of various policy scenarios and one that captures various direct and indirect 
linkages will add much value in the debates around whether the policy proposals are 
appropriate and how they should be designed. Two main types of ex ante modelling 
approaches are considered in this study, namely partial and general equilibrium models. 
Partial equilibrium models are typically specified at a micro-level and can be non-behavioural 
(micro-incidence) or behavioural (micro-simulation) models. These models are useful for 
poverty and distributional analyses because they consider welfare changes at the individual 
unit of observations (i.e., individuals or households). However, they have limitations as far as 
the capturing of indirect effects is concerned. In particular, when simulating the impact of 
wage-based labour market policies, the important indirect price, demand, employment and 
(possibly) financing effects of such policies are ignored in such modelling frameworks.  
General equilibrium models are effective at capturing these indirect effects, but the use of 
representative household and factor groups (as opposed to individual or real units of 
observation) in these models limits the precision of the model in estimating the micro-level 
effects. An underlying implication of CGE models is that income gains or losses accruing to a 
certain representative group are shared equally among all the individual members of that 
group. Furthermore, since linkages between factor markets and households are only captured 
at a group-level, and given a lack of information that would allow us to somehow 
‘endogenise’ the functional relationship between households and factors, factor income gains 
or losses are distributed among household groups in fixed proportions (i.e., those proportions 
determined in the base data).  
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By extension, any employment gains or losses are implicitly distributed following the factor 
endowments in the base, which stands in contrast to the much more nuanced approaches that 
are permitted in some types of micro-models or even partial equilibrium models. This is 
particularly problematic when, for example, in a minimum wage context there is reason to 
believe that job losses will be concentrated among those workers that are further away from 
the minimum wage level prior to the policy implementation. Wage subsidy programmes, in 
turn, are targeted at the unemployed (or at specific sub-groups among the unemployed), and 
hence the distribution of job gains is more likely to follow the base-level distribution of the 
unemployed rather than that of the employed. A CGE model therefore produces results that 
may at times produce distributional results that are counterintuitive. These ‘biases’ can be 
either pro-poor or not, depending on the scenarios modelled.  
As a result, we argue in this study, poverty and distributional effects of wage-based policies 
are best analysed in an integrated or sequential macro-micro modelling framework. Such a 
framework allows us to exploit the advantages of both model types. Various simulation 
results are generated using a CGE model and two types of micro-models, namely micro-
incidence and micro-simulation model. The CGE and micro-models are linked sequentially. 
Whereas the CGE component is useful for evaluating aggregate production, employment and 
income effects, the micro-models are used to generate poverty and distributional results that 
are, as far as possible, consistent with the macro-model.  
The simpler micro-incidence model links average disposable income changes observed at the 
household group level in the CGE model with individual members of those households in the 
survey-based micro-model. Such linking ensures that it is possible to differentiate between 
individual households within a household group, i.e., also those that are below or above a 
given poverty line. Hence, the poverty implications for individual households can be analysed 
more precisely than what is permitted within a CGE model alone.  
However, the micro-incidence approach still suffers from many of the limitations of the 
representative household group approach to CGE modelling. Most importantly, job losses 
and gains are still implicitly allocated among household groups following the factor 
endowments in the base. This ultimately implies that income gains and losses associated with 
wage-based labour market policies cancel each other out at the household group level, thus 
causing poverty results to be averaged out or muted. Although this problem is diminished in 
models with highly disaggregated factor and household accounts (such as the model used 
here), the impact of such averaging out remains clear to see when comparing results with 
those generated in a micro-simulation model.  
A micro-simulation model allows for a more nuanced approach whereby individual 
characteristics are taken into account when allocating job gains and losses. Essentially, this 
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implies that the main interface between the macro- and micro-models is at the level of the 
factor market, and hence a household income generation function is specified independently 
from the household income generation function in the CGE model. This necessarily means 
that the household income vector generated in the micro-model is no longer consistent with 
that of the CGE model. These inconsistency problems can, in theory, be overcome by setting 
up a macro-micro iterative model (i.e. a model with feedback from the micro- to the macro 
model). This has been identified by many as an important area of future research. Such 
models, however, are technically complex and often unstable, and hence their ease-of-use and 
functionality are presently still very limited. 
The minimum wage simulations were designed specifically with the aim of exploring 
whether South Africa’s existing minimum wages would have had any significant impact on 
poverty when they were introduced between 2002 and 2005. The focus is on those sectors 
that fall outside the sphere of Bargaining Councils and for which sectoral determinations 
have been instituted. An ex ante analysis of the effects of a policy that has already been in 
place for a number of years still adds value relative to an ex post evaluation since it permits 
an assessment of the outcomes in a ‘controlled environment’ free of external influences. The 
results are therefore useful for gauging the effectiveness of such policies in general and hence 
may influence future policy decisions around the expansion of minimum wage policies either 
through increasing existing minimum wage levels or instituting additional sectoral 
determinations. The model framework can also be used to explore any specific policy design 
options of such future policies, should the need arise. 
Minimum wages are often justified on the basis of their poverty-reducing effects. The 
argument is that by targeting low-wage sectors or the working poor, minimum wages present 
an effective way of transferring money to poor households without requiring any major 
financial commitment or administrative involvement by government. As with any economic 
policy shock, however, minimum wage policies will have winners and losers. The winners 
are those that benefit from higher wages, but these gains come at the expense of job losses in 
the economy, especially among those workers with occupations and/or sectors of 
employment that are directly targeted by the policy. The extent of the job losses depends on 
the wage elasticity of demand, and hence this parameter is important in determining the 
overall poverty impact. Various other indirect effects may also play a role. The poverty 
effects are therefore uncertain and warrant further investigation.      
Industry-level production and employment effects and changes in aggregate household 
incomes were explored with the help of a CGE model. A key result from the CGE model is a 
loss of about half a million low-skilled jobs at the benchmark national average wage elasticity 
of η = 0.7. A simplistic interpretation of this result is that, in the absence of minimum wages, 
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the broad unemployment rate would have been about 1.6 percentage points lower than the 
current observed rate of 37.3 per cent (2006). Under a long run scenario where sector-level 
structural changes are permitted, those sectors for which minimum wage levels are set 
contract further as capital stock levels decline. In turn, production capacities increase in non-
minimum wage sectors under the long run closure as these sectors attract investments. 
However, the net effect is that employment losses in the long run are approximately 10 per 
cent higher than in the short run (η = 0.7) given the lower labour intensity in the expanding 
sectors compared to the declining minimum wage sectors.   
The employment effects can be decomposed into components relating to substitution and 
scale effects. The latter relates to supply responses to changes in aggregate demand. A 
substitution effect is observed when minimum wages for low-skilled workers lead to an 
increase in demand for skilled workers. Yet, the CGE results show an overall decline in 
skilled wages. Given the labour market closure for skilled workers, this result indicates an 
overall decline in demand for skilled workers. The negative scale effects actually dominate 
the positive substitution effects for this labour group, thus serving as an indication of a 
general contraction in the economy as a result of the minimum wage policy.  
Since CGE models are demand-driven, output levels are determined by consumer demand 
levels. Minimum wages cause production costs to rise, and hence commodity prices increase. 
This is especially true when the labour market substitution possibilities are limited. The result 
is that aggregate consumption demand declines due to minimum wages, which explains the 
overall decline in demand for all types of factors of production. This is an important result. In 
partial equilibrium models a wage elasticity of less than one will always lead to an increase in 
the aggregate wage bill, and hence scale effects are thought to be positive. However, in a 
general equilibrium model that accounts for the impact of prices, these indirect demand 
effects are negative at all wage elasticity levels. This result illustrates the advantage of using 
a general equilibrium framework for these types of analyses.    
Despite the decline in employment among low-skilled workers, minimum wages still 
represent an effective way of redistributing factor income from skilled to low-skilled 
workers. This suggests that the higher wages earned by minimum wage workers more than 
offset the wage income losses associated with higher unemployment. This is not an 
unexpected result given inelastic labour demand, but even in this general equilibrium context 
that accounts for indirect effects, the result still holds for higher wage elasticity values. Low-
skilled workers are typically attached to relatively poorer households and skilled workers are 
more likely to be linked to wealthier households. This implies that minimum wages may 
ultimately play an important role in redistributing household income from non-poor to poor 
households. In fact, as shown, the greatest beneficiaries are households in the bottom third of 
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the income distribution. These households experience an increase of around 2 to 3 per cent in 
their aggregate income, depending on the simulation, while those in the top third of the 
income distribution experience a decline in income of an equivalent magnitude as the 
increase in the bottom third.  
While redistribution of income is an important policy goal in South Africa, the question is 
always at what cost is such redistribution achieved? In these particular simulations the 
opportunity costs of increased equality are reflected in a fairly large decline in employment, 
coupled with a net welfare loss in the economy. Total factor and household incomes decline 
by around one per cent in the benchmark simulation. This, however, does not imply that 
minimum wage policies should be abandoned. If minimum wages act as an incentive for 
workers to raise their productivity levels, the policy may even raise overall welfare levels 
while also mitigating some of the employment losses. In fact, results show that if the 
beneficiaries of minimum wage policies raise their productivity levels by as little as half of 
the percentage by which wages increase, the net welfare change (as measured by the change 
in aggregate household disposable income in the economy) becomes positive.  
Of real interest in the minimum wage scenarios are the poverty effects under different 
modelling assumptions. The micro-level analyses focused on the short-run results in the 
absence of labour productivity adjustments. Several approaches were followed. A partial 
equilibrium framework was shown to overestimate the poverty-reducing effects of minimum 
wages, especially at low elasticity levels. This is due to the fact that such a model 
underestimates job losses in a low wage elasticity scenario because production cost effects of 
minimum wages are ignored. Partial equilibrium analyses therefore do not add enough to the 
debate, but they illustrate the advantage of having a model framework that links workers and 
households at the individual unit of observation.  
A sequential macro-micro framework is more suited to the analysis. Two micro-modelling 
approaches were followed, namely a micro-incidence model and a micro-simulation model. 
These models are shown to produce very different poverty results, which makes it hard to 
make generalised conclusions. Although a micro-incidence model is easy to use and always 
produces results that are entirely consistent with the macro-model, the poverty effects are 
often muted due to averaging out of income gains and losses within representative household 
groups. For this reason a micro-simulation model is more appealing despite the macro-micro 
inconsistency problems that remain unresolved when feedback effects from the micro- to the 
macro-level are not modelled. Also, in this particular application to minimum wages, it was 
argued that the overall poverty results in the micro-simulation model are overstated relative 
to the CGE results due to the way in which wages of sub-minimum wage workers are 
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adjusted directly in the micro-model as opposed to the more orthodox micro-simulation 
method of linking wage changes as observed in the CGE model.   
As far as the results are concerned, a first important point relates to the relationship between 
wage elasticities and the likely poverty effects. Higher wage elasticities are associated with 
greater employment losses among minimum wage workers, while at lower wage elasticities 
prices increase by more due to the effect minimum wages have on production costs in an 
inflexible labour market. Both employment losses and inflationary effects tend to erode the 
income gains associated with minimum wages, but in general the policy seems more effective 
in reducing poverty when the wage elasticity is low.  
This relates to the fact that minimum wage-induced job losses are largely concentrated 
among low-wage workers that are more likely to be poor. Thus, when the wage elasticity is 
high, more poor people lose their jobs, and hence the poverty-reducing effects are diminished 
or poverty actually increases, depending on the model setup and assumptions. The income-
eroding effects of price increases are felt by consumers across the entire income spectrum. 
Thus, when the wage elasticity is low, price increases serve as the primary financing 
mechanism for minimum wages, but this burden is shared more equally by consumers across 
the welfare spectrum.  
A second important consideration is the issue of the distribution of job losses among 
individuals. Under the assumption that job losses disproportionately affect those further away 
from the minimum wage, poverty rates increase substantially at lower poverty lines. The 
implication is that minimum wages may well end up benefiting the relatively better off 
among the minimum wage workers, while workers who are already living in abject poverty 
may lose out further.  
Finally, the results suggest that the poverty effects of minimum wages in South Africa are 
generally small. For example, at poverty lines between R2 000 and R4 000 the micro-
incidence model suggest almost no decline in poverty or even small increases at high wage 
elasticities. The micro-simulation model, in turn, suggests a decline in the poverty headcount 
rate of between 2.5 (high elasticity) and 3.6 (low elasticity) per cent at a poverty line of 
R4 000. The latter is equivalent to the headcount rate dropping from 51.3 per cent in the base 
to 49.4 per cent – a decline of 1.9 percentage points or 800 000 people.  
In Chapter 5 the example of a poor households with a single wage income earner was used to 
illustrate how a minimum wage in the region of R1 000 per month (or R12 000 per annum), 
once shared among six household members, will only be sufficient to lift that household 
beyond an ultra poverty line in the region of R2 000 per annum. The implication is that 
minimum wages in South Africa are perhaps not designed to have a meaningful impact on 
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poverty at conventional poverty lines in the region of R3 000 to R4 000. When taking 
household income sharing into account it should be clear from this example that minimum 
wage levels would have to be almost double the current level in order to have an impact on 
poverty at these higher poverty lines.  
This raises the question of whether higher minimum wages a sensible approach to improving 
the poverty outcomes. The answer to this is probably ‘no’. At the current moderate minimum 
wage levels firms may choose to absorb the cost increases or pass them on to consumers 
without adjusting employment levels. The employment response may therefore be even 
smaller than what is observed at the benchmark wage elasticity level used in this analysis. If, 
however, the wage increase is high relative to the average wage in a sector, the employment 
response may well be higher than what we expect it to be.  
South African minimum wages, when first introduced, were set roughly at the median wage 
level in covered sectors. It is unclear exactly what the true employment response has been 
given a fairly strong employment performance in the economy between 2001 and 2006 when 
most of the sectoral determinations were introduced. However, since being implemented, 
annual minimum wage adjustments have been moderate, with the inflation rate used as the 
guideline in this respect. It is probably reasonable to assume that employment responses to 
such year-on-year adjustments have been minimal.  
In its current format minimum wages appear to be successful in redistributing some income 
from wealthier to poorer households, albeit at the cost of an overall decline in household 
welfare. However, attempts at using minimum wages to lower poverty should be resisted. 
Minimum wages that are set too high run the risk of leading to much larger employment 
losses, an outcome that is certainly undesirable in a country riddled with high unemployment. 
As such, minimum wages should remain a moral guideline to employers rather than a policy 
tool that hopes to reduce poverty among low-wage workers and their families.  
Wage subsidy programmes are once again high on the policy agenda after the recent proposal 
from the Harvard Group. There are many reasons to believe that a wage subsidy may be 
appropriate for South Africa. Any policy measure that reduces unemployment is important 
from both a socio-economic and economic perspective. Lower unemployment will lead to a 
decline in poverty, while policies that allow people to enter employment where they acquire 
skills and add value to the economy make sound economic sense.  
Wage subsidies targeted at low-skilled workers will improve the relative attractiveness of 
these workers. Despite a surplus of low-skilled labour, the South African economy is 
becoming increasingly skills- and capital-intensive. This points at an imbalance in relative 
employment costs of low-skilled versus skilled workers, and hence a policy that corrects this 
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imbalance is appropriate. Wage subsidies will further reduce the perceived risk of hiring 
young, inexperienced labour market participants, a group that is also most prone to being 
unemployed.  
While a wage subsidy programme sounds good in principle, similar programmes elsewhere 
have been not been as successful as expected. Thus, the most contentious issue in the wage 
subsidy debate is whether these programmes actually generate more jobs than what would 
have been created in the absence of the policy. Put differently, are firms simply collecting the 
subsidy as a windfall gain without generating above-equilibrium employment? Job creation 
should, after all, be the single most important policy goal of wage subsidy programmes, 
especially when implemented in a labour surplus economy such as South Africa as a measure 
to reduce unemployment.  
The review of the international evidence further suggests that many of the beneficiaries of 
wage subsidy schemes are those that would have found employment in the absence of the 
subsidy anyway. This may especially be true when wage subsidies are widely targeted, which 
allows firms to cherry-pick their preferred candidates. Those jobseekers that are truly in need 
of support simply do not make it to the front of the job queue. The design of the wage subsidy 
scheme is clearly important, as an appropriately designed policy will avoid such unintended 
consequences.     
Before considering the model results, it is useful to briefly look at some of the design options 
and to consider which are most appropriate in the South African context. In economies with 
labour supply constraints, worker-side subsidies are appropriate and have also been quite 
successful. It should be clear, though, that a firm-side subsidy is more appropriate in South 
Africa given the context of surplus low-skilled labour in this economy. The aim, after all, 
should be to raise demand for those workers that are in excess supply as opposed to raising 
labour supply.  
There are also several targeting considerations. Although targeting reduces the overall 
subsidy cost, which may be necessary depending on the budget that is available for such a 
programme, targeting should also be based on sound economic principles. Unemployment is 
a highly complex phenomenon in South Africa, with elements of a structural problem, 
deficient demand due to employment cost imbalances and low levels of economic activity, as 
well as labour supply-side problems. Wage subsidies are not appropriate to address all these 
types of unemployment, and should therefore not be seen as a blanket solution to 
unemployment. It is therefore important to identify those subsets of unemployed persons that 
would in fact benefit from a wage subsidy programme, and to then actively target these 
individuals.  
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In South Africa the idea of a youth-targeted wage subsidy that ties in with a broader suite of 
labour market policies aimed at improving skills and labour market absorption among the 
youth is appropriate. Earlier analyses have shown that the youth are particularly 
disadvantaged as far as employment prospects are concerned. This group of labour market 
participants often lack work experience and require substantial training by firms. Given the 
weak signals that firms are getting from the South African education system, firms perceive 
employing young people as being risky. A wage subsidy reduces that risk that firms face, 
thus serving as an incentive for them to employ more of these workers.  
It is important, though, that firm-side wage subsidies are generous enough to ensure 
participation by firms. In addition to being an incentive to employ workers that may be 
perceived as being risky, the subsidy should also cover the administrative costs incurred 
under such a programme. It is unclear exactly what level of subsidisation would be deemed 
sufficient, and unfortunately economic models cannot predict this threshold level at which 
firms may decide to start participating. Consultation with stakeholders or a trial-and-error 
approach to policy design may therefore be necessary.   
A final design issue that deserves some consideration is that of training-linked subsidies. 
Many have argued that training-linked wage subsidy programmes have merit when 
unemployment is linked to a skills deficit as is the case in South Africa. Training-linked wage 
subsidy programmes may also seem particularly relevant in the context of the youth-targeted 
programmes, given that many of the youth are considered inexperienced and do in fact 
require substantial training upon being employed. Experiences with training-linked wage 
subsidies elsewhere seem positive, but it is clear from the survey of the literature that more 
analysis is needed. In South Africa the learnership programme does not appear to have had a 
significant impact on employment levels, and hence it is important to consider whether a new 
wage subsidy programme in this country should be linked to training. Two points can be 
made in this regard.  
Firstly, the country already has a learnership programme with a strong training focus in place. 
Many of the problems with this programme seem to be associated with poor implementation 
and management by the sectoral authorities. While much can be learned from this programme 
with regards to administration and implementation of wage subsidy programmes in general, 
the idea of designing and implementing a new programme with similar objectives to the 
learnership scheme seems redundant. The aim should rather be to improve and strengthen the 
learnership programme as far as its administration is concerned (an area found to be seriously 
lacking), while at the same time narrowing its focus to training and education exclusively, 
rather than seeing it as a policy that has the potential to address both the skills shortage and 
unemployment at the same time.  
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The second issue relates to training that takes place in firms. Firms tend to want to train 
people that they choose to employ, as this makes sense from a business perspective. The 
operative word here is the ‘choice’ or decision about whether to employ people or not. There 
appears to be a general reluctance among firms in taking the first step and offering people 
jobs, given the risk factors referred to earlier. The real bottleneck is therefore getting people 
into employment, and not getting people into training programmes. A wage subsidy 
programme, therefore, should be a stand-alone employment promotion programme. This 
policy need not replace the learnership scheme, as some firms may still wish to offer their 
training under the auspices of that scheme.  
In an attempt to add value to the analysis and to help answer some of the policy questions that 
may arise, several wage subsidy simulations were implemented in a CGE framework. Key 
features of the hypothetical policy simulated include: (1) a broadly targeted wage subsidy 
equal to 50 per cent of the annual wage and capped at R4 200 per annum (2000 prices); (2) 
targeting of low-skilled occupation groups with an average annual wage of less than R35 000 
(2000 prices); (3) targeting of agricultural, light manufacturing and non-government services 
(excluding private households); (4) an overall programme budget in line with those estimated 
by National Treasury (R25 to R30 billion per annum in 2007 prices); (5) modelled as a 
general as opposed to a marginal subsidy; and (6) financed through increased household 
income taxes or through the introduction of a tax on capital stock employed in targeted 
sectors.     
The CGE model results suggest that fairly large employment gains may materialise under this 
hypothetical policy setup. Simulated employment gains range from about 500 000 to over one 
million low-skilled jobs for elasticity values ranging between η = 0.3 and η = 0.7. Of course, 
these job gains are directly dependent on the size of the subsidy, and R30 billion is a 
considerable amount when compared against the total welfare budget of R90 billion in 2000. 
Importantly, however, employment gains increase significantly at higher wage elasticity 
levels.  
The fact that the programme is modelled as a general wage subsidy has important 
implications for the cost-effectiveness of the subsidy. The cost-per-job falls by about 50 per 
cent to R20 000 when the wage elasticity increases from η = 0.3 to η = 0.7. This amount still 
exceeds the average wage of targeted workers (about R18 000), which may lead some to 
conclude that a general wage subsidy programme is cost inefficient.  
The reality is that such a general subsidy acts as both a wage subsidy and a production 
subsidy (the subsidisation of existing workers under this policy is effectively a production 
subsidy). In a perfectly competitive CGE model any production cost reductions are passed on 
to consumers in the form of lower commodity prices. Important welfare effects arise from 
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this. The policy should therefore not only be judged on the basis of its employment effect and 
the cost-per-job estimate, but rather on its overall welfare or poverty effects.  
Perfect pass-through of prices is of course a strong assumption. Firms with some market 
power may have a strong incentive to capture the wage subsidy as rent. Prices may therefore 
not decline as much as predicted in a CGE model. The implications of imperfectly 
competitive product markets and mark-up pricing for the effectiveness of a wage subsidy 
scheme are important issues for future research. The important question is what firms do with 
these increased profits earned when prices are not decreased. One possibility is for firms to 
increase their production capacity levels in the long run by investing more in capital stock (an 
accumulation effect). Alternatively, the shareholders of firms may benefit from increased 
profits, in which case the beneficiaries are more likely to be relatively wealthy households.    
In the same manner the existence of strong union power may mean that part of the wage 
subsidy is captured as a wage increase. In the extreme case the entire subsidy is captured by 
workers and no employment effect is observed. Only targeted incumbents gain from higher 
wages, funded in this instance by government.  
There is one further reason why the employment responses observed at the benchmark 
simulation (η = 0.7) might be considered optimistic. Even though the benchmark wage 
elasticity level used here is consistent with econometric estimates, this measure reflects 
observed employment responses in a ‘business as usual’ context. International evidence, and 
also the evidence from the South African learnership scheme, suggest that high 
administrative costs and procedurally complex processes associated with these types of 
schemes may seriously hamper firm participation and hence also the effectiveness of the 
programme. The simulations do not take into account such hidden costs or barriers to 
participation. Administrative costs incurred by government itself are also not accounted for. 
As such the employment results in the benchmark simulation represent the ‘best case 
scenario’ or an upper bound of the kind of employment responses that will materialise under 
a wage subsidy scheme in South Africa.  
While low participation rates among firms do not really relate to the wage elasticity, a low 
elasticity level could be seen as a proxy of low participation. Given this, it can be argued that 
a lower wage elasticity level may be a more realistic benchmark level. For a wage elasticity 
of η = 0.3 (for example), the cost per job created (R40 000) becomes excessive and serious 
consideration needs to be given to whether a general subsidy can be justified at such a low 
effective wage elasticity level.  
A less costly marginal wage subsidy programme may thus be required. Under a marginal 
subsidy the average cost per job will always remain equal to the average subsidy value paid 
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for every additional worker. Given the simulation setup here, this will amount to about 12.5 
per cent of the average low-skilled wage or about R2 250. This frees up a substantial amount 
of funding to either increase the subsidy value per worker or to extend the coverage of the 
programme.   
A standard firm-side marginal wage subsidy programme may be particularly difficult to 
administer. The monitoring and evaluation processes associated with such a marginal wage 
subsidy will also be considerably more complex than a simple general subsidy programme. 
These direct and implicit costs incurred by government and firms alike will reduce 
participation by firms, thus causing the employment generation potential of such a scheme to 
be diminished. The indirect employment effects of a marginal subsidy scheme are also likely 
to be smaller than that of a general subsidy, while it may create an incentive for firms to 
replace existing workers with subsidised ones in order to maximise their benefits.  
A worker-initiated subsidy, which is effectively a variation on the standard firm-side 
marginal subsidy, is certainly the preferred design option for a marginal subsidy programme 
in South Africa. In terms of the Harvard Group’s proposed design for such a programme in, 
only matriculants (who represent new labour market entrants) will receive a voucher that 
employers can draw funds from. As an added advantage, such worker-initiated subsidies have 
been shown to improve the supply-side job search incentives, while the administrative burden 
is also shifted away from the firm towards government or the implementation agency.  
Of course, as with standard marginal subsidies, even this scheme may result in the 
displacement of incumbents by subsidised youth. Even so, it is still likely that the programme 
would lead to positive overall scale effects, which means that demand for unsubsidised 
workers may also increase (see below). A further danger exists in that voucher-carrying 
workers may be stigmatized, but this may be less of an issue when the programme is widely 
targeted. Broad-level targeting, of course, is once again associated with the risk that many of 
the beneficiaries might be those that would have found employment even in the absence of 
the subsidy. This issue is clearly a recurring theme in the debate.  
The CGE analysis has shown that overall factor incomes of low-skilled workers rise as a 
result of higher employment generated under the auspices of the wage subsidy programme. 
This is not unexpected. A further heartening result is that there is no real evidence of 
unintended substitution of skilled workers for low-skilled workers, with overall demand for 
both these types of workers increasing as a result of wage subsidies. This suggests that 
despite the increased burden placed on the shoulders of taxpayers or owners of capital stock 
under the two financing options, the aggregate output and employment effects associated 
with a wage subsidy scheme are positive.  
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As far as financing is concerned, the findings suggest that a capital tax, although yielding 
better employment results than the income tax option in the short run, harms the long run 
production and employment capacity in the wage subsidy sectors (i.e. the sectors in which the 
tax is introduced). In the long run, therefore the income tax option is a preferable method of 
raising revenue for the programme. From a purely distributional point of view the income tax 
option also produces more satisfying results. This relates to the fact that the income tax 
increases required to finance the subsidy programme largely affect households at the top-end 
of the income distribution. In contrast, the burden of capital taxes seems to be more equally 
distributed among households across the income spectrum, which relates to the fact that 
returns to capital is an important income source to all households, irrespective of their level 
of welfare. As discussed, though, the fact that data limitations prevent us from distinguishing 
between human and physical capital stock detracts from the strength of this conclusion. In 
reality a capital tax would be levied against physical capital stock employed in formal 
sectors, the returns of which are probably more likely to accrue to wealthier households than 
to poorer households.    
The central focus of the wage subsidy simulations is on the poverty effects of this policy 
instrument. Once again, two modelling approaches were adopted. The micro-incidence model 
shows that all measures of poverty decline and at all poverty lines. The gains in poverty are 
also more pronounced at higher elasticity levels. However, this approach is somewhat 
problematic in that job gains associated with the policy are implicitly distributed across 
households groups in the same way as which low-skilled jobs are distributed in the base, 
which means that much of the income gains accrue to middle-income households.  
A more realistic assumption is to say that jobs are allocated to those targeted by the policy, 
i.e. the unemployed or the youth. The flexibility afforded by a micro-simulation model allows 
for such a targeted policy impact to be simulated. Since unemployed individuals, who are 
now directly targeted in the micro-simulation model, are more likely to be living in the poorer 
households than employed persons, the micro-simulation model predicts greater declines in 
poverty than the micro-incidence model. In fact, in the youth-targeted scenario, the income 
gain among low-income households (deciles one to four) is in the region of 21 per cent 
compared to only 6 per cent in the micro-incidence model.  
A wage subsidy policy can certainly be important in the fight against unemployment and 
poverty. Although the general subsidy modelled here may seem a fairly expensive policy 
option as opposed to, say, welfare transfers or minimum wages, there are many long-term 
benefits associated with a policy that brings people into employment where they gain skills 
and experience that will stand them in good stead in the future. It is crucial, however, that 
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employment responses are optimised by ensuring that the administrative processes are as 
simple and inexpensive as possible, particularly to smaller firms.  
Limited participation by firms will reduce the employment generation potential, and evidence 
here suggests that the policy may be ineffective in reducing poverty significantly when the 
wage elasticity is low. The wage elasticity parameter may also be sensitive to the subsidy 
level in much the same way as it is sensitive to the minimum wage level (as discussed 
earlier). As such it is important that the actual wage subsidy offered is substantial enough to 
entice employers to participate.  
The actual implementation of a wage subsidy policy will be crucial to its success. Of 
particular importance is the identification of the roles and responsibilities of relevant 
institutions. A detailed discussion falls beyond the scope of this study, but some preliminary 
ideas are raised. Firstly, government would need to decide on the responsibilities of several 
government departments. Wage subsidies could be considered a labour issue (Department of 
Labour), a welfare issue (Department of Social Development or the South African Social 
Security Agency) or an industry-level issue (Department of Trade and Industry). Given the 
financial implications, National Treasury and the South African Revenue Services would also 
have to be involved directly.  
Outside of government, labour offices may be important in facilitating the processes of 
matching jobseekers and potential employers. As such, an institution such as the Umsobomvu 
Youth Fund may play a very important role in enhancing coordination between different 
active labour market policies, facilitating the job search process, and providing training and 
education opportunities to the youth. It is therefore crucial to develop the capacity at this 
institution (or other similar institutions) so that such a role can be fulfilled successfully. 
Ultimately, given the large potential number of stakeholder, a clear definition of roles and 
responsibilities of different government departments and institutions is crucial in order to 
ensure proper coordination and collaboration. 
In conclusion, this study did not attempt to compare minimum wages and wage subsidies 
with the intention of choosing a more appropriate alternative. These policies are simply too 
different to compare directly. Minimum wages are easy to implement and require no direct 
funding from government. Rather than reducing poverty by addressing a labour market 
failure, they reduce poverty directly by raising earnings of the employed. However, this 
comes at the expense of employment losses and an overall decline in welfare. Wage 
subsidies, on the other hand, require funding. A larger subsidy programme is associated with 
higher costs and larger gains in terms of reductions in unemployment and poverty. It is for 
these reasons that the poverty-reducing effects of the two policies cannot be compared 
directly.  
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Wage subsidies are perhaps more flexible than minimum wages in that, through targeting, the 
poor unemployed can be targeted directly. About two-thirds of the unemployed are poor in 
any event, which means the policy will generally be quite effective at reaching poor people. 
Minimum wages, on the other hand, can only be targeted at existing workers. It was shown 
that only about half of sub-minimum wage workers were poor prior to the implementation of 
minimum wages in South Africa, which suggests that even in terms of its design this policy 
will be less effective at reaching the poor.   
An area of contention for both policies is the issue of the effectiveness of the policy under 
different wage elasticity levels. Both theory and the evidence presented in this study suggest 
that minimum wages will be more successful in reducing poverty when the wage elasticity is 
low, while wage subsidies will generate superior poverty effects under a high wage elasticity 
scenario. Thus, if policymakers believe that the wage elasticity is relatively high (say 
η = 0.7), a case may be made to support wage subsidies but not minimum wages. The 
opposite may be true if policymakers believe the wage elasticity is relatively low (say 
η = 0.3).   
The truth, however, is that the same wage elasticity level might not apply under both policies.  
International evidence suggests that when minimum wages are set at moderate levels and 
increases in the minimum wage are kept in check, employment responses are small, i.e., the 
effective wage elasticity level is low. Therefore, if minimum wages in South Africa continue 
to serve its purpose of providing a moral guideline to firms, employment losses could be kept 
low. Importantly, however, the job losses that do occur are likely to affect the poorest among 
the minimum wage workers, and for these people some alternative form of support is 
required. Similarly, under a carefully designed wage subsidy programme that is well 
managed, properly targeted and offers a reasonable subsidy to South African firms, the 
employment responses may be large and the poverty gains significant.  
In conclusion, though, these policies should not be regarded as permanent solutions to a 
massive poverty and unemployment problem in South Africa. In the long run a focus on skills 
development and economic growth will remain the only sustainable solution to poverty and 
unemployment in South Africa.  
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Appendix . 
1. Poverty Measurement and Trends 
Some uncertainty and controversy exists around the issue of whether South Africa has in fact 
experienced an increase or a decrease in poverty during the past decade. Although this issue 
is not central to the theme of this paper, a consideration of the literature here is appropriate. 
Before summarising the findings on welfare or poverty trends (section 1.2), a brief 
explanation of how income poverty is generally measured is provided in the following 
section. 
1.1. Measuring Income Poverty 
Income poverty is best measured using the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) poverty measure. 
The functional form of this poverty measure is shown in equation [A.1] below:   
 
1
1 q i
i
z yP
n z
α
α
=
− 
=  
 
∑  [A.1] 
In this equation the variable yi is the welfare measure that can be compared against the 
poverty line, z. The FGT measure is defined over a population of n people, i = 1,…, n. If 
ranked by their income or welfare measure, individuals ranked the first q (i = 1,…, q) are 
classified as poor due to the fact that yi < z. The remaining (n – q) (i = q + 1,…, n) individuals 
are non-poor since yi ≥ z. The parameter α is called the poverty aversion parameter and can 
take on any value greater or equal to one, but in practice α = 0, 1 or 2 is most frequently used. 
These three measures represent the poverty headcount index (P0), the poverty gap index (P1) 
and the poverty gap squared (P2) respectively.  
The poverty aversion parameter (α) in the FGT poverty measure shown previously in 
equation [A.1] can take on any value greater than zero, but often in practice values of 0, 1 and 
2 are selected. When α = 0, Pα simply reduces to P0 = q/n, where q is the number of poor. It 
thus represents the share of the population that is poor. This ‘poverty headcount’ is 
completely insensitive to the depth of poverty, i.e. it does not consider how far on average 
people are from the selected poverty line.  
When α = 1 the above equation sums the relative poverty gap over the poor population. P1, 
also known as the poverty gap index, therefore measures the average depth of poverty, as it is 
a function of both the distance of each poor household from the poverty line and the number 
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of poor. Woolard (1998) points out that P1 has a number of advantages over P0. Since P0 is 
discontinuous at the poverty line, a transfer from a very poor household to a just-poor 
household that enables the just-poor household to escape poverty will reduce the headcount 
ratio. This is a violation of the Pigou-Dalton condition. Since P1 is continuous and concave, 
such a transfer will increase the poverty gap index. However, P1 nevertheless neglects 
inequality among the poor. A transfer from one poor household to another will have no 
impact on P1, provided the receiving household remains poor after the transfer.  
P2 is also a measure of the depth of poverty. It improves on P0 and P1 because it also takes 
into account the inequality among the poor. In fact, it can be shown that P2 can be 
decomposed into two components, namely an amount due to the poverty gap, and an amount 
due to the inequality among the poor as measured in terms of the coefficient of variation 
(Woolard, 1998). Thus,  
 
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
21 0 1
2
0 0
q
P P P
P C
P P
−
= +  [A.2] 
where Cq denotes the coefficient of variation of income among the poor. Woolard (1998) 
explains that although this breakdown goes partway in explaining the meaning of P2, it 
remains difficult to interpret the measure on its own. One of the advantages of P2, however, is 
that an increase in the measured poverty associated with a fall in the living standard will be 
deemed greater the poorer the household. Put differently, people further away from the 
poverty line are given a greater weighting in the poverty measure due to the fact that the 
poverty gap is squared when α = 2. 
1.2. Poverty Trends in the Post-Apartheid Period 
The question about whether poverty levels have increased or decreased in the decade since 
the end of apartheid is a topical and even controversial one. Macroeconomic data published 
in the national accounts of the South African Reserve Bank suggest that both current 
household income (expressed in per capita terms) and per capita GDP grew consistently in 
real terms between 1995 and 2005. Appendix Figure 1 shows the year-on-year growth rate of 
per capita household income as calculated from the national accounts.88 According to these 
estimates, real per capita household incomes have been growing at between 1 and 2 per cent 
per annum over the period 1995 to 2000, where after the average growth rate improved even 
further.  
                                                 
88
  Mid-year population estimates published annually by Statistics South Africa were used to obtain per 
capita estimates.  
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Appendix Figure 1: Real Growth in Per Capita Current Household Income, 1990 - 2005 
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Source: National Accounts Data, SARB Quarterly Bulletin (September 2006) 
Two key datasets for poverty and inequality analyses in the post-apartheid have been the IES 
1995 and 2000. Although data problems and the comparability of these two datasets have 
been important discussion points ever since the IES 2000 was released,89 a comparison of 
these two datasets, taken at face value, suggests there was actually a decline in average 
household income and an increase in poverty between 1995 and 2000 (compare results in 
Table 2.1). Leibbrandt et al. (2005a) note that discrepancies between household survey data 
and national accounts are not uncommon. When weighted to national levels, household 
survey data often yields lower aggregate income estimates than those reported in national 
accounts. The concern here, however, is the fact that the per capita income trends in the 
national accounts and household surveys seem to contradict each other. Appendix Table 1 
summarises findings of some of the key post-apartheid era studies on incomes, poverty and 
inequality. Most of these studies compare data from the IES/OHS 1995 and IES/LFS, while 
National Census data from 1996 and 2001 was also used. Van der Berg and Louw (2004) and 
Van der Berg at al. (2005) generated some controversy with the use of hybrid data sets (see 
below).  
A decline in average per capita or household incomes between 1995 and 2000 is a universal 
finding across the studies that report on incomes. The Statistics South Africa report estimates 
the decline in household income at around 11.8 per cent (SSA, 2002a).90 Leibbrandt et al.’s 
                                                 
89
  See section 3.1 in the Appendix.  
90
  Earlier in Table 2.1 per capita income estimates were also shown to have declined across all the 
household quintiles. This decline was particularly pronounced in the poor quintiles, where the average 
decline was 19 per cent. In contrast non-poor per capita incomes declined by only 1 per cent. The data 
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(2005a) study focuses specifically on shifts in the income distribution. Their analysis is 
limited to individuals aged 18 and older with ‘valid’ demographic information and sampling 
weights, as well as positive income.91 A leftward shift in the income distribution is evident 
throughout the distribution with the exception of the highest income earners. At the average, 
the decline in income is about the same magnitude as inflation (around 6.7 per cent per 
annum), which means nominal incomes have remained roughly constant. Leibbrandt et al. 
(2005a:15) also compare the distribution of the share of food expenditure between the two 
periods and find a dramatic shift to the right, which “is entirely consistent with a substantial 
decline in real income”.  
In another study based on National Census data from 1996 and 2001, Leibbrandt et al. 
(2005b) confirm the leftward shift in the real per capita income distribution. This shift, they 
show, is “particularly pronounced in the middle and lower-income sections of the 
distribution”.92 The evidence that lower-income earners had been affected worse by income 
declines between 1995/6 and 2000/1 points at worsening inequality. In fact, all the studies 
listed in Appendix Table 1 find that inequality had increased between 1995 and 2000.  
The results on changes in poverty vary widely, although the consensus seems to lean towards 
a worsening of poverty between 1995 and 2000. This increase in poverty is perhaps less clear 
at ‘normal’ poverty lines; for example, at Hoogeveen and Özler’s (2006) lower bound 
poverty line of R322 per capita per month, poverty remains unchanged at 58 per cent. 
However, the increase in poverty becomes more evident at lower poverty lines. For example, 
at the $2 per day poverty line both the studies of Hoogeveen and Özler (2006) and Leibbrandt 
et al. (2005b) show an increase in poverty headcount rate (from 32 to 34 per cent and 26 to 28 
per cent respectively) using different datasets. The UNDP (2003) study also finds that 
poverty had increased at an ‘extreme poverty’ line of $1 per day. Worsening inequality and 
relatively larger income declines among the very poor has also meant that the depth of 
poverty had increased. Hoogeveen and Özler (2006), for example, show that at the $2 per day 
                                                                                                                                                        
presented in Table 2.1 suggest that in real terms, the average South African earned 9 per cent less in 2000 
compared to 1995. 
91
  This approach is an alternative to the approach whereby individual incomes (wages, pension income and 
so on) and household incomes (non-wage sources, e.g. remittance income) are first aggregate at the 
household level and then allocated uniformly across household members. 
92
  Much of Leibbrandt et al.’s (2005a) paper is dedicated to explaining the leftward shift in the income 
distribution. One explanation, they argue, is that returns to education had declined between 1995 and 
2000, which seems consistent with evidence presented in Chapter 2. Another possibility is issue of the 
selection of observations into the survey dataset. Even though the 1995 and 2000 samples were designed 
to be random and unbiased, differences in selection into the survey sample may explain changes in 
income. Related is the issue of selection into the subset of income earners in the sample. For example, the 
authors find that income ‘recipiency’ rates among White men have declined, while they have increased 
for Black women. If the incomes of Black women are now lower, on average, than those of White men, 
the changes in ‘recipiency’ rates explain the decline in average incomes. 
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poverty line the average poor household earned 11 per cent less than the poverty line in 1995, 
but that this poverty gap (P1) had increased to 13 per cent by 2000.  
Van der Berg and Louw (2004) and Van der Berg et al. (2005) follow a very different 
approach, essentially building up datasets for the analysis of poverty trends from a variety of 
sources. These combined datasets are benchmarked against national accounts estimates of 
macroeconomic trends and hence the authors perceive them to be more plausible for studying 
poverty trends than household survey or census data. In both the studies, micro-level data is 
obtained from a variety of sources, including for example the Standardised Employment 
Series, OHSs and LFSs (wage and employment data), Department of Social Development 
(welfare transfer data), and the Bureau of Market Research (property income data). Van der 
Berg and Louw (2004) obtain income distribution data from the IES/OHS 1995 and IES/LFS 
2000, while Van der Berg et al.’s (2005) work is unique in using the All Media Products 
Surveys (published by the South African Advertising Research Foundation) as the source of 
data on income distributions. What further makes Van der Berg et al.’s (2005) work unique 
among the studies referred to here is the fact that their methods allow them to also present 
results for the period 2000 to 2004. As far as the results for 1995 to 2000 is concerned, they 
find (like many others) a marginal increase in the poverty headcount rate. However, they 
claim that poverty as measured against a poverty line of R3 000 (2000 prices) declined by 
about 8 percentage points between 2000 and 2004 (from 41.3 to 33.2 per cent of the 
population).  
In a recent report Yu (2008) compares income and expenditure estimates across the three IES 
surveys, i.e. 1995, 2000 and 2005/06. Yu explains that the 1995 and 2000 editions used the 
recall method to collect income and expenditure data, whereas in 2005/06 a diary method was 
adopted. In addition to this, the latter survey also differed from its predecessors in terms of 
sampling design, questionnaire structure, expenditure categorisation, and so on. This requires 
some modification or reclassification of income and expenditure items to allow for 
comparisons to be made across the three surveys. Although direct comparisons will always 
remains somewhat tenuous, Yu’s (2008) findings corroborate those of Van der Berg et al. 
(2005) in suggesting that incomes rose and poverty declined rapidly between 2000 and 
2005/06. The exact extent of these changes depends on how income and expenditure 
estimates are reclassified in order to facilitate such comparisons.  
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Appendix Table 1: Summary of Income, Inequality and Poverty Findings, 1995-2005/06 
 Income Inequality Poverty Data Source 
SSA (2002a) ↓ Average household income declined by 11.8 per cent. ↑ 
Gini coefficient increased from 0.56 to 0.57 
between 1995 and 2000. - - 
IES 1995, 
2000 
Hoogeveen & 
Özler (2006) - - ↑ 
Gini coefficient increased from 0.565 to 0.577 
between 1995 and 2000. The mean log deviation 
and Theil index also show increases in inequality.  
↑ / → 
Depending on poverty line: For $2 per day poverty 
line poverty increases from 32 per cent to 34 per cent 
between 1995 and 2000, while for the 'lower bound 
poverty line' it remains virtually unchanged at 58 per 
cent.  
IES 1995, 
2000 
Leibbrandt et al. 
(2005a) ↓ 
Average fall in incomes by roughly the same 
magnitude as inflation. - - - - 
IES/OHS 
1995, 
IES/LFS 2000 
UNDP (2003) 
  
  
↑ 
Gini coefficient increased from 0.596 to 0.635 
between 1995 and 2002. ↓ / ↑ 
Depending on poverty line: National food poverty 
line shows decline in poverty from 51.1 per cent to 
48.5 per cent between 1995 and 2002. Also decline 
for $2 per day, but increase from 9.4 per cent to 10.5 
per cent for $1 per day extreme poverty line.  
IES 1995; 
Unknown 
Leibbrandt et al. 
(2005b) ↓ 
Leftward shift in the entire income 
distribution, particularly pronounced in the 
middle- to lower sections of the distribution. 
↑ Gini coefficient increased from 0.68 to 0.73 
between 1995 and 2000. 
↑ 
Poverty increased from 26 to 28 per cent at the $2 
per day poverty line, and from 50 to 55 per cent at 
the R250 per capita per month poverty line 
Census 1996 
and 2001 
Van der Berg 
and Louw (2004) - - ↑ 
Increases in inequality within all racial groups, 
namely 0.57 to 0.59 for Africans, 0.52 to 0.55 for 
Coloureds, 0.49 to 0.51 for Indians and 0.47 to 0.49 
for Whites. 
↓ 
Falls under both the 'pessimistic' and 'optimistic 
scenarios, from 38.8 per cent in 1995 to 38.6 or 36.4 
per cent in 2000 at a poverty line of R3 000 per 
capita per annum. 
Standard 
Employment 
Series, OHS, 
LFS, IES 
(various 
years) 
Van der Berg et 
al. (2005) - - ↓ 
Decline in inequality among the Black population 
since 2000 ↑ / ↓ 
Initially increased from 40.6 per cent in 1993 to 41.3 
per cent in 2000, but thereafter declined to 33.2 per 
cent in 2004 at a poverty line of R3 000 per capita 
per annum. 
Standard 
Employment 
Series, OHS, 
LFS, AMPS 
(various 
years) 
Yu (2008)* ↑ / ↓ 
Aggregate household income declines 12.8 
per cent between 1995 and 2000; then rises 
43.1 per cent increase from 2000 to in 
2005/06. Net increase of 24.9 per cent over 
ten-year period.  
↑ / ↓ 
Gini worsens from 0.66 to 0.71 between 1995 and 
2000, declines (increases) marginally  when 
imputed rent is excluded (included). 
↑ / ↓ 
At R3 864 poverty line (2000 prices) poverty rises 
from 43.8 to 56.4 per cent between 1995 and 2000, 
then drops to 49.7 (46.7) per cent when imputed rent 
is excluded (included).  
IES 1995, 
2000 and 
2005/06 
Sources:  Sources as referenced. Table adapted from Pauw and Mncube (2007).  
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As expected, the results by Van der Berg et al. (2005) were received very favourably by 
government. However, the authors were vehemently criticised for their methods from within 
the academic fraternity. Meth (2006) counts as perhaps the most vociferous of the critics. 93 
Nevertheless, Van der Berg et al. (2005:22) suggest that these are their “conservative 
estimates” and that the “true conclusion regarding the extent of poverty in South African may 
be even more optimistic than the one drawn”. They attribute the much improved outlook on 
two factors, namely large-scale expansion of the social welfare grants94 as well as favourable 
economic growth and the associated employment creation. The latter has caused a turnaround 
in the trend of rising unemployment that was seen prior to 2000.  
In conclusion, then it seems fair to suggest that poverty levels, and especially extreme 
poverty levels and the depth of poverty increased between 1995 and 2000. Although evidence 
of an overall decline in welfare levels stands in contrast to national accou ts data, Leibbrandt 
et al. (2005a) note that “results using the survey data are replicable, and all the inputs – 
principally survey responses and sampling weights – are explicit and available, hence 
yielding a relatively transparent and replicable methodology”. This is not the case with South 
Africa’s national accounts data, and consequently the consensus position has to be that 
poverty did in fact increase between 1995 and 2000 (Bhorat and Kanbur, 2006a). Early 
evidence suggests a turnaround in this trend of rising poverty since 2000. The high 
correlation between poverty and unemployment, coupled with the decline in unemployment 
since 2002 and the rapid increase in means-tested welfare payments (see Chapter 2) all seems 
to suggest that a decline in poverty is not an unexpected outcome. 
2. Technical Information: Models 
2.1. Computable General Equilibrium Model 
This study makes use of the Standard General Equilibrium (STAGE) model developed by 
McDonald (2006). The STAGE model is a member of the class of single country CGE 
models that are descendants of the approach to CGE modelling described by Dervis et al. 
(1982). More specifically, the implementation of this model, using the GAMS (General 
Algebraic Modelling System) software, is a direct descendant and development of models 
devised in the late 1980s and early 1990s, particularly those models reported by Robinson et 
                                                 
93
  Meth’s (2006) major critique is against the scaling up of income and expenditure estimates to national 
accounts levels, something Van der Berg et al. (2005) justify on the basis of underreporting in the 
surveys and/or AMPS data. Meth (2006) uses LFS September 2004 data (which in itself has been 
questioned by others given inadequate capturing of non-wage income sources in the LFS datasets) and 
shows that he is only able to start replicating Van der Berg et al.’s (2005) results when he allows for 
underreporting of between 38 and 50 per cent. This, he argues, seems excessive. 
94
  Welfare transfer payments have increased by more than a 70 per cent in real terms between 2000 and 
2004 (see Pauw and Mncube, 2007 for an in-depth analysis) 
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al. (1990), Kilkenny (1991) and Devarajan et al. (1994). Following Pyatt’s (1998) ‘SAM 
approach to modelling’, the model is calibrated with a SAM for South Africa. This SAM, 
with base-year 2000, was compiled by the PROVIDE Project (PROVIDE, 2006).  
2.1.1. Social Accounting Matrices  
Social Accounting Matrices (SAMs) have become the database of preference for most 
economy-wide models. Initial theoretical developments in social accounting are largely 
attributable to Sir Richard Stone who addressed the matter of integrating disaggregated 
production accounts (in the form of input-output systems) into the national accounts. The aim 
was to form an economy-wide database, which not only included information about 
productive activities in the economy, but also incorporated other non-productive institutions 
and markets, such as factor markets, capital markets, households, government, and the rest of 
the world. A SAM can therefore be described as a “comprehensive, economy-wide data 
framework” (Löfgren et al., 2001:2).  
A SAM has two principle objectives (King, 1985). The first is to organise information about 
the economic and social structure of an economy in a specific period (usually one calendar 
year). When economic agents are involved in transactions with each other, financial resources 
exchange hands. The SAM captures all the financial resource flows in the economy 
associated with economic transactions and presents it in an organised matrix framework. 
SAM accounts representing economic agents or markets make up the rows and columns of 
the matrix, with the basic rule being that incomes are shown in the rows and expenditures in 
the columns of the SAM (see Appendix Table 2). This accounting procedure ensures 
completeness and consistency in a SAM; the value and direction of the resource flows 
associated with all economic transactions that have taken place during the accounting period 
are captured in this data framework.  
The second principle objective of a SAM is to provide the statistical basis for the creation of 
plausible economy-wide models. Since a SAM forms a complete database of all economic 
transactions, is consistent with the national accounts and upholds all macroeconomic balances 
inherent to the economy (the SAM row and column totals are consistent), it presents a very 
useful ‘static image’ or ‘snapshot picture’ of the structure of an economy. It is therefore the 
database of choice for calibrating general equilibrium or economy-wide models. 
The SAM accounts, representing economic agents in the model, can be grouped into six types 
of accounts, namely production activities, commodity markets, factor markets, current 
accounts of domestic institutions (households, government and incorporated business 
enterprises), a capital account (savings and investments) and a rest of the world account. 
These accounts as well as the associated transactions that may take place between economic 
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agents are summarised in Appendix Table 2. The SAM shown here is a macro-SAM, but 
usually in practical applications each of these macro-accounts is disaggregated further. The 
extent of the disaggregation depends on data availability and requirements of the study. 
Disaggregated activity and commodity accounts reflect the diverse nature of production 
activities as far as input structures are concerned and the kinds of products produced or 
supplied in the economy. A variety of factor accounts may be formed to capture differences 
in types of factors of production (capital, land and labour) or differences in skills attributes of 
workers (high skilled, semi-skilled, and so on). Household accounts may be formed by 
grouping together relatively homogenous households, with the resulting representative 
household groups reflecting the unique socio-economic stratification in the society. 
Of particular importance in this study, which focuses on the employment and household 
linkages in the economy, are the transaction flows in the SAM that link productive activities 
to factors of production and households. The value added sub-matrix in the activities column 
account captures information about wages and employment levels (the product of which is 
the wage bill) across different types of industries. A wage-based labour market policy will 
impact on employment levels and/or wage levels, which will result in a change in factor 
incomes. A change in factor income will ultimately lead to a change in household income, 
with the relevant matrix here being the functional distribution matrix in the SAM. This matrix 
(household row and factor column) shows how factor incomes are distributed among 
household groups. Clearly, in terms of the distributional effects of labour market policies, the 
factor and household accounts are of critical importance.  
This study uses a South African SAM with base-year 2000, which was compiled by the 
PROVIDE Project (PROVIDE, 2006). The version of the SAM used in this study includes 22 
commodity accounts, 22 activities representing economic sectors, as well as a rich 
specification of households and factors. There are 88 labour groups, disaggregated by 
province, race and occupation type, as well as 162 representative household groups, 
disaggregated by province, race, and gender and education of the head of the household. 
Agricultural households and those living in former homelands are also identified where 
relevant. A full listing and description of how the household and factor groups were formed is 
included in section 3.2 of this appendix.  
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Appendix Table 2: A Macroeconomic Social Accounting Matrix Framework and Description of Transactions 
Expenditures→ 
Receipts ↓ 
1. Commodities 2. Activities 3. Factors 4. Households 5. Enterprises 6. Government 7. Savings 
investment 
8. Rest of the 
world (RoW) 
TOTAL 
1. Commodities  Intermediate 
inputs 
(USE matrix) 
 Private 
consumption 
Enterprise 
consumption 
Government 
consumption 
Investment Exports Demand 
2. Activities Domestic 
production 
(MAKE matrix) 
       Activity income 
(gross output) 
3. Factors  Value-added      Factor income 
from RoW 
Factor income 
4. Households   Factor income 
to households 
Inter-household 
transfers 
Transfers to 
households 
Transfers to 
households 
 Transfers to 
households 
from RoW 
Household 
income 
5. Enterprises   Factor income 
to enterprises 
  Transfers to 
enterprises 
 Transfers to 
enterprises from 
RoW 
Enterprise 
income 
6. Government Sales taxes, 
tariffs, export 
taxes 
Indirect taxes, 
factor use taxes 
Factor income 
to government, 
factor taxes 
Transfers to 
government, 
direct 
household taxes 
Transfers to 
government, 
direct enterprise 
taxes 
  Transfers to 
government 
from RoW 
Government 
income 
7. Savings-
investment 
  (Capital Stock 
Depreciation) 
Household 
savings 
Enterprise 
savings 
Government 
savings 
 Balance of 
payments 
(Current 
account deficit) 
Total savings  
8. Rest of the 
world (RoW) 
Commodity 
Imports 
 Factor income 
to RoW 
     Foreign 
exchange 
outflow 
TOTAL Supply Activity 
expenditures 
Factor 
expenditures 
Household 
expenditure 
Enterprise 
expenditure 
Government 
expenditure 
Investment Foreign 
exchange 
inflow 
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2.1.2. CGE Model Basics 
While the accounts of the SAM determine the agents that are included in the CGE model, and 
the transactions recorded in the SAM identify the transactions that took place, the CGE 
model itself is defined by behavioural relationships. These behavioural relationships are a 
mix of non-linear and linear relationships that govern how the economic agents in the model 
respond to exogenously determined changes in the model’s parameters and/or variables.  
The CGE model used here uses a Linear Expenditure System (LES) to model consumption 
demand. This is an extension of the familiar Cobb-Douglas demand system. The associated 
utility function is also known as the Stone-Geary utility function (Stone, 1954). The Stone-
Geary function is calibrated by specifying commodity-specific income elasticities for each 
household group in the model. So-called Frisch parameters, i.e., substitution parameters that 
measure the sensitivity of the marginal utility of income to changes in income (Nganou, 
2004), are also specified exogenously. Frisch parameters establish a direct relationship 
between the exogenously specified income elasticities and commodities’ own price 
elasticities. One of the important limitations of the LES is the restriction on own price 
elasticities: these have to lie between -1 and 0, which implies inelastic demand for all goods 
and services. Also, cross-price elasticities are negative, which means all goods are defined as 
gross complements (De Boer and Missaglia, 2006).   
Households choose their consumption bundles from a set of ‘composite’ commodities that are 
aggregates of domestically produced and imported commodities. These ‘composite’ 
commodities are formed as CES aggregates based on the so-called Armington assumption 
that domestically produced and imported commodities are imperfect substitutes (Armington, 
1969). In this model the country is assumed to be a price taker for all imported commodities. 
Domestic production uses a two-stage production process. A generalised version of this 
production structure was shown earlier in Figure 4.2. In terms of this formulation, final 
activity output (QX) is defined as a CES (or Leontief) function of ‘value added’ (QVA) and 
‘aggregate intermediate inputs’ (QINT). The degree of substitutability (if any) at this level is 
determined by an elasticity of substitution parameter, σQX. At the second level value added is 
a CES function of primary factors of production (QF1, QF2,…, QFn). In this instance the 
elasticity of substitution that determines the degree of substitutability between different 
factors is represented by σQVA. Intermediate inputs (QINTD1, QINTD2,…, QINTDn) are 
further used in fixed proportions (Leontief function) to the level of QINT (or to the level of 
QX if the top-level function is also a Leontief function). The production set-up further allows 
for activities to produce multiple products under the assumption that the proportionate 
combinations of commodity outputs produced by each activity/industry remain constant; 
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hence for any given vector of commodities demanded there is a unique vector of activity 
outputs that must be produced. 
This employment structure is a key model aspect in the context of the labour market policies 
simulated in this study. The reason for this becomes clear when model results are explored; 
the degree of substitutability between different factors of production (σQVA) determines the 
employment and hence overall poverty results to a large extent. 
The vector of commodities demanded in the economy is determined by the domestic demand 
for domestically produced commodities and export demand for domestically produced 
commodities. Using the assumption of imperfect transformation between domestic demand 
and export demand, in the form of a Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function, 
the optimal distribution of domestically produced commodities between the domestic and 
export markets is determined by the relative prices on the alternative markets. The model can 
be specified as a small country, i.e., price-taker, on all export markets, or selected export 
commodities can be deemed to face downward sloping export demand functions, i.e., a large 
country assumption. The other behavioural relationships in the model are generally linear. 
For a detailed discussion of the model properties, see PROVIDE (2005).  
2.1.3. Closure Rules Adopted for this Study 
The model is set up with a range of flexible closure rules. Model closure rules are typically 
selected with the objective of providing a realistic representation of the economy under 
investigation. Mathematically speaking, closure rules ensure that the number of variables and 
equations in the model are consi tent, a necessary condition for the model to solve. In 
economic terms closure rules define fundamental differences in perceptions of how economic 
systems operate, i.e. it assigns causality in terms of how equilibrium is achieved in the 
various macroeconomic balances. For this particular study the following closure rules are 
selected as the ‘basic closure’:95   
• The foreign exchange market is cleared under the assumption of a flexible exchange 
rate regime, in line with current practices of the South African Reserve Bank. The 
alternative closure (not selected here) is a fixed exchange rate and a flexible external 
balance. 
• The capital account, which records all savings and investment related transactions, 
can be closed in a variety of ways, ultimately ensuring that investment equals savings 
                                                 
95
  In some instances alternative closures may be selected as part of the process of testing the sensitivity of 
model results. Any such deviations from the basic closure are explicitly mentioned.  
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in the economy. The investment level can be fixed, which implies that institutions 
(government, households and enterprises) generate enough savings to finance 
investments (investment-driven closure). This is typically achieved by allowing 
average savings rates of households and enterprises to vary. Alternatively, under a 
savings-driven closure the investment level is determined by the level of savings in 
the economy, with average savings rates of households and enterprises fixed. A 
further option, often regarded as a more balanced approach, is allowing the share of 
investment expenditure in total final domestic demand remains constant. This latter 
closure is selected in this study.  
• The government account is either closed by variations in the level of government 
borrowing or savings, i.e. the size of the budget deficit or surplus. In terms of this 
closure all tax rates remain constant. This closure is appropriate when the policy 
shock considered has no significant impact on government revenue and/or requires no 
increase in government spending. Alternatively, tax rates can be allowed to vary in 
order to generate a level of government revenue sufficient to maintain the base-level 
budget deficit or surplus (balanced budget closure). Government expenditure can be 
fixed in real or nominal terms, or alternatively, in terms of a more balanced closure, it 
can be fixed relative to the level of domestic absorption (as with the savings-
investment closure). Hence as the economy shrinks, government’s expenditure levels 
also drop to compensate to some extent for the expected drop in revenues.  
• The factor market closures selected were discussed in Chapter 4. To recap, labour is 
grouped into skilled workers and unskilled workers. An unemployment closure is 
selected for unskilled workers, i.e. there is an infinite supply of unskilled workers at 
fixed wages. In contrast, skilled wages adjust to ensure full employment. Under a 
short run closure capital stock is assumed to be immobile (or activity-specific), while 
under a long run closure capital stock is mobile, with capital being attracted to those 
sectors where the return to capital is the highest. The factor land is only employed in 
the agricultural sector. Land is assumed to be fully employed and immobile, i.e. it is 
only employed in the agricultural sector.  
All prices in a CGE model are expressed relative to the numéraire, a fixed price (or price 
index) in the model, usually the consumer price index (CPI). This ensures that all the value 
results are expressed in real terms. 
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2.2. Micro-Simulation Models 
The multinomial logit model is used in the estimation of employment and unemployment 
probabilities for labour market participants. As explained, the dependent variable is a discrete 
variable with 23 outcomes, namely employment in any one of 22 sectors and unemployment. 
The independent variables include the following dummy and spline variables:  
• Age group: Ages 15 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 44 and 45 to 54, with 55 and up the referent 
group 
• Race group: African, Coloured and Asian, with White the referent group 
• Gender: female, with male the referent group 
• Location: Urban areas are divided into metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. 
Officially, there are five metropolitan areas in South Africa, including those in the 
Western Cape, Eastern Cape, Free State and Kwa-Zulu Natal, with Gauteng 
metropolitan areas selected as the referent group (see Pauw, 2005b). Other urban 
areas (or non-metropolitan areas) are grouped together as a single dummy variable, 
while two dummies for rural areas exist, i.e. those that fall under the former 
homelands and ‘other’ rural areas. The latter primarily includes commercial farmland. 
• Education splines: Splines include no education up to grade 7, grades 8 to 11, grade 
12, matric with diploma and matric with degree. The first spline is the referent group.  
The model output appears below in Appendix Table 3.  
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Appendix Table 3: Multinomial Logit Model for Low-Skilled Workers and Unemployed Individuals 
  aagric aforest afish amine afood abevs atext alwpap 
age15_24 -2.37 [20.67] ** -1.90 [5.4] ** -4.61 [4.01] ** -2.54 [10.62] ** -2.21 [8.14] ** -3.40 [6.53] ** -2.97 [13.94] ** -2.41 [7.88] ** 
age25_34 -1.66 [15.38] ** -0.78 [2.59] ** -0.79 [1.14]   -0.59 [3.02] ** -1.11 [4.56] ** -1.67 [4.31] ** -1.71 [9.03] ** -1.26 [4.83] ** 
age35_44 -1.26 [11.62] ** -0.30 [1.01]   -0.93 [1.41]   0.51 [2.68] ** -0.47 [1.93]   -0.76 [2.06] * -0.80 [4.41] ** -0.66 [2.55] * 
age45_54 -0.74 [6.51] ** -0.38 [1.18]   -1.70 [2.09] * 0.56 [2.81] ** 0.04 [0.17]   -0.27 [0.69]   -0.43 [2.3] * -0.51 [1.85]   
African -2.11 [13.11] ** 0.22 [0.21]   16.46 .   -1.32 [7.45] ** -0.21 [0.54]   1.09 [1.71]   0.20 [0.68]   -0.47 [1.34]   
Coloured -0.41 [2.47] * -0.30 [0.27]   20.49 [40.01] ** -2.17 [8.28] ** 0.54 [1.39]   1.99 [2.96] ** 1.32 [4.21] ** 0.58 [1.57]   
Asian -3.18 [4.75] ** -32.05 [30.4] ** -15.07 [30.62] ** -5.42 [5.31] ** 0.66 [1.48]   -34.14 [55.5] ** 2.03 [5.94] ** 1.43 [3.39] ** 
female -0.90 [15.49] ** -0.75 [4.43] ** -2.45 [4.46] ** -4.14 [19.03] ** -0.94 [8.19] ** -1.03 [5.21] ** 0.82 [8.62] ** -1.50 [9.79] ** 
wcmetro 0.70 [2.29] * 23.63 .   23.48 [22.2] ** 0.47 [0.76]   0.58 [2.31] * 0.53 [1.26]   1.73 [10.21] ** 0.95 [3.85] ** 
ecmetro 1.13 [3.16] ** -9.11 [13.2] ** 22.22 [15.47] ** -31.47 [152.79] ** -0.61 [1.74]   0.04 [0.09]   0.25 [1.08]   -1.14 [2.89] ** 
fsmetro 2.14 [5.9] ** -8.98 [13.18] ** -5.94 [5.45] ** -0.92 [0.89]   -0.33 [0.6]   0.50 [0.89]   1.55 [6.28] ** 0.07 [0.16]   
kzmetro 0.91 [2.19] * -8.92 [13.19] ** -5.86 [5.43] ** -31.20 [146.31] ** 0.33 [1.18]   0.29 [0.56]   0.78 [3.15] ** 0.19 [0.62]   
othurban 1.65 [6.23] ** 23.04 [29.2] ** 24.14 [23.21] ** 2.49 [12.49] ** 0.18 [1.12]   0.24 [0.81]   0.72 [4.89] ** -0.37 [1.87]   
rural_hl 2.56 [9.81] ** 24.23 [34.93] ** 23.35 [18.01] ** 0.26 [1.09]   -0.41 [2.05] * -0.44 [1.42]   0.21 [1.28]   -0.97 [4.08] ** 
othrural 4.27 [16.56] ** 26.31 [38.7] ** 21.45 .   3.57 [17.68] ** 0.20 [0.98]   -1.38 [2.96] ** 0.16 [0.77]   0.43 [2.15] * 
gr8_gr11 -0.37 [12.54] ** -0.44 [4.64] ** -0.43 [2.17] * -0.03 [1.15]   0.12 [2.89] ** 0.18 [2.23] * 0.17 [5.37] ** 0.08 [1.7]   
gr12 0.10 [0.75]   -0.01 [0.02]   -22.77 .   -0.19 [1.38]   -0.35 [1.98] * -0.50 [1.49]   -0.37 [2.83] ** -0.13 [0.61]   
diploma 0.09 [0.35]   -21.72 .   -1.16 .   0.31 [1.33]   -0.24 [0.51]   0.16 [0.29]   -0.28 [0.97]   -0.08 [0.19]   
degree 0.57 [3.64] ** 11.26 [20.2] ** 12.82 [21.08] ** -0.10 [0.47]   0.51 [1.8]   0.38 [1.03]   -0.34 [1.34]   0.43 [1.55]   
_cons -0.39 [1.35]   -27.52 [22.48] ** -44.73 [35.26] ** -2.03 [6.79] ** -2.16 [4.74] ** -4.15 [6.18] ** -3.23 [9.51] ** -1.70 [4.28] ** 
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...Appendix Table 3 continued... 
  apetro afert apharm anonmet ametals amach autil aconst 
age15_24 -2.88 [2.99] ** -2.58 [4.15] ** -2.73 [2.67] ** -1.91 [6.23] ** -2.47 [8.57] ** -2.58 [8.8] ** -3.00 [5.61] ** -2.16 [13.85] ** 
age25_34 -1.03 [1.1]   -2.15 [3.48] ** -3.77 [4.08] ** -0.72 [2.55] * -1.47 [5.96] ** -1.30 [5] ** -1.44 [3.43] ** -1.22 [8.52] ** 
age35_44 -0.38 [0.44]   -0.76 [1.28]   -1.35 [2.06] * -0.25 [0.91]   -0.43 [1.88]   -0.52 [1.99] * -0.19 [0.48]   -0.53 [3.75] ** 
age45_54 0.42 [0.5]   -0.31 [0.51]   -0.51 [0.58]   0.11 [0.37]   -0.12 [0.5]   -0.17 [0.62]   0.37 [0.91]   -0.22 [1.52]   
African -1.20 [1.65]   18.66 [31.67] ** -0.93 [1.38]   -0.06 [0.17]   -0.86 [3.28] ** -1.07 [4.2] ** -1.01 [2.38] * -1.09 [5.77] ** 
Coloured -0.21 [0.22]   20.02 [31.41] ** -0.29 [0.32]   0.53 [1.28]   -0.16 [0.52]   0.16 [0.58]   -0.54 [1.06]   -0.32 [1.56]   
Asian -0.53 [0.68]   -15.89 [26.42] ** -28.59 [42.96] ** -35.03 [88.37] ** -0.52 [1.29]   0.27 [0.81]   -1.66 [1.55]   -0.88 [2.87] ** 
female -2.91 [5.02] ** -0.99 [3.82] ** -2.64 [3.44] ** -1.19 [8.2] ** -3.06 [14.4] ** -1.34 [10.77] ** -1.80 [6.95] ** -3.08 [24.55] ** 
wcmetro 0.86 [0.7]   -0.60 [1.38]   -0.83 [0.81]   0.89 [3.82] ** -0.20 [0.81]   -0.26 [1.18]   0.98 [1.81]   0.76 [4.95] ** 
ecmetro -31.66 [39.81] ** -0.65 [1.28]   -0.79 [0.7]   0.45 [1.68]   -1.96 [4.24] ** 0.41 [2.23] * -0.64 [0.81]   -0.38 [2.01] * 
fsmetro -30.69 [40.59] ** -0.86 [0.84]   -27.80 [49.25] ** -0.74 [0.91]   -2.46 [2.42] * -0.36 [0.93]   -32.71 [86.09] ** 0.01 [0.03]   
kzmetro 0.61 [0.49]   -34.32 [153.62] ** -0.31 [0.27]   0.02 [0.06]   -0.71 [2.12] * -0.83 [2.46] * 1.40 [2.36] * -0.23 [1.08]   
othurban 1.30 [1.74]   -0.99 [3] ** -0.68 [1.26]   0.01 [0.03]   -0.41 [2.89] ** -0.60 [4.04] ** 0.91 [2.3] * -0.13 [1.24]   
rural_hl -0.83 [0.83]   -2.33 [4.54] ** -1.41 [1.84]   -0.84 [3.8] ** -1.78 [8.57] ** -1.28 [7.2] ** 0.69 [1.6]   -0.08 [0.82]   
othrural 0.93 [0.85]   -1.34 [2.43] * -28.04 [77.2] ** -0.66 [2.27] * -1.23 [5.37] ** -2.67 [6.62] ** 1.09 [2.5] * -0.36 [2.79] ** 
gr8_gr11 0.31 [1.61]   0.22 [1.8]   0.55 [2.31] * -0.05 [0.86]   -0.01 [0.12]   0.08 [1.75]   -0.13 [1.29]   -0.15 [5.03] ** 
gr12 0.69 [1.06]   0.50 [1.25]   0.16 [0.22]   -0.02 [0.1]   0.32 [1.81]   -0.06 [0.37]   1.32 [3.69] ** -0.14 [1.06]   
diploma 1.13 [2.1] * -0.65 [0.88]   1.92 [2.9] ** -0.36 [0.7]   -0.32 [0.8]   -0.11 [0.3]   0.16 [0.33]   0.04 [0.14]   
degree 0.10 [0.24]   0.63 [1.43]   -15.34 [60.07] ** 0.21 [0.58]   0.34 [1.25]   0.08 [0.28]   0.13 [0.35]   0.20 [1.04]   
_cons -5.28 [4.79] ** -21.93 .   -3.99 [3.74] ** -2.38 [5.56] ** -0.28 [0.89]   -0.53 [1.56]   -3.00 [4.73] ** 0.83 [3.64] ** 
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...Appendix Table 3 continued... 
  atrad aaccom atrans afinbus asocial adomes       
age15_24 -2.32 [21.57] ** -2.22 [10.33] ** -3.04 [14.51] ** -2.61 [12.89] ** -4.04 [36.02] ** -2.65 [23.12] **       
age25_34 -1.37 [13.67] ** -1.38 [7.05] ** -1.67 [9.9] ** -1.58 [8.56] ** -2.96 [32.3] ** -1.74 [17.53] **       
age35_44 -0.76 [7.66] ** -0.68 [3.46] ** -0.81 [4.79] ** -1.02 [5.45] ** -2.05 [23.17] ** -1.03 [10.7] **       
age45_54 -0.48 [4.58] ** -0.55 [2.68] ** -0.26 [1.53]   -0.50 [2.44] * -1.61 [16.76] ** -0.55 [5.46] **       
African -0.40 [2.71] ** 2.12 [2.11] * -0.28 [1.27]   0.50 [1.81]   -0.48 [3.32] ** 2.14 [3.51] **       
Coloured 0.31 [1.94]   2.50 [2.48] * 0.27 [1.07]   1.48 [5.08] ** 0.50 [3.17] ** 2.32 [3.79] **       
Asian 0.36 [1.79]   1.74 [1.58]   -0.54 [1.48]   -0.91 [1.72]   -0.59 [2.57] ** 0.20 [0.24]         
female -0.37 [8.87] ** 0.26 [2.9] ** -2.57 [20.29] ** -0.86 [10.56] ** -0.38 [8.27] ** 1.28 [21.33] **       
wcmetro 0.30 [2.95] ** 0.28 [1.41]   0.46 [2.67] ** 0.08 [0.52]   0.51 [4.52] ** 0.28 [2.25] *       
ecmetro -0.51 [4.33] ** -0.76 [2.78] ** -0.50 [2.41] * -0.61 [3.2] ** -0.08 [0.63]   -0.09 [0.73]         
fsmetro -0.41 [2.3] * 0.16 [0.59]   0.23 [0.81]   -0.06 [0.25]   0.98 [6.7] ** -0.06 [0.37]         
kzmetro -0.08 [0.55]   -0.12 [0.44]   0.10 [0.37]   -0.03 [0.15]   0.17 [1.01]   0.18 [1.28]         
othurban -0.11 [1.77]   -0.39 [3.22] ** -0.22 [1.98] * -0.67 [6.48] ** 0.27 [3.84] ** -0.08 [1.13]         
rural_hl -0.39 [5.86] ** -0.90 [6.75] ** -0.94 [6.97] ** -1.68 [11.35] ** -0.42 [5.32] ** -1.10 [13.05] **       
othrural -0.59 [6.62] ** -0.20 [1.27]   -0.65 [3.93] ** -1.28 [7.51] ** 0.06 [0.62]   0.06 [0.67]         
gr8_gr11 0.08 [4.46] ** 0.04 [1.2]   0.13 [4.11] ** 0.22 [6.13] ** 0.12 [6] ** -0.23 [10.49] **       
gr12 0.04 [0.61]   0.03 [0.24]   -0.09 [0.73]   0.61 [5.2] ** 0.35 [4.47] ** -0.41 [3.49] **       
diploma -0.09 [0.64]   -0.39 [1.21]   -0.03 [0.11]   0.42 [2.39] * 0.91 [9.2] ** -1.69 [3.55] **       
degree 0.03 [0.27]   -0.33 [1.14]   0.24 [1.37]   -0.08 [0.56]   -0.01 [0.06]   1.32 [5.16] **       
_cons 0.40 [2.37] * -3.80 [3.78] ** -0.37 [1.54]   -1.60 [4.97] ** 1.09 [6.42] ** -2.56 [4.16] **       
 Notes: (1) Absolute values of z-statistics in square brackets.  
(2) * Significant at 5 per cent; ** Significant at 1 per cent.  
(3) Number of observations: 37 204.  
(4) Pseudo R2: 0.1555.  
(5) Base outcome: ‘unemployed’.  
Source:  IES/LFS 2000 and author’s own estimations 
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The earnings function is a simple regression on wages earned. As noted briefly in the main 
text, the equation includes the same set of independent variables as the multinomial logit 
model above, except for the addition of sector dummy variables. Since this equation is 
estimated for all low-skilled (employed) and unemployed persons, there are 23 dummy 
variables. The dummy for ‘unemployment’ is selected as referent case, which means that the 
estimated coefficient associated with each of the remaining sector dummies in the equation 
(see left-hand column of Appendix Table 4) shows the amount by which an unemployed 
person’s estimated wage must be increased once that person is selected for employment in a 
growing sector. The fact that all coefficients are positive and significantly different from zero 
(unemployed persons report a wage of zero in the survey data) attests to the reliability of this 
model in predicting earnings of individuals that move from unemployment to employment.  
Appendix Table 4: Earnings Function Low-Skilled Workers and Unemployed Individuals 
aagric 12,322.74 [16.2] **   …continued…     
aforest 12,032.80 [20.01] **   age15_24 -2,805.65 [3.28] ** 
afish 14,024.54 [7.23] **   age25_34 -541.79 [0.62]   
amine 29,070.89 [24.82] **   age35_44 3,372.60 [3.88] ** 
afood 17,747.30 [17.13] **   age45_54 3,304.60 [3.81] ** 
abevs 18,188.45 [11.32] **   African -25,533.35 [11.79] ** 
atext 14,680.27 [23.72] **   Coloured -20,900.79 [9.31] ** 
alwpap 18,614.37 [14.38] **   Asian -15,358.66 [5.68] ** 
apetro 54,871.88 [5.24] **   female -3,634.07 [11.43] ** 
afert 21,445.55 [10.36] **   wcmetro 2,171.30 [2.25] * 
apharm 16,079.97 [2.38] *   ecmetro -192.32 [0.23]   
anonmet 18,732.32 [19.83] **   fsmetro -595.55 [0.55]   
ametals 22,366.21 [16.51] **   kzmetro -1,308.29 [1.33]   
amach 22,946.38 [13.67] **   othurban -658.61 [1.08]   
autil 28,877.18 [11.56] **   rural_hl -1,400.80 [2.94] ** 
aconst 17,275.45 [17.04] **   othrural -1,411.91 [2.48] * 
atrad 15,015.75 [31.21] **   gr8_gr11 1,079.36 [12.07] ** 
aaccom 14,059.52 [18.4] **   gr12 3,163.14 [6.92] ** 
atrans 23,912.74 [23.75] **   diploma 16,342.54 [4.85] ** 
afinbus 25,665.14 [7.4] **   degree -321.55 [0.14]   
asocial 19,642.27 [25.27] **  _cons 23,705.13 [10.29] ** 
adomes 8,544.85 [35.71] **      
Notes: (1) Absolute values of z-statistics in square brackets.  
(2) * Significant at 5 per cent; ** Significant at 1 per cent.  
(3) Number of observations: 37 204.  
(4) R2: 0.2039.  
Source:  IES/LFS 2000 and author’s own estimations 
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3. Data and Data Sources 
3.1. Micro-Level Data: Income and Expenditure and Labour Force Surveys 
There are various sources of demographic and income/expenditure data available in South 
Africa. Statistics South Africa conducts a variety of regular surveys. Most suited to the 
micro-level analyses in this particular study is the Income and Expenditure Survey (IES) of 
2000 (IES 2000) (SSA, 2002b) as well as the LFS September 2000 (LFS 2000:2) (SSA, 
2002c). These two surveys are merged to form a comprehensive database that links detailed 
labour market information at the person-level with household-level information about income 
(including non-wage income sources) and expenditure. The household-level information is 
particularly important as it allows for a better evaluation of the poverty status of households 
and individuals within households.  
The use of the IES/LFS 2000 may seem surprising for at least two reasons. Firstly, several 
researchers have raised concerns about the reliability of the IES/LFS 2000 datasets, whether 
merged or used separately, as well as the comparability of these with other datasets. The IES 
2000 dataset, for example, is fraught with data problems. Most of the problems relate to 
sloppiness in data collection, accounting and coding of variables. There are also numerous 
records that are problematic due to missing values for some of the variables, while an 
alarmingly large number of household report zero expenditure on food. Reporting on, for 
example, tax payments is also far below the expected level when compared to actual tax 
collection data.  
A detailed account of the problems is included in a technical report by Pauw (2005a) (also 
see Burger and Burger, 2003, Poswell, 2003, Simkins, 2003). This report also outlines, in 
detail, the steps followed to remove errors and inconsistencies from the dataset.96 This 
includes recalculation of income and expenditure totals and sub-totals and estimation of 
missing values. Numerous consistency checks of income and expenditure estimates within 
observations (households) were also performed. Care was taken not to compromise the 
reliability of income and expenditure estimates, although at the aggregate level income and 
expenditure estimates, and hence also poverty and, to a lesser extent, inequality estimates, 
were affected. In a comparative static modelling context where the interest is in changes in 
poverty and inequality, the actual level of poverty and inequality in the base is arguably of 
lesser importance than the modelling process that generates the predicted change. 
                                                 
96
  The data cleaning process was part of the data preparation work for the compilation of the PROVIDE 
SAM used in this study (see below).  
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The second reason why the use of the IES/LFS 2000 might be criticised relates to the fact that 
this data is by now fairly dated. Statistics South Africa has already released the Labour Force 
Survey of March 2007, which means much more recent wage and employment are available. 
The IES 2005/06 was also recently released (March 2008). Unfortunately, though, this 
newest edition of the IES cannot be merged with the LFS (or October Household Survey) of 
the same period as was possible with its predecessors, the IES 2000 and 1995. Merging is 
important in the context here given the interest in linking labour market participants and 
households directly in order to accurately capture poverty and distributional effects 
associated with labour market policies. The fact that the IES/LFS 2000 also forms the basis of 
the household and factor-related accounts and sub-matrices in the SAM is a further 
motivating factor for using this dataset, as it facilitates the integration or sequential linking of 
the CGE results with the micro-level models used in this study.   
A final reason for the use of the IES/LFS 2000 data in the minimum wage scenarios in 
particular relates to the fact that minimum wages were first introduced in 2002 in South 
Africa, while others followed in the three to four years thereafter. The aim of the minimum 
wage scenarios is to simulate their impact on employment and poverty, and hence the ‘base 
case’ has to be the situation prior to the introduction of minimum wages.  
3.2. The Household and Factor Groups in the South African SAM 
The household accounts of the PROVIDE SAM used here were formed using indicators or 
location (province and former homelands), population group, informal agricultural activities, 
gender of the head of the household, education levels of the household head and the per 
capita income levels of the households. The IES/LFS 2000 was used as a source of 
individual/household demographic information and income levels for the formation of the 
household groups. Being a survey with limited numbers of observations, the population 
cannot be disaggregated fully in each dimension. Hence, the extent to which sub-groups 
could be further disaggregated was determined to a large extent by the sample sizes within 
those sub-groups. When fewer and fewer sample observations are included in a representative 
group, the confidence intervals around estimates of incomes and expenditures become very 
large, something that is best avoided.  
At the first level of disaggregation households are grouped by province, reflecting the fact 
that welfare levels vary significantly across the provinces of South Africa.97 For example, 
households in the more industrialised Western Cape and Gauteng are much better off than 
households in the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. Large parts of the latter two provinces 
formed part of former homelands, and are still impoverished today. The next level of 
                                                 
97
  A further motivation is the strong regional focus of research conducted as part of the PROVIDE Project.   
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disaggregation is by racial group. Depending on the population numbers households within 
provinces were disaggregated into African, White, Coloured and/or Asian households.98 
African households living in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape were also split into former 
homelands and ‘non-homelands’. The racial groupings and homeland/non-homeland 
distinctions are justified by historical events which still today explain much of the 
inequalities that exist between racial groups as well as the high level of poverty among 
people living in the former homelands (see discussions in Chapter 2).   
In addition to distinguishing African households involved in subsistence agriculture in some 
provinces99, a gender dimension is also introduced in the SAM. In those province-race sub-
groups where population numbers permitted, households were split into female- and male-
headed households. It is especially among many of the African households where the high 
incidence of female-headed is evident. This is also a direct consequence of past policies 
which forced women to live in rural areas (often in the homelands) while their husbands were 
provided with ‘passes’ to work in the mines or industries in the cities. These migrant labour 
policies eventually contributed to creation of many fractured families, with women eventually 
becoming main breadwinners and heads of their households.   
Again where population numbers permitted, educational attainment of the head of the 
household was used as a further dimension in the SAM. The main education levels included 
were (1) none or pre-primary, (2) primary schooling (up to Grade 7), lower secondary 
(Grades 8 through 10), upper secondary (Grades 11 and 12) and tertiary (any post-matric 
qualification or diploma). Education levels capture an important skills dimension and hence 
improve the relationship between factor and household accounts. There is also a strong link 
between education levels and unemployment and/or the poverty status of individuals.100  
A final level of disaggregation is income. As explained, although it is convenient to be able to 
report results for different household income groups, income is not an ideal way to define 
groups that are affected similarly by policies. The income dimension is therefore used here 
only to reduce the size of certain household sub-groups, i.e. only the very large groups were 
split around the groups’ median income into low-income and high-income groups. A total of 
162 household groups were formed, which are believed to accurately reflect the socio-
economic structure of South Africa. A detailed description of the household groups as well as 
                                                 
98
  Given the small number of Asian or Indian households outside of KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, they 
were grouped with Coloured households in the other provinces.  
99
  This group is less relevant in the current study, and was motivated by the fact that the SAM was 
principally designed with analyses involving the agricultural sector in mind.   
100
  Although the education level of only the head of the household is used here, it is also evident that the 
household head is often the breadwinner in the household; hence the household’s welfare level is closely 
linked to the educational attainment of the household head.   
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summary statistics (mean incomes and distributional statistics) is included in Pauw 
(2005b).101  
The IES/LFS 2000 was also used as a source of information for the formation of the labour 
groups. As noted earlier, the link between household and factor groups in the SAM is 
important in the context of this study, as this forms the prime source of information about 
how additional income earned by factors of production are likely to be distributed across 
household groups. Income from labour is furthermore an important income source for many 
household groups. For this reason it is almost equally important to carefully consider the 
disaggregation of the factor account, although this is an area that is often neglected. The 
PROVIDE SAM includes capital, land and labour as the three main types of factors of 
production. Labour factors are further disaggregated, first by province and race. The resulting 
sub-groups are then disaggregated along skills and/or occupation groups, which provides an 
important link with the education attribute in the corresponding household groups. As with 
the household groups, the number of observations often determined the level of 
disaggregation. Where observation numbers within sub-groups were deemed insufficient, 
skills groups were formed (high-skilled, skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled) by grouping 
occupation types with similar skills profiles. A total of 88 labour groups are included in the 
SAM.  
A detailed description of these labour groups and various summary statistics (mean wages 
and distributional statistics) are included in Pauw (2005b). Given the inconsistency between 
macro-data used in the construction of the macro-SAM (including data on value-added in the 
National Accounts) and the micro-data used to populate the macro-SAM, it is necessary to 
either free up wages or employment levels in order to allow the SAM to be balanced. The 
choice here was to preserve employment numbers, but this came at the expense of freeing up 
wages (PROVIDE, 2006). The average wages in the SAM therefore differ – sometimes 
substantially – from those in the survey data. No attempt was made to reconcile the survey 
                                                 
101
  In earlier research Pauw (2003) considers the use of cluster analysis to identify ‘true groups’ among 
households using a completely numerical technique rather than . Cluster analysis attempts to solve the 
problem of devising a classification scheme for grouping the objects (households) into any number of 
classes given the characteristic variables of the households (Everitt, 1974). It is based on the notion of 
multivariate ‘distances’ between two single observations or samples of observations. The distance 
measures used are therefore used as measures of similarity or dissimilarity between observations. When 
forming representative household groups the aim is to group households that are likely to be affected 
similarly by policy shocks. One option, therefore, is to form any number of cluster groups based on 
households’ income shares from various sources and expenditure profiles. From the work by Pauw 
(2003) it can be concluded that clustering techniques are potentially useful for describing data and 
finding true or natural household groups, but the randomness of the iterative clustering process makes 
replication difficult. Household groups formed in this manner are also not easily recognisable for policy 
purposes, nor are they based on comparatively stable characteristics that are reliable and easily measured 
(see Decaluwé et al., 1999). Hence, from a practical point of view, cluster analysis may not be a 
preferable method of forming household groups.  
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data as this would influence poverty results (also see section 1.2 in this Appendix). As argued 
in Chapter 4, this is also not necessary when the link between the macro and micro models 
uses percentage changes as opposed to absolute changes in wages or prices.  
In summary, it is clear that the PROVIDE SAM used here contains very rich detail about 
factors and households, and importantly, the interplay between these two sets of accounts as 
represented in the functional distribution matrix. Of course, no disaggregation structure is 
perfect, as you will inevitably still have households or factors that are dissimilar but grouped 
together, mainly due to data constraints.  
3.3. CGE Model Calibration: Setting Sectoral Elasticities of Substitution 
The simulations in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 are set up to produce results for a range of 
‘national weighted wage elasticities’ ranging from (in absolute terms) η = 0.3 (highly 
inelastic employment response) to η = 2 (highly elastic employment response). An elasticity 
of η = 0.7 is considered the benchmark elasticity. In the CGE model used here factor 
substitution is governed by a CES function specified separately for each activity; hence 
calibration requires that an elasticity of substitution value is set for each activity separately. 
Since wage elasticities vary across sectors it is not appropriate to simply set all sectoral wage 
elasticity at the same level as is often done in CGE modelling.  
Plausible sectoral wage elasticity values are estimated for this study through experimentation. 
The wage increase calculated for low-skilled workers in the minimum wage simulations is 
used as a departure point. As shown in Table 5.3, the national average low-skilled wage 
shock emanating from the minimum wage is 6.5 per cent. Given low-skilled employment of 
8.65 million in the base, employment losses will total 382 100 if the national weighted 
average elasticity were η = 0.7 (assuming a simple partial equilibrium framework where
 
%∆L = ηL%∆w; see Table 5.7). The next step is to estimate sectoral wage elasticities using a 
simple solver model that would yield an aggregate employment loss of 382 100 given the 
sectoral wage changes shown in Table 5.3. Plausible boundaries are first set for these 
elasticities, i.e. a relatively low elasticity value is assumed for mining, agriculture and 
domestic services (η = 0.2 to η = 0.4), all manufacturing sectors are assumed to have the 
same moderate elasticity (η = 0.5 to η = 0.8), while services sectors have a slightly higher 
elasticity value (η = 0.6 to η = 0.9). These boundaries are considered plausible based on the 
literature survey done in Chapter 3. A simple solver model and several rounds of 
experimentation then yielded partial or own-price wage elasticity values for each sector that 
are consistent with a national weighted elasticity of η = 0.7 (see shaded column in Appendix 
Table 5 below). By adjusting sectoral elasticities up or down pro rata, elasticities are also 
obtained that are consistent with national weighted elasticities of η = 0.3, η = 0.5, η = 1 and 
η = 2. 
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It may appear strange that the national average elasticity is higher than any of the individual 
sectoral elasticities. This relates of course to the ‘aggregation issue’ in wage elasticity 
estimation (see equation [3.5] in Chapter 3), and also to the fact that the ‘weighted average’ 
here corresponds precisely to the expected wage increases as per the minimum wage 
scenario. A different approach may yield different elasticities. For example, if all low-skilled 
wages across all sectors increased by the same percentage, the implicit national weighted 
average elasticity in the benchmark simulation would be only η = 0.5 (see last row in 
Appendix Table 5). Incidentally, a different set of sectoral elasticities, such as those used in 
the National Treasury model (see Go et al., 2009), would yield a similar employment effect to 
our model if wages increased by the same percentage across the board, but for the minimum 
wage simulation their results would suggest a greater employment loss (the implicit elasticity 
would then be η = 0.90; see column labelled (2) in Appendix Table 5).    
The elasticities shown in column (1) in Appendix Table 5 are partial or own-price elasticities 
that can be used in a partial equilibrium labour market model. In particular, in this study, 
these elasticity values are used to generate the direct employment loss associated with 
minimum wages in the partial equilibrium model (see Table 5.7). The CGE model, however, 
requires that these partial wage elasticities are converted to elasticities of substitution. This is 
easily done by applying equation [3.2]. In order to do this conversion, each factor’s share in 
total value added is required (τ), a parameter that can be calculated directly from the SAM 
(see column (3)).102 Column (4) shows the elasticity of substitution values that are equivalent 
to the partial elasticities in the benchmark simulation. The elasticities of substitution 
associated with the remainder of the simulations are all calculated in the same way. For 
comparative purposes we also show the elasticities of substitution in the National Treasury 
model.103 
The same elasticity values are maintained for the wage subsidy simulations. Of course, as 
explained above, since these simulations are based on a different set of wage changes than the 
minimum wage simulations, the implicit national average elasticity will no longer be η = 0.3, 
η = 0.5, and so on. For example, in reality in the simulation labelled η = 0.7 the partial 
equilibrium employment effect of the wage subsidy programme will actually yield an implicit 
elasticity value of η = 0.51 given an effective wage subsidy of 12.5 per cent for low-skilled 
workers and employment gains of about 500 000 (see Table 6.1 and Table 6.6). However, in 
order to avoid confusion, the ‘simulation names’ as they were used in the minimum wage 
scenarios are maintained.  
                                                 
102
  The value added function assumes the same elasticity of substitution between each pair of factors of 
production. This means that it is unnecessary to calculate a separate value for τ for each factor of 
production, and hence the average share across all factors is used in the conversion here.  
103
  A simple average elasticity value is shown in the table in instances where the National Treasury model 
reports elasticities at a more disaggregated sectoral level than our model.  
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Appendix Table 5: Sectoral Factor Substitution Elasticities for Value Added Production Function 
  
Sectoral elasticities (ηL) (*) 
(1) 
  
η = 0.3 η = 0.5 η = 0.7 η = 1.0 η = 2.0 
Implied sectoral 
elasticities in 
National 
Treasury model  
(ηL)  
(2) 
Average factor 
share of value 
added (τ) 
(3) 
Equivalent 
benchmark 
EOS value 
(σQVA) (**) 
(4) 
Equivalent EOS 
value in 
National 
Treasury model 
(σQVA) (***) 
(5) 
Agriculture               0.15                0.24                0.34                0.49                0.97                0.57                0.07                0.36                0.58  
Forestry               0.15                0.24                0.34                0.49                0.97                0.57                0.03                0.35                0.58  
Fishing               0.15                0.24                0.34                0.49                0.97                0.57                0.09                0.37                0.58  
Minerals and mining               0.09                0.14                0.20                0.29                0.57                0.19                0.06                0.21                0.19  
Food products               0.21                0.36                0.50                0.71                1.43                0.57                0.09                0.55                0.58  
Beverages and tobacco               0.21                0.36                0.50                0.71                1.43                0.38                0.05                0.53                0.38  
Textiles               0.21                0.36                0.50                0.71                1.43                0.29                0.14                0.58                0.29  
Leather Wood and Paper               0.21                0.36                0.50                0.71                1.43                0.43                0.10                0.55                0.43  
Petroleum               0.21                0.36                0.50                0.71                1.43                0.42                0.04                0.52                0.42  
Fertilisers and pesticides               0.21                0.36                0.50                0.71                1.43                0.58                0.03                0.52                0.58  
Pharmaceuticals and other chemicals               0.21                0.36                0.50                0.71                1.43                0.47                0.06                0.53                0.47  
Non metallics               0.21                0.36                0.50                0.71                1.43                0.58                0.09                0.55                0.59  
Metals               0.21                0.36                0.50                0.71                1.43                0.41                0.07                0.55                0.41  
Machinery equipment and other               0.21                0.36                0.50                0.71                1.43                0.41                0.07                0.54                0.41  
Electricity and water               0.26                0.43                0.60                0.86                1.71                0.57                0.05                0.63                0.58  
Construction and Building               0.26                0.43                0.60                0.86                1.71                0.57                0.12                0.68                0.58  
Trade services               0.26                0.43                0.60                0.86                1.71                0.57                0.09                0.66                0.58  
Accommodation               0.26                0.43                0.60                0.86                1.71                0.57                0.12                0.68                0.58  
Transport and communication               0.26                0.43                0.60                0.86                1.71                0.57                0.07                0.65                0.58  
Financial and business services               0.26                0.43                0.60                0.86                1.71                0.57                0.07                0.65                0.58  
Government, social and other services               0.26                0.43                0.60                0.86                1.71                0.57                0.14                0.70                0.58  
Domestic services               0.15                0.24                0.34                0.48                0.97                0.57                0.17                0.41                0.58  
National average equivalent elasticity in 
minimum wage shock η = 0.30 η = 0.50 η = 0.70 η = 1.00 η = 2.00 η = 0.90     
National average equivalent assuming same 
relative increase in wages in all sectors η = 0.21 η = 0.36 η = 0.50 η = 0.71 η = 1.42 η = 0.50       
Notes: (*) As used in a partial equilibrium labour market model. (**) As used in the CGE model in this study. (***) See Go et al. (2009) 
Source:  Author’s own calculations. 
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4. Additional Data, Model Results and Explanations 
4.1. Minimum Wage Scenarios 
Appendix Figure 2: Minimum Wages: Predicted Changes in Wage Distributions  
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Note: The wage distributions are for covered workers only and assumes no job loss, i.e. all sub-minimum 
wage workers simply move up to the minimum wage level without any risk of losing their income.   
Source:  IES/LFS 2000 and author’s own calculations 
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Appendix Table 6: Baseline Poverty Estimates (Per Capita Income) 
P0 P1 P2 
95% conf. int. 95% conf. int. 95% conf. int. 
Annual 
poverty line Estimate 
Lwr. Upp. 
Estimate 
Lwr. Upp. 
Estimate 
Lwr. Upp. 
R 1,000 0.095 0.089 0.101 0.028 0.026 0.031 0.013 0.011 0.014 
R 1,250 0.147 0.139 0.154 0.047 0.044 0.050 0.022 0.020 0.023 
R 1,500 0.200 0.191 0.208 0.068 0.064 0.071 0.033 0.030 0.035 
R 1,750 0.249 0.240 0.258 0.090 0.086 0.094 0.045 0.042 0.047 
R 2,000 0.291 0.281 0.300 0.113 0.108 0.117 0.058 0.055 0.061 
R 2,250 0.330 0.320 0.340 0.135 0.130 0.140 0.072 0.069 0.075 
R 2,500 0.367 0.357 0.377 0.156 0.151 0.161 0.086 0.082 0.090 
R 2,750 0.403 0.392 0.413 0.177 0.171 0.182 0.100 0.096 0.104 
R 3,000 0.432 0.421 0.442 0.197 0.191 0.203 0.114 0.110 0.118 
R 3,250 0.461 0.451 0.472 0.216 0.210 0.222 0.128 0.123 0.132 
R 3,500 0.485 0.474 0.496 0.234 0.228 0.241 0.141 0.136 0.146 
R 3,750 0.506 0.495 0.517 0.252 0.245 0.258 0.154 0.149 0.159 
R 4,000 0.527 0.516 0.538 0.268 0.262 0.275 0.167 0.162 0.172 
Source:  IES/LFS 2000 and author’s own calculations 
 
Appendix Table 7: Employment Results: Short Run Scenario With Labour Productivity Gains 
  
η = 0.7 
25% lab. 
prod.      
 (η = 0.7) 
50% lab. 
prod.      
 (η = 0.7) 
75% lab. 
prod.      
 (η = 0.7) 
100% lab. 
prod.      
(η = 0.7) 
125% lab. 
prod.      
 (η = 0.7) 
Low-skilled employment         
Agriculture -46,902  -42,319  -38,942  -36,264  -34,047  -32,158  
Forestry -1,223  -1,029  -866  -725  -601  -488  
Retail and wholesale trade -54,842  -45,270  -37,218  -30,169  -23,860  -18,130  
Accommodation -19,597  -15,125  -11,301  -7,909  -4,843  -2,036  
Transport and communication -4,254  -2,723  -1,457  -361  611  1,489  
Financial and business services -5,419  -2,985  -1,010  676  2,157  3,484  
Government, social and other services -13,031  -4,697  2,073  7,860  12,950  17,514  
Domestic services -291,328  -279,036  -269,036  -260,476  -252,938  -246,174  
Other Sectors -12,395  -3,371  3,940  10,169  15,626  20,497  
Net change -448,991  -396,555  -353,818  -317,199  -284,943  -256,002  
Percentage change in overall low-skilled 
employment -5.2% -4.6% -4.1% -3.7% -3.3% -3.0% 
Change relative to benchmark   -11.7% -21.2% -29.4% -36.5% -43.0% 
Skilled employment         
Agriculture -1,202  -1,147  -1,114  -1,093  -1,078  -1,069  
Forestry -16  -16  -17  -17  -17  -18  
Retail and wholesale trade -6,337  -6,236  -6,111  -5,978  -5,846  -5,715  
Accommodation -3,050  -2,458  -1,946  -1,489  -1,073  -692  
Transport and communication 674  404  188  8  -149  -288  
Financial and business services 1,434  1,485  1,503  1,503  1,494  1,479  
Government, social and other services 5,718  5,685  5,621  5,545  5,466  5,387  
Domestic services -161  -156  -152  -148  -145  -142  
Other Sectors 2,940  2,441  2,028  1,669  1,349  1,059  
Net change 0  -0  -0  -0  0  0  
Source:  CGE/micro-model results 
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Appendix Table 8: Activity Output (Production Effects) 
  Short run Long run 
No labour productivity gains η = 0.3 η = 0.5 η = 0.7 η = 1.0 η = 2.0 η = 0.3 η = 0.5 η = 0.7 η = 1.0 η = 2.0 
Agriculture -0.0% -0.3% -0.5% -0.8% -1.5% -1.4% -1.7% -1.9% -2.1% -2.6% 
Forestry 0.1% -0.0% -0.1% -0.3% -0.8% -0.4% -0.5% -0.6% -0.7% -1.1% 
Retail and wholesale trade 0.0% -0.1% -0.3% -0.5% -1.0% -0.4% -0.5% -0.6% -0.7% -1.2% 
Accommodation -1.3% -2.0% -2.6% -3.3% -5.2% -7.6% -7.9% -8.2% -8.4% -9.1% 
Transport and communication 0.1% 0.0% -0.0% -0.1% -0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.1% -0.4% 
Financial and business services -0.3% -0.4% -0.5% -0.6% -1.1% -0.1% -0.2% -0.3% -0.5% -1.1% 
Government, social and other services -0.1% -0.2% -0.3% -0.4% -0.9% 0.0% -0.1% -0.2% -0.3% -0.9% 
Domestic services -23.9% -24.0% -24.1% -24.2% -24.5% -24.4% -24.4% -24.4% -24.5% -24.8% 
Other Sectors -0.1% -0.2% -0.3% -0.4% -0.9% -0.0% -0.1% -0.2% -0.3% -0.8% 
Net change -0.2% -0.4% -0.5% -0.6% -1.1% -0.3% -0.4% -0.5% -0.7% -1.2% 
With labour productivity gains 
25% lab. 
prod.      (η = 
0.7) 
50% lab. 
prod.      (η = 
0.7) 
75% lab. 
prod.      (η = 
0.7) 
100% lab. 
prod.      (η = 
0.7) 
125% lab. 
prod.      (η = 
0.7) 
25% lab. 
prod.      (η = 
0.7) 
50% lab. 
prod.      (η = 
0.7) 
75% lab. 
prod.      (η = 
0.7) 
100% lab. 
prod.      (η = 
0.7) 
125% lab. 
prod.      (η = 
0.7) 
Agriculture 0.6% 1.4% 2.0% 2.6% 3.1% -0.9% -0.0% 0.7% 1.2% 1.7% 
Forestry 0.3% 0.8% 1.2% 1.5% 1.9% -0.1% 0.4% 0.8% 1.2% 1.5% 
Retail and wholesale trade 0.2% 0.7% 1.1% 1.5% 1.9% -0.1% 0.4% 0.9% 1.3% 1.7% 
Accommodation -0.4% 1.4% 3.0% 4.5% 5.9% -5.2% -2.6% -0.2% 2.0% 4.2% 
Transport and communication 0.3% 0.6% 0.8% 1.1% 1.3% 0.5% 0.8% 1.1% 1.3% 1.5% 
Financial and business services -0.0% 0.4% 0.7% 1.0% 1.3% 0.1% 0.5% 0.9% 1.2% 1.5% 
Government, social and other services 0.1% 0.5% 0.8% 1.1% 1.4% 0.2% 0.6% 0.9% 1.2% 1.4% 
Domestic services -17.3% -11.3% -5.7% -0.5% 4.4% -17.7% -11.7% -6.1% -0.9% 4.0% 
Other Sectors 0.2% 0.6% 0.9% 1.3% 1.6% 0.2% 0.6% 1.0% 1.3% 1.6% 
Net change 0.0% 0.5% 0.9% 1.3% 1.6% 0.0% 0.5% 0.9% 1.3% 1.6% 
Source:  CGE/micro-model results 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Appendix 
257 
 
4.2. Wage Subsidy Scenarios 
4.2.1. South Africa’s Learnership Experience 
The South African learnership system could be considered a direct outcome of earlier 
proposals related to the subsidisation of employment (as discussed in Chapter 6). 
Learnerships can be classified as training-linked wage subsidies where subsidised 
employment is linked to both temporary employment and the provision of structured learning 
by the employer. In many respects learnerships are similar to apprenticeships; in fact, in some 
countries they are referred to as ‘modern apprenticeships’. However, whereas standard 
apprenticeships focus on training and skills acquisition only, learnerships have a broader 
focus, aiming to also provide academically accredited learning. The intention is to strengthen 
the link between structured learning and workplace experience, thus ultimately providing a 
learner with a nationally recognised qualification (Smith et al., 2005).  
Learnerships officially became part of South Africa’s National Skills Development Strategy 
(NSDS) when the Tax Act (No. 58 of 1962) was amended in 2002 to allow for “deductions in 
respect of learnership agreements”. This provision allowed firms to deduct a certain (fixed) 
part of the cost of offering formally registered learnerships from company taxes, the idea 
being that this would act as an incentive for firms to increase their intake of learners and 
ultimately increase employment levels. The learning component has to be offered by an 
accredited training provider (this may be the employer itself, subject to accreditation) while 
the qualifications obtained upon completion have to be nationally recognised.104 Learnerships 
are primarily targeted at entry-level occupations and hence also implicitly at young labour 
market entrants, particularly school-leavers. In principle, though, the subsidy applies to any 
type of occupation or skill level for which a learnership is registered.  
Pauw et al. (2006) investigated the role and impact of learnerships in promoting the 
absorption of the youth and graduates105 into employment. The study finds that firms that 
participate in the learnership programme are generally very positive and enthusiastic about 
                                                 
104
  In South Africa learnerships are developed and registered by the various Sectoral Education and Training 
Authorities (SETAs) established in terms of the National Skills Development Act of 1998. All 
learnerhsips are graded in terms of the South African Qualifications Authority’s (SAQA) National 
Qualifications Framework (NQF).  
105
  Graduates in this instance were broadly defined as students with post-matric qualifications obtained from 
tertiary institutions, including universities, colleges and universities of technology. Their findings are 
based on around 20 interviews conducted with human resources practitioners in large corporations in 
South Africa, including several financial institutions (banking, accounting and insurance), construction 
firms, mining companies, wholesalers and retailers, and other manufacturing corporations. They warn 
that these findings may be ‘large firm-specific’, although, as discussed further below, uptake of 
learnerships mainly took place in these large firms and not so much in smaller firms excluded in the 
study.  
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the idea of the programme, but less positive about several aspects around administration, 
implementation and the effectiveness of the policy in promoting ‘above-equilibrium 
employment’. Pauw et al.’s (2006) main findings relating to learnership programmes are 
summarised here.106  
The first major concern of firms relates to the high administrative costs associated with 
learnerships. The administrative processes involved in setting up learnership programmes are 
complex, costly and time-consuming. The processes are also highly bureaucratic; for 
example, learnership programmes have to be developed along a very restrictive set of 
guidelines, programmes have to be registered and programme content has to be accredited in 
terms of unit standards. A common sentiment was that the SETAs that are meant to facilitate 
the processes are incompetent, while poor management and high staff turnover rates within 
the SETAs are slowing down the process of applying for accreditation.  
The high costs have several implications. Some firms indicated that the red tape involved in 
setting up and registering learnerships is too cumbersome to make it a worthwhile exercise. 
Large corporations that can afford to employ dedicated persons to manage learnership 
programmes and maintain contact with the SETAs are more likely to participate. They also 
benefit from economies of scale, which reduces the fixed cost per learner. For smaller firms 
that may only wish to enroll a small number of learners, on the other hand, the start-up costs 
of learnership programmes are very often prohibitive. The administrative burden further acts 
as a major barrier to expansion of existing programmes. Most firms indicated that although 
they make use of the learnership system, they tend to link the learnership system to their 
recruitment and employment strategies with the intention of employing learners upon 
completion of the training. They therefore only employ learners that they would have 
employed in any event.  
The above point brings us to a second major conclusion of the Pauw et al. (2006) study, 
namely the issue of whether the learnership programme is effective in reducing 
unemployment through the generation of above-equilibrium employment. In this regard it 
is worthwhile pointing out that firms may either enroll their existing workers in learnership 
programmes or they can recruit unemployed persons from outside the firm. In an attempt to 
promote the absorption of people from outside firms, learnership subsidy amounts are more 
generous for these ‘unemployed learners’. It is also therefore not surprising that unemployed 
learners make up the majority (about two-thirds) of registered learners (Smith et al., 2005). In 
fact, official figures show that the intake of learners exceeded initial targets: by March 2005 
                                                 
106
  The main findings of the research was also published as a journal article (see Pauw et al., 2008b), but the 
earlier working paper version referenced here contains more of the information on learnerships relevant 
to this study. 
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almost 110 000 learners were enrolled in programmes nationwide, well above the target of 
80 000. However, when considering that only about 73 000 of these learners were recruited 
from outside the firm, it is clear that firms still tend to use the scheme as vehicle for 
providing training for their incumbent workers. Pauw et al. (2006) further find that even the 
intake of unemployed learners, i.e. external jobseekers, largely represent people who would 
have been hired by the firm anyway. When viewed within the context of a generally 
expanding labour market between 2002 and 2006, the employment-generating effects of the 
scheme no longer look so positive.  
A third concern relates to the incentive structures of the learnership scheme. Learnerships 
are certainly perceived as being important in standardising and promoting learning in the 
workplace. However, many firms feel that the learning component or the accredited academic 
qualification attached to learnerships is not always appropriate from the firm’s point of view, 
particularly those that operate in manufacturing, construction or mining-type environments. 
In this regard the decline of the apprenticeship system that focused more on practical work 
experience or vocational training in specific competency areas is lamented. Officially the 
apprenticeship system is still in place, but since BEE points107 are only available to firms 
offering learnerships, there is an incentive to convert apprenticeship programmes to 
learnerships, even if the latter are less appropriate. Firms surveyed in the Pauw et al. (2006) 
study admitted that participation in the scheme was motivated to a large extent by the BEE 
charter, clearly suggesting that incentive structures are perverse. Others suggested that they 
saw participation as a corporate social responsibility rather than a business necessity. The 
consensus was that the actual subsidy that is on offer for participation plays only a small part 
in the decision whether to participate or not.  
The evidence that firms typically only enrol learners that they would have employed in any 
event, coupled with the evidence above that the actual grants received in respect of learners 
are not the main incentive for participation in the learnership scheme, suggests that the ‘wage 
subsidy’ earned by firms could be seen as a windfall gain. The fact that one-third of 
registered learners are already employed at the time of registration further attests to this. The 
alternative view, however, and one that was pointed out by many respondents in the Pauw et 
al. (2006) study, is that the cost of compliance actually far exceeds the grant value. In theory, 
                                                 
107
  The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) developed a (Broad-Based) Black Economic Empowerment 
(BEE) scorecard system, which South African firms use in order to demonstrate their commitment to 
transformation in ensuring that black people participate in the mainstream economy and enjoy the 
benefits thereof. BEE codes have been developed around three main strands, namely empowerment 
(ownership and management of firms), human resources development (employment equity and skills 
development) and indirect empowerment preferential procurement, enterprise development and socio-
economic development). Up to 15 per cent of a firm’s BEE score is made up by skills development in the 
form of learnerships and learning programmes offered (see www.dti.gov.za), and hence participation in 
learnership programmes becomes an imperative, especially for large corporations who are in the public 
eye.  
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the subsidy is meant to compensate employers for the lower productivity of learners relative 
to other workers (this is linked to the opportunity cost when the worker is away on training), 
the cost of learning materials and the costs associated with management time invested in 
implementing the programme and mentoring learners. In reality, however, only a portion of 
the actual wage is covered, and although these subsidies may seem generous108 firms claim 
that the excessive administration costs that they have to incur are to blame for their failure to 
expand their intake.  
While the implications of these findings for a pure wage subsidy scheme may seem dire, the 
overwhelming perception is that the disheartening aspect of the learnership system is not the 
fact that the employment subsidy component is necessarily ineffective, but rather that the 
administrative requirements around the learning component of the programme is the major 
stumbling block. Many firms indicated a willingness to expand enrolment of learners if the 
subsidy amount was truly sufficient to cover the administrative costs. Alternatively, they felt 
that participation may improve if the administrative burden was reduced. This suggests that a 
carefully designed pure wage subsidy programme may well be more effective at generating 
above-equilibrium employment than the learnership programme has been thus far. 
4.2.2. Wage Subsidy Modelling Results 
Appendix Table 9: Wage Subsidy Scheme Effectiveness: Cost per Job Created 
    η = 0.3 η = 0.5 η = 0.7 η = 1.0 η = 2.0 
Tax capital stock R 41,460 R 26,316 R 19,652 R 14,595 R 8,618 
Sh
o
rt
 
ru
n
 
Tax personal income R 43,063 R 27,128 R 20,188 R 14,948 R 8,767 
Tax capital stock R 33,638 R 24,115 R 19,065 R 14,753 R 8,930 
Lo
n
g 
ru
n
 
Tax personal income R 31,977 R 23,030 R 18,246 R 14,149 R 8,591 
Source:  CGE/micro model results 
                                                 
108
  Upon registration 100 per cent of an unemployed learner’s annual wage can be claimed (up to a 
maximum of R30 000) and 70 per cent of an employed learner’s annual wage (up to a maximum of 
R20 000). Upon completion (i.e. a qualification is obtained) 100 per cent of the annual wage (capped at 
R30 000) can be claimed for all learners. Typically learnerships run for between 2 and 3 years; this 
means that between 50 and 100 per cent of the wage is subsidised if prescribed learner allowances are 
paid.In terms of the sectoral determination governing minimum wages/allowance for learners (see 
www.labour.gov.za), a minimum annual allowance of between R6 240 and R36 400 has to be paid to 
learners, depending on the qualification level targeted by the learnership agreement. 
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Appendix Figure 3: Annual Average Sector-Specific Wages of Targeted Workers 
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Note: The horizontal line represents the national average annual wage of targeted workers across all sectors 
(approximately R18 000).  
Source:  South African PROVIDE SAM (2000) and author’s own calculations. 
Appendix Table 10: Baseline FGT Poverty Estimates and Confidence Intervals (Disposable 
Per Capita Income) 
P0 P1 P2 
95% conf. int. 95% conf. int. 95% conf. int. 
Annual 
poverty 
line Estimate Lwr. Upp. 
Estimate 
Lwr. Upp. 
Estimate 
Lwr. Upp. 
R 1,000 0.095 0.089 0.101 0.028 0.026 0.031 0.013 0.011 0.014 
R 1,250 0.147 0.139 0.154 0.047 0.044 0.050 0.022 0.020 0.023 
R 1,500 0.200 0.191 0.208 0.068 0.064 0.071 0.033 0.030 0.035 
R 1,750 0.249 0.240 0.258 0.090 0.086 0.094 0.045 0.042 0.047 
R 2,000 0.291 0.281 0.300 0.113 0.108 0.117 0.058 0.055 0.061 
R 2,250 0.330 0.320 0.340 0.135 0.130 0.140 0.072 0.069 0.075 
R 2,500 0.367 0.357 0.377 0.156 0.151 0.161 0.086 0.082 0.090 
R 2,750 0.403 0.392 0.413 0.177 0.171 0.182 0.100 0.096 0.104 
R 3,000 0.432 0.421 0.442 0.197 0.191 0.203 0.114 0.110 0.118 
R 3,250 0.461 0.451 0.472 0.216 0.210 0.222 0.128 0.123 0.132 
R 3,500 0.485 0.474 0.496 0.234 0.228 0.241 0.141 0.136 0.146 
R 3,750 0.506 0.495 0.517 0.252 0.245 0.258 0.154 0.149 0.159 
R 4,000 0.527 0.516 0.538 0.268 0.262 0.275 0.167 0.162 0.172 
Source:  IES/LFS 2000 and author’s own calculations 
4.2.3. National Treasury Wage Subsidy Study: Comparing Methods and Results 
Go et al. (2009) argue that the structural feature of the South African labour market is 
manifested in the complementarity (or lack of substitution) between skilled and low-skilled 
workers. The production structure in the CGE model employed by Go et al. (2009) uses a 
translog function as opposed to the more common CES function used in this study. In their 
simulations Go et al. (2009) then consider the impact of wage subsidies for different 
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reference elasticities (low, medium and high) in much the same way we consider outcomes 
under various weighted average elasticity levels. The important difference, though, is that the 
relative substitutability between low-skilled and skilled workers in their model is lower than 
that of other factors of production. This contributes to the fact that their simulations yield 
lower employment effects than those generated in this study, controlling for targeting and the 
actual wage shock implemented. Of course, for a proper comparison it would be necessary to 
review in detail how consumer demand in their model responds to changes in prices and 
household incomes and compare that to the chosen elasticities for our model. As in this study, 
Go et al. (2009) did not consider the sensitivity of results to different price and income 
elasticities.  
As far as the wage subsidy scenario modelled in Go et al. (2009) is concerned, they model a 
10 per cent constant wage subsidy payable for all low- and medium-skilled formal sector 
workers. They exclude the mining, petroleum and government sectors. Although their report 
is not explicit about this, it appears as if the targeting mechanism assumed yields a slightly 
smaller target group than that in our model.  
Further important differences include the following: firstly, our CGE model does not 
distinguish between formal and informal sector workers. Go et al.’s (2009) estimates suggest 
that up to one-quarter of workers in South Africa are in fact employed in the informal sector. 
Secondly, although we exclude more sectors from the target group, our average subsidy value 
is higher at about 12.5 per cent per worker (see Table 6.1). Overall, therefore the programme 
modelled in our study is slightly larger. This partly explains why our modelling approach 
yields larger employment results (see below), but even in their high elasticity scenario their 
total programme cost is R21.9 billion (2003 prices), which is lower in real terms than our 
benchmark cost estimate of R20.8 billion (2000 prices). Given the smaller employment 
effects generated, the subsidy cost per job created is also significantly higher in the Go et al. 
(2009) study.  
The employment results generated in two studies are comparable in our low-elasticity 
(η = 0.3) and in Go et al.’s (2009) medium elasticity case (about 4 per cent increase in overall 
employment in the economy). In our benchmark simulation employment growth exceeds one 
million jobs, representing a 9.5 per cent increase in total employment (see Table 6.4). It is 
therefore also not surprising that our model predicts much larger income gains for poor 
households; for example, those in the poorest decile experience a 42 per cent increase in 
income (benchmark simulation in the youth-targeted micro-simulation model, see Figure 6.3) 
compared to Go et al.’s (2009) estimate of 20 per cent. The way in which jobs are allocated to 
individuals may also explain some of the differences. We specifically target the youth 
whereas Go et al. (2009) include a variable called ‘previous sector of employment’ in their 
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employment probability model, which is likely to exclude many young labour market 
entrants who have never worked before. 
Ultimately, Go et al. (2009) derive a similar conclusion to that in this study, namely that the 
assumption around elasticities of substitution or complementarities between different groups 
of factors are important in determining the overall employment and poverty effects. Their 
study concentrates on issues around skills shortages and how complementary policies (such 
as a relaxation of immigration controls on skilled workers) may enhance the impact of a wage 
subsidy given these complementarities. In fact, one of their main findings is that labour 
market flexibility is the critical issue here. Areas for future research highlighted in their 
conclusions include imperfect competition and how high mark-ups and concentration ratios 
in the economy are affecting labour market outcomes, as well as dynamic effects of schooling 
and training. Our study, in turn, focused more on financing issues and the sensitivity of 
results to different ways of modelling the micro-level poverty and distributional effects. 
 
